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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation contains an evaluation of the interaction between law and sport 
in South Africa. The evaluation includes description of the main areas where laws 
(in the form of the common law, legislation and the relevant provisions of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996) apply to sport, in the contexts 
of both amateur sport and the fast-developing professional sports industry. Apart 
from such descriptive content, the dissertation will also critically evaluate the 
appropriateness of the relevant laws and their application in the often atypical 
context of sport, as well as the courts' treatment of the relevant legal issues. In 
the process of providing such critical evaluation, and where relevant, the author 
includes a comparative analysis of the treatment of relevant legal issues in other 
jurisdictions (most notably the United Kingdom and European Union, which are 
especially relevant in light of the application of the 'European model' of sports 
governance and regulation, which applies to the major sporting codes in South 
Africa) . 
. In particular, the author critically evaluates the following aspects of the South 
African jurisdiction's treatment of the application of law to sport: 
- The South African system of public regulation of sport by the State 
(and, specifically, the issue of the race-based transformation of sport, 
which involves an apparent government-driven agenda and is unique to 
the South African jurisdiction); 
- The courts' treatment to date of the susceptibility of the conduct of 
sports governing bodies to judicial scrutiny (and of the nature of such 
bodies as voluntary associations); 
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- Various aspects related to the application of employment laws to the 
employment of professional athletes in team sports; 
- The application of common law remedies for breach of contract in the 
professional sports employment context; 
- The potential application of the restraint of trade doctrine (in, as the 
author suggests, an extended_ form) in the context of the freedom of 
movement of professional athletes; 
The apparently unsatisfactory state of current South African law in 
respect of legal protection against commercial misappropriation of 
aspects of the persona of famous athletes (i.e. in the context of 'image' 
-or-,'publicity' rights as recognized in certain other jurisdictions); and 
- An evaluation of the extensive protection (especially in the form of 
specific legislation in South Africa) against ambush marketing of major 
sporting events . 
.-
The author includes some concluding observations regarding the state of 
South African sports law as compared to other jurisdictions, as well as 
some comment on expectations for the future development and potential 
importance of the South African domestic jurisdiction in the application of 
law to sport. 
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OPSOMMING 
Hierdie tesis bevat 'n kritiese blik op die toepassing van die Reg op sport in Suid-
Afrika. Hierdie ondersoek s/uit in beskrywing van die vernaamste areas waar die 
Reg (in die vorm van die gemenereg, spesifieke wetgewing en die relevante 
bepalings van die Grondwet van die Repub/iek van Suid-Afrika, 1996) toepassing 
vind, in die konteks van beide amateursport sowel as die snel-ontwikke/ende 
professionele sportbedryf. Benewens sodanige beskrywing bevat die tesis oak 'n 
kritiese ontleding van die gepastheid van die relevante regsbepalings en van hut 
toepassing tot die dikwels atipiese konteks van sport, sowel as die howe se 
benadering tot die betrokke regsaspekte. In die loop van sodanige kritiese 
ontleding, en waar relevant, verskaf die:skrywer 'n regsvergelykende blik op die 
benadering tot sodanige regskwessies in ander jurisdiksies (meestal die 
Verenigde Koningkryk en die Europese Unie, welke stelse/s vera/ relevant is in 
die fig van die toepassing van die 'Europese model' van spottregulering en -
bestuur in die vernaamste sportkodes in Suid-Afrika). 
In die besonder onderneem die skrywer 'n kritiese ontleding van die volgende 
aspekte van die Suid-Afrikaanse jurisdiksie se benadering tot toepassing van die 
Reg tot sport: 
Die Suid-Afrikaanse stelsel van staatsregulering van sport (en, meer 
spesifiek, die "kwessie van rasgebaseerde transformasie van sport, wat 
klaarblyklik 'n regerings-gedrewe agenda vertweenwoordig en oak 
uniek is tot die Suid-Afrikaanse jurisdiksie); 
Die howe se klaarblyklike benadering tot die vatbaarheid van die 
optrede van sportbeheerliggame vir geregtelike hersiening (en 
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aangaande die aard van sodanige organisasies as vrywillige 
assosiasies); 
·verskeie aspekte van die toepassing van arbeidsreg op die 
professionele sportpersoon in spansporte; 
Die toepassing van gemeenregtelike remedies vir kontrakbreuk in die 
konteks van die diensverhouding in professionele spansporte; 
Die potensie/e toepassing van die leerstuk van handelsbeperkinge (in, 
soos die skrywer voorstel, 'n uitgebreide gedaante) in die konteks van 
die handelsvryheid van professionele sportpersone; 
Die klaarb/yk/ik onbevredigende aard van die huidige Suid-Afrikaanse 
Reg ten opsigte van beskerming teen ongemagtigde kommersiele 
uitbuiting van aspekte van die persona van bekende 
sportpersoonlikhede ( d. w.s. in die konteks van publisiteitsregte soos 
erken in sekere ander jurisdiksies); en 
'n Ontleding van die omvattende beskerming (veral in die vorm van 
spesifieke wetgewing in Suid-Afrika) teen lokvalbemarking ten opsigte 
van groat sportbyeenkomste. 
Die skrywer sluit sekere gevolgtrekkinge in aangaande die huidige stand van 
Suid-Afrikaanse sportreg verge/eke met ander jurisdiksies, sowe/ as kommentaar 
op verwagtinge vir die toekomstige ontwikke/ing en potensie/e belang van die 
Suid-Afrikaanse jurisdiksie ten opsigte van die toepassing van die Reg op sport. 
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A Critical Evaluation of the Interaction between 
Sport and Law in South Africa 
Andre M Louw 
GENERAL BACKGROUND 
§1 Law in South Africa 
1 South Africa has a mixed or hybrid legal system, which consists of (and displays 
strong influences from) principles of Roman Dutch law, the English common law, and (to 
a lesser extent) African customary law. Law is un-codified, and common law principles 
are largely given substance through the means of statutory interpretation and a system 
of judicial precedent. 
2 The supreme law of the country is embodied in the 1996 Constitution,1 and any 
law or conduct inconsistent with its provisions is invalid. 2 This displays a marked 
departure from the system of parliamentary supremacy which characterized the South 
1 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, hereinafter referred to as 'the Constitution'. The text of 
the Constitution is available on the web site of the South African Constitutional Court, at 
http://www.constitutionalcourt.org .za/site/theconstitution/thetext.htm. The final Constitution was drafted by 
the Constitutional Assembly in accordance with Chapter 5 of the interim Constitution (Act 200 of 1993), which 
in turn was a product of the negotiations conducted by the Multi-Party Negotiation Process at the World Trade 
Centre in Johannesburg in 1993 (which prefaced South Africa's peaceful transition from the Apartheid state to a 
constitutional democracy). In what has been referred to as a 'jurisprudentially unique and comprehensive 
judgment' by the Constitutional Court of 6 September 1996, the text of the final Constitution was referred back 
to the Constitutional Assembly for reconsideration because it did not comply in every respect with the 
constitutional principles contained in Chapter 4 of the interim Constitution. The text was subsequently certified 
by the Constitutional Court on 10 December 1996 (see Certification of the Amended Text of the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa, 1996 1997 BCLR 1 (CC)). For more on the Constitution, see Devenish, GE 
'Constitutional Law' in Joubert et al The Law of South Africa 1st Reissue Vol. 5 Part 3; Woolman, S, Roux, T & 
Bishop, M (eds.) Constitutional Law of South Africa Juta Law electronic publication (CD-ROM/online) 2009. 
2 Constitution sec. 2 
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African legal landscape following the passing of the Statute of Westminster in 1931 (and 
which was such a central cog in the passing of abhorrent 'Apartheid' laws and the 
prolonged maintenance of this perverse system prior to the pre-1994 dispensation). 
While a strong component of the checks and balances that are so central to the 
. constitutional democracy is a strong and independent judiciary, a major concern in 
current political and legal discourse in South Africa at the time of writing relates to the 
role and function of the courts in respect of a number of high profile matters with political 
significance. 3 Future developments in this regard will be watched with interest. 
South Africa enjoys what is commonly considered to be one of the most progressive 
constitutions in the world, and specifically boasts a progressive and comprehensive Bill of 
Rights, which guarantees the fundamental rights of all South Africans and affirms the 
democratic values of human dignity, equality and freedom. 4 The Bill of Rights5 applies to 
all law, and is binding on the legislature, the executive, the judiciary and all organs of 
state. It is also binding on natural and juristic persons if, and to the extent that, it is 
applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and any duty imposed by the 
right. 6 
= 
3 These centre around the controversial arms deal saga regarding the process of acquisition of arms (primarily 
of new corvettes and submarines for the navy and new trainer and fighter jets for the air force) by the South 
African government in 1999 (and the related, high profile corruption trial of the president of the African 
National Congress and designated candidate for the presidency of the country following the 2009 general 
elections (held on 22 April 2009), which charges were controversially dropped by the National Prosecuting 
Authority on 6 April 2009 following representations by the accused's legal team which apparently pointed to 
undue political influence in the prosecution). The interested reader will find a succinct and factual overview of 
these developments (the effects of which are so central to the current South African political landscape and 
· have impacted significantly on the constitutional order in the post-1994 democracy and, more specifically, the 
role of the judiciary), in Holden, P The Arms Deal in ·Your Pocket Jonathan Ball Publishers, Johannesburg & Cape 
Town 2008. 
4 Constitution sec. 7(1) 
5 As contained in chapter 2 of the Constitution. For detailed discussion of the rights contained in the Bill of 
Rights and case law regarding its interpretation and application, the reader is referred to more specialised texts 
on the subject - see Currie, I & de Waal, J The Bill of Rights Handbook 5th edition Juta & Co Ltd 2005; Cheadle, 
MH; Davis, DM & Haysom, NRL South African Constitutional Law: The Bill of Rights 2nd edition LexisNexis 
Butterworths 2005; Devenish, G The South African Constitution LexisNexis Butterworths 2005. 
6 Constitution sections 8(1) and (2). Section 8 of the Bill of Rights provides as follows: 
'8(1) The Bill of Rights applies to all law, and binds the legislature, the executive, the judiciary and all organs of 
state. 
8(2) A provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or a juristic person if; and to the extent that, it is 
applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and the nature of any duty imposed by the right. 
8(3) When applying a provision of the Bill of Rights to a natural or juristic person in terms of subsection (2), a 
court -
(a) in order to give effect to a right in the Bill, must apply, or if necessary develop, the common law 
to the extent that legislation does not give effect to that right; and 
(b) may develop rules of the common law to limit the right, provided that the limitation is in 
accordance with section 36(1) [the limitation clause contained in the Bill of Rights] .. .' 
27 
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3 The fundamental rights as contained in the Bill of Rights may only be limited in 
terms of the provisions of the limitations clause contained in section 36 of the Bill of 
Rights, and any 'limitation' of a right which does not comply with the provisions of this 
section will constitute an unconstitutional and invalid infringement of the applicable right. 
Section 36, the limitations clause, provides as follows: 
'S 36(1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general 
application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society based on human digni_ty, equality and freedom, taking into account all 
relevant factors, including: 
a) the nature of the right; 
b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
c) the nature and extent of the limitation; 
d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and 
e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. 
(2) Except as provided in subsection (1) or in any other provision of the Constitution, no 
law may limit any right entrenched in the Bill of Rights.' 
Every court, tribunal or forum is enjoined to promote the spirit, purport and objects of 
the Bill of Rights when interpreting any legislation, or when developing the common law 
or customary law. 7 Courts are also obliged to consider international law, and may 
·consider foreign law when interpreting the Bill of Rights. 8 In the past decade following 
the coming into force of the Constitution in 1996, the courts have increasingly 
emphasized the need to develop different branches of the common law through the prism 
7 Section 39(2) of the Bill of Rights provides a vehicle for the 'indirect' application of the Bill of Rights to 
disputes between private individuals or natural and juristic persons (e.g. contractual disputes), and states as 
follows: 
'When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or customary law, every court, 
tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights .. .' [Emphasis provided] 
8 Constitution sec. 39(1) 
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of the foundational values which underlie the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. 
Accordingly, various aspects of the common law (and especially more open-ended 
concepts that find application in different contexts, e.g. the concept of public policy or 
the legal convictions of the community, and the bani mores or good .morals of society) 
have now been infused with the values of equality, freedom, dignity, non-racialism and 
non-sexism. 9 
4 Legal rules.originating outside the domestic law of South Africa are mainly found 
in public international law and the obligations arising from treaties between sovereign 
states and international organisations such as the United Nations and the International 
Labour Organisation. On the other hand, the laws of foreign states may be applied in 
South Africa in certain circumstances - these cases resort under private international law 
(or the 'conflict of laws' doctrine). The basis for the application of public international law 
is to be found mainly in the provisions of sections 232 and 233 of the Constitution. 
Section 232 provides that customary international law is law in the Republic unless 
inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of Parliament. Section 233 states the 
following: 
'When interpreting any legislation, every court must prefer any reasonable interpretation of 
the legislation that is consistent with international law over any alternative interpretation 
that is inconsistent with international law.' 
Section 39( 1) deals with interpretation of the provisions of the Bill of Rights (which is 
contained in Chapter 2 of the Constitution), and provides as follows: 
'When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum 
a) 
9 See, in respect of the common law of contract, Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (Supreme Court of Appeal); 
Afrox Healthcare Ltd v Strydom 2002 6 SA,21 (SCA); Napier v Barkhuizen 2006 (4) SA 1 (SCA) and Barkhuizen 
v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC); in respect of the law of delict (tort), see Carmichele v Minister of Safety and 
Security & Another 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) at par 54; NK v Minister of Safety and Security (2005) 26 IU 1205 
(CC) at 1213-1215 
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b) must consider international law, and 
c). may consider foreign I.aw.' 
5 The Constitution vests judicial authority in the courts, which are independent and 
subject only to the Constitution and the law. 10 The judiciary in South Africa is made up of 
the following courts: 11 
The Constitutional Court; 
The Supreme Court of Appeal (formerly the Appellate Division of the 
High Court); 
The various provincial and local divisions of the High Court (and any 
high court of appeal that may be established by Act of Parliament); 
Magistrates' courts; and 
Any other court established or recognized in terms of an Act of 
Parliament. 12 
The Constitutional Court (which consists of 11 judges and is situated on Constitutional 
Hill in Braamfontein, Johannesburg) is the supreme court in the country, and the only 
court that may adjudicate disputes between organs of state in the national or provincial 
sphere 13 con.cerning the constitutional status, powers or functions of any of those organs 
of state or to decide on the constitutionality of any amendment to the Constitution or of 
any parliamentary or provincial Bill. It is also the court of final instance in deciding 
whether an Act of Parliament, a provincial Act or conduct of the President is 
constitutional. 14 The Supreme Court of Appeal (which is situated in Bloemfontein in the 
Free State province, traditionally the judicial capital of South Africa) is the highest court 
1° Constitution sec. 165 
11 Constitution chapter 8 
12 Such other courts that have been established include the different divisions of the Labour Court and the 
Labour Appeal Court, special income tax courts, the Land Claims Court, the Competitions Appeal Court, the 
Electoral Court, divorce courts, consumer courts, equality courts and military courts. 
13 See the discussion in paragraph 30 below regarding the division of powers between national, provincial and 
local government. 
14 Constitution sec. 167 
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in all other matters, and has jurisdiction to determine an appeal over any decision of.a 
High Court. 15 In terms of the principle of stare decisis (the system of legal precedent), 
the decisions of the Supreme Court ofAppeal are binding on all courts of a lower order, 
and the decisions of High Courts are binding on all magistrates' courts within the 
respective areas of jurisdiction of the divisions. In the provincial divisions of the High 
Court, appeals from the judgment of a single judge may be heard by a full bench of 
judges, and judgments by a full bench are binding in subsequent matters before a single 
High Court judge. 
6 At the time of writing, a number of important new legislative enactments and 
amendments to existing legislation, in the form of Bills currently before Parliament, are 
expected to be passed in the foreseeable future. Other Acts of Parliament were passed 
recently and have yet to be interpreted and reviewed by the courts in order to determine 
their reach and application. These Bills and Acts relate to various aspects of South African 
law and some, more specifically, relate to aspects of the socio-economic development 
and social transformation programmes, which form such an integral part of the post-
1994 constitutional dispensation. Examples are the National Credit Act, 2005, the 
Consumer Protection Act, 2008, 16 and the very substantial amendments to company and 
tax law as contained in the Companies Act Amendment Bill 17 and proposed changes to 
the Income Tax Act respectively. In respect of sport, more specifically, the National Sport 
and Recreation Amendment Act, 2007 has significantly amended the key piece of sports 
legislation in South Africa (although these amendments have also not yet, at the time of 
writing, been the subject of court review). These legislative instruments will be examined 
or referred to where relevant in the discussion that follows, but it is hoped that future 
updates to this chapter will be able to examine their impact on South African sport more 
closely and meaningfully. 
15 Constitution sec. 168 
16 The Consumer Protection Act, 68 of 2008 was signed into law by the President of the Republic on 24 April 
2009 and published in the Goverment Gazette on 29 April 2009. The Act will come into force on a date 
unknown during the course of 2009/10 
17 The new Companies Act 71 of 2008 (Government Gazette 32121 of 9 April 2009) has been promulgated, and 
is to come into force within a period of 12 months (date to be announced in due course). 
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§2 Sport in South Africa 
7 South Africa is often called a 'sports mad nation', which has a proud history of 
success on the international stage in a number of different sporting codes. This history is 
tainted·, however, by a legacy of political intervention (both pre- and post-1994) and of 
sport reflecting the wider social milieu of inequalities that exist in the country. While 
South African teams tasted success in sports such as rugby union and cricket, wherethe 
'Springboks' were consistently rated as amongst the best in the world during the first half 
of the twentieth century,. these teams were predominantly (and often exclusively) made 
up of 'white' athletes,·18 and largely reflected the racial segregation of South African 
society under the invidious apartheid policies of the erstwhile nationalist government. As 
a result, South African sport faced a vicious backlash from governments, federations and 
governing·bodies19 and individuals20 during the last half of the previous century, which 
resulted in a sports boycott and isolation on the world stage. 21 
B The·governance of sport, as so many facets of South African life, was essentially 
racially aligned in a proliferation of 'official' federations and governing bodies 
representing the interests of specific race groups. Sports bodies representing the 
interests of 'non-White' athletes had been forced, by the all-pervasive segregationist 
18 While recognising the historical and contemporary difficulties surrounding the potential reification of 'race' as 
a social or political construct, its use is required in a discussion of the development of sport in South .Africa, due 
to the historical legacy of the Apartheid system and continuing inequalities that exist between different groups 
(not only fn sport but also in society more generally), as well as in light of the pursuit and implementation of 
policies of racial transformation which have been enforced in South African sport in the democratic order post 
1994. The discussion in paras 69-111 below will focus in more detail on the race-based transformation policies 
that are currently pursued in South African sport (and which policies, rightly or wrongly, have been criticised as 
perpetuating race consciousness in contemporary South African society). 
19 For example the International Olympic Committee and FIFA, which expelled South Africa in 1976 (following a 
number of suspensions of the then all-White Football Association of South Africa during the early 1960s - the 
Confederation of African Football had expelled this same body in 1960). The new, non-racial, SA Football 
Association (SAFA) was accepted back into FIFA on 3 July 1992. 
20 Rugby tours to countries such as Australia, New Zealand and England were disrupted by protest action, and 
organisations like HART (Halt All Racial Tours) and Campaign Against Race Discrimination in Sport were active 
in this regard. 
21 The international condemnation of apartheid culminated in measures to exclude South African athletes 
(especially the traditional 'white teams' in the major sports of rugby union and cricket) from international 
competition. Specific measures included the Gleneagles Agreement (Commonwealth Agreement on Apartheid in 
Sport, 1977) and the International Convention against Apartheid in Sports (1985) - see the discussion by 
Valerie Collins Recreation and the Law E & F.N Spon 1984 at 3-4. For a brief history of the influence of politics 
in sport in South Africa, see Jarvie in Jarvie, G (ed) Sport, Racism and Ethnicity Falmer Press 1991at175 -
189; John Nauright Sport, Cultures and Identities in South Africa David Philip, Cape Town 1997 at 124 et seq. 
21 For a discussion of developments in South African cricket, see Vahed, G "What do they know of cricket who 
only cricket know?' Transformation in South African cricket, 1990-2000' International Review for the Sociology 
of Sport 36/3 (2001) 319 at 320 et seq. 
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policies of the National Party government, to develop their own structures and cultures. 
These bodies were in an unenviable position in respect of their efforts to obtain 
recognition and to establish power bases in the milieu of South African domestic as well 
as international sport. Ironically, the very nature of international sports governing bodies 
in terms of the European model of sport, and one of the prime pillars of their governance 
structure (namely the principle of a monopolised national recognition system - only one 
sports federation is recognised per country), served to further exacerbate the problems 
experienced by 'non-white' athletes in South Africa during the apartheid era. While sports 
federations were hard at work formulating and enforcing a sports boycott against the 
'apartheid teams', new black 'national federations' formed in the post war era could not 
obtain international status. International federations recognised only one affiliate per 
country; and recognition in the case of South Africa already-belonged to the established 
'white' controlling bodies. 22 Throughout this period, sport and politics were inextricably 
intertwined.23 Apart from international instruments and measures applied to boycott 
South African teams' participation outside its borders and the frequent political unrest 
and protests that accompanied its tours on foreign soil, the regime also used sport in the 
1970's as a tool to try and regain respectability and reverse the trend towards isolation. 24 
9 Following South Africa's re-entry into the fold of international sporting competition 
in late 1991,25 and the first post-apartheid democratic elections in April 1994, the 
landscape of South African sports governance was predictably characterized by a process 
of rationalization and unification of the previously racially aligned sports bodies. There 
was increasing recognition of the need for 'nation-building' also in the context of sport, 
22 See Bruce Murray & Christopher Merret Caught Behind: Race and Politics in Springbok Cricket Wits University 
Press 2004, at 67; for discussion on the sports boycott, generally, see 63 et seq; Nauright op cit. at 124 et seq. 
23 For more on the influence of politics in sport in South Africa, see Gouws, .J Sport Management: Theory and 
Practice Knowledge Resources 1997 at 184~189; Jarvie in Jarvie, G (ed) Sport, Racism and Ethnicity Falmer 
Press 1991 at 175 - 189; Mpati 'Sport and Politics', in Basson & Loubser Sport and the Law in South Africa 
Butterworths (looseleaf) CH 2-1 et seq, John Nauright Sport, Cultures and Identities in South Africa David 
Philip, Cape Town 1997 at 124 et seq. 
24 John Gemmell The Politics of South African Cricket Routledge, London 2004, at 77. 
25 The International Olympic Committee readmitted South Africa on 9 July 1991, after the country had been 
expelled by the IOC in 1970 with a 35:28 vote (the IOC had earlier, in 1964, withdrawn South Africa's invitation 
to participate in the Tokyo Olympic Games); South African cricketers became the first team to play in official 
· international competition in November 1991, with a hastily organised tour to India to replace the Pakistan team 
who had withdrawn from their Indian tour due to threats by anti-Muslims. 
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and of the urgent need to ensure the -legitimisation of control over sport. 26 This process 
was especially evident for example in cricket, one of the major sports (and. which had 
also been a specific flashpoint of international controversy during the apartheid years27), 
where the early 1990s saw the establishment of a new, unified, national governing body, 
the United Cricket Board of South Africa (or UCBSA). 
During this period of rebuilding after 19.94,_ state regulation of sport assumed a 
more structured guise through the introduction of a White Paper on Sport and Recreation 
in 1998, which called for new legislation to solidify government's regulatory framework in 
sport. The establishment of a dedicated government sports Ministry and department 
illustrated the importance government attached to sport in respect of its social and 
cultural role in rebuilding a just society under the new democratic dispensation. 28 The 
legislation that followed was the National Spo·rt and Recreation Act29 and the South 
African Sports Commission Act, 30 both passed· in 1998. -
The discussion in this chapter will not focus on the history of apartheid sport in 
South Africa or other aspects of the historical legacy in this regard, although sections of 
the discussion will touch on related matters of relevance to the current state of sports 
law and the regulation of sport in the country. 31 
10 Up to date statistical information regarding sport in South Africa is not readily 
available; and some such information as has been compiled for purposes of the sports 
sponsorship market is not freely available for public consumption. According to figures 
available for 1999, an estimated total of 8.6 million adults and nearly 3.7 million juniors 
26 For a discussion of developments in this regard in SA cricket, see Vahed op cit. 
27 E.g. see the events concerning the aborted England cricket tour to South Africa in 1968, where the apartheid 
government objected to the inclusion of 'Coloured' expatriate player Basil D'Oliveira in the English team - see 
the discussion in Booth The Race Game: Sport and Politics in South Africa Frank Cass Publishers, London 
(1998) 95. The 1980s also saw a number of rebel tours by unofficial foreign teams, which led to a spate of 
disciplinary action by member boards of cricketing countries. The members of Graham Gooch's 'South African 
Breweries English XI' of 1982 were banned from Test cricket for three years. The Sri Lankan rebels of 1982/83 
were suspended from domestic cricket in any form in their own country for 25 years. The West Indies team, 
who toured twice in the 1982/83 and 1983/84 seasons, were banned for life (although several players 
continued their careers in South Africa and England). See Murray & Merrett Caught Behind at 208-9. 
28 See, generally, Mpati in Sasson & Loubser Sport and the Law in South Africa op cit. 
29 Act 110 of 1998 (discussed infra) 
30 Act 109 of 1998 (which has subsequently been repealed - see the discussion infra) 
31 For example policies and measures in pursuit of transformation of South African sport post 1994, which are 
central to many of the facets of public regulation of sport as well as affecting the private governance functions 
of sports federations, aspects of the employment of athletes in professional sport, etc. 
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participated in sport in South Africa. At the time it was observed that around 130 
different sporting codes are played in the country, and in light of the fact that people 
often participate in more than one sport, it was estimated that a cumulative total of more 
than 13 million adults and 7 million juniors participated in sport during that year. 32 
A Sport and Recreation South Africa (SRSA) survey of 2005 on participation 
patterns in sport33 found that approximately 25% of respondents participated in some 
form of sport or recreational activity, and that, as could be expected, the highest levels 
of participation were in the age group 16-25 years of age. Participation in sport was also 
to a certain extent dependent on living standard, with the highest proportion of 
participants among the highest living standard measure group. 34 From the. sample group 
respondents, it appears that the most popular sports are soccer/football"(.11% of 
respondents played the sport, and 61% supported the sport), cricket.(1% play, 19% 
support) and rugby (2% play, 18% support). Of the sample responde.nt~ 68% who. 
participated in sport made use of facilities, mainly at schools (33%), municipal sports 
clubs (31 %) and at private paid facilities. Predictably, the white population -group (which 
has historically been a privileged group) showed the highest level of utilization of private 
paid facilit~es (44%, as compared to 9.5% amongst the African group). 
In 1999 it was estimated that sports contributed around ZAR 15 913 million to the 
economy of South Africa, and provided jobs for 34 325 full-time, 6 140 part-time and 
about 8 000 volunteer workers. 35 Sport accounted for approximately 2% of the Gross 
32 According to the report of the Sports Information and Science Agency (SISA) A Summary of the Contribution 
of Sport to South African Society 2000, at 4. According to the report (at 14) there were an estimated 138 
national sports codes in South Africa in 1999, and over 1 000 provincial and/or regional controlling bodies in 
these sports. At the time of writing an updated study of the impact of sport is in progress (although information 
in this regard was not forthcoming). 
South Africa had a total population of around 44.8 million people in 2001 (according to the report of the SA 
Census 2001, available on the web site of Statistics South Africa at http://www.statssa.gov.za). The SISA 
report contained a further breakdown of levels of sports participation among adults between the different 
population groups, as follows (classification of 'race' groups used purely for statistical and comparative 
purposes): Whites - 63% were active in sports; Indians - 41%; Coloureds - 29%; and Blacks - 27%. The 
report also identified a disparity in participation between adult males and females, namely 43% amongst men 
and 23% amongst females; and it was estimated that around 60% of children participated in sports. 
33 Sport and Recreation South Africa Participation Patterns in Sport and Recreation in South Africa 2005. This 
survey was undertaken with a sampling frame that consists of 1 000 census enumerator areas across all 9 
provinces of the country, and the representative sample of 7 000 adults (16 and over with no upper age limit) 
was designed to be representative of the total adult population (when weighted, the sample represents 29 446 
688 adults). I wish to thank Chari Durand of Sport and Recreation South Africa for providing me with a copy of 
the 2005 Survey. 
34 Ibid. at 4 
35 SISA A Sum'mary of the Contribution of Sport to South African Society 2000, at 5. The horse racing industry 
is not included in these figures regarding the economic impact of sport. 
35 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Domestic-Product (or.GDP) of South Africa, which was estimated as ZAR 795 billion for 
1999.36 The total contribution of sports controlling bodies to the economy of South Africa 
during the same year was ZAR 747 million in terms of expenditure and ZAR 260 million 
in terms of capital expenditure, at macro-sports; national and provincial levels. 37 
11 ··As meneioned above,-by far the-biggest professional team sports are rugby union, 
association football {or 'soccer' as the game is popularly known in South Africa) and 
cricket, .while .the.governing body of women's netball {Netball South Africa) recently 
announced ·that:th-e sport is planning to turn professional. At the time of writing, the 
South African national men's rugby team (the 'Springboks') is the reigning 2007 IRB 
Rugby World .Cup champions and is rated no. 2 in the world behind New Zealand in the 
Interna.tionar Rugby Board's world rankings. 38 The national men's cricket team (the· 
'Proteas') is rated no. 1 in the world in the International Cricket Counc.il's One Day 
Internationals rankings and ranked no. 2 behind Australia in the Test match rankings. 39 
The national men's .football team ('Bafana Bafana') is rated a rather disappointing no. 72 
in the world. 40 In one of the major sports, rugby union, South Africa boasts the second 
highest number·oLregistered senior rugby players in the world as well as the largest 
rugby:club in·the world. 41 There are approximately 700 professional rugby players in 
South Africa. 42 According to the web site of the SA Rugby Players' Association (SARPA),43 
its membership has grown since its establishment in 1998 to around 470 professional 
rugby player members. 44 According to available information at the time of writing, there 
are a total of 110 fully professional cricketers in South Africa, of which 15 are contracted 
36 Ibid. If capital expenditure of ZAR852 million is included, the total contribution of sport to the SA economy in 
1999 was ZAR16 765 million, or 2.1 % of the Gross Domestic Product. 
37 Ibid. at 14 
38 IRB rankings as on 30 March 2009 
39 ICC rankings as on 19 March 2009 
4° FIFA world rankings as on 11 March 2009 
41 The Stellenbosch University Rugby Club (in Stellenbosch, Western Cape), which boasts around 1 200 
members (even though membership is compulsory for residents of the university residences, the club 
reportedly boasts the most playing members of any rugby club in the world). 
42 See the article by Mark Keohane 'SA's professionalism promotes mediocrity' Business Day, 15 February 2006 
43 The registered trade union representing the interests of professional rugby players as employees. 
44 See the web site of SARPA at http://www.sarpa.net 
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to Cricket South Africa 45 for service in the national team and 95 are contracted to the 
franchises in the domestic first class league.46 All professional cricketers were members 
of the SA Cricketers' Association (SACA)47 at the time of writing. 
According to available information at the time of writing, there are approximately 
960 fully professional football players in South Africa (who play in the Premier Soccer 
League and the National First Division - the registration of 'semi-professional' players in 
the lower leagues is administered by the SA F:ootball Association). Star players such as 
Benni McCarthy and Steven Pienaar play for English Premier League clubs while other 
South African footballers play professional football elsewhere in Europe and Africa. : 
South African athletes have also been highly successful in individual sports, and 
the country has produced world champions and top-level competitors in a number of 
disciplines in recent years. These include golf,48 swimming,49 athletics, 50 tennis,51 motor 
sport52 and other codes. 53 
12 Income from commercial exploitation of sport is significant.in the major 
professional sporting codes, with especially the sale of broadcasting rights being a major 
source of income for the relevant governing bodies in the major codes and being seen as 
critical to the development of such sports. 54 For example, by far the largest part of the 
SA Rugby Union's annual income during the last decade has derived from the sale of 
broadcasting rights in terms of the SANZAR agreement for the Super 14 and Tri-Nations 
45 The professional arm of the national governing body for the game, which is responsible for the management 
of the commercial aspects of the professional game. 
46 Source: e-mail communication from the CEO of the SA Cricketers' Association (SACA), 28 February 2008 
47 The professional players' association, which is a registered trade union in terms of the Labour Relations Act, 
1995 
48 Where South African professional golfers such as Ernie Els, Retief Goosen, Trevor Immelman and Tim Clark 
have been multiple winners on the world's major professional tours 
49 South African male swimmers Ryk Neethling and Roland Schoeman (amongst others) and female swimmers 
(Penny Heyns and Natalie du Toit) have won multiple medals at international events and have been world 
record-holders on occasion 
50 E.g. Zola Budd, Elana Meyer and Oscar Pistorius 
51 E.g. Kevin Curran in the 1980s and Amanda Coetzer, who was a successful female professional tennis player 
on the international tours during the 1990s 
52 E.g. Jody Schecter, who was a successful Formula 1 driver in the 1970s and 1980s, and Giniel de Villiers, 
who won the 2009 Dakar race (which was held on the South American continent due to North African security 
concerns) 
53 South Africa's Sibusiso Vilane became the first black man to climb the seven highest peaks on seven 
continents (Denali in Alaska, Kilimanjaro in Africa, Aconcagua in South America, Elbroes in Europe, Kosciuszko 
in Australia, Everest in Asia and Vinson Masif in Antartica) in May 2007, and the first black man to climb Everest 
54 See the position paper of the Independent Broadcasting Authority of South Africa (!CASA) on Sports 
Broadcasting Rights, 25 July 2003 (available on the web site of !CASA at http://www.icasa.org.za), at 28 
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competitions.ss While sponsorship spend ·in South African sport in real terms is on a 
significantly smaller scale than in other jurisdictions such as Europe and the United 
States, large amounts of money are invested annually in this regard. Expectations are, 
however, that the current worldwide economic recession will impact negatively on the 
sports sponsorship market in the foreseeable future. 
The 2010 FIFA World Cup South Africa™ and other major events 
13 The 2010 football World Cup is scheduled to be played in South Africa from 11 
June to 11 July 2010. "f.he tournament will see matches played in 8 of the country's 9 
provinces. The host cities for the tournament are Johannesburg, Cape Town, Durban, 
Bloemfontein, Port Elizabeth, Pretoria, Nelspruit, Polokwane and Rustenburg, and a total 
of 10 stadia will be used. Five new stadia are being purpose-built for the event,s6 while 
five other existing stadia are undergoing extensive upgrading.s7 According to the 
schedule for completion of stadia, the 2009 Confederations Cup venuess8 are to be 
finished between December 2008 and March 2009, while all 2010 stadia and 
infrastructure are to be completed by December 2009. At the time of writing, and 
according to available reports, most stadia are well on their way to timeous completion, 
although some teething problems remain. For example, it was reported in February 2009 
that contractors had dismissed 400 striking workers at the Mbombela Stadium in 
Nelspruit (Mpumalanga province), who, reportedly, were claiming bonus fees in the 
region of ZAR 70 000 each to return to work. At the time there were serious doubts 
55 The SANZAR agreement with Rupert Murdoch's News Ltd, which originally ran from 1995-2005 and was 
worth around US$550 million for the union, was subsequently renewed for a further five years for US$320 
million. The current SANZAR agreement will expire in 2010, and at the time of writing there are reports that the 
SA Rugby Uh ion is considering withdrawing from the Super 14 competition upon expiry of this agreement in 
order to send its teams to compete in the UK's Magners League (with expectations of increased broadcasting 
revenues as a result of the fact that home and away games for the South African teams would be played in the 
same time zone) - see the discussion elsewhere in this chapter. 
56 The Peter Mokaba Stadium in Polokwane (Northern Province), the Greenpoint Stadium in Cape Town 
(Western Cape), the Mbombela Stadium in Nelspruit (Mpumalanga province), the Nelson Mandela Bay Stadium 
in Port Elizabeth (Eastern Cape), and the Moses Mabhida Stadium in Durban (KwaZulu-Natal). 
57 Soccer City (a 94 000 seat stadium) and Ellis Park in Johannesburg (Gauteng province), Loftus Versfeld in 
Pretoria (Gauteng province), the Royal Bafokeng Stadium in Rustenburg (North West province), and Mangaung 
Stadium in Bloemfontein (Free State province). 
58 See the discussion below 
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about this stadium reaching its July 2009 deadline, as it was nine weeks behind schedule 
at the time (in part due also to a crane collapse in January 2009, which damaged part of 
the roof). 59 Doubts about South Africa's ability to host the event in 2010 have been 
widely expressed in the international and local media over the last couple of years,· and 
included speculation of talks between FIFA and Brazil for a possible 'plan B' hosting of the 
event. 60 It appears, however, that at the time of writing (in early 2009) there is general 
confidence that preparations are well on track and that no major upheavals are expected. 
The costs for the staging of an event of this size are of course astronomical (not least 
being the cost of stadium and infrastructure development and upgrading). The South 
African government has set aside ZAR 17.4 billion of direct investment in the event over 
the period of 2006-2010, and it is expected to invest more than ZAR 400 billion ih the 
country's infrastructure during this same period (not all spending related to the event). 61 
In addition, funding allocations for delivery of guarantees and programmes include a 
reported ZAR 1.2 billion for safety and security62 and ZAR 2.5 billion for information and· 
communications technology (Johannesburg has been approved as the venue forthe 
International Broadcasting Centre). 63 It has been estimated that the economic boost for 
the South African economy from the event will be in the region of ZAR 21 billion, and 
that more than 150 000 jobs will be created. 
Apart from the large sums of money invested by the South African government and other 
stakeholders, it is estimated that the cost to FIFA will likely be of the same order of 
magnitude as the cost of the 2006 event in Germany (i.e. in the region of more than ZAR 
5 billion). 64· It has also been reported that FIFA has set aside the amount off. 20 million 
59 See the report entitled 'State of the stadiums' in the Mail & Guardian, 27 February 2009 (at 52) 
60 See e.g. also the report in Sport and the Law Journal Issue 2 Vol. 16 (March 2009), 'Sports Law Foreign 
Update' at 74 
61 From the web site of the government department of Sport and Recreation SA (at www.srsa.gov.za -
accessed 9 March 2009) 
62 See the brief discussion in paras 420-427 below regarding security arrangements for the 2010 FIFA World 
Cup event 
63 Ibid. 
64 From the supporting affidavit by the Deputy Head of the Marketing Legal Department of FIFA (at par. 7.1), 
filed in support of its application in the matter of Federation Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) v 
Metcash Trading Africa (Pty) Ltd (Gauteng North Provincial Division, case number 53304/07) - see the 
discussion in par 577 et seq below 
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to be paid to clubs for: the services of their national players who will be participating in 
the 2010 World Cup.~5 
-· 
14 For environmental lawyers, it is interesting to note.that the South African 
government's Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism have embarked on a 
national carbon offsetting programme for the 2010 FIFA event. The 2010 World Cup is 
expected to have the largest carbon footprint of any major event, which is estimated will 
be more than 850 000 tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (tC02e), with an additional 
estimated 1.4 million tC02e to be contributed by air travel relating to the event. It is 
estimated that offsetting the domestic carbon footprint of the event (excluding the 
footprint of international travel) could cost between US$ 6.8 million and US$ 12 million. 
It has been observed that the event ·provides an opportunity to raise awareness of 
climate change and sustainability challenges. 66 
15 . It is expected that the football World Cup;.:which is the largest single sporting 
competition in the world, will provide an opportunity to function as a platform for 
significant' development of sports law in·South Africa, in light of the vast array of different 
legal aspects related to such tournament which have (and will continue to) come to the 
fore. Just some of these aspects are the following: 
Management of broadcasting rights relating to the tournament: 
Coverage of the 2006 tournament (held in Germany) reached 214 
countries with a cumulative audience of 26.3 billion viewers, and in 
South Africa alone, the cumulative audience for the 2006 
tournament was 104 873 000 viewers (with 988 programmes and a 
cumulative duration of 1 810 hours and 34 minutes); 67 
65 From a report in the Sport and the Law Journal Vol 16 Issue 1 (2008) Foreign Update, p 58 (available to 
subscribers on the web site of the British Association of Sport and the Law at http://www.britishsportslaw.org) 
66 Source: Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Republic of South Africa 
67 From the supporting affidavit by the Deputy Head of the Marketing Legal Department of FIFA (at par. 6.3 and 
6.4), filed in support of its application in the matter of Federation Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) 
v Metcash Trading Africa (Pty) Ltd (Gauteng North Provincial Division, case number 53304/07) 
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Management of-the licensing and other forms of commercial 
exploitation of intellectual property rights in respect of the 
tournament; 
Management of the protection of the rights.and interests of the 
event organisers and official sponsors and other commercial 
partners to the event (e.g. combating ambush marketing in- respect 
of the event); and 
Major event security arrangements (in light, especially_, of the 
current global terrorism threat which has also touched sport). 68 
No more will be said here regarding the 2010 football World-Cup, and assorted legal. - -· 
issues relating to the event will be discussed where relevant throughout this chapter. 
16 At the time of writing, South Africa is gearing up to host the 'dress rehearsal' for 
the 2010 event, the 2009 FIFA Confederations Cup, which is to be held in Joh~mnesburg, 
Pretoria, Bloemfontein and Rustenburg from 14 to 28 June 2009. The stadia will also be 
used to host matches in the British and Irish Lions rugby tour to South Africa; which will 
be in progress during the tournament, with time for pitch recovery allocated between 
rugby and football matches. At the time of writing, media reports suggest that one of the 
main concerns regarding the hosting of the upcoming Confederations Cup (apart from the 
issue of stadium readiness in time for the event) relates to claims by the South African 
government (and, reportedly, FIFA) that the Local Organising Committee has not done 
enough to market the event (as well as the 2010 event). At the time of writing, roughly 
60 days before the Confederations Cup kick-off, it is reported that ticket sales have thus 
far been conservative. 
17 Other exciting developments regarding major events at the time of writing include 
the decision to host the 2009 ICC Champions Trophy cricket tournament in South Africa 
68 Compare the attack on the Sri Lankan national team in Lahore, Pakistan, on 3 March 2009 
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in September 2009, as well as the decision (announced on 25 March 2009) that the 
lucrative DLF Indian Premier League (IPL)'s 2009 competition (the second year of the 
tournament) is to be played in South Africa from 18 April 2009. The tournament will see 
59 matches between the franchises being played at six venues throughout the country 
(with 16 matches scheduled for Durban, with its large ethnic Indian population). The 
decision to move the IPL outside India was taken followin9 security concerns (as 
originally scheduled, the tournament would have coincided with the Indian general 
elections in April 2009, and it is assumed that the recent terrorist attacks on the Sri 
Lankan cricket team in Lahore, Pakistan and the Mumbai attacks of late 2008 have also 
been a significant consideration). English and South African cricket authorities were 
requested to undertake feasibility studies for the hosting of the event, and according to 
reports it appears that a deciding factor in South Africa's successful bid was the expected 
favourable weather in South Africa in the months of April and May, as well as the existing 
infrastructure to host matches and the interest of local fans in the 'Twenty20' format of 
the game. It was reported that Cricket South Africa is set to be paid in the region of 
between ZAR 70-90 million for hosting the tournament, and organisers have speculated 
that spin-offs from the event for the local economy {which are expected to include an 
estimated 30 000 room nights in local accommodation) will be very lucrative. 
A less positive development, which relates to the 2010 FIFA World Cup South Africa™, 
was the announcement in the week of 23 March 2009 that the South African government 
had refused the Dalai Lama a visa to_ visit the country for a scheduled World Cup peace 
conference along with other Nobel Peace Prize laureates such as Archbishop Desmond 
Tutu, F.W. de Klerk and Michael Gorbachev. The decision (apparently only the second 
time ever that a government has refused the Dalai Lama entry to a country, apart from 
China) has been widely criticised. In what one observer has called a 'spectacular own 
goal' by the South African government in the run-up to the 2010 football event, the 
government has been criticised for succumbing to pressure from China relating to bi-
lateral trade agreements between the two countries and for failing to live up to its 
claimed human rights credentials (especially in light of the fact that, as has been 
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reported, such credentials featured prominently in South Africa's bid for the 2010 World 
Cup). The peace conference was subsequently cancelled. It remains to be seen whether 
these developments will affect the 2010 event in any significant way. 
It appears that other 'political' matters in sport in which South Africa (or South Africans) 
have been involved have also had international repercussions in recent times. 69 
..... , 
69 E.g. it was reported that Malcolm Speed, the former Chief Executive of the International Cricket Council (ICC) 
had resigned his position because of a continuous dispute with the ICC President, South African Ray Mali, who 
has been a staunch ally of Zimbabwe Cricket's position in the ongoing developments regarding potential 
proscriptive action against the national body as a result of the political situation in Zimbabwe, and whose 
support had enabled Zimbabwe Cricket to maintain its ICC status - see Journal of Sport and the Law Issue 2 
Vol. 16 (March 2009) at 29. 
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§3 Sport and the ·Law in South Africa 
18 'Sports law' in South Africa is a relatively new phenomenon, which has only seen. 
any real measure ofdevelopment in the period following first democratic elections in 
1994. This is attributable to a number of reasons, which include the following: 
Due to South Africa's politically inspired isolation from world sport 
. ::during:the 1970s and 1980s, the South African legal system was 
~generally not exposed to the sources of this developing body of 
1a·ws at international level; for example, disputes in sport arising 
-· · ~ ::·from participation in international events and foreign leagues, which 
·h9ve been so formative and contributed so significantly to t.he 
-· • ... _ .. ·-development of sports law (or a lex sportiva) in other systems. 
- The nature and characteristics of-the major sports in South.Africa 
have .also played a significant role in this regard. The major sports 
(which-are also the largest professional sports) are rugby union, 
football (or soccer) and cricket. While soccer has traditionally been 
most popular amongst the African section of the population, the 
sport enjoyed little support from government during the apartheid 
era. Cricket, a mainly 'white' sport, was a key focus in the backlash 
against apartheid and also featured prominently in the sporting 
boycott against South Africa. Rugby enjoyed the same status as 
cricket, while official recognition of professionalism in the sport is 
also a very new phenomenon (the International Rugby Board 
officially sanctioned professionalism only in 1995, shortly a~er the 
establishment of the new united national rugby governing body, the 
South African Rugby Football Union,7° in 1992). 
7° Currently the SA Rugby Union (or SARU) 
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Accordingly, some of the most important contributing factors that have been so formative 
in other jurisdictions to the recognition of a branch of the law relating specifically to 
sport, namely professional leagues and competitions,71 the influx of large amounts of 
money from sponsors and other commercial partners (such as broadcasters), as well as 
exposure and interaction with international sports governing bodies, governments, 
events and teams, were largely absent from South African sport until the mid-1990s. 
19 However, trends in the globalisation of sport, specifically during the last few 
decades, have also touched South African sport to a significant extent. No longer can a 
domestic system function in isolation and independent of international developments in 
the governance and regulation of sport. This is especially clear in light of the very nature 
of the governance of sport at international level, .where international governing bodies 
such as FIFA exercise their monopoly powers of regulation in diverse territories, often to 
the attempted exclusion of the application of domestic laws or the interference of 
governments. Rightly or wrongly, at least one product of this system is that decisions, 
judgments and actions affecting those governing the sport in one jurisdiction inevitably 
impacts on the sport in other jurisdictions, to a greater or lesser extent. 
20 ·Commercialisation and the com modification of sport have also necessitated 
recognition of South Africa's global citizenship on the world stage, especially in light of 
the continuing trend of new forms of international competition in pursuit of maximizing 
the 'entertainment dollar' to be earned from especially the sale of broadcasting rights 
(not only at the level of national teams but increasingly also at the level of provincial or 
71 As mentioned, both rugby union and cricket only embraced professionalism relatively recently 
(professionalism in international cricket really only gained momentum following the 'Packer saga' in the 1970s, 
which involved a number of White South African cricketers who were at the time prevented from participating in 
the International Cricket Council's official Test matches due to the sports boycott - for discussion of events in 
world cricket at the time, especially in respect of Kerry Packer's 'World Series of Cricket' and its legacy for the 
professional game, see Simon Rae It's Not Cricket Faber & Faber 2001 chapter 14 ('Money Again: Packer and 
After'), at 243 et seq; G. Haigh The Cricket War: The Inside Story of Kerry Packer's World Series Cricket Text 
Publishing Co., Melbourne 1993; Greig and Others v Insole and Others; World Series Cricket (Pty) Ltd v Insole 
and Others [1978] 3 All ER 449). 
Soccer in South Africa had flirted with professionalism throughout the dark days of Apartheid, but efforts at 
establishing professional leagues (for example the formation of an African professional league by the anti-
apartheid South African Soccer Federation in 1961; the National Professional Soccer League's 'Keg League' 
sponsored by South African Breweries in 1971) were largely unsuccessful in the circumstances pertaining at the 
time. The current league, the National Soccer League (trading as the Premier Soccer League or PSL) was 
formed in 1996. 
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regional teams or professional franchises), and global corporate sponsorship of sport. 
Examples of·international trends that are increasingly impacting on South African sport 
include the development of new international'competitions (e.g. in rugby, with the Super 
12 and.Super 14 tournament72 and the Tri-Nations tournament involving South African, 
Australian and New ·Zealand teams, as well as the recent announcement of South Africa's 
hosting of the lucrative Indian Premier l:eague franchise competition in 2009); the linking 
of local clubs and teams with clubs overseas, and increasing athlete migration in the 
relatively 'free'·labour ma·rket of international· professional sport (e.g. South African 
football, rugby and cricket players playing in-. England, Europe, Australia, Japan and 
elsewhere). Significantly also, South Africa is one of the ACP signatory countries to the 
Cotonou Agreement.with the EU .. Accordingly,:South African athletes and players stand to 
benefit from the Kolpak ruling: of the· Eur:opean .Gou rt of Justice. This has increasingly 
happened in recent years, with South' African players especially gaining access to English 
domestic cricket and UK and European rugby·union teams as 'Kolpak players' (although 
the discussion elsewhere in this chapter. will refer to recent developments in these 
jurisdictions which appear to augur an increasingly restrictive approach to the application 
of Kolpak with a view to limiting·the influx of foreign professionals to domestic leagues). 
By 2010, with the next FIFA World Cup, South Africa would have also hosted, since 1995, 
world cup tournaments in all three of :its major professional sports, 73 and it is speculated 
that cities such as Cape Town may be gearing up to bid to host the remaining jewel in 
the crown of major international sporting events, the Olympic Games (in 2020). 
72 The international rugby competition sponsored by Australian media magnate Rupert Murdoch's Newscorp, 
and involving provincial or regional rugby teams from Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. The tournament 
(which commenced in 1995 as the 'Super 10") has been played as the 'Super 12' since 1996, and as the 'Super 
14' from 2006, involving two extra teams (one each for Australia and South Africa). For more information on 
the tournament, visit http://www.super14.com. 
73 The South African national team (the Springboks)'s victory in the 1995 IRB Rugby World Cup is generally 
viewed to be one of the most significant 'nation-building' events in the country's post 1994 era, and is soon to 
be immortalized in the Clint Eastwood-directed film 'The Human Factor', to star Morgan Freeman as Nelson 
Mandela and Matt Damon as former Springbok captain Francois Pienaar. The production began filming in Cape 
Town in March 2009 and is scheduled for release in December 2009. 
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: ' .. •:• 
21 Specifically, deyelopments in Europe and the UK in recent times also mirror 
developments in-the globalisation and commodification74 of sport elsewhere, and 
specifically in South Africa. An example of this from English football is comparable to 
developments in South African rugby. Commercial exploitation of English domestic 
football through the exploitation of television broadcasting rights to matches was the 
prime moving force behind the establishment of the FA Premiership league ~ the 
prospect of enhanced revenues from television contracts was 'probably the single most 
important factor in persuading clubs in the old first division of the Football League to sign 
up to the new Premier League'75 • By the 1997/98 season earnings generated.by 
television coverage accounted for approximately 26% of the total income of the 
Premiership. 76 :In-So"uth African rugby, we have seen a similar development in the 
emergence of.Soper -12 (and more recently Super 14) rugby. South African rugby. 
received ·an injection of new life in the 1990s with conclusion of the 10-yearSANZAR77 
agreement with Newscorp. 78 This contract, which was worth ZAR 280 million a year (plus 
an annual increase of 5%) and accounted for approximately 90% of the SA ·Rugby 
Union's annaal income,79 contributed significantly to the landscape (and survival) of 
South African rugby in the first decade of professionalism. In South African football, 
SuperSport (sports content aggregator to major pay-tv broadcaster Multichoice) paid a· 
record ZAR 1.4 billion for the broadcasting rights to· the Premier Soccer League in 2007 
(a deal which has had important implications, which are discussed elsewhere in this 
chapter). 
22 South African sport has also been touched by a recent development in European 
professional sport, namely the changing relationship between top clubs and the lower 
74 On the reciprocal relationship between corporate sponsorships and sport, in the context of the continued 
internationalisation of sport, see Amis, J & Cornwell, B (eds.) Global Sport Sponsorship Berg Publishers, Oxford 
& New York 2005 at 303 et seq. _ 
75 Paul Spink and Philip Morris 'The Battle for TV Rights in Professional Football', in Caiger & Gardiner 
Professional Sport in the EU at 167. 
76 Ibid. 
77 South Africa New Zealand and Australia Rugby (Pty) Ltd 
78 Rupert Murdoch's media giant and sponsor of the Super 14 and Tri-Nations rugby competitions in which 
South African, New Zealand and Australian teams are involved. 
79 As reported by Johan Volschenk Struggle-Rugby: A Sport in Crisis 2 ed Solidarity Research Institute (2002) 
at 18 
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divisions in football. A growing phenomenon, which is not unknown to baseball in the 
USA, is that lower division clubs are acting as training and farming (or 'nursery') clubs for 
the elite clubs that acquire ·them for this purpose: It is in these lower division clubs that 
promising players learn their trade, in order to move up to elite competition within this 
structure. 80 This also occurs at international Level - compare the link between Dutch club 
Ajax and Ajax Cape Town81 and, more recently, the academy partnership between South 
African Premier Soccer League (PSL) club Bloemfontein Celtic and Sporting Club Portugal 
(which was announced in February 2009}. At the time of writing there is speculation that 
similar developments may follow in respect of domestic cricket franchises (with possible 
links to be established with city-based franchises in the Indian Premier League, in light of 
the second season of the IPL which will oe played in South Africa in April-May 2009). 
Proponents-of the view that South African professional sport is lagging far behind the 
multi-billion dollar industries elsewhere should take heed of such developments, in 
considering the relevance of regulatory devel-opments in other jurisdictions for our 
burgeoning professional sports industry. 
23 There have also in recent times been very visible examples of how sport in South 
Africa has impac-ted on world sport and its regulation and governance in other 
jurisdictions. An. unfortunate example relates to the corruption and match-fixing scandal 
in world cricket, which had its nadir in South African cricket in 2000. 82 The backlash of 
80 See Gardiner et al Sports Law at 51 
81 Ajax of Amsterdam entered into a franchise agreement, whereby two local Cape Town clubs (Cape Town 
Spurs and Seven Stars) have merged to form Ajax Cape Town. Ajax took a 51 % share in the newly formed 
club, and will be able to claim first call on its promising young players. In return, the new club is now financially 
supported and identified by an internationally recognised brand name - see Simon Gardiner 'Quotas in Sport: 
Some Reflections from Europe', in Le Roux and Cornelius (eds.) Sport: The Right to Participate and Other Legal 
Issues, Selected papers from the Sports Law Conference held at the University of Cape Town, 6-7 February 
2003, at 87-8. Manchester United FC is also involved in youth-player development in South Africa, through its 
representative club FC Fortune in Cape Town (owned by Quinton Fortune, Man. United player) - Ned Kelly (with 
Eric Rowan) Manchester United: The Untold Story Michael O'Mara Books Ltd., London 2003 at 76. 
Simon Gardiner ('Quotas in Sport' at 87) observes that this trend for European clubs to establish links 
elsewhere is similar to the established practice in American sports: e.g. the recruitment of players for major 
league basketball from the Caribbean, and of players for the professional ice hockey league from Canada and 
Scandinavia. 
82 The scandal made international headlines following the proven involvement by South African national cricket 
captain, the late Hansie Cronje, in large-scale and repeated offences involving corruption and 'match fixing', 
which conduct was held (by the International Cricket Council and the UCB) to constitute conduct 'wholly inimical 
with the whole ethos of cricket'. For further reading on the 2000 match fixing scandal in cricket, see Deon 
Gouws '-and nothing but the truth?' Zebra Press, Cape Town 2000; Andre Oosthuizen & Gavin Tinkler The 
Banjo Players: Cricket's Match Fixing Scandal Riverside Publications, Hout Bay 2001; Gardiner et al Sports Law 
2"d Edition 2001 at 365 et seq; Sir Paul Condon Report on Corruption in International Cricket (Report of the 
48 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
this scandal led to the establishment of a Code of Conduct (Corruption) Commission by 
the Interriational Cricket Council, and investigations, which involved players and 
individuals from other cricketing nations, have had a significant impact on the 
international regulation of the game.83 On a more positive note, South Africa is currently 
playing a leading role in respect of the legal regulation of ambush marketing ass-ociated 
with sports events. Its legislative framework regarding this issue84 is currently considered 
as world-leading, and other jurisdictions have followed this lead in preparation for major 
events, such as the ICC Cricket World Cup in the West Indies in 2007. 85 
~ . 
24 Even though sport in South Africa is part of the global sports system and is 
increasingly faced with issues regarding interdependency and integration, certain unique 
features and characteristics of the development of sport (especially professional and -elite 
sports) do however serve to distinguish the South African experience and to call for < 
specialized and context-sensitive. treatment of issues that face those who are active in 
the developing body of sports law internationally. A prime example of such issues is the 
government-driven race-based transformation policies in sport, which also raise 
questions regarding a rather unique application of internationally-accepted standards 
relating to the autonomy of sports bodies and general condemnation in the sporting 
ICC's Anti Corruption Unit, April 2001), available online as http://www.icc-
cricket.com/corruotion/condon report.html; Judge Edwin L King Final Report: Commission of Inquiry into 
Cricket Match Fixing and Related Matters 2001, available online at 
http://www.info.gov.za/otherdocs/2001/kinqfinal.pdf; Qayyum, Justice M.M. Report of Judicial Commission, 
Pakistan Cricket Board, Lahore 1998; Central Bureau of Investigation Report on Cricket Match Fixing and 
Related Malpractices, New Delhi 2000; Simon Rae It's Not Cricket Faber & Faber 2001 at 254 et seq; Castle, T 
'Corruption in International Cricket', in i:oomey (ed) Keeping the Score: Essays in Law and Sport, Centre for 
Commercial and Corporate Law, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand (2005) at 145-155. 
83 An interesting recent development that arose from the ICC's steps to fight corruption, which is akin to 
eligibility rules in international sport but extend beyond the ambit of such rules in affecting eligibility for 
competition, is the International Cricket Council's 'Approved List of International Players'. This recent 
innovation, which amounts to a system of 'black-listing' of offending players, was introduced by the ICC in 
order to address a perceived regulatory lacuna that has arisen from the haphazard sanctions imposed by 
domestic judicial bodies in disciplinary actions against players who have contravened the ICC Code of Conduct 
(e.g. in respect of match fixing and corruption). Apparently, this instrument was felt to be necessary in order to 
maintain the ICC's control over the integrity of the game in the face of 'unsatisfactory' judicial sanctions (from 
discussion with senior executive members of the ICC, London, 12 October 2004). 
84 See par 562 et seq below, for discussion of the Merchandise Marks Amendment Act 61 of 2002, which was 
passed in the run-up to the ICC Cricket World Cup 2003. Further ambush marketing controls are contained in 
the Safety at Sports and Recreational Events Bill (see section 39; sections 19 and 22), which, at the time of 
writing, is still to be passed by Parliament. Further special measures are contemplated by means of designated 
legislation regarding the 2010 FIFA World Cup (e.g. see the 2010 FIFA World Cup South Africa Measures Act 12 
of 2006). · 
85 Compare section 25 (2) and (3) of the ICC Cricket World Cup West Indies 2007 Act, 28 of 2006, which was 
passed by the Parliament of the Republic of Trinidad & Tobago, 1 November 2006. The wording of the relevant 
sections.of this Act is nearly identical to the South African ambush marketing provisions referred to. 
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community of state intervention in the governance of sport. These issues will, because of 
their uniqueness to the South African·context, be examined in more detail elsewhere in 
this chapter. 
25 • Special recognition of the development of the law relating to sport in South Africa 
is also important ·in light of the country's specific role and position on the African 
continent. South Africa remains an economic powerhouse in Africa and boasts 
infrastructure that is comparable to many developed countries, although large sections of 
the population still live in third world conditions. On the sporting front, the country 
boasts·world-class stadia (including, especially, the newly-built and upgraded stadia for 
the 2010 FIFAWorld Cup South Africa™) and facilities such as high performance centers 
and academies; at the same time, the most basic of facilities are largely absent in many 
previously.disadvantaged (especially rural) areas. 86 Sadly, it appears that South African 
sport has not·yet sufficiently come to grips with the legacy of unequal development, and 
pervasive problems such as widespread poverty and poor service delivery (especially in 
rural areas).continue to hamper the quest to promote a culture of mass participation and 
healthy lifestyles among the masses as well as exploiting the potential for enlarging the 
pool of talent for sporting success at the higher levels. 
De?pite these and other problems, 87 South African sport promises to retain its 
potential to fulfill an important role in the wider context of regional and international 
sport. The three major sports are at the time of writing still important 'players' on the 
global stage in their respective disciplines, with two of the three fulfilling a key role in 
86 Although, at the time of writing, exciting developments are underway in respect of the development of 
facilities especially in previously disadvantaged rural areas (e.g. a joint programme between the 2010 FIFA 
World Cup Local Organising Committee and the national lottery agency to build artifical surface football pitches 
in all 52 of the SA Football Association (SAFA)'s regions). 
87 South African national teams in the three major sports enjoyed frequent success in the first decade after 
readmission. 'Bafana Bafana', the national football team, won the African Cup of Nations tournament in 1996, 
against some of the powerhouse teams of African football. South Africa not only managed to successfully host 
its first IRB Rugby World Cup in 1995, the Springboks, the national rugby team, won the tournament by 
beating the New Zealand All Blacks in the final. The SA national cricket team managed to reach the semi-finals 
of the ICC Cricket World Cup in 1992, immediately following South Africa's re-admission to world cricket late in 
1991, and quickly established itself in the 1990's as one of the top teams in the world. 
Despite these successes, however, it appears that South African sports (especially at the elite levels) have in 
the past decade struggled to come to grips with problems in respect of administration off the field of play (see, 
for example, the discussion by Le Roux, R '2003: Annus Horribilis for South African Sport?' International Sports 
Law Journal 2004/1-2 47; and in respect of the problems faced in SA rugby, see 'Turning Buffalo into 
Businessmen', in Mark Keohane Springbok Rugby Uncovered: The Inside Story of South Africa's Rugby 
Controversies Zebra Press, Cape Town.2004). 
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international competition especia-lly in the southern hemisphere and the third (football) 
having an important potential developmental role on the African continent. 
26 'Sports law' in South Africa refers mainly to an ad hoc and loosely described 
system of rules that relate to the application of general legal principles in sports-related 
cases. There is in fact no special branch of the law relating to sport; such rules that exist 
have developed on a casuistic basis and ·are more properly called the application of law to 
sport, rather than a distinct branch of ~sports laws'.88 
Accordingly, the fact that this chapter purports to deal with 'sports law in South 
Africa' is a misnomer to an extent. While dogmatically suspect, such a characterisation 
does however reflect the reality that sport in South Africa is increasingly becoming a 
frequent object of scrutiny by lawyers, academics, the judiciary; and (somewhat more 
controversially) politicians and the legislature; As the professional sports industry is 
growing in line with developments elsewhere, so the law is increasingly being thrown into 
the mix to a·ddress the plethora of disputes and issues that invariably arise with the influx 
of money. While amateur and recreational sport has.often.been the subject of legal 
action (e.g. over contractual issues,89 but most'often in respect of constitutional issues 
regarding the powers of voluntary associations, dubs, etc and in respect of disciplinary 
action involving participants),90 in professional sport, more and more commercial, 
employment, governance and other disputes are reaching courts and other. fora. It is 
especially in the period since 2000 that South African courts have delivered landmark 
88 The discussion in this chapter will not touch on the fundamental question of whether there exists a distinct 
and identifiable legal subject of 'sports law' or whether this merely encompasses the relationship between sport 
and the law, more generally. For discussion of the divergent views of Grayson, Gardiner et al and others, see 
Tebbutt in Basson & Loubser Sport and the Law in South Africa Butterworths (Looseleaf - Service Issue 5, July 
2005) 2000 at Ch 3-10. See also Beloff, Kerr & Demetriou Sports Law Hart Publishing 1999, at 5; Ken Foster 'Is 
There a Global Sports Law?' Entertainment Law Vol. 2 No. 1, Spring 2003 (Frank Cass Publishers) 1-18. 
89 Compare the judgment in Troskie v van der Walt 1994 (3) SA 545 (0) (judgment reported in Afrikaans), 
which involved an application for an order of specific performance against an amateur rugby player to play for a 
specific club and to refrain from playing for any other (interestingly, on the facts it appears that this case 
involved an incident of 'shamateurism', where an amateur player was paid to play rugby at a time when rugby 
union was an amateur sport and th·e International Rugby Board had not yet sanctioned professionalism). 
9° Commissions of inquiry into the management of sports federations and allegations of corruption have also 
been appointed periodically; for example the Pickard Commission (which investigated the SA Football 
Association in 1996) and the Browde Commission (which investigated certain financial and administrative 
aspects of the SA Rugby Football Union - the appointment of this last commission led to judicial review and the 
subsequent judgments of the Transvaal Provincial Division of the High Court in SARFU and Others v President of 
the Republic of South Africa and Others 1998 (10) BCLR1256 (T) and the Constitutional Court in President of 
.the Republic of SA and Others v South African Rugby Football Union and Others 2000 (1) SA 1 (CC) dealt with a 
number of important issues of administrative law). 
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judgments in res·petf of a number of important issues concerning sport and the law (e.g. 
on the nature of sports governing .bodies as associations and judicial review of their 
decisions,91 the powers of th'e President of the Republic to appoint a commission of 
enquiry to examine the administration of a national sports governing body, 92 and even 
what can be described as South Africa's own 'Bosman' judgment93 on transfer rules in-
professional football 94), while the Legislature -has also increasingly become involved ii") the 
regulation of sport (e.g. in respect of racial transformation95 and in terms of ad hoc 
. . 
measures to address commercial issues such as ambush marketing96). Most larg_e law 
firms have started to incorporate sports law departments (even though these often 
consist of individuals within the firm who have b~en involved in one or more sports-
related matters, or who happen to have a client with sporting links). The Sports Law 
Association.of South·Africa (.SLASA) was founded in 2002, but boasted a rather limited 
membership of academics and practitioners. The organization promised to play an 
increasingly visible role in respect of interventions in the 'industry' of sport (for example 
its marketing of an alternative dispute resolution forum for sports bodies made up of 
experts in the field, and plans to provide an introductory course on relevant legal issues 
(e.g. negotiating sports contracts, dealing with agents, etc) targeted at young athletes at 
91 Compare Cronje v United Cricket Board of SA 2001 (4) SA 1361 (TPD), which is discussed in more detail 
infra. 
92 President of the Republic of South Africa and Others v South African Rugby Football Union and Others 2001 
(1) SA 1 (CC) 
93 ASBL Union Royale Beige des Societes de Football Association & Others v Jean-Marc Bosman [1996] CMLR 
645 
94 Coetzee v Comitis and Others 2001 (1) SA 1254 (C) 
95 See, generally, the discussion regarding the public regulation of sport, infra. 
96 The Merchandise Marks Amendment Act 61 of 2002 was passed in the run-up to the ICC Cricket World Cup 
2003, as a response to the threat of ambush marketing and compliance by South Africa with its obligations (as 
host of the tournament) towards the International Cricket Council and major commercial partners of the event. 
This measure was deemed necessary as a response to what came to be known as the 'Cola wars', which took 
place during the ICC Cricket World Cup in the Asian subcontinent in 1996. While Coca-Cola was a sponsor of 
the event, hot air balloons were launched at cricket grounds bearing the branding of their rivals, Pepsi, while 
Pepsi also sponsored a number of participating players. Between that event and the 2003 World Cup, Pepsi had 
become one of cricket's 'Global Partners', the top bracket of sponsors, by signing a seven-year deal with Rupert 
Murdoch's Global Cricket Corporation. As Pepsi's conduct has been described - 'the poacher had turned 
gamekeeper' - and the organisers of the 2003 event were obliged to stamp out ambush marketing in favour of 
event sponsors such as Pepsi (see Rodney Hartman Ali: The life of Ali Bacher Viking 2004 at 417). A 
Johannesburg businessman felt the sting of measures enforced in terms of this new legislation during the 
tournament at the match between Australia and India on 15 February 2003, when he was evicted from 
Centurion stadium for drinking Coca-Cola and refusing a request by security personnel to surrender cans of the 
soft drink (he was, however, subsequently readmitted to the stadium). 
The Australian government enacted similar legislation to deal with unfair ambush marketing in the run-up to 
the 2000 Olympics. The Sydney 2000 Games (Indicia and Images) Act 1996 outlawed any unauthorised visual 
or aural representation suggesting a connection with the event - see Gardiner et al Sport Law 2001 at 513. 
Portugal also enacted similar legislation prior to the Euro 2004 football championship. 
For more on ambush marketing, see Janet Hoek 'Ambush Marketing' in Amis, J & Cornwell, B (eds.) Global 
Sport Sponsorship.Berg Publishers, Oxford & New York 2005 at 207 et seq; Wise & Meyer International Sports 
Law and Business Kluwer Law International (1997), Vol. 3 at 1965 et seq. and 2016 et seq. 
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secondary and tertiary education institutions). SLASA was disbanded in 2008 due to an 
apparent lack of interest from legal practitioners, although the time may be ripe for a 
similar organization with a more academic or research focus (in line with similar 
organizations in other jurisdictions) to be established. It is believed that research links 
with similar organizations in other jurisdictions would be mutually beneficial in the 
continuing development of international sports law. 
27 'Sports law' as a subject of academic legal study has also started to gain a limited 
foothold in tertiary education - at the time of writing a handful of universities in South 
Africa has introduced sports law courses as part of postgraduate curricula, and only one 
university (the University of Pretoria) offers this subject as a distinct field of study at 
LL.M level. A number of sports law centers or institutes have also sprung up at some 
universities, although these have yet to produce the volume and quality of research 
output as their counterparts elsewhere. 97 
28 At the time of writing, two specialist works in the field have been published to 
date, incorporating contributions from lawyers and academics who are active mostly in 
other fields of the law, and which deal with sports-related issues, although at a more 
general level.98 
97 Such as the Asser International Sports Law Centre based in The Hague, and the Football Governance 
Research Centre of the University of London. 
98 Basson & Loubser Sport and the Law in South Africa Butterworths (Looseleaf) 2000; Cloete, R (ed.) 
Introduction to Sports Law in South Africa pt Ed LexisNexis Butterworths 2005. 
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PART I ORGANIZATION OF SPORTS 
Chapter 1 Public Regulation of Sport 
§1 Introduction 
29 . This section will focus on the public regulation of sport by the state in South 
'· . 
Africa. It will proceed, by way of background information, to provide an overview of the 
system and spheres of government and the functioning of the legislature in South Africa, 
before the discussion will turn more specifically to sport and the bodies and entities that 
are active in its regulation and governance. 99 This section will continue to list the 
applicable sports-specific legislation which has emanated from the Parliament of the 
Republic, and to examine recent restructuring of the state's sports regulatory framework 
as well as recent, very significant, amendments to the most important sports legislation. 
Finally, the section will focus on detailed discussion of the issue of race-based sports 
transformation, which pervades nearly all aspects of sports regulation in South Africa and 
significantly affects the relevant governing bodies' private governance of their respective 
codes (and the related issue of the application of 'affirmative action' in (professional) 
sport, which phenomenon impacts significantly on the employment of athletes in 
professional sport and is unique to the South African jurisdiction, but may hold important 
implications for other systems). 
30 Government in South Africa consists of national, provincial and local spheres, with 
separation of powers between the legislative, executive and judicial arms of government. 
Supreme legislative authority at national level resides in Parliament, which has the power 
99 For the purposes of the discussion in this chapter, I will follow Gardiner et a/'s distinction between 
'governance' and 'regulation' (which will carry the following meanings): 
'A simple distinction can be made between sports regulation and governance. Although intertwined, regulation 
concerns outside supervision of some type, governance concerns the procedures and issues of power within the 
organisation or body itself.' 
(Gardiner, S; James, M; O'Leary, Jet al Sports Law 2"d Edition Cavendish Publishing, London 2001 at 42). 
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to make laws for the country in accordance with the Constitution. 100 Parliament consists·· 
of the National Assembly (the members elected through a system of proportional 
representation, for a term of five years) and the National Council of Provinces (consisting 
of delegates from the provinces, with the aim of representing provincial interests in the 
national sphere of government). In terms of law making, any Bill may be introduced in 
the National Assembly and must be referred to the National Council of Provinces for 
consideration after being passed by the Assembly. 101 Bills affecting provinces may be 
introduced in the Council, and if passed must be referred to the Assembly for 
consideration. Executive power vests in the Cabinet, which consists of the President of 
the Republic, the Deputy President and ministers (who are appointed by the President 
from members of the National Assembly). 
The National Assembly is elected by the people and represents the people in 
ensuring democratic governance in terms of the Constitution, which is the supreme law 
of the Republic. This function is performed by the Assembly through its powers to appoint 
the President, to provide a national forum for public consideration of issues, the passing 
of legislation, and scrutinizing and overseeing executive action (through means of 
portfolio committees). 102 
The provinces each have their own legislature (which has the power to make 
provincial laws as well as to pass a provincial constitution, which must be in line with the 
national Constitution and must be certified as such by the Constitutional Court). 
According to the Constitution, the provinces may have legislative and executive powers 
.concurrent with the national sphere over a number of areas, 103 and exclusive competency 
over a limited number104 of other areas. 105 
100 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (which was approved by the Constitutional Court on 4 
December 1996 and came into force on 4 February 1997, and succeeded the interim Constitution, the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, 200 of 1993). 
101 For more information on the process of the passing of a Bill into law, see the web site of the South African 
parliament, at http://www.parliament.gov.za. · 
102 Source: South Africa Yearbook 2004/5, chapter 12: Government - available on the internet as 
http://www.gcis.gov .za/docs/pubfications/yearbook/qovernment. pdf [last accessed 19 April 2006] 
103 As set out in Schedule 4 to the South African Constitution, 1996 
104 As set out in Schedule 5 to the South African Constitution, 1996 (and including provincial sport) 
105 Source: South Africa Yearbook 2004/5, chapter 12: Government - available on the internet as 
http://www.gcis.gov .za/docs/publications/yearbook/qovernment.pdf [last accessed 19 April 2006] 
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Local government consists of-284 municipalities, which are classed as either metropolitan 
municipalities, local municipalities or district areas or muniC:ipalities. Local government 
focuses ori growing local economies and extending the provision of services to previously 
neglected areas. 106 
~.. . ... . : :~ .•. 
§2 Government regulation of sport 
31 Sport·an'd recreation in South Africa resorts under a Ministry of Sport, with a 
dedicated governxnent department of sport and recreation (Sport and Recreation South 
Africa, or 'SRSA'texercising overarching executive power over sport at all levels of 
participation. Parliamentary oversight is vested in the parliamentary Portfolio Committee 
on Sport-and Recr:eation, which provides a forum for monitoring the Executive's 
regulation of sport and recreation in line with government policy as well as exercising an 
advisory function to Parliament and the Minister in respect of sport and recreation 
legislation. Recently, the regulatory regime of South African sport was considerably 
restructured aod supplemented by the establishment of a new, non-governmental, body 
charged with administering high performance sport, the South African Sports 
Confederation and Olympic Committee (SASCOC). The role and powers of these two 
regulatory agencies will be discussed below, after a brief examination of the current 
sports-specific legislation. 
32 Lewis & Taylor, in their discussion of the regulation of sport in Europe and the UK, 
distinguish between 'interventionist' and 'non-interventionist' models of governmental 
regulation. 107 The authors cite France as an example of the former system (which is 
common in a number of southern and eastern European states), where sport is seen as a 
public good and a social service responsibility of the State, and sports organizations are 
106 Ibid. 
107 Adam Lewis & Jonathan Taylor Sport: Law and Practice Butterworths LexisNexis 2003 5-11. See also the 
Study on National Sports Legislation in Europe, 1999 (Council of Europe, Strasbourg), discussed below 
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created and exist by virtue of government license and funding in order to perform their 
governance functions as agents of the State. 108 In contrast to the interventionist system, 
the UK has been characterized by far less intervention from government. Historically, the 
UK government 'has left sport almost entirely alone not only to organize and manage 
itself, but al.so to regulate the entire conduct of the sport, including fundamental issues of 
public interest'. 109 No general 'law of sport' had been enacted (as in countries such as 
France), and legislation and intervention by government is countenanced only as a last 
resort in response to a pressing public interest requirement. 110 In th.is latter system, 
therefore, the control and administration of sport remains essentially a private exercise 
undertaken by voluntary associations within the framework of the wider regional and 
global context of governance in a sporting code, 111 with minimal intervention and 
regulation from the State. 
Recent developments in the European context p.oint towards a recognition of the 
social function of sport, which is seen as being wider and more 'worthy of protection' 
than the economic aspects arising from the industry of professional sport. This view, as 
evidenced in the European Commission's Helsinki Report on Sport, has led to an 
approach for the Commission's function as one of promoting and safeguarding this social 
role of sport. Accompanied with this approach is the emergence of signs of another 
strand of policy, with the goals of harmonisation and co-ordination of sports p9licy 
among member states of the EU. 112 
In respect of such efforts at harmonisation, it is important to identify the different 
systems applicable in different countries, an exercise that was undertaken in the EU in 
1999 through a study by the Council of Europe. 113 Foster describes the study's division of 
countries as 'interventionist and non-interventionist' systems: 
108 Lewis & Taylor at 6 
109 Lewis & Taylor at 7 
110 Ibid. Examples of such issues of pressing public interest are child protection, anti-doping, corruption, safety 
of spectators at events, addressing hooliganism, regulating broadcasting of events of national importance and 
prestige, etc. 
111 E.g. in terms of the 'European Model' of sport 
112 See Foster in Caiger, A & Gardiner, S (eds.) Professional Sport in the EU: Regulation and Re-regulation 
T.M.C. Asser Press (2000) at 62. 
113 The Study on National Sports Legislation in Europe, 1999 (Council of Europe, Strasbourg) 
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"'Interventionist" is ... a country that has "specific legislation on the structure and mandate 
of a significant part of the sports movement." The state has a central role ... It endows 
sports federations with their right to exercise regulatory and disciplinary functions. These 
are thus public powers. that are only delegated to federations so long as they comply with 
criteria of independence, legality and democracy. The powers can be withdrawn if these 
criteria are not met or the powers are abused ... Where state intervention is reinforced with 
. . 
state funding, the threat of derecognition is a powerful regulatory tool for the state. 
By comparison, non-interventionist states regulate sports federations under the general 
private law of associations:This allows them greater freedom from state interference but 
makes them less accountable ... The chief advantage of non-interventionism is said to be 
greater flexibility. Each sport can adapt its institutions and structures to its own particular 
needs. Non-interventionist models are more organic, protecting the grassroots of the game 
and adapting to circumstances rather than being controlled from above. They are said 
therefore to be more resistant to the state's demands to allocate resources in particular 
ways such as towards elite sport.'114 
It would seem that Italy and Belgium are specific examples of a rather interventionist 
approach to the regulation of sport, which is specifically evident if one examines the 
regulation of employment of athletes and players in professional sport. Italy adopted a 
professional sports law in 1981, 115 which governs the employment of professional 
sportspersons. While sport in Belgium displays characteristics of organisation on a 
predominantly voluntary basis, 116 a Professional Sports Contract Act was enacted in 1978 
to specifically regulate professional sports employment. 117 More recently, Austria passed 
114 Foster op cit. at 62-63 
115 Law 91of1981 (Official Gazette 27 March 1981) 
116 See Luc Silance 'The Approach to Sports Policy in Belgium' in Caiger and Gardiner (eds.) Professional Sport 
in the EU: Regulation and Re-regulation T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague 2000 at 268 
117 See Valerie Collins Recreation and the Law E&FN Spon 1984 at 96. Other jurisdictions have seen similar 
developments, for example Greece (where the governance and development of professionalism in sport is 
regulated by Law 879/1979 as supplemented by Law 1958/1991). The Russian Federation has seen limited 
legislative involvement in professional sport (although the Federal Law on Physical Culture and Sports in the 
Russian Federation defines concepts such as a 'professional sportsman' (art. 2) and a 'contract on sports 
activities' (art. 25)), there has been a call for more direct legislative intervention in order to provide an 
appropriate legal basis for one of the fastest growing industries in the Russian economy - see Mikhail Loukine 
'Organisation of Professional Sports in the Russian Federation' International Sports Law Journal 2005/1-2 at 21. 
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a Professional Athletes Bill (or 'Berufssportlergesetz'), in terms .of which athletes would 
no longer be viewed as employees of clubs but rather as self-employed persons. 118 
33 It is indeed an interesting exercise to attempt to classify state regulation of sport 
in South Africa on these bases. It appears that South Africa displays a mixed system in 
respect of state intervention: We see, for instance, that legislation prescribes state 
funding to sports federations on the basis of criteria that relate inter alia to such 
federation's conduct and policies in respect of the development of disadvantaged 
groups.119 We also see that government, by way of the Minister of Sport.and Recreation, 
is empowered to determine the general policy to be pursued with regard to sport and 
recreation (which is binding on all sport and recreation bodies), including such policy 
relating to 
-
' ... 
Investing in the preparation of sport participants ~ho are elected to 
represent the Republic in major competitions; 
Helping in cementing the sports unification process; and 
Instituting necessary affirmative action controls which will ensure that 
national teams reflect all parties involved in the process. 120 
Apart from such express powers in respect of the formulation of policy, we have seen 
further moves by government of late in respect of intervention in the regulation of 
professional sport, We have, for instance, seen specific legislation enforcing 
transformation on sports federations (which legislation has, at the time of writing, not yet 
been the object of judicial scrutiny), the forging of a 'partnership' with sports federations 
regarding the formulation of transformation charters for each of the sporting codes, the 
establishment of a committee of enquiry in respect of the performance of the United 
118 See the report available online on the web site of FIFPro at 
htto: //www .fiforo.ora/index. php?mod =one&id = 12342 (visited 16 August 2005). 
119 See section 10(3) of the National Sports and Recreation Act 110 of 1998 (discussed below) 
120 Section 4 of the Act 
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Cricket Board of South Africa in transformation o_f cricket/21 as well as intervention by 
SASCOC (the South African Sports Commission and Olympic Committee) 122 in the day-to-
day management of the SA Rugby Union. 123 
'. 
34 : All these developments hint at.increased, and substantial, government 
intervention in sport. 124 The passing of the National Sport and Recreation Amendment Act 
2007 has now significantly cemented such inten7ention in legislation aimed at providing 
the basis for a much more active role for inter alia the Minister of Sport to intervene in 
matters·stich as the private governance.of sporting codes, the employment of persons·in 
sport, as well as the active enforcement of transformation of sport along racial lines. At 
the time of writing, significant draft regulations regarding the awarding of national 
colours and control over foreign sports persons have been circ::_ulated for comment by the 
federations (which will be discussed below). All these issues will be discussed in greater 
detail in the relevant following sections. 
35 On the other hand, we have seen that the judiciary, in the case of Cronje v United 
Cricket Board, 125 has elected to follow what can only amount to an embodiment of a 
'non-interventionist' model, electing to view the national governing body for cricket as a 
121 The report of this committee (dated 16 October 2002) acknowledged that the committee had no statutory 
powers - it seems that the former Minister of Sport, Mr. Ngconde Balfour, appointed it in terms of a 
'Performance Agreement' in respect of transformation concluded between the Minister and the UCBSA. The lack 
of statutory basis for such investigation, however, does not appear to be evident if one reads the 
recommendations contained in the report. For example (paragraph 7.4 of the report): 
'It appears common cause amongst all role players that there is a lamentable lack of structured co-operation 
between the Government and sporting codes. The Government has already assumed responsibility for driving 
transformation in other spheres, such as commerce and mining. It is appropriate for Government to 
play a leading role in the transformation of all spheres of society. It is therefore recommended that Sport and 
Recreation South Africa sets in motion a consultative process which will result in a National Transformation 
Charter wherein the respective roles of Government and those of the various sporting codes will be clearly 
defined. This charter should also provide for the appointment of a National Transformation Committee by the 
Minister.' 
122 See the discussion below on recent developments re regulatory structures and agencies in South African 
sport 
123 Compare the events following the controversial award of the fifth Super 14 rugby franchise in April 2005, 
which evoked condemnation by the Minister of Sport, Makhenkhesi Stofile, who had publicly supported the 
awarding of the franchise to the Eastern Cape region (in terms of the government's transformation agenda for 
rugby). 
124 It will be noted that most of the examples of increased and active government intervention in sport in South 
Africa relate to the issue of transformation and redress for past unfair discrimination in sport. This aspect of the 
landscape of SA sport will be discussed in more detail below. 
125 This judgment is discussed in more detail in par 224 below 
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'private' organisation which may thus be largely removed from judicial scrutiny as a 
result of the source of its powers. 126 
36 By way of summary, it appears that South Africa is experiencing a gradual 
paradigm shift in respect of the role of the state in the public regulation of sport, which is 
significant also in respect of the role and powers of governing bodies and sports 
federations, 127 and is relevant to a review not only of the application of the law to sport 
in South Africa but also of-the place and role of South African sport in the wider context 
of global sport and its regulation. These issues will be highlighted below where relevant. 
§3 Legislation affecting sport 
37 Sport as an activity, at all levels of participation, is generally not a highly 
regulated activity in respect of specifically-applicable legislation. Even though 
government regulation of sport is substantial, the last decade has seen relatively few 
statutes and other legislative instruments that specifically deal with sport. However, in 
light of the fact that prior to 1997 South Africa had only one statute specifically dealing 
with sport, 128 the legislative enactments in this sphere during the last decade point to a 
126 See the discussion in par 224 et seq below, and the criticism of the court's approach 
127 It should be noted that this observation should not be viewed as necessarily of general application in all 
facets and at all levels of South African sport. For example, in respect of the issue of government funding of 
private sports federations, it should be noted that at the level of elite and professional of participation in the 
three major sports, government funding plays a very limited role, while legislative control appears to be 
substantial (or at least potentially so). By way of illustration of the limited role of government funding and the 
special importance of the role of the commercial partners in this context: According to the United Cricket Board 
of SA (in a submission to the Independent Communications Authority of SA in 2003, on the listing of national 
events for the purposes of regulating exclusive broadcasting rights agreements), in the 2001/2 year 63% of its 
total income derived from the sale of broadcasting rights, while government grants accounted for 
approximately 0.1 %. During this same period, the ZAR 161 million earned by SA Rugby from broadcasting 
rights accounted for 55% of its total revenue. The SA Football Association and the Premier Soccer League 
reported that they had received no government funding during this period. The SA Sports Confederation and 
Olympic Committee (see discussio'n below) has recently called for re-evaluation of the funding model for sport 
(in a discussion paper on their web site), specifically that lottery funding should be stepped up to a minimum of 
20% (compared with the 12% or ZAR 372 million in 2004) and applied to high performance sport, with 
government's annual funding being allocated to the Department of Sport and Recreation (SRSA)'s mass 
participation programme. 
128 The Boxing and Wrestling Control Act 39 of 1954 (which has subsequently been amended substantially and 
partially repealed by the South African Boxing Act 11 of 2001) 
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commitment from government to increase its regulatory oversight in this regard. 129 At 
present, the following statutes are in force: 
The National Sport and Recreation Act, 1998; 130 
·'The South African Boxing Act, 2001; 131 and 
The South African Institute for Drug-free Sport Act, 1999. 132 
A number of potentially important and far-reaching sports-related Bills were tabled in 
Parliament (with some enacted into law) since 2005. 133 
38 ·Apart from these sports-specific statutes, a number of other Acts of .Parliament 
are of course relevant and applicable to the wide array of issues and aspects of sport that 
may arise at different levels of competition, participation, governance, etc. These include 
the following (as amended, where applicable): 
The Lotteries Act, 1997; 
The Income Tax Act, 1962; 
Taxation Laws Amendment Act, 2000; 
The Non-profit Organisations Act, 1997; 
The Fund-raising Act, 1978; 
The Trade Marks Act, 1993; 
The Corruption Act, 1992; 
The Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act, 2004; 
The Labour Relations Act, 1995; 
The Basic Conditions of Employment Act, 1997; 
129 See Kelly, M in Joubert et al The Law of South Africa Vol. 25 Part 1, First Reissue, Butterworths 2001 at par. 
125. 
130 Act no. 110 of 1998, as amended in 2007 by means of the National Sport and Recreation Amendment Act, 
18 of 2007 (discussed in more detail below). 
131 Act no. 11 of 2001 
132 Act no. 57 of 1999. 
133 These include the Safety at Sports and Recreational Events Bill, the South African Combat Sports Bill, the 
National Sport and Recreation Amendment Bill (which was enacted into law - see the discussion below), the 
Institute for Drug-free Sport Amendment Bill (which was enacted into law - see the discussion below), and the 
2010 FIFA World Cup Special Measures Acts 
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The Employment Equity Act, 1998; 
The Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination 
Act, 2000; 
The Competition Act, 1998; 
· The Merchandise Marks Amendment Act, 2003; and 
The 2010 FIFA World Cup South Africa Special Measures Acts. 
The key provisions and relevance of these statutes will be examined or referred to in the 
discussion that follows, where applicable. The following is a brief exposition of the 
important sport-specific legislative instruments passed during the past decade, and their 
key provisions. 
The White Paper on Sport and Recreation (1998) 
39 Legislative and government regulation of sport in South Africa remained limited 
following the first democratic elections in 1994, until the first important policy document 
was published in 1998: the White Paper134 on Sport and Recreation. 135 The White Paper 
had the theme of 'getting the nation to play', and dealt with sport in all its forms and 
levels of participation (namely mass participation, recreational sports and elite and 
professional sport). For the purposes of this policy document, the White Paper adopted 
the following definition of sport: 
'Any activity that requires a significant level of physical involvement and in which 
participants engage in either a structured or unstructured environment, for the purpose of 
134 A document prepared and published in order to set out government policy on a matter, and to serve as 
foundation for the development of legislation specifically dealing with such matter. 
135 A draft of the White Paper had been published in 1995, but the document was only finalised for publication 
in 1998. 
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declaring a winner, though r:iot solely so, or purely for relaxation, personal satisfaction, 
physical. health, e~otional growth and development.'136 
The basic thrust of this policy document (in terms of the structures for governance and 
regulation of sport) was the. following: 
. . . 
Oy.erall responsibility for pplicy, provision and delivery of sport resides with 
the.Department of Sport and Recreation (or 'DSR', now Sport and 
Recreation. South Af~ica); 
Parliament has the principal responsibility for defining government policy, 
. legislati.on and budget allocations :- this responsibility is exercised through 
~ . ._ - . . - . . 
the Minister of Sport and the DSR, with the Parliamentary Portfolio 
Committee on .Sport and Recreation fulfilling a monitoring role in respect of 
. the governance of sport in line with such government policy; and 
A .number of 'lead agencies' were i_dentified, with specified contractual 
_obligations in respect of the delivery of sport and recreation in line with 
goyernrllent policy - these were the National Sports Council (NSC), the 
National Olympic Committee (NOCSA), the SA Commonwealth Games 
Association (SACGA), and the national federations in the different sporting 
codes. 137 
The White Paper further identified the lack of a specific empowering statute as a major 
factor hampering the DSR and the Ministry's authority to discharge its mandate, and was 
viewed as providing the framework for enabling legislation in order to achieve its goals 
relating to a number of key priorities. These priorities were identified as relating to 
development, transformation, funding for the upgrading of facilities in disadvantaged 
136 
'Recreation' is defined as 'a guided process of voluntary participation in any activity which contributes to the 
improvement of general health, well-being and the skills of both the individual and society'. See the White 
Paper 1998, and Kelly, M in Joubert et al The Law of South Africa Vol. 25 Part 1, First Reissue, Butterworths 
2001 at par. 122. . 
137 The national federations in the three major sports in South Africa are the SA Football Association (in 
football), the SA Rugby Union and the United Cricket Board of SA. 
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communities, encouraging mass participation in sport and recreation and the 
development of active lifestyles, and to develop a high performance programme geared 
towards the preparation of elite athletes for major competitions. 
40 The two 1998 statutes138 established the SA Sports Commission (SASC) as the 
prime overall coordinating body for sport and recreation. The SASC would be a juristic 
person, funded by Parliament by means of an annual budget, and charged with 
performing its role under the guidance of and in consultation with the Minister of Sport 
and Recreation. The SASC would consist of a General Assembly, made up of· 
representatives of national federations and multi-coded sports organizations, a number of 
members elected by such General Assembly and a number of members appointed by the 
Minister. 
. - . 
The Minister of Sport was charged with the poweno determine general sport and 
recreation policy, after consultation with the ·sASC or the N·ational Olympic ·committee of 
SA (in respect of the Olympic Games). Policy so developed by the Minister would be 
binding on all sport and recreation bodies in SA, including·national federations. 
The legislation further provided that national federations would be members of the 
SASC, if they met the Commission's recognition criteria. 
Finally, the SASC was provided with wide powers (and duties) in respect of 
advising the Minister on issues relating to sports and recreation policy, as well as powers 
in respect of funding of federations and other sport and recreation bodi_es. 
41 · The system established in terms of these two Acts placed extensive powers 
relating to the development and promotion of government139 sports policy in the hands of 
the Minister and the SASC. In respect of the national federations, this meant that they 
were now constrained in the performance of their private governance functions to align 
138 The National Sport and Recreation ·Act and the South African Sports Commission Act - see the discussion 
supra 
139 At national level - Provincial legislatures were empowered to formulate their own policies on sport and 
recreation. The Free State Province (previously the Orange Free State) was the first to do so, and published its 
Green Paper on Sport and Recreation: 'Getting Free State Active' in 1998 (Free State Provincial Gazette 42 
Notice 7, 21 May 1998). 
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such governance with government policy. In fact, the legislation provided specific 
mechanisms to ensu·re compliance by federations, of which the following are examples: 
The SASC was empowered to determine recognition criteria for 
membership by national federations, and to withhold membership (sec 5, 
National Sport and Recreation Act); 
The lever of funding could be used by the SASC to encourage federations 
to toe the line, e.g. in respect of transformation (see section 10, National 
Sport and Recreation Act); and 
The SASC would, through its National Colours Board (established by 
regulation) control the awarding of national· colours to representatives of 
national federations. .,._ ·-~ .. 
42 The main area where intervention in the autonomy of sports federations 
(especially by the Minister) came to the fore during the past few years has been in 
respect of the overarching policy ·objective of race-based transformation. Government 
policy on transformation runs like a golden thread through the provisions of the 
legislation, and has been the staging ground for the most visible form of active 
government intervention in private sports governance in recent years. 140 
§4 Recent developments in the restructuring of sports regulation 
43 Following South African athletes' poor performance at the Olympic Games in 
Sydney in 2000, 141 the former Minister of Sport, Mr. Ngconde Balfour, appointed a 
Ministerial.Task Team to investigate the state of high performance sport. The team's 
remit was to make recommendations to address factors that impact negatively on SA 
teams' and athletes' sporting performances in international competition. 
140 The role of race-based transformation in South African sport will be discussed in much more detail below 
141 Athletes from Team South Africa managed to win only 2 silver and 3 bronze medals · 
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The Task Team's report identified a number of fundamental problems, which related 
mainly to the dysfunctional fragmentation of governance structures in sport and 
recreation, and which contributed to duplication and replication of functions and wasteful 
expenditure. It was specifically recognized that the Department of Sport and Recreation 
was challenged in respect of its capacity to deliver, specifically on the mass participation 
mandate envisaged by the White Paper (e.g. in the provision of infrastructure and 
facilities, etc). The report recommended that sports governance structures should be 
rationalized, in line with the 1998 White Paper's first key priority. 142 .. 
44 Cabinet endorsed the report's recommendations on 25 June 2003, proposing the 
establishment of only two regulatory structures for sport and recreation, namely an 
expanded Department of Sport and Recreation (to be known as Spo_rt and. Recreation 
South Africa, or SRSA'), and a new non-governmental umbrella sports structure. A 
Steering Committee was appointed to implement the Cabinet decision. After wide 
consultation, it was recommended that the new structure be established in two General 
Assemblies. For this purpose, a co-operation agreement was signed on 19 August 2003 
between the various existing overarching or 'macro-sports' bodies, including the SA 
Sports Commission (which acted in this regard as a representative body of its then 
members, the national sports federations). This process led to the establishment of the 
new umbrella body, the South African Sports Confederation and Olympic Committee 
(SASCOC). 
45 SASCOC was established on 27 November 2004, to replace the SA Sports 
Commission. This process was accompanied by the passing of the SA Sports Commission 
Repeal Act, in 2005. Since 1 April 2005, SASCOC has assumed the role of the supreme 
sports governing body in the country. SASCOC and the government sport department 
(Sport and Recreation SA) have now each been allocated specific functions. The SRSA 
142 Priority 1 of the White Paper (1998) provides as follows: 'To confirm roles and streamline the responsibilities 
of the various stakeholders in sport and recreation to ensure that coordination and economies of scale are 
realized'. 
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has taken responsibility primarily·for"grassr:oots, mass-based, community:-oriented sport 
and recreation"activities. SASCOC ·has taken responsibility for South Africa's high 
performance sports programme, taking over the functions performed in this regard by 
the prevfous DISSA143 , NOC144, SACGA145 , USSASA146, SASSU 147 , SASC and Department 
of Sport·and Recreation. 
·' 
46 SASCOC was established as a section 21-company148 (non-profit organization). It 
is proclaimed to be the 'supreme non-governmental macro sports body' in South Africa. 
The organization is .publicly funded through the Ministry of Sport, as well as through 
national lottery awards and the sourcing of private sponsorships. The SA Sports 
Confederation~s-specific mandate relates to the promotion and development of high 
performance sport,149 and includes responsibility for the preparation and delivery of Team 
South Africa to multi-sport international games such as the Olympics, Paralympics, 
Commonwealth Games, World Games and All Africa Games; 150 affiliation and/or 
recognition by the appropriate international, continental and regional sports organizations 
as the recognized entity for the Republic of South Africa; 151 the establishment, 
monitoring·, coordination and management of an academy system for sport; 152 the 
selection (on recommendation from national federations) of multi-sport teams for 
143 Disability Sport South Africa 
144 The National Olympic Committee of SA (now incorporated in SASCOC) 
145 The SA Commonwealth Games Federation 
146 The United School Sports Association of SA 
147 The SA Students' Sports Association 
148 In terms of the Companies Act, 1973. The 'section 21 company' is a special type of privileged company 
limited by guarantee (a public company), which is incorporated not for commercial purposes but for the lawful 
promotion of religion, art, science, education, charity, recreation or for any other cultural or social activity, or 
communal or group interests. Such company is an 'association not for gain', and its profits must be applied to 
promote its main object. Dividends may not be paid to members. Upon its winding-up, deregistration or 
dissolution the assets of the association remaining after satisfaction of liabilities shall be transferred to some 
other association(s) or institution(s) with objects similar to its main objects. Such a company is required to 
have the phrase 'Association incorporated under section 21' as the last words of its name. See section 21 of Act 
61 of 1973; Gibson South African Mercantile and Company Law 81h edition Juta & Co. Ltd 2003 at 264; Basson 
op cit. Ch 4-22. 
149 
'High performance sport' is defined in article 1.24 of SASCOC's Articles of Association (filed in terms of 
section 60(1) and regulation 18 of the Companies Act, 1973) as 'the high level participation in major, 
international sporting events including but not limited to world championships and other international multi-
sport events such as Olympic Games, Commonwealth Games, Paralympic Games and All Africa Games'. 
150 See section 2 of SASCOC's Memorandum of Association (filed in terms of section 54(1) and regulation 17(3) 
of the Companies Act, 1973) 
151 Section 4.2 of SASCOC's Memorandum of Association 
152 SASCOC Memorandum sec. 6.3.2 
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international and·representative competitions at all levels; 153 and overseeing the bidding 
for and hosting of major and international sporting everits154 (including the power to 
withhold approval to national sports federations or persons registered with such 
federations to participate in multi-sports events at national and international level 155 ). 
Amongst the quite significant powers of SASCOC vis a vis national sports federations in 
the ·execution of their private governance functions in their respective sporting codes, is 
the power (through the organisation's National Executive Board) to inquire into the 
administrative and/or·financial affairs of member federations and, where necessary, to 
recommend corrective measures-in this regard (and even to make recommendations.to 
take over the administrative and/or financial affairs of a member until such affairs are 
put on a satisfactory footing); as well as the power to award national colours to 
federations and spbrts persons: 1-~6 More will be said below regarding draft Regulations in 
respect of national colours, which are currently envisaged at the time of writing. 
47 SASCOC has, since its establishment, introduced four commissions to address 
matters relating to it.s mandate. These are the National Colours Commission, the High 
Performance Commission, the.Medical and Scientific Commission, and the Athletes 
Commission. 157 Despite SASCOC's already substantial powers in respect of the regulation 
of high performance sport, the organisation has had a rather chequered start to its 
activities. rhe main problems experienced in its first 18 months of operation related to 
staffing, 158 an apparent lack of funding and of clear lines of financial support from 
government and lottery funds, 159 problems in incorporating one of the main organisations 
it was intended to replace (Disability Sport SA) in its organisation, 160 and a highly 
publicised instance of proposed intervention in the affairs of one of the major national 
153 SASCOC Memorandum sec.6.3.3 
154 SASCOC Memorandum sec. 4.4 · 
155 Article 21 of SASCOC's Articles of Association 
156 SASCOC Memorandum sec. 6.3.1 
157 From the SASCOC CEO's report for the period 1 October - 19 November 2005, available on the 
organisation's web site at http://www.sascoc.co.za 
158 Especially the process· of merging staff from the constituent organizations SACGA, DISSA, SASSU and 
NOCSA. See the SASCOC CEO's report for the period 1 April - 30 September 2005, which is available on the 
organisation's web site at http://www.sascoc.co.za (last visited 23 October 2006). 
159 Ibid. 
160 See the report by Mr. Moss Moshishi contained in the SASCOC President's Corner July 2006, available on the 
organisation's web site at http://www.sascoc.co.za (last visited 23 October 2006). 
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federations in terms of the powers contained in the organisation's articles of 
associ~tion .. ~ 61 More rece,ntly, SASCOC received very vocal and wide-spread criticism 
following Team South Africa's dissapointing performance at the 2008 Olympic Games in 
Beijing. 
§5 The 2008 amendments to the National Sport and Recreation Act 
48 Following the restructuring of the government regulatory system in the wake of 
the Ministerial Task Team report of 2002, referred to earlier, the general perception has 
been that both the agencies charged with regulating mass participation (the SRSA) and 
high performance.sport (SASCOC) have failed rather dismally in delivering on 
expectations for real improvements to sport at the different levels. SRSA has been 
frequently criticised for the failure to contribute substantially to problems regarding the 
provision of infrastructure; development programmes and, generally, promotion of 
opportunities for access to sport at the lower levels. SASCOC has been hampered 
significantly by internal teething problems regarding staffing and the carry-over of 
functions, structures and personnel from the disbanded SA Sports Commission, while 
also having trouble in receiving recognition and acceptance of its role from a number of 
sports federations. 
49 In the midst of all this, the first half of 2006 saw the drafting of significant new 
sports legislation, dealing inter alia with preparations for the 2010 FIFA World Cup South 
Africa™ and doping regulation. One of the most important and potentially far-reaching 
Acts that emanated from Parliament since 2006 is the National Sport and Recreation 
161 This last was the appointment, in May 2005, of a three-member interim committee to manage the affairs of 
the SA Rugby Union following rifts in the administration of the Union (which process was averted when warring 
individuals within the Union declared a truce in order to resolve differences 'in the interests of South African 
rugby' (see the report by Zeena Isaacs entitled 'SASCOC never wanted to take over rugby - Moshishi', in 
Business Day, available on the web at · 
htto://www.businessday.co.za/articles/specialreports.aspx?ID=BD4A50376 [posted 30 May 2005 - last visited 
23 October 2006]. The appointment was made in terms of sec. 8.3.1.3 of SASCOC's articles of association. 
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Amendment Act, 18 of 2007. On 16 May.2007 the National Assembly passed the National 
Sport and Recreation Amendment Bill, amending the key piece of legislation regulating 
South African sport and its governance, namely the National Sport and Recreation Act 
110 of 1998. The Amendment Act was subsequently accepted by the National Council of 
Provinces and was signed into law by the former President of the Republic of South 
Africa, Mr. Thabo Mbeki, in November 2007. The major amendments that have been 
effected to the 1998 Act will be considered b~iefly. 
50 Chief amongst these amendments are the provisions aimed at substituting 
SASCOC for the now-defunct SA Sports Commission, a legislative development that has 
been long overdue and serves to fill a· lacuna in respect of the processes for the 
establishment of the organisation over the last couple of years. 162 The proposed role of 
SASCOC in the new two-tiered regulatory regime of SA sport permeates the whole of the· 
amendments contained in the Act. · 
This discussion will only mention a few of these amendments, which are deemed 
to be most relevant to the powers of SASCOC and serve to point to the legislative vision 
for the future role of this organisation il'.l regulating South African sport. In essence, the 
main amendments relate to the powers of SAS~OC and those of the Minister for Sport 
and Recreation. 
51 Section 2 of the Amendment Act deals with the demarcation of SASCOC's role in 
sports regulation, and provides as follows: 
'Sec. 2 (1) SASCOC will be the only recognised national co-ordinating macro body 
for the promotion and development of high performance sport and 
recreation in the Republic; 
162 Following the passing·of the SA Sports Commission Repeal Act, 2005, and the establishment of SASCOC as 
supreme macro-sports body from 1 April 2005, the organisation has apparently been operating without 
legislative legitimacy. Prior to the passing of the amendments to the National Sport and Ri;sr~<2tion Act SASCOC 
appears to have been operating in a state of limbo as a relative 'non-entity' in respect of-its regulatory 
activities. See also Cloete (ed.) Introduction to Sports Law in South Africa Butterwort~ LexisNexis, Durban, 
2005 at 8 I 
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· (2) SASCOC may, .from time to time, develop guidelines for the promotion 
~nd. developm~~t of high perfo:mance sport and recreation; 
(3)(a) ... 
(3)(b) SASCOC may, in wr.iting, require a government minis_try, 
department, province or local authority to consult with it in relation to the 
activities referred to in paragraph (a); 163 
(4) All sports and recreation bodies must consult and co-ordinate with 
SASCOC on any matter that has been prescribed by regulation-.' 
52 Section 6(2) of the Act provides that '[n]ational federations must actively 
.. ' ~ .. ~ 
participate in and support programmes and services of Sport and Recreation South Africa 
and of the Sports Confederati;n-, i'n so far' ~s high· pe~formance sport is concerned'. 
Section S(a) of the Amendment Act has substitute-d (in section 4 of the principal A-ct) 
SASCOC for the defunct Sports Commission in respect of its role in consultation with the 
Minister of Sport in determining general policy to be pursued in sport and recreation, and 
- •. 
sec. S(b) has substituted SASCOC for the.SASC In the role of determining priorities for 
the allocation of funding by the Minister for the creation and upgrading of basic multi-
purpose sport and recreation facilities. Section 12( 1) of the Amendment Act has 
substituted SASCOC for the SASC in section 11 of the principal Act, with the 
responsibility.to establish a national colours board which will consider all applications for 
the awarding of national colours. 
53 It is submitted that a rather troubling aspect of the above amendments to the Act 
is that the measure of coercion in respect of membership of SASCOC has now received 
legislative sanction: Federations will now be forced through the provisions of the Act to 
obtain membership of the organization. This issue of involuntary membership was raised 
by the SA Rugby Union in its submission to Parliament regarding the Amendment Bill. 
163 Section 2(3)(a) of the Act provides that '[e]very government ministry, department, province or local 
authority may carry out sporting or recreational activities or activities relating to physical education, sport and 
recreation, including training programmes and development of leadership qualities.' 
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Specifically, SARU claimed that the proposed amendments would result in national 
federations being 'statutorily included as members of SASCOC164 and that, accordingly, 
such amendments are open to constitutional challenge in terms of section 18 of the Bill 
of Rights, the right to freedom of association. 165 
The consequences of membership of SASCOC are of course far-reaching. Member 
sports federations or bodies will be subject to the organisation's constitution as contained 
in the articles of association, and will be bound by any rules, regulations or directives 
issued by SASCOC. 166 SASCOC's rules may furthermore regulate any matters relating to 
· membership, including any amendments to a member federation's constitution. 167 In 
fact, and this is a power that might be very relevant to any federation that intends to 
restructure the commercial operations relating to the professional arm of its sporting 
code 168 , SASCOC is also empowered to review any intende_d ag_reement between a 
member federation and a company that may change the status of the federation and its 
affiliation with SASCOC. 169 
54 Another significant concern regarding SASCOC and it operations is found in the 
nature of proceedings at its general meetings (the supreme decision-making forum of the 
organization). Here one should consider the respective voting rights of the member 
federations. While it is clear to all that the three major professional and elite sports in 
South Africa are soccer, rugby union and cricket, the relative importance of the national 
federations in these disciplines as 'breadwinners' of SA sport does not appear to enjoy 
any recognition. According to a schedule to SASCOC's memorandum, which lists the 
voting rights of member federations, the SA Football Association and SA Rugby Union 
each has 3 votes at general meetings, while the United Cricket Board has 1 vote. 170 This 
164 See par. 4.8.2 of the SARU memorandum to its presentation to Parliament, 13 October 2006 
165 See par. 2.5 et seq. of the SARU memorandum 
166 See also the memorandum to the SARU submission to Parliament referred to supra, at par. 4.8.3 
167 Clause 7 .1.6 of SASCOC's articles of association; par. 4.8 of the memorandum to the SARU submission 
supra. 
168 E.g. as was done in recent years in the three major professional sports of football, rugby and cricket 
169 Clause 7 .5 of SASCOC's articles 
170 Voting rights are determined in accordance with the provisions of par 15 of the Articles of Association. While 
the size of the registered membership of a federation is one of the factors determining the allocation of 
additional votes, additional votes are also allocated (apparently also to relatively small federations) based on 
their participation in the Olympic Games, the Commonwealth Games and/or the All Africa Games. 
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raises questions when one considers 'the voting rights of some other, traditionally much 
smaller and (frankly) less important federations - compare the SA Hockey Association, 
SA Shooting.Sport Federation, SA Weightlifting Federation and SA Wrestling Federation, 
each with four votes. In fact, it appears that the United Cricket Board has the same 
voting powers as the SA Drum Majorette Association, the SA National Scrabble Playe_rs' 
Association and the SA Sheep Shearing Federation. 
55 Some of the most significant amendments to the National Sport and Recreation 
Act relate to section 13 of the principal Act, which deals with dispute resolution in 
sporting codes (and, accordingly, holds - apart from the funding allocation provisions 
and, possibly, the above amendments regarding membership ofSASCOC - the most 
direct potential to affect the private governance of sporting codes). Apart from the 
substitution of references to the SJ\SC with references _to SASCOC, the most fundamental 
amendments were effected by means of section 13(d) of the Amendment Act, which 
provides for the addition of subsections (5) t~ ( 10) to section 13 of the Act, as follows: 
, '(5) . Notwithstanding subsection ( 4 ), 171 the Minister may intervene in any dispute or 
alleged mismanagement, or any other related matter in sport or recreation which is 
likely to bring a sport or recreational activity into disrepute. 
(6) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (5), the Minister may not intervene in 
matters relating to the selection of teams. 
(7) In intervening in terms of subsection (5), the Minister may -
(a) refer the matter for mediation; or 
(b) issue a directive. 
171 Section 13(4) of the principal Act in its previous form provided as follows: 
'[SASCOC - as per amendment by section 13(c) of the Amendment Act, previously 'the SASC'] may, at any 
time, of its own accord, cause an investigation to be undertaken to ascertain the truth within a sport or 
recreation body, where allegations of -
(a) any malpractice of any kind, including corruption, in the administration; 
(b) any serious or disruptive divisions between factions of the membership of the sports or recreation 
body; or · 
(c) continuation or maintenance of any institutionalized system or practice of discrimination based on 
gender, race, religion or creed, or violation of the rights and freedoms of individuals or any law, 
have been made, and may ask the Minister to approach the President of the Republic to appoint a commission 
of inquiry referred to in section 84(2) of the Constitution.' 
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. (8) Before.issuing a directive under subsection (7)(b), the Minister must, by vyrit_ten 
notice served on the relevant parties -
(a) notify the relevant parties of the allegations and of his or. her intention .to 
issue a directive; and 
(b) give the parties the opportunity to respond within 30 days. 
(9) SASCOC may, for the purposes of subsection (7), submit its recommendations for 
the resolution to the problem to the Minister. 
( 10) Without derogating from the rights of the affected parties, a decision taken in 
terms of subsection (7) shall be binding on the parties.' 
By way of summary of the amendments in respect of dispute resolution as effected by 
section 13 of the Amendment Act: 
Every sport or recreation body m·ust, in accordance with its internal 
procedures and remedies provided for in its constitution, resolve ariy 
dispute:arising among its members or with its governing body (section 
13(1)(a); 
Sport o( recreation bodies are in terms of the amended s 13(1)(b) of the 
Act obliged to notify the Minister in writing of any dispute arising between 
its members or with its governing body, as soon as it becomes aware of 
such dispute; 
SASCOC (or 'the Sports Confederation', in terms of the wording of the Act) 
must notify the Minister in writing of any dispute referred to it by a sport 
or recreation body in terms of s 13(2)(a); 
The amended s 13(3) now provides that SASCOC ('the Sports 
Confederation') must in relation to any such dispute referred to it notify 
the relevant parties of the allegations, invite the parties to make 
representations to it, convene where necessary an inquiry into the dispute, 
and in accordance with the provisions of the Promotion of Administrative 
Justice Act (No. 3 of 2000) 'notify the parties of the decision'; 
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In respect of the insertion of ss (5) to (8) in s 13 of the Act, the Minister 
has now been.clothed with quite far-reaching powers of intervention in 
disputes. These include the right to intervene 'in any dispute, alleged 
mismanagement, or any other related matter in sport or recreation that is 
likely to bring a sport or recreational activity into disrepute'; 
. The Minister is furthermore empowered to intervene in 'any non 
. compliance with guidelines or policies issued in terms of s 13A172 or any 
measures taken to protect or advance persons or categories of persons, 
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination as contemplated in sedion 9(2) of 
the Constitution', by referring the matter for mediation or issuing a 
directive; ·: · ~ . 
The· amended ·s 13(5)(b) provides that the Minister may not-'inter.fere in 
matters relating to the selection of teams, administration of sport and · 
appointment of, or termination of the service of, the executive members of 
the sport or recreation body'; 
If a national federation fails to adhere to the decision of a mediator or a 
directive issued by the Minister in terms of s 13(5), the Minister.may direct 
Sport and Recreation SA to refrain from funding such federation and notify 
the federation in writing that it will not be recognised by Sport and 
Recreation SA (amended s 13(5)(c)); and 
Finally, the amended s 13(8) provides that, subject to the Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act, 2000 and 'without derogating from the rights of 
the affected parties, a decision taken in terms of subsection (5) shall be 
binding on the parties'. 
172 Section 13A as inserted in the Act provides that '[t]he Minister must issue guidelines or policies to promote 
equity, representivity and redress in sport or recreation'. This section will be discussed below. 
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The reader is referred to discussion elsewhere in this chapter (on dispute resolution in 
sport) for criticism of the extensive powers that have now been afforded to SASCOC and 
the Minister of Sport to intervene in private dispute resolution. 173 
56 Finally, it should- be-noted that section 14 of the Amendment Act also provides 
significant powers to the Minister of Sport in respect of regulating important aspects of 
sport and its private governance. Section 14, which deals with the making ofregulations, 
provides that the Minister may, after consultation with the Sports Confederation in so far 
as high performance sport is concerned, make regulations as to a number of aspects, 
inter alia hosting of and bidding for major international sports events, the awarding of 
national colours in a sport, the recognition of sport or recreation bodies, the control of 
foreign sports persons in South Africa, and, generally, 'any.other matter in respect of 
which the Minister may deem it necessary or expedient to make regulations in order to 
achieve the objects of this Act'. 
These powers are clearly very wide and empower the Minister to regulate virtually all 
aspects of sport and of-its private governance. The discussion elsewhere in this chapter 
will examine draft Regulations that are, at the time of writing, apparently being 
envisaged in terms of these provisions. 
§6 The nature of SASCOC as a regulatory entity 
57 It remains to briefly consider another potential problematic issue, which relates to 
the nature of SASCOC as a regulatory entity. The SA Sports Confederation and Olympic 
Committee was established as a company without a share capital, in terms of section 21 
of the Companies Act of 1973. 174 This type of company is an association not for gain (or 
non-profit organization); a company incorporated not for commercial purposes but 
having as its main object the lawful promotion of religion, art, science, education charity, 
173 See the discussion in par 195 et seq below 
174 Act 61 of 1973 (as amended) 
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recreation, or any other cultural or social activity or communal or group interests175 (in 
this case relating to sport). In terms of South .African law, a company is essentially a 
partnership of which the shareholders (or members) are partners, but with a very 
different juristic nature - through incorporation (and obligatory registration under the 
Companies Act) a corporation is not simpl:y- ar.i association of individuals but a separate 
juristic person. 176 
The basis for incorporation of a section 21-company is found in the agreement 
between its members, the memorandum of association registered in terms of the 
Companies Act. The memorandum is the charter of the company, which 'defines the 
limits beyond which the company cannot go and serves as public notice, on registration, 
of facts of primary importance about the company in which persons dealing with it are 
interested and such persons are deemed to have constructive notice of the contents'. 177 
The memorandum states (inter alia) the purpose for which the company is incorporated 
and the main object it is to promote. Along with the memorandum, a company must also 
register its articles of association, which are the internal regulations of the company and 
subordinate to the memorandum. 
From the above it is clear that the provenance of a company (also a section 21 
company) remains essentially private in nature; companies are commercial or non-profit 
entities that function in civil society, distinct from the organs of the state. Apart from the 
requirements and benefits (in respect of separate legal personality) associated with 
legislatively prescribed registration of the entity, it remains based in the private 
agreement between the members. 
This essentially private nature of SASCOC may prove to be problematic, as it 
appears to depart from the traditional concept of state regulation of sport (and of a 
separation of functions between the private and public spheres of power). The author has 
expressed the (cynical) view elsewhere that, in light of the frequent and vocal criticism of 
175 Companies Act section 21(1)(b) '\-
115 See Dadoo Ltd v Krugersdorp Municipa/Council 1920 AD 530; Webb & Co Ltd v Northern Rifles 1908 TS 
462; and Gibson South African Mercantile and Company Law 8th Edition Juta & Co Ltd (2003) at 259 et seq.; 
Bamford The Law of Partnership and Voluntary Association in South Africa 3rd Edition Juta & Co Ltd (1980).at 
229 et seq. 
177 Gibson op cit 275 
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the government's regulation of and intervention in sport (also, specifically; in respect of 
the sports transformation agenda which is discussed elsewhere in this chapter), it is not 
inconceivable that SASCOC has been established largey to act as a buffer against such 
criticism, or to provide government with a semantic 'out' when accused in future of 
interfering in the governance of sport. 17~ ·It is not within the scope of this chapter to 
examine possible concerns in this regard, although the author has done so elsewhere. 179 
178 Compare the following statement by the Minister of Sport, Mr Makhenkesi Stofile (as quoted in an article 
entitled "Brian sidesteps govt tackle" (2005-05-24), available online as 
http://www.news24.com/News24/Sport/Rugby/0,6119,2-9-838_1710265,00.html last accessed 2006-11-10): 
'Challenged on government 'interference' in sport, [the Minister] said: "I think we must be careful what 
language we use. There is a difference between interference and intervention. Those are two different things ... 
That's not a government interfere.nee. It's a Sascoc intervention, and Sascoc is not government"'. [Emphasis 
provided] 
179 Louw, A M 'Evaluating Recent Developments in the Governance and Regulation of South African Sport: Some 
Thoughts and Concerns for the Future' International Sports Law Journal 2006/1-2, May 2006; Louw, AM 'Why 
South African Sport Should Say No to a State-Sanctioned SASCOC Autocracy - Part 1: The background and 
nature of SASCOC' - (2007) Vol. 2 De Jure 257-276; Louw, AM 'Why South African Sport Should Say No to a 
State-Sanctioned SASCOC Autocracy - Part 2: Questioning the legitimacy of SASCOC' (2008) Vol. 1 De Jure 16-
35 
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§7 Sports Regulation and Race-Based Transformation of South African 
Sport180 
I Introduction 
58 In recent years, government intervention in South African sport (especially rugby 
and cricket, but also other codes) has been most visible and controversial in respect of 
the issue of racial transformation. Following the birth of the new democratic dispensation 
in 1994 and the subsequent rationalization and unification of our sports and sports 
structures, 181 the institutionalization of efforts and measures aimed at ensui"ing sports 
teams that are representative of the wider South African population have touched on all 
4 • 
aspects o(sport in the country, including its go~ernance and regulation. South Africa's 
history and.legacy of social injustice has forced this issue on the country; "this is 
.• 
something that has found unique application in the domestic context. Accordingly, for 
exam.pie, the consistent linking of government funding of sport to transformation issues 
constitutes a unique phenomenon in the wider context of global sports regulation; 
government's interventionist role in respect of issues that are traditionally viewed 
elsewhere as of 'sporting interest only' (e.g. team selection), poses unique challenges to 
sports governance in the wider context of international sports governing bodies and their 
governance interest in international competition. 182 
180 The material covered in this section on race-based transformation of South African sport is based 
substantially on the author's following series of articles: 
Louw, AM '"Should the Playing Fields be Levelled?" Revisiting Affirmative Action in Professional Sport - Part 1: 
The Background and the Context' Stellenbosch Law Review Vol. 15 No 1 (2004) 119-136; Louw, AM '"Should 
the Playing Fields be Levelled?" Revisiting Affirmative Action in Professional Sport - Part 2: The Professional 
Sporting Context' Stellenbosch Law Review Vol. 15 No 2 (2004) 225-246; Louw, AM '"Should the Playing Fields 
be Levelled?" Revisiting Affirmative Action in Professional Sport - Part 3: Testing the 
Legitimacy of Affirmative Action in Professional Sport' Stellenbosch Law Review Vol. 15 No 3 (2004) 409-428. 
The material is used here with the permission of the publishers, Juta & Co. The Stellenbosch Law Review may 
be accessed at http://www.jutalaw.co.za/cataloque/itemdisplay.jsp?item id=3603 
181 See the discussion in par 7 et seq above 
182 Not to mention other role-players and stakeholders with significant interest in SA sport, including sponsors 
and commercial partners such as broadcasters 
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59 Justice Lex Mpati has outlined the role of the State in the regulation of sport as 
follows: 
~· . 
'The State's major role in sport is to regulate and facilitate sporting activities. It 
does so as the protector, and custodian of a country's social values. Sporting 
organisations, as mainly voluntary associations, are, in principle, independent from 
State intervention.'183 
In the South African context, and specifically its racially segregated legacy in all areas of 
society, and especially sport, this role of 'facilitation of sporting activities' assumes a 
unique character. 184 Du~ to the fact that the majority of South Africans were excluded 
from sport, at all levels, before the country's readmission to international sport in 
1991, 185 the Sta~e'.s role and function in the regulation and facilitation of sport ~n the n~w 
democratic order ~as a distinctly political flavour, which displays an undercurrent of more 
pervasive issues of social and cultural ideals and realities. As in most other ~reas of 
modern South African society, the issue of transformation has assumed a central role in 
the regulation of sport at all levels, from the development of athletes from all races at 
school and junior.level, to elite competition in professional sport. 186 
60 In a sense, the 'transformation agenda' has significantly altered the character of 
state regulation of sport: Under the apartheid system, sport was clearly also politicised 
183 Mpati 'Sport, public policy and the role of.the State', in Basson & Loubser Sport and the Law in South Africa 
Blltterworths (Looseleaf) at Ch 2-9 
184 /For more on the history of apartheid sport and the influence of politics in sport in South Africa, see Gouws, J 
Spprt Management: Theory and Practice Knowledge Resources 1997 at 184-189; Jarvie in Jarvie, G (ed) Sport, 
Racism and Ethnicity Falmer Press 1991 at 175 - 189; Mpati 'Sport and Politics', in Basson & Loubser Sport and 
the Law in South Africa Butterworths (looseleaf) CH 2-1 et seq, John Nauright Sport, Cultures and Identities in 
South Africa David Philip, Cape Town 1997; Bruce Murray and Christopher Merrett Caught Behind: Race and 
Politics in Springbok Cricket Wits University Press 2004; Jarvie, G Class, Race and Sport in South Africa's 
Political Economy Routledge, London .1985; Lapchick, R.E. The Politics of Race and International Sport: The 
Ca?e of South Africa Greenwood, Westport 1975; Osborne, P Basil D'Oliveira - Cricket and Conspiracy: The 
Un,told Story Little Brown, London 2004; Rodney Hartman Ali: The life of Ali Bacher Viking 2004. 
185
'The International Olympic Committee readmitted South Africa on 9 July 1991, after the country had been 
expelled by the IOC in 1970 with a 35:28 vote (the IOC had earlier, in 1964, withdrawn South Africa's invitation 
to !participate in the Tokyo Olympic Games); South African cricketers became the first team to play in official 
inti=rnational competition in November 1991, with a hastily organised tour to India to replace the Pakistan team 
who had withdrawn from their Indian tour due to threats by anti-Muslims. 
186 See also Louw, A M 'Should the Playing Fields be Levelled? Revisiting Affirmative Action in Professional Sport' 
2004 Stellenbosch Law Review Vol 15 No 1 129, Vol 15 No 2 225, Vol 15 No 3 409; and Louw, A M 
'Transforming South African Professional Sport: Some Observations on Recent Developments' Law, Democracy 
& pevelopment Butterworths LexisNexis 2005 (2) Vol. 9 193 
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by the ruling elite, and .developments such as the orchestrated and systematised isolation 
of South African sport by the outside world contributed to a situation where the State 
frequently intervened more significantly in the regulation of sport than would be 
expected in light of the traditional notion of sporting activity as a social phenomenon that 
has a. fundamentally private and voluntary nature. However, sport in the new 
dispensation has been actively targeted as a social force for transforming wider society, 
for redressing the inequalities caused by apartheid and for building a unified, 'rainbow' 
nation. This could be characterised as a healing process: 
'Since the country's transition to a _democratic order, South African sport has been in a 
state C?f convalescence. The present government has taken it upon itself to work in 
partnership with st.akeholders in sport .... for the upliftment of sport in general.'187 
" : ·- ~ .... . .. . ~ .. . 
Accordingly, $tate regulation of sport has experienced a fundamental shift, which 
·I .. • 
appears.to .be contrary to developments in the regulation of sport in other jurisdictions . 
. ,,. ... 
While the United Kingdom and the European Union have witnessed developments in 
increased governmental r:egulation of sports organisations and the formation of 
partnerships between government and governing bodies, in South Africa this 
'partnership' h9~ a significantly different character. In fact, we have seen indications that 
government has_ undertaken a number of initiatives to usurp the power of sports 
organisations; while such efforts have involved legislative action, it has also involved 
more direct ar:id active intervention in governance of the professional sports industry. 
Coupled with these initiatives has been a fundamental restructuring of the organisational 
structures charged with the ~dministration of sport. The often-expressed public 
perception (both in South Africa and elsewhere) of the widespread 'politicisation' of South 
African sport appears to be an accurate one. While one should remember that the active 
involvement of politicians and politics in sport is not a new phenomenon in this country, 
187 Mpati op cit. at Ch 2-4 
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188 recent events have shown that such involvement, intervention and (one might even 
say) interference, ·are reaching new and worrisome dimensions. 
61 A number of examples spring to mind, of which only a couple will be mentioned: 
We recently saw an embarrassing and very public incident regarding the award of the 
fifth Super 14189 rugby franchise in 2005, when the Minister of Sport became involve.d 
following the SA Rugby Union Adjudication Panel's award (which had awarded the 
franchise to the Central Unions), on the basis of the imperative of transformation and the 
va'lue of a suggested award to rugby development in the Southern and Eastern Cape 
region. 190 A compromise was reached with the award of a Super 14 berth for the Central 
Unions in 2006, and a relegation system whereby the bottom SA team on the log at the 
end of the 2006 season would make way for a Southern and Eastern Cape region team in 
2007 and 2008, the 'Southern Spears' (now the 'Southern Kings'). Apart from the fact 
that this process seems to have-been clouded with issues relating to poor internal 
management and decision-making by rugby's powers that be, it is interesting to note the 
practical effect of the events - while public debate and mud-slinging between various 
parties continued, it was reported that the then new Australian Super 14 team (Perth-
based 'Western Force') was well advanced in preparations for the 2006 competition. 
These developments received widespread condemnation from local as well as 
international commentators. The matter received a fresh airing in the media during early 
2006. According to reports, the 'Big Five' franchises insisted that the Southern Spears 
should play a relegation-qualification match against the weakest SA team at the end of 
the 2006 season, in order to qualify for entry to the tournament in 2007. The Southern 
Spears objected to this as being in flagrant contravention of the decision of SARU, and 
expressed a willingness to go to court to ensure their automatic qualification for Super 14 
188 See the discussion in par 7 et seq above 
189 The international rugby competition sponsored by Australian media magnate Rupert Murdoch's Newscorp, 
and involving provincial or regional rugby teams from Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. The tournament 
, · has been played as the 'Super 12' since 1996, and as the 'Super 14' from 2006, involving two extra teams (one 
each for Australia and South Africa). For more information on the tournament, visit http://www.superl4.com 
190 This latter region apparently having the largest provincial / regional complement of Black rugby players in 
South Africa 
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in 2007 and 2008. 191 On .19 April 2006 the Board of Directors of SA Rugby (Pty) Ltd 192 
resolved to exclude the Spears from participating in the competition in 2007, a decision 
that was based on an examination of the viability of the team and a finding that it was 
not ready for participation at that time. The decision was accompanied by a commitment-
by SA RLlgby to assist the franchise to develop and to find a sustainable solution to the·. 
problems facing rugby in the Eastern and Southern Cape provinces. At the time of writing 
the Spears (now the Southern Kings) have yet to enter the Super 14 competition 
(although .negotiations·.are currently underway regarding expansion of the tournament, 
which might provide a vehicle in this regard). 193 
Reports of statements by politicians regarding team selections (especially 
regarding·the· implementation of race-based quota. systems in certain sports) are also 
common. In fact, such .intervention even went as far as the appointment of a :Ministerial 
.Commission of Enquiry into Transformation in Cricket, which condemned- the UCB's 
attempted scrapping of race-based quotas in 2002. 194 
62 In light of the .interconnected and internationalized nature of modern sports 
govern"ance and regulation, it is troubling to see that the issue of transformation has 
provided a major source of division between government and private organizations 
involved in sport. It has proven to be the single biggest burning issue upon whi_ch sports 
administrators are often taken to task by the Minister of Sport and members of 
Parliament. This raises the question of how best to marry the needs and challenges 
regarding transformation with the structures of sport and the interests of stakeholders. 
Arguably, mass participation and development programmes, school sports and 
infrastructure delivery systems are the ideal vehicles for promoting such government 
policy goals - at elite and professional levels, the practical nature and characteristics of 
191 See the report by Dale Granger 'Southern Spears tired of being "bullied" by "Big Five'" 3 February 2006 
(available online at http://www.iol.co.za - last accessed 7 February 2006). 1 
192 The commercial arm of the South African Rugby Union charged with administering the game of professional 
. rugby and commercial aspects associated therewith. 
193 More is said elsewhere in this chapter regarding the current developments in respect of the future of the 
Super Rugby tournament 
194 See the report of the Ministerial Committee of Inquiry into Transformation in Cricket (convened by the then 
Minister of Sport and Recreation, Mr Ngconde Balfour), dated 1_6 October 2002. 
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international global sport requires that domestic polity should not unduly interfere-with 
existing market forces. While the SA model of sports regulation largely adheres to 
international standards regarding recognition of the inherent autonomy of private 
organizations in sport, 195 recent years have (most visibly in the context of 
transformation, equity and the promotion of 'representativity' in sport) seen a number of 
instances of rather drastic government intervention in this sphere. 
63 Accordingly, it might be advisable to propose that government policy in sport 
should also follow the clear and logical demarcation of functions and responsibilities in 
the new two-tiered regulatory system of the SRSA and SASCOC. The ideal of 
transformation, equal access to opportunities for all and representativity in sport cannot 
be faulted - we have not yet reached a point where our 'playing fields' have been 
leveled. By way of example of the inequalities South African sport still faces in this 
regard: The report of the Ministerial Inquiry into Transformation in Cricket in 2002196 
mentioned that in the four largest townships in South Africa (Soweto, Mdantsane, 
Motherwell and Botshobelo), with a combined population 8 million people, there are 7 
cricket clubs. In Johannesburg, which has a white population of 700 000, there are 106 
cricket clubs. Clearly many inequalities still exist. 
It is however less clear at present whether SASCOC as a regulatory agency will 
prove to be the best driver for policies and measures aimed at transforming South 
African sport, especially in light of its key mandate of promoting excellence in high 
performance sport. 197 
195 Compare the judgment in Cronje v United Cricket Board of SA 2001 (4) SA 1361 (TPD), which is discussed in 
more detail infra. While the Cronje judgment appeared to express unqualified support for the notion that a 
sports governing body (national sports federation) is a private body, which does not exercise public powers and 
is accordingly not subject to the rules of natural justice, there have been conflicting judgments in recent years. 
See, for example, the dicta in President of the Republic of South Africa and Others v South African Rugby 
Football Union and Others 2001 (1) SA 1 (CC) (a case concerning the South African Rugby Union, then the SA 
Rugby Football Union), at par 182-183 of the judgment; and the unreported judgment of the Cape of Good 
Hope Provincial Division of the High Court in Tirfu Raiders Rugby Club v SA Rugby Union & Others Case No. 
8363/2005. See, generally, the discussion in par 224 et seq below 
196 Discussed elsewhere in this chapter 
197 The author has previously posed a number of questions in this regard - see Louw, AM 'Evaluating Recent 
Developments in the Governance and Regulation of South Afrkan Sport: Some Thoughts and Concerns for the 
Future' International Sports Law Journal 2006/1-2, May 2006. 
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II The experience of post-1994 sports transformation 
64 The· author has elsewhere criticised the policies and measures in respect of race-
based transformation which have been implemented (and driven by government) in the 
post-1994 dispensation. The following sections will briefly examine the possible legal 
. . 
grounds of criticism here, as the' recent amendments to the National Sport and 
Recreation Act appear to perpetuate government policy in this regard and it is expected 
that the racial transformation agenda in sport will continue to be actively pursued for 
some time to come. Also, it is submitted that the phenomenon of government-driven 
race-based transformation policies in sport is unique in the international sporting context, 
and may provide not only an informative comparative perspective for sports lawyers from 
other jurisdictions (especially those who are active in the field of unfair discrimination in 
sport), but also promises to be a potential area of contention in South Africa's future 
involvement in the global sports arena. 
65 The past decade has seen numerous examples of prescriptive conduct (or what 
some would term 'interference') by sports administrators in team selections on the basis 
of 'transformation', as well as the development of specific rules regarding the inclusion of 
'players of colour' in high profile teams: 
• An example of the first caused controversy in 2003, when there was public furore 
over the last-minute inclusion of Coloured cricketer Justin Ontong in the SA 
national team for their third test against Australia in Sydney, January 2002. 
Ontong's inclusion was ordered by the then President of the United Cricket Board 
of South Africa, the late Percy Sonn., and the player was preferred over White 
player Jacques Rudolph as a result of Sonn's view that the original team selection, 
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which included only one 'player of colour' (Hershelle Gibbs) constituted a 'breach 
of policy' in terms of the UCBSA's Transformation Charter. 
• An example of the 'transformation' measures employed by federations under 
pressure from government, is the South African Rugby Union (SARFU)'s rules in 
respect of the domestic provincial ABSA Currie Cup competition (which have since 
been repealed but inclu~e_d the following provision): 
'There _sh~ll be at least 3 black players in a team of 22 participating in the ... 
competition. There shall be at least two (2) black players in the starting line-up._ A 
black player may be tactically replaced on condition that the quota is adhered to. A 
black player having to leave the field due to injury or a blood bin, need not be 
replaced by another black player ... ' (Rule 1.1.6). 
• It was reported that Cricket South Africa's selection policy for the ICC Cricket 
World Cup West Indies 2007 required a minimum of 7 'players of colour' in the 
squad that travelled to the Caribbean, and that this policy also required that no 
less than 4 'players of colour' should be on the field of play during any match. This 
policy was a matter of common knowledge, and television commentators 
specifically commented on the 'breach' of such policy during the first-round match 
between South Africa and the Netherlands, when the team fielded only 3 'players 
of colour' due to injury. 
South African hockey also experienced controversy in the run-up to the Olympic Games 
in Sydney, 2000, when the (then) National Olympic Committee of South Africa (or 
'NOCSA') disqualified the men's national team from participating in the Games. The 
South African Hockey Federation unsuccessfully appealed to the Executive Board of the 
International Olympic Committee to have NOCSA's decision set aside. The NOCSA 
Selection Criteria for Sydney 2000 included a provision that read as follows: 
'[Teams would be considered for participation in the Games] if the qualifying team, 
individuals or combination of athletes are made up of an acceptable portion of athletes 
from the historically disadvantaged sector of South African society.' 
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What had made the NOCSA decision to disqualify the men's national team even more 
controversial was the fact that such team was at the time the continental champions in 
the sport, having successfully defended its title as Continental champions at the All-Africa 
Games in 1999 - the qualifying competition for the Sydney Games. At the time, NOCSA's 
'Guidelines for the Selection of the South African Olympic Team to Compete in the 
Sydney 2000 q1ympic Games' (which had been adopted by NOCSA's membership in April 
1998) contained the following regarding NOCSA's selection policy -.a provision which 
may appear rather bizarre when viewed in light of the fundamental principles of sport as 
encompassed in documents such as the Olympic Charter: 
'NOCSA's selection policy will comply with the letter and spirit bf the IOC qualification 
criteria: NOCSA contends that it will not be fulfilling the IOC criteria if it utilises its 
continental qualification as entry for the Olympic Games by individuals and teams from the 
former establishment sector of the population. In fact, it would be dishonest if such 
individual athletes and teams used the continental qualification system to compete in the 
Games as this method of entry was established to encourage development of Olympic 
sports in the disadvantaged sector. If we allow the advantaged sector to qualify via the 
continental system, South Africa would qualify with little or no effort in many sports 
because of the low development of many sports in the rest of Africa. In fact, South Africa 
would qualify automatically in several sports because of the non-existence of certain sports 
in the rest of Africa. For such sports, NOCSA will in general, consider entries from the 
disadvantaged sector. This selection policy will justifiably address the present concern 
about the demographic representation of South Africa in international sport.' 
[Emphasis provided] 
Elsewhere in this chapter the reader will find more detailed discµ~sion of the South 
African Sports Confederation and Olympic Committee (or SASCOC), which has been 
established to regulate South African high performance sport in conjunction with the 
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government department Sport and Recreation South Africa. It is submitted that some 
readers might find it strange that the following statement should be attributed to a 
representative of a national Qlympic committee: 
SASCOC's manager of team preparation for international competition, Mr. Khaya Majeke, 
told the Parliamentary Sport Committee on 19 June 2007 that South African sports codes _ 
that do not have at least a 50-50 'Black-White ratio' of participants may not be allowed to 
send teams to the Beijing Olympics in 2008. Mr. Majeke was quoted 198as saying in the 
following terms that SASCOC had conveyed a strong message to non-transforming sports 
federations: 
'We told them that we would include their teams only if they have a 50-50 
representation. Some of them said they did not have black players. Our reply was 
that we do not care; they should go find them in the streets of Alexandra [a black 
township near Johannesburg]. SASCOC shall ensure representative demographies.' 
At this same meeting the First Vice-President of SASCOC, Ms. ·licijera Kajee, stated that 
qualification by athletes for the Beijing Olympic Games in 2008 did not necessarily mean 
selection for a Games event. Kajee said that it was not about qualifying but about how 
someone qualified: 'An athlete could come from an advantaged family, with parents who 
have money, or from a disadvantaged one without it. Everything has to be weighed up.' 
These last sentiments appear rather ironic in light of Ms. Kajee (the Chef de Mission of 
Team South Africa to the 2008 Beijing Olympics)'s recently quoted statements in the 
media which blamed South Africa's medal drought at the event on 'too much political 
interference and too little support'. 199 
At the same Parliamentary portfolio Committee meeting referred to above, the 
chairperson, Mr. Butana Komphela of the ANC - no stranger to controversy - was quoted 
as follows regarding the South African team which was at the time preparing for Beijing 
198 In a report available on the internet at www.superswimmer.co.za 
199 See the report entitled 'Stop meddling in sport: ANC blamed for Olympics failure', Sunday Tribune, 17 
August 2008 
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2008 (from the minutes of. the meeting available on the web site of the Parliamentary 
Monitoring Group, at www.pmg.org.za): 
'[Mr. Komphela] was happy with the team preparations. He asked if the team would be as 
lily white as in the past. This would never happen again. This would be part of the National 
Sport and Recreation Amendment Act. There would be measures to punish any federation 
moving in the wrong direction. The government might not be able to confiscate passports 
as had been threatened.' 
This last statement referred to a controversial incident in April 2007, when Komphela 
threatened that government would request the Department of Home Affairs to withdraw 
the passports of white rugby players in the national team who were scheduled to tour to 
France for the IRB Rugby World Cup 2007 (which the Springboks eventually won), if the 
team was not demographically representative enough and did not contain 'at least 6 
black and/or coloured players'. This statement was widely criticised (also by the 
-
government Department of Home Affairs, who denied that this would be legitimate 
grounds for withdrawing a person's passport). 
At a meeting of the Portfolio Committee with rugby administrators in June 2007, Mr. 
Komphela was reported as declaring that teams that failed to transform satisfactorily, 
and by doing so 'transgressed the law', would face financial fines, while 'those who co-
operated would be compensated'. With reference to the National Sport and Recreation 
Amendment Act (discussed elsewhere in this document), Komphela was quoted as telling 
the President of the SA Rugby Union to '[g]o and read the law, this is exactly what is 
going to happen'. 200 
66 One of the most troubling aspects of the South African government's racial 
transformation agenda in sport, is that it is applied not only at the top level of 
20° From a report by Coetzee, G 'Sides face fines for slow transformation', available online at 
http://www.superruqby.co .za 
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professional or elite sport, but also to young participants such as schoolchildren. The 
controversial racial quotas of participants in teams and events are also applied at such 
levels - rather ironically also to children born after the dissolution of the Apartheid state 
and in a democratic society which is (in the terms of the Constitution) professed to be 
based on the fundamental principles of freedom, the respect for human dignity and 
equality, as well as non-racialism and non-sexism. 201 
The implementation of race-based quota policies appears to have been in effect at 
the level of school and youth sport as early as 1995.202 The effects of such a system have 
sometimes engendered controversy and public outcry: The South African Games, held in 
Port Elizabeth in March 2004, were tainted by an incident where a young white tennis 
player, Adele van Niekerk, was stripped of her medal by tournament director David 
Kampele, apparently because her team did not meet the required '50% black' quota as 
. . . 
prescribed. A month earlier, white athlete Erna Wedemeyer's team was disqualified from 
. ' - ~ "' 
the South African Life Saving Championships becaus~ they did not comply with the 
prescribed racial quotas. 203 
It is submitted that the rather bizarre nature of 'transformation' taken to its irrationat 
extreme is illustrated by the following media report regarding developments in woments 
netball, which report deserves to be quoted in full: 204 
201 In a discussion document of the ANC's Commission on Social Transformation Service Delivery, entitled 
'Policy Challenges for Social Transformation Towards the Next Millennium' (available on the web site of the 
African National Congress at http://www.anc.org .za/ancdocs/history/conf /conference50/discomms2. html), 
which was apparently tabled at the 501h National Conference of the ANC, Mafikeng, 16-20 December 1997, we 
find the following statements regarding racial transformation of sport, and of school sport: 
'Par. 12.2 - One of the most important challenges in sport is to accelerate sports development, especially in 
rural areas. Affirmative action policies need to be put in place to ensure that sports reflects the demography of 
South Africa's population. Such policies should target disadvantaged groups including women, youth, disabled, 
and rural areas.' 
'Par. 12.3 - Transformative policies in sport should also target school sports. It becomes imperative to come up 
with a policy which will give every single child in this country an opportunity to excel in sport. Our sports 
policies also need to enhance involvement of communities in sports.' 
202 A report in the Financial Mail Vol 136, Issue 6 (12 May 1995) at 45 observed as follows: 
'Athletics SA president Leonard Chuene has said ... that race discrimination could be at the root of the recent 
case in which a 14-year-old white athlete tested positive for performance enhancing drugs. Chuene said racial 
discrimination was alive and well in junior athletics "not against blacks but against whites". Though he had no 
proof, he said some athletes are convinced they will never make teams simply because they are white. "These 
children do not understand the issues around discrimination. They know they have done well but see athletes 
who have finished up to five places worse than them being selected."' 
203 From a report in the Dispatch, 27 March 2004 - available online at 
http://www. dispatch .co.za/2004/03/30/SouthAfrica/aaba I. html 
204 Dated 7 August 2007 (and available online at http://www.news24.com/News24/Sport/More Sport/0.,2-9-
32 2159954.00.html) 
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'Rewards for racial quotas' 
06/08/2007 17:43 - (SA) 
Durban - Netball South Africa (NSA) announced on Monday that it had devised a new 
system to reward teams that comply with the required racial quotas. 
NSA president Mimi Mthethwa said it had been decided that instead of docking points from 
teams that do not meet the quota, any team that had the required five-two ratio on court 
at all times would receive an additional six goals. 
If they fielded a six-one ratio, they would receive three additional goals. 
In close matches, this could mean the difference between winning and losing. 
NSA regulations require teams to field a ratio of five to two on court at all times - either 
five white and two black players, or five black and two whites. In the past, teams such as 
Zululand and other rural areas, who have no white players, were consistently docked 
points, and in some cases, failed to win their section even after winning all their matches. 
"We want to adopt a more positive approach," she said. "In the past, some teams were 
docked so many points that they went into negative territory. This way, they will keep the 
goals they have scored, but their opposition will benefit if they stick to the quotas. We 
think it makes more sense to reward teams that meet the quotas than to penalise the ones 
that don't."' 
[Emphasis provided] 
67 The discussion that follows will attempt to scrutinize the legitimacy of these and 
other race-based transformation measures in light of the applicable fundamental rights 
and (in the professional sports context) employment legislation. 
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I 
III The legal arguments against the application of race..;based affirmative 
action in (professional) sport 
68 The section th~t follows will briefly examine the legitimacy of these and other 
transformation measures in light of the South African legal framework relating to the 
pursuit of the fundamental right of equality and (in the professional sports context) of 
employment equity in the workplace. 
A The test for justification of affirmative action in terms of the Constitution 
. · .. 
69 South African courts, including the Con-stitutional Court, have consistently held 
that the right of equality as contained in section 9 of the Constitution205 embraces a 
substantive rather than a formal notion of equality. Formal equality subscribes to the 
'traditional liberal notion of similarity of treatment', which entails that the law is seen as 
' -
applying neutrally and symmetrically to everyone, igno_ring group status and group-
related social conditions. Accordingly, formal equality assumes that everyone is 
essentially similarly placed, and that the neutral application of the law best avoids 
preference or prejudice. Substantive equality acknowledges the importance of a 
contextual examination of any alleged discriminatory conduct, taking into account the 
circumstances of the parties and society in order to determine whether there has in fact 
been unfairly discriminatory conduct. In this way, courts are able to ignore the central 
criticism against the formal notion of equality, namely that it is blind to social and 
economic disparities between groups and individuals. Substantive equality focuses on the 
results or effects of a rule rather than its form. 206 Accordingly, a substantive notion of 
equality attempts to recognise that the test for unfair discrimination in any giveri case 
205 Section 9(2) provides for the application of affirmative action, as follows: 
'Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. To promote the achievement of 
equality, legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance persons, or categories of persons, 
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken.' 
206 Dupper, 0 & Garbers, C 'Employment Discrimination: A Commentary' in Thompson & Benjamin South 
African Labour Law Juta Law (Looseleaf) Vol 1 at CC 1-14 
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cannot proceed in a.vacuum. The South African society is not a utopian one, and one 
must accept and acknowledge the unjust nature of the social order in the pursuit of the 
achievement of true equality. 
70 South African courts have embraced this notion of substantive equality. The 
Constitutional Court has, for example, held that a more realistic approach to equality, 
which takes cognisance of the unique nature and history of South African society, is 
required: 
'It is insufficient for the Constitution to merely ensure, through its Bill of Rights, that 
statutory provisions which have caused such unfair discrimination in the past are 
eliminated. Past unfair discrimination frequently has ongoing negative consequences, the 
continuation of which is not halted immediately when the initial causes thereof are 
eliminated, and unless remedied, may continue for a substantial time and even indefinitely. 
Like justice, equality delayed is equality denied.'207 
The right to equality, which is also, significantly, reflected in one of the three core values 
embraced by the Constitution (along with freedom and dignity), 208 is thus interpreted as 
an important foundation stone in the 'historic bridge between the past of a deeply divided 
society characterised by strife, conflict, untold suffering and injustice', and a democratic 
future. 209 
71 The notion of substantive equality can be termed the mother of affirmative action. 
This notion recognises that "past patterns of discrimination have le~ their scars upon the 
present", and that "[t]reating all persons in a formally equal way now is not going to 
207 National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1998 12 BCLR 1517 (CC) at 1546G. See 
also City Council of Pretoria v Walker 1998 3 BCLR 257 (CC). 
208 Equality is one of the overarching goals laid down in the first article of the Constitution. Section l(a) 
provides that '[t]he Republic of South Africa is one sovereign democratic state founded on the ... values ... [of] 
human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms'. The right to 
equality is, within the Bill of Rights, listed as the first of the substantive rights, and it influences the 
interpretation and application of all the other fundamental rights. 
209 The Afterword of the interim Constitution, Act 200 of 1993 
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' 
change the patterns of the past, for that inequality needs to be addressed and not simply 
removed". 210 In the words of Mosen eke J in the Constitutional Court: 
'[O]ur Constitution heralds not only equal protection of the law and non-discrimination but· 
also the start of a credible and abiding process of reparation for past exclusion, 
dispossession, and indignity within the discipline of our constitutional framework ... [A] 
major constitutional object is the creation of a non-racial and non-sexist egalitarian society 
underpinned by human dignity, the rule of law, a democratic ethos and human rights. From 
there emerges a conception of equality that goes beyond mere formal equality and mere 
non-discrimination which requires identical treatment, whatever the starting point or 
impact. '211 
Accordingly, this means that persons deprived of resources in the past are entitled to 'an 
"unequal" share of resources at present'. 212 In this we find the crux of affirmative action 
and also the first shades of the criticism it engenders: Affirmative action programmes 
have as their object, means and purpose the unequal treatment of persons, in order to 
redress past unequal treatment against groups or individuals. As such, it constitutes a 
seeming aberration, and (at least for its critics) begs the question of whether two wrongs 
can make a right. 
72 This controversial nature of affirmative action has necessitated South African 
courts, though recognising its legitimacy, to impose a framework for the constitutional 
imperative of actions, policies and measures implemented in the name of affirmative 
action. When a complainant in the constitutional testing of an unfair discrimination claim 
succeeds in showing that unfair discrimination has occurred, the respondent would need 
to show that such conduct is justifiable in terms of the limitation clause of the Bill of 
210 Janet Kentridge as quoted in Dupper & Garbers at CC 1-14. See also the Explanatory Memorandum to the 
Employment Equity Bill, General Notice 1840 of 1997, 1 December 1997, Government Gazette 18481, at 5. 
211 Minister of Finance & Others v van Heerden 2004 (6) SA 121 (CC) at par 25-26. See also Bato Star Fishing 
(Pty) Ltd v The Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism & Others 2004 (7) BCLR 687 (CC) 
212 Dupper & Garbers at CC 1-14 
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Rights. Section 36(1) requires that, in order to succeed, the respondent must show that 
the distinction in treatment is 'reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic 
society based on freedom and equality and does not negate the essential content of the 
right of equality.'213 In this enquiry, the court will take all relevant factors into account, 
including the nature of the right, the importance of the purpose of the limitation, the 
nature and extent of the limitation, the relation between the limitation and its purpose, 
and less restrictive means to achieve this purpose. The core of this test is therefore to 
determine whether the limitation serves a legitimate social purpose in a way that is 
proportionate to the end that it seeks to achieve. 214 This test is remarkably similar to the 
'collapsed one-stage enquiry' into fairness under the discrimination provisions of the 
Employment Equity Act, 215 which was formulated as follows in the case of Leonard 
Dingler Employee Representative Council v Leonard Dingler (Pty) Ltd: 216 
'Discrimination is unfair if it is reprehensible in terms of the society's prevailing norms. 
Whether or not society will tolerate the discrimination depends on what the object is of the 
discrimination and the means used to achieve it. The object must be legitimate and the 
means proportional and rational.' 
However, as has been mentioned, South African courts have acknowledged the 
substantive nature of the equality right. Specifically, it is recognized that affirmative 
action or-other restorative measures which, at first blush, might appear to be an 
exception to equal treatment and thus would appear to violate the right of equality, are 
in fact part and parcel of such right. Accordingly, in van Heerden, the Constitutional 
Court rejected the American 'strict scrutiny' approach which regards affirmative action 
measures as a suspect category. 217 Our constitutional understanding of equality includes 
'remedial or restitutionary equality': 'Such measures are not in themselves a deviation 
213 Dupper & Garbers at CC 1-31 
214 Kentridge, as quoted by Dupper & Garbers at CC'l-31 
215 Act 55 of 1998, discussed infra 
216 (1998) 19 JU 285 (LC) at 295H 
217 Minister of Finance v van Heerden op cit. par 29 
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from, or invasive of, the right to equality ... They are not "reverse discrimination" or 
"positive discrimination".'218 
73 This -reading of restitutionary measures such as affirmative action does, however, 
not isolate them from judicial scrutiny. Even though such measures that properly fall 
within the requirements of sec. 9(2) are not presumptively unfair, they will only be 
warranted provided they are shown to conform to the internal test set in sec. 9(2). 219 
This test was succinctly explained as follows: 
'When a measure is challenged as violating the equality provision, its defender may meet 
the·.claim by showing that the measure is contemplated by seetion 9(2) in that it promotes 
the achievement of equality and is designed to protect and ad"'.anc_e persons disadvantaged 
by unfair discrimination. [T]o determine whether a measure falls within section 9(2) the 
enquiry is threefold. The first yardstiC:k relates to whether the measure targets persons or 
categories of persons who have been disadvantaged by. unfair discrimination; the second is 
whether the measure is designed to protect or advance such persons or categories of 
persons; and the third requirement is whether the measure. promotes the achievement of 
equality. '220 
Accordingly, in evaluating whether an affirmative action policy, programme or measure 
will pass muster as a legitimate and justifiable limitation of the right of equality, it will 
need to satisfy the above test which stresses the importance of the rationality of the 
measure (in respect of its being designed to protect or advance persons who were 
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination), as well as the importance of its effect (being the 
actual promotion of the achievement of equality). While such measures may therefore 
not require 'strict scrutiny', the threshold for legitimacy still requires rationality and the 
218 Ibid. par 30 
219 Ibid. par 32 
220 van Heerden supra par 37 
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actual promotion of equality,221 and affirmative action should not be applied in an 
arbitrary and unfair manner. 222 It should also be noted in passing that, in the 
employment context (and in terms of the provisions of the Employment Equity Act223), it 
has been held that employees do not enjoy a 'right to affirmative action'. 224 
74 Against this background, in practice, affirmative action can be classified as taking 
one of two forms: The 'weak' form of affirmative action refers to measures whereby the 
preference given to members of a certain group is allowed to influence decisions between 
candidates who are otherwise equally qualified for the particular position. 225 'Strong 
221 The lower level of scrutiny of such measures, in light of van Heerden's judgment, was affirmed as follows in 
Alexandre v Provincial Administration of the Western Cape Department of Health (2005) Industrial Law Journal 
768 (LC) at par 6): 
'[Affirmative action] measures are not required to be strictly necessary to achieve a compelling policy objective. 
It is enough that they be a rational means of advancing the legitimate aims of affirmative action.' 
222 Independent Municipal & Allied Workers' Union v Greater Louis Trichardt Transitional Local Council (2000) 21 
Industrial Law Journal 1119 (LC); Baxter v National Commissioner: Correctional Services & Another (2006) 27 
Industrial Law Journal 1833 (LC). In the context of the application of affirmative action in terms of the 
Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998, the Labour Court (by way of Nel J) reiterated the importance of fairness in 
the determination of the legitimacy of affirmative action measures, when it observed the following in Wilfemse 
V Patelia NO & Others (2007) 28 Industrial Law Journal 428 (LC) at par 34 - where it was argued that the 
application of affirmative action would not be rational and fair where the employer does not have an 
employment equity plan (in terms of section 20 of the EEA) in place: 
'In view of the potential discriminatory nature of affirmative action measures, it is of course important, when 
one has to assess whether such discrimination as may have been perpetrated by an employer in pursuit of 
affirmative action goals, was fair or not, for a reviewing court to see exactly how and in terms of what the 
employer exercised its discretion. In this process one of the issues to be determined will be whether the 
employer had interpreted its own employment equity policies and plans properly. Affirmative action measures 
should not be applied in an arbitrary or unfair manner. Where an employer, like in the present instance, fails 
and/or refuses to promote an employee by reason of promoting representativity levels from designated groups, 
then, if that employer had no employment equity plan whatsoever, it may be very difficult to determine 
whether such discrimination as it may have perpetrated in its refusal to promote an employee constituted unfair 
discrimination or not. Whilst the [employer] did not have a formal employment equity plan at the time the 
acting director-general refused the recommendation to promote [applicant], the evidence before the arbitrator 
did disclose that the [employer] was operating within a framework of policy statements as well as targets with 
reference to its employment equity goals and objectives. The [employer] had an employment equity policy 
statement and race, gender and disability profiles for the department. It also had compiled a progress report in 
respect of the transformation process and it had been submitting annual report data to the Department of 
Labour as required by law. There accordingly was a determined or determinable framework within which the 
[employer] was to operate, and against which one can assess whether the conduct of the [employer] herein 
was fair and whether it constituted an unfair labour practice or not.' 
223 Act 55 of 1998 
224 Dudley v City of Cape Town (2004) 25 ILJ 305 (LC) (contra Harmse v City of Cape Town (2003) 24 ILJ 1130 
(LC)); Cupido v GlaxoSmithkline SA (Pty) Ltd [2005] JOL 14271 (LC); PSA obo Karriem v SA Police Services & 
Another [2007] 4 Butterworths Labour Law Reports 308 (LC). In the recent judgment of the Labour Court in 
Thekiso v IBM [2006] JOL 18447 (LC), the court (by way of Freund AJ) approved and followed Dudley and 
determined as follows regarding the affirmative action provisions contained in the EEA (specifically section 
15(2)(d)(ii)) - at par 46 of the judgment: 
'[O]n a proper construction [of the Employment Equity Act], there is no legal obligation on an employer when 
taking any particular appointment or dismissal decision to give preference to suitably qualified employees from 
a designated group. In my view, section 15(2)(d)(ii) does not impose an obligation on an employer 
contemplating retrenchments to retain black employees in preference to white employees it believes better 
meets its needs. Whilst Chapter III of the EEA (including section 15(2)(d)(ii)) plainly imposes legal obligations, 
those obligations are, in the language of Tip AJ [in Dudley], "programmatic and systematic". They require 
consultation on, and the implementation of, an employment equity plan but they do not confer legal rights to 
preferential treatment on individuals in respect of particular appointment or dismissal decisions.' 
225 Dupper 'In Defence of Affirmative Action in South Africa' South African Law Journal 2004 states that weak 
affirmative action 'merely involves efforts to ensure equal opportunity for members of groups that have thus 
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affirmative action' goes beyond this, and involves the selection ofcandJdates from 
designated groups over other candidates who are better qualified for the position. 226 As is 
discussed elsewhere in this chapter, the use of race-based quotas in team selection is an 
example of this latter form of affirmative action, and it characterises the current 
controversial transformation measures in South African sport. 227 
B 'Demographic representivity' as the objective of sports transformation· 
75 The fundamental problem (in respect of constitutional legitimacy) with the South 
African government's prescribed policy of transformation (in the meaning.of the 
application of 'affirmative action') as applied by sports federations, is that- these 
mea~ure~ do not _appeqr - at l~ast not as they have been articulated to date - to be _ 
aimed primarily at protecting and advancing persons previously disadva"ntaged.b_y unfair. 
discrimination, in the meaning qf the equality clause in the Bill of Rights. _n is e·minently 
clear, from the experience of the application of such measures in practic;e as well as from 
the explicit wor_qing of the sports legislation as referred to earlier, that the stated 
been subject to discrimination', and cites as examples of such efforts the active recruitment of applicants from 
formerly excluded groups, special training programmes to help them meet the standards for appointment, as 
well as measures to ensure that they are fairly considered in the selection process. Kekes 'The Injustice of 
Affirmative Action involving Preferential Treatment', in Steven M. Cahn (Ed.) The Affirmative Action Debate 
Routledge (1995) 193, distinguishes (in the form of affirmative action policies) between 'impartiality' and 
'preferential treatment', as follows: 
'The aim of impartiality is to assure open access to the initial pool from which people are selected and selection 
in accordance with procedural rules which apply to everyone equally. The aim of preferential treatment is to 
alter the procedural rules so as to favor some people in order to increase the likelihood that they rather than 
others will achieve the desired position.' 
225 Dupper 10-11. See also the discussion of different types of affirmative action measures in Pretorius et al 
Employment Equity Law Ch 9-23 to 9-24. 
227 Such as the quota system enforced in rugby and cricket in respect of players, and 'aggressive' 
empowerment measures such as the SA Rugby Union's erstwhile 'Transformation Incentive Scheme'. In terms 
of this scheme, which was implemented in 2001, the SARFU (as it then was) undertook to pay financial 
incentives to provincial rugby unions for the appointment of 'Black persons' in certain categories, including 
players, coaches, administrative staff and executives (which were characterised as categories 'worthy of 
reward'). For example, the appointment of a Black coach could earn a provincial union R25 000, the 
appointment of a Black CEO R18 000. This scheme included a troublesome provision. It stated that one of the 
categories of appointment of Black persons for which SARFU undertook to financially reward provincial unions, 
was that of "employing above employment equity requirements". A union could qualify for an amount of RS 000 
for every 5% employment above such requirements. In effect the SARFU scheme offered financial incentives to 
provincial rugby union employers to pursue affirmative action policies that go beyond the statutorily prescribed 
requirements. This raises the question whether such appointments would not constitute unfair discrimination, 
as not being sanctioned or protected under the provisions of Chapter III of the EEA, and apparently constituting 
attempts at "racial balancing". If "equitable representation" is the purpose of transformation measures in sport, 
this provision went further than this stated purpose, in rewarding representation that goes beyond that 
envisioned or pursued in terms of the EEA. 
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objective of such measures is to ensure the 'demographic representivity' of sports teams 
and participants. 
The meaning attributed to this term appears to be, simply put, that government 
has at the level of policy formulation opted to pursue the achievement of a goal where 
sports teams are composed of athletes from the different race groups in the same ratio 
as such persons are represented in the South African population; i.e. where 
approximately 80% of the South African population is comprised of the black African 
group, a rugby or cricket team should also be made up of 80% black African players. 
It should be noted that the equality clause in the Constitution, as quoted earlier, 
contains no reference to 'demographic representivity' as a yardstick or indicator of 
equality. 
76 It is here that (it is submitted) the premise of such policies suffers a fatal 
misapprehension, and that they appear to cross the boundary between legitimate 
remedial action and unfair race discrimination. The following discussion will show that 
there is in fact no rational or moral justification for the use of 'demographic 
representivity' as an indicator of the achievement of substantive equality. The 
'affirmative action' policies in South African sport appear to follow the lead of the 
Employment Equity Act, 1998 (or the 'EEA', which Act was passed in furtherance of the 
provisions of section 9(2) of the Constitution, and which is also referred to elsewhere in 
this chapter), even though the EEA has never been expressly invoked by government or 
any sports federation as constituting the legislative basis for race-based transformation 
measures. The EEA was introduced in order to prohibit unfair discrimination in 
workplaces, and also to sanction (and, in fact, prescribe) the implementation by 
employers of affirmative action in instances where it is determined that persons from 
previously disadvantaged. groups in society are not 'equitably represented' in the 
workplace. 
While, as was remarked above, no reference to the yardstick of 'demographic 
representivity' is to be found in the Constitution's equality provisions, the EEA has (in 
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section 42 of the Act) introduced this as a factor in determining whether persons from . 
the 'designated groups' are equitably represented in the workplace of an employer. While 
such 'representivity' or diversity of the workforce is just one (albeit the first) of the 
factors listed in sec. 42 in determining the equitable representation of groups (and the 
consequent need for affirmative action measures), in practice, and in implementing the 
EEA, many employers have proceeded to view such 'representivity' as a guiding principle 
or deciding factor in determining the extent to which they will employ affirmative 
measures in order to change the face of the workforce. 
Government has followed this same route in respect of its transformation agenda 
in sport, and 'demographic representivity' has been raised to the level of the key 
objective of all policies and measures aimed at 'transforming' South African sport. 
77 Which brings one to the question of the relationship, if any, between the 
Constitutional imperative for justifiable affirmative action, namely the redress of past ~ 
unfair disadvantage, and the purely statistical yardstick of the demographic make-up of 
the South African population vis a vis the racial make-up of a sports team. Here one 
must consider the following questions: 
• In what way can it be affirmed that the current transformation policies in sport 
are addressing past disadvantage of the previously disadvantaged groups? 
• Can the value of 'representivity' be equated with the traditionally accepted 
view that affirmative action is justified in the pursuit of substantive equality 
because its objectives are to redress past disadvantage caused by unfair 
discrimination? 
• Or has the ideal of 'representivity' been selected as a proxy for equality? 
These questions necessitate an examination of the meaning of 'representivity' and its 
place in the transformation debate. 
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78 Commentators have warned that one should not, in assessing inequality in South 
African society, lose sight of the fact that the invidious apartheid policies are not the 
sole causes for existing inequalities. 228 In the process of assessing past disadvantage, 
a comparison is drawn between groups in order to ascertain whether they are at the 
same level. If they are not, it must be determined whether they would have been but 
for the discriminatory conduct. But there are two underlying suppositions to this 
approach: the first is that the groups would be the same but for some conduct by the 
one in relation to the other; the second is that this conduct (if found to exist) is 
unjustifiable. 229 In this regard the following has been observed: 
'If we are to be conscientious in evaluating the degree of illegitimate oppression ... we must 
- lgok at the period [of contact between black and white people in South Africa] as a whole 
and compile our balance sheet accordingly. We must ask to what extent the material 
deprivation of blacks is the consequence of their own conduct on the one hand and the 
product of unjustified white oppression on the other. In the process we are compelled, 
unpalatable though the task is, to judge the historical experience of blacks and the 
behaviour towards them of whites. We have to look at the starting points of each, trace 
their developments, follow the decisions each group made along the way, and weight the 
results in the ·scales.'230 
It is by no means the intention to deny the abhorrent nature and effects of apartheid 
policies in the development of South African sport. However, it is submitted that one 
should not deny the role of cultural choices and historic legacies in this regard. None of 
the major sports in South Africa were indigenous to the African population; football, 
rugby and cricket were all imported from Europe (and specifically England). Football is 
currently (and has been for a number of years) the major sport of choice of the African 
majority of the population. But can it be said that the status of rugby and cricket (the 
high profile targets of the South African government's transformation agenda) as the 
228 Brassey, M 'The Employment Equity Act: Bad for Employment and Bad for Equity' 1998 Industrial Law 
Journal Vol 19 Part 6 1359 at 1362 
229 Brassey 1362 
230 Brassey 1362 
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'preserve of the white minority' is due solely to apartheid? Was there not a measure of 
choice by the majority group in participation and involvement, a 'selective ownership' in 
respect of these sports? Internationally it is shown that cultural choice features strongly 
in determining the sporting identity of nations and peoples. When we think soccer we 
think Brazil, when we think baseball we thirik the USA, table tennis the Chinese; and 
there are numerous similar examples of nations or peoples adopting a game and making 
it their own. 231 
Sociologists23_2 have observed that the human socialization process is influenced by the 
subculture in which individuals are socialized. In respect of sport, the following has been 
stated (in the American context): 
'[I]f one is a member of a particular ethnic, religious or racial group they are often faced 
with norms and values which differ from those of mainstream society. These differences 
may have an impact on the socialization process, including the learning of sport roles. For 
example, [it has been] argued that involvement in specific sport roles by blacks is self-
induced rather than due to overt or subtle discrimination by white leaders within the sport 
system ... [T]he opportunity set, the value orientations, and the type of role models present 
early in life may account for involvement in a particular sport by members of a minority 
group ... In summary, the process whereby primary and secondary sport roles are learned 
seems to vary by sport, by specific roles within a sport, by nation, by sex, and by stage in 
the life-cycle. Moreover, the process is influenced by both macro and micro system 
parameters, including ascribed attributes of the socializee. In short, the learning of specific 
sport roles is a complex phenomenon which is not adequately understood at this point in 
time. '233 
While not attempting to deny or undervalue the role of apartheid policies in the 
development and involvement of designated groups in South African sport, it is 
submitted that a simplistic view of the issue should be avoided. The role of other factors 
231 Stone 'Sport as a Community Representation', in Luschen & Sage (eds.) Handbook of Social Science of Sport 
Stipes Publishing (1981) 214, at 221. 
232 McPherson 'Socialization into and through Sport Involvement', in Luschen & Sage 246. 
233 McPherson 262-3 
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should enjoy proper consideration. And, in the interests of fairness and objectivity, the 
proponents of affirmative action in sport should consider these other sources of 
disadvantage or (maybe mere) differences between racial groups and their impact on the 
current state of our sport. If affirmative action measures are aimed at redressing past 
injustices, it should be admitted that not all differences between the groups compared in 
the debate are attributable to unfair discrimination by one group against another. These 
and other reasons (including but not limited to the role of unjust white conduct towards 
black persons in the past) have all contributed to the racial and social differentiation 
between the different' sports. Any specific racial group's ownership of a sport is not due 
solely to what took place under the Apartheid system. 
79 It appears that the government's view of sport in South Africa, in the justification 
and promotion of transformation, does not recognise this. This is illustrated by the report 
of the Ministerial Committee of Inquiry into Transformation in Cricket (published October 
2002, and referred to elsewhere in this chapter), which contains the following 
observation: 
'Transformation with regard to the composition of teams in the nat_ional competitions from 
its current approximate demographic profile of 
~sian Coloured White African 
9 9 73 9 
to the estimated national demographic profile of 
Asian Coloured White African 
2 8 11 79 
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. is a major challenge. To underestimate the complexities of balancing the need for 
demographic representivity and world class performances, is a strategic mistake.'234 
Even though this view expressly recognises the complexities of balancing the interests in 
this context, the apparent blind adherence to the attainment of an unqualified target of 
. ' 
general 'demographic representivity' is troubling. One must question whether any 
workplace in any sector or industry can ever be totally representative of the whole 
population; this applies equally to those employed in professional sport as well as 
. 
amateur sportsmen and -women who choose to participate in the sporting codes of their 
choice. In the specific context of sport, it should be self-evident that not all persons -
regardless of their race - are equally talented, inclined or otherwise suited to 
participation in any pa~icular sporting code; this is especially true of top-level, elite 
sport. 
80 It is clear that government has opted to select 'representivity' as a proxy for 
equality: This yardstick is not found in the constitutionally guaranteed equality right, but 
has been elevated to the status of the objective of measures which should be aimed at 
the redressing of past disadvantage and the upliftment of those most in need of such 
affirmative measures - not at the achievem.ent of 'rainbow' sports teams. 
Accordingly, one must ask whether 'representivity' can possibly function, 
legitimately and rationally, as an indicator of the achievement of racial equality. If 
supporters of affirmative action in the composition of sports teams argue that teams 
representative of the general demographic composition of the South African society are 
warranted in terms of the equality provisions of the Constitution, one must determine 
what this 'representivity' means. This argument seems to assume that, in any workplace 
or context where one selects a number of persons for a particular purpose (e.g. a sports 
team), and the group selected contains members from each of the racial groups in the 
same proportion as such groups are represented in society, this would equate to all such 
' 
234 At 29 of the Report 
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persons (as well as those who were not selected) having been treated equally, and thus 
fairly, in terms of section 9 of the Constitution. 
But it is submitted that this is a rather absurd proposition. Such an inference 
cannot follow naturally merely from the racial make-up of the group. In theory, a number 
of persons not selected may have been excluded because of discriminatory sel~ction 
practices. Does the fact that the demographic make-up of the eventual group is 
'representative' of society then negate or justify such discriminatory selection? Of course 
it can't. 
81 Also, one surely cannot rationally expect all occupations and workplaces to mirror 
the demographic make-up of our population - traditionally, women are more likely to 
pursue careers in the fashion industry, and not all persons aspire to be bankers or 
engineers. The following is surely correct, and also relevant in respect of participation in 
sport: 
'[T]here is no prima-facie reason to suppose that members of different racial and ethnic 
minorities wou.ld .be equally likely to want to go into [a specific profession] and, on the 
contrary, many reasons to expect that they would not. To the extent that ethnic and racial 
groups form at least partially self-contained communities (and they do), members of one 
community will value different sorts of character traits, encourage the acquisition of 
different skills, and have different ideas about what sorts of jobs carry the most prestige. 
Most arguments in favour of affirmative action in fact suppose that racial and ethnic groups 
differ in these sorts of ways; if they did not then bringing in a wider variety of such groups 
would not contribute to diversity.'235 
The 'representivity' of the group can never be viewed as proof or consequence of equal, 
non-discriminatory treatment. And that is precisely the problem with the use of race-
based quotas. Such a policy elevates the group above the individual in the assessment of 
selection criteria for participation. As such, it holds no guarantees for the promotion of 
235 Celia Wolf-Devine 'Proportional Representation of Women and Minorities' in Steven M. Cahn (ed.) The 
Affirmative Action Debate Routledge 1995 at 136 
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equality and the eradication of unfair discrimination, and serves merely to ensure, 
reminiscent of tokenism, that the group eventually selected is 'representative'. 
82 It is accordingly submitted that the use of 'affirmative action' measures and 
policies as part of the racial transformation agenda of the South African government, 
especially as such measures are aimed at the achievement of 'demographically 
representative' sports teams, is not in line with the Constitution of the Republic and the 
right of equality guaranteed to all in its Bill of Rights. Such measures and policies may in 
fact constitute infringement of such right of equality for a large number of athletes and 
participants at various levels of sporting participation. 
C The 'quotas and targets' debate 
83 At this point it is useful to refer in passing to a related objection, which is aimed 
at the actual measures used in pursuit of the transformation policies in South African 
sport, which serve to highlight another conceptual shortcoming of such policies' objective 
of demographically representative sports teams. This objection relates to the 'quotas vs. 
targets' debate. Race-based quotas in sports transformation have been one of the most 
controversial features of the process. First, some observations regarding the difference 
between quotas and numerical goals or targets. 
84 A 'quota' has been defined (in the American context) as 'a number or percentage 
... of people, constituting a required or targeted minimum; e.g. a system of quotas for 
hiring minority applicants'. 236 The US Supreme Court237 has distinguished as follows 
between quotas and goals in the context of affirmative action: 
I 236 The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, 4th Edition, 2000 237 In Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers' International Association v EEOC 478 US 421 at 495 127 
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'A quota would impose a fixed number or percentage which must be attained, or which 
cannot be exceeded, and would dQ so regardless of the number of potential applicants who 
meet necessary qualifications ... By contrast, a goal is a numerical objective, fixed 
realistically in terms of the number of vacancies expected, and the number of qualified 
applicants available in the relevant job.' 
Pretorius et al have observed the following: 
'"Quotas" refer to all preferential techniques that have the effect of reserving all or a fixed 
.· 
percentage of job opportunities for designated groups. This may be achieved through the 
setting aside of a specific number of positions for designated groups or by making 
designated group status the only or.dominant criterion for eligibility for employment 
opportunities. '238 
On the other hand, numerical targets involve guidelines determined by employers with 
reference to the circumstances of the specific workplace and in consultation with 
employees. In short, it can be said that '[n]umerical goals or targets are flexible, 
whereas quotas are rigid, inflexible and are.generally prescribed by an outside agency'. 239 
The purpose of numerical goals is described as follows in the Code of Good Practice: 
Preparation, Implementation and Monitoring of Employment Equity Plans published by 
the Department of Labour: 240 
'Numerical goals should be developed for the appointment and promotion of people from 
designated groups. The purpose of these goals would be to increase the representation of 
people from designated groups in each occupational category and level in the employer's 
workforce, where underrepresentation has been identified and to make the workforce 
reflective of the relevant demographics as provided for in form EEA8.' 
238 Employment Equity Law Butterworths 2000 at Ch 9-50 
239 Bhoola 'Affirmative Action: A Commentary' in Thompson & Benjamin South African Labour Law Juta Law 
(looseleaf service issue 43, 2002) Vol 1 at CC-1-B6 
240 Government Notice No. R. 1394, 23 November 1999, in section 8.4.1 
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In practice, and in contrastto-quotas, such guidelines are not mandatory. Thus, the two 
main differences between goals and quotas are the following: First, quotas are 
mandatory and represent a fixed number to be achieved, apparently, at any cost. 
Second, as will be argued below, the setting and application of quotas are generally 
divorced from reality and the circumstances of the specific situation in which they are . 
applied. 
85 A central criticism of the nature of quotas is that it is reminiscent of tokenism, or 
the achievement of 'representivity for its own sake'. The basic distinction in the selection 
of persons for employment in this context is that between merit selection and selection 
upon other grounds (or where such other grounds are the deciding crit~ria in selection). 
The 'merits' of an appointee will be used here to mean the skills, attributes and 
characteristics of such appointee that are determinative of his or her suitability and 
ability to perform the specific-job in a satisfactory manner. The merits of an appointee 
are determined as a combination of such appointee's personal attributes and the inherent 
requirements of the job. The role cf merit in the employment context is central to the 
difference between targets and quotas. As has been observed :241 
'[T]argets are aspirational in nature and do not predetermine the outcome of any given 
selection decision - the merit principle is thereby retained; quotas, on the one hand, may 
require the hiring of a less qualified individual. The preferred approach depends 
substantially on how far one accepts that jobs both are and should be allocated on the 
basis of merit.' 
When it is prescribed that a predetermined number of employees are to represent a 
certain group (e g black Africans), it is inherent in such prescription that, even though 
merit might be relevant and considered in the selection process, the deciding factor will 
necessarily be whether the particular candidate is in fact African. This requirement or 
241 Townshend-Smith, R Discrimination Law: Text, Cases and Materials Cavendish Publishing Ltd, London 
( 1998) at 562 
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characteristic of the applicant is a sine qua non for appointment. Such a policy in fact 
adds a new 'inherent requirement of the job', which is specific only to the particular 
appointee or person filling the position under such policy. While it might not be an 
inherent job requirement that the applicant be African, an appointee must in fact be 
African in order to be appointed to perform the job in terms of the policy, as non-
membership of the particular group constitutes an absolute bar to appointment. And any 
policy or measure where the job-related merits of an appointee are secondary to that of 
group membership naturally implies tokenism, as the criteria of group membership, race 
or ethnic origin are. elevated above the interests of the job requirements with an 
objective of ensuring greater representivity or the promotion of 'diversity', for its own 
sake. 
86 The use of noh-job related criteria in numerical targets should not attract the 
same criticism, if targets function as non-enforceable guidelines as opposed to 
mandatory quotas. An important point to emphasise is that the EEA requires that 
numerical targets and the timetable imposed for their achievement should be justifiable 
on a rational basis. This process involves an evaluation of the effect of such targets on 
non-designated groups and the employing institution, in respect of their fairness and 
proportionality,242 also bearing in mind issues such as the efficiency of the organisation in 
performing its economic function. In this process, some of the relevant factors to be 
considered are those set out in section 42, which are quoted below. This evaluation of 
rationality, fairness and proportionality is absent in the use of quotas. When a policy 
states that three employees in a department must be African, the importance of the non-
job related characteristic (race) is elevated to the primary role of deciding factor in the 
selection of an appointee. Accordingly, such a policy rigidly imposes a target from above, 
without concerning itself with the circumstances and conditions of the specific workplace, 
and specifically the interests of non-designated persons as well as the employer. 243 It is 
one-sided and evinces a preoccupation with the objective which is sought to be attained 
242 See Pretorius et al, supra, at Ch 9-46 
243 See Public Servants Association v Minister of Justice 1997 5 BCLR 577 (T) at 641 C-D 
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(greater representivity or diversity) to the exclusion of all other considerations, which 
prings the very fairness of such conduct into question. Accordingly, the logical conclusion 
is that an appointee in terms of a quota would equate to 'one that represents a group, as 
1 
an employee whose presence is used to deflect from the employer criticism or 
accusations of discrimination', the definition of a 'token'. 244 While this definition assumes 
an intention or state of mind in respect of the appointment of persons from designated 
groups, it is submitted that this is a logical inference in the absence of selection on the 
basis of merit. By definition, selection based on.a statutory or prescribed obligation on 
the employer to fill a certain position with a candidate from a certain group precludes 
merit selection. 
87 In order to examine the Employment Equity Act's specific treatment of quotas, 
one must refer to the provisions of section 15. Section 15(2)(d) reads as follows: 
'Affirmative action measures implemented by a designated employer must include ... 
subject to subsection (3), measures to ... ensure the equitable representation of suitably 
qualified people from designated groups in all occupational categories and levels in the 
workforce ... ' 
Section 15(3) states that 'the measures in subsection (2)(d) include preferential 
treatment and numerical goals, but exclude quotas'. While section ~5(4) states that 
'[n]othing in this section requires a designated employer to take any decision concerning 
~n employment policy or practice that would establish an absolute barrier to the 
prospective or continued employment or advancement of people who are not from 
designated groups', it is submitted that the wording of section 15(3) is not merely 
negatively permissive but constitute an express prohibition on the use of quotas as an 
affirmative action measure. A possible interpretation of section 15(3) read with 15(2)(d) 
is that the legislature has simply indicated that the measures prescribed in order to 
achieve the goal (of ensuring equitable representation of suitably qualified people from 
' 
244 The American Heritage Dictionary 4th ed. supra 
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designated groups) do not include quotas, although quotas are still permissible as long as 
they are designed to achieve this goal. However, it is submitted that the preferable 
interpretation is the following: Section 15(2)(d) states that measures to ensure this goal 
of equitable representation must be taken, and this includes any and all possible 
measures designed to this end. However, this prescription is subject to section 15(3), 
which explicitly ·states that the measures referred to in 15(2)(d) (therefore all possible 
measures to.achieve the goal) exclude quotas. Therefore, the two subsections read 
together constitute an express prohibition on quotas. This would seem to be. in line with 
the condemnation "Of quotas in other jurisdictions, notably the USA, where measures such 
as guaranteeing a certain percentage of jobs or university admissions to a racial or 
gender group have been .called 'racial or gender balancing', which practise has been 
consistently rejected as a legitimate affirmative action goal. 
88 So, if one accepts that the legislature has expressly prohibited quotas in the EEA, 
what is the real difference between such quotas and the legitimate measure of numerical 
goals? Section 19 of the Act places an obligation on designated employers to undertake 
an organisational-analysis in order to, inter alia, determine the degree of under-
representation of people from designated groups. Section 20, which deals with the 
formulation and implementation of an organisational employment equity plan, states that 
such plan must include numerical goals to achieve the equitable representation of 
suitably qualified people from designated groups, where such under-representation has 
been identified. The plan must also contain a timetable in terms of which these goals are 
to be achieved, as well as indicating the strategies intended to achieve such goals. 
As will be shown below, the determination of under-representation of designated 
groups is central to the formulation of numerical goals - the yardstick of 'equitable 
representation' is the primary determinant of not only the extent of such goals but also 
whether their existence is in fact justified at all. Section 42 of the EEA lists a number of 
indicators to be used in assessing an employer's compliance with the Act, and specifically 
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the determination of whether designated groups are equitably represented in a specific 
workplace and the legitimacy of targets set. These include the following: 
The demographic profile of the national and regional economically active 
population; 
The pool of suitably qualified persons from designated groups from which 
the employer may reasonably be expected to promote or appoint 
employees; 
Economic and financial factors relevant to the sector in which the 
employer operates; 
Present and anticipated economic and financial circumstances of the 
employer; and 
The number of present and planned vacancies that exist in the various 
categories and levels, and the employer's labour turnover. 245_ 
When an employer has identified that a certain designated group or groups are 
underrepresented ih the workplace, with reference to such factors, it is legitimate to set 
numerical goals for the increased representation of such groups over a period of time. 
When an employer sets and pursues such goals in light of these and other relevant 
factors, affirmative action measures designed to achieve such goals would be legitimate 
in terms of section 15. Otherwise, such goals would operate no differently than quotas. 
89 Quotas, in contrast to numerical goals, can be characterised as lacking a realistic 
basis in the surrounding circumstances of the workplace and labour market. It is in this 
characteristic that the central criticism against quotas is to be found: when a goal for 
representation of any given group is determined without reference to the types of factors 
mentioned in section 42, such goal can not be viewed as being realistic, and hence not as 
245 In respect of the factors to be taken into account in setting numerical goals, see also the Code of Good 
Practice, supra, at section 8.4.2 
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reasonable, rational or indeed morally justifiable. The tokenism inherent in the use of 
quotas can have no rational basis, as the mere appointment of persons on the grounds of 
their race as deciding factor can hold no possible economic or social benefit. While race 
may be relevant in certain cases, for instance in the case of candidates for a police force 
that needs to patrol in a certain area-where persons of that race reside, in all other 
instances mere race-based hiring would not only be unproductive but possibly counter-
productive. Such hiring practices would be reminiscent of job reservation systems 
employed in our recent past. And, accordingly, the. pursuit of such quota at the cost of 
persons from non-designated groups woold not constitute a legitimate exception to the 
prohibition of unfair discrimination in section 5 of the EEA. In other words, while 
affirmative action is expressly identified as a justifiable form of differentiation between 
employees (section 6(2)(a) of the Act), such action that lacks a reasonable and justifiable 
basis would fall short of qualifying as affirmative action 'consistent with the purpose of 
the Act'. Here, one would cross the line between employment equity and employment 
discrimination. 
90 The central concept in the EEA's prescriptions regarding affirmative action 
measures is that of equitable representation of designated groups across all categories 
and levels in the workplace. Only once it is determined that a group or groups are not 
equitably represented does the need for affirmative action measures arise. Accordingly, 
an employer may only legitimately set a goal for such group's representation, to be 
achieved through affirmative action measures, once this determination has been made. 
The concept of equitable representation is not defined in the Act, and one must assume 
that the words should bear their usual meaning. 'Equitable' is defined by the American 
Heritage Dictionary of the English Language246 as 'marked by or having equity, just and 
impartial'. 'Equity', in turn, is defined as 'the state, quality or ideal of being just, impartial 
and fair'. Accordingly, the meaning envisaged by the EEA for the concept of equitable 
representation of designated groups appears, at first glance, to be rather clear, 
246 4th Edition, 2000 
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' 
unambiguous and uncontroversial, based as it appears to be on recognition of the 
fundamental constitutional values of equality and fairness. 
However, the wording of the Act leaves some room for debate in gauging the 
exact meaning of equity in the context of its provisions. Specifically, there is no express 
indication of whether 'equity' should be read in light of a formal or substantive 
interpretation of equality. As a barometer of the legislature's understanding of this 
concept, one should look at the objective of the Act's affirmative action chapter. Are we 
dealing, in the implementation of affirmative action measures, with the traditional 
notions of equality of treatment or of outcomes, and how relevant is the choice between 
these two possible avenues for the determination of whether a group is equitably 
represented? The answers to these questions are central to the interpretation of the Act 
and the legitimacy, morally and otherwise, of the measures it prescribes in the pursuit of 
equity. The devil lies in the difference between the two approaches - while the former 
implies only equal treatment, the latter, in practice, requires preferential treatment of 
certain individuals as a means to eliminate existing disadvantage, which strictly runs 
counter to the very content of the principle of equality. Equality of treatment would fit 
most closely under a formal concept of equality, namely that all persons should be 
treated equally in respect of opportunities for employment and advancement in 
employment. This ideal would primarily be attained by the elimination of existing unfair 
discrimination, as the Act aims to do in Chapter II. Equality of outcomes, on the other 
hand, embodies a substantive reading of the concept of equality, and opens the door to 
measures and policies for the advancement of designated groups that may in fact 
infringe or impact negatively on the equality rights of other persons, notably physically 
able white males (the only non-designated group in terms of the EEA). 
91 Numerical goals and even quotas are only relevant in the pursuit of an objective 
of equality of outcomes. Where the objective is simply to treat all persons equally, fairly 
and impartially, there is no-place for a goal or target for the representation of such 
persons in the workplace - surely the application of fair procedures and criteria in 
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recruitment, appointments, promotions and the like would automatically mark a group's 
level of representation to be 'equitable'. Notwithstanding any existing differences in the 
starting positions of individuals, the eventual outcome of their fair treatment must be 
considered to be equitable as far as the employer is concerned (in line with the 
traditionally European notion of equality of opportunities, where individual merit remains 
paramount in evaluating the equity of outcomes - the very antithesis of preferential 
treatment). The fairness and impartiality required of an employer would preclude any 
preconceived notion or plan of what the level of representation of any group should be at 
some future date. Therefore, we must conclude that the EEA, in sanctioning the setting 
of numerical goals and the application of affirmative action measures, including the 
preferential treatment of certain persons, in-fact leans conclusively towards an objective 
of equality of outcomes. 247 As mentioned, this is in line with the Constitutional concept of 
substantive equality, which finds its substance in section 9(1)'s definition of equality as 
inclµding the 'full and equal enjoyment' of rights and freedoms, as well as the provision 
in section 9(2) that allows for measures designed to advance previously disadvantaged 
persons. " 
92 This entails that one should distinguish in the determination of the meaning of 
'equitable representation' between an objective, static and clear-cut fact (in the case of 
equality of treatment - whether all persons were in fact treated equally, fairly and 
impartially) on the one hand, and a dynamic value judgement of what is equitable on the 
grounds of certain other facts and factors, on the other hand. In the former case, the 
very fact of equal and fair treatment and opportunities would label the representation of 
all groups as being equitable. In the latter case, this determination can only be made 
with reference to other facts, for example the representation of such group in larger 
society, the availability of members of such group who are suited for employment in the 
specific workplace, etc. A numerical goal for the equitable representation of such group is 
247 See Dudley v City of Cape Town (2004) 25 JU 305 (LC) at par. 71 
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therefore a value judgement as to what is equitable (namely-what such level should be); 
a product of a balancing exercise in respect of such other facts. 
93 How does the EEA's implicit support for the objective of equality of outcomes 
influence the actual assessment of whether a group is equitably represented? It is 
submitted that such an objective in fact colours the determination of what is equitable -
if we decide that mere equal and fair treatment of all persons is not sufficient to ensure 
equity, we have already made a value judgement as to what equity means, in 
anticipando. We have in fact decided that equality of treatment is not enough; something 
more is needed. We have already decided that, in order to address the existing 
inequalities through a substantive view of equality, we must for example treat Africans 
preferentially in order to ensure an outcome for them in the workplace that is 'equal'. to 
that enjoyed by white males. Therefore, we have succeeded in removing the 
determination of equitableness from th·e specific workplace and the (reasons for) exjsting 
representation of each of the groups, and have decided to rather base our judgement on . 
an external standard, which is coloured by a value judgement as to which facts are 
relevant and should enjoy preference in this evaluation of what is equitable. 
94 In this light, even though we have seen a preference for numerical goals as 
opposed to rigid quotas, such goals are themselves not immune from scrutiny. They are 
not mandatory, but appear to be guidelines based on a preconceived notion of what 
would be 'equitable'. In this we find a paradox: Surely this goal is no longer a guideline 
and must in fact function as a mandatory quota if we have already determined it to be 
the be all and end all of equity. Any failure to achieve this target will fall short of 
achieving equitable representation of the group in question. Also, we saw that goals are 
distinguished from quotas as being grounded in reality and the due consideration of 
objectively verifiable facts that influence the meaning of what is equitable in the 
circumstances of any given case. But how can this be when such meaning has in fact 
been predetermined in motivation of the very target-setting exercise, as a product of a 
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value judgement based on the objective of equality of outcomes? In reality, .and on this 
reading -of the objective of chapter III of the EEA, there may not be much difference 
between numerical goals and quotas. 
95 . By way of summary, therefore, a possible objection to numerical goals is the 
following: 
(1) Employers may only legitimately apply affirmative action in cases where 
a group is not equitably represented in the workplace; 
(2) 
... 
This determination must be made on some reasonable and rational 
- basis - what is the basis for a finding that the existing representation of 
such group is not equitable?; 
(3) Only once inequitable representation is established may steps be taken 
to address this, which should proceed from the basis ofthe setting of a 
(4) . 
goal for the representation of such group that would in fact be 
equitable; 
As such goal must itself be equitable in order to address the existing 
inequality, the setting of the goal must itself also involve a rational and 
reasonable exercise; 
(5) This can only be achieved by considering objectively verifiable facts, as 
opposed to a value judgement; 
(6) The EEA's preference for an objective of equality of outcomes imposes 
exactly such a value judgement as to which facts should sway the 
scales, at the very outset in the target-setting exercise. 
96 As observed above, the EEA's pursuit.of an objective of equality of outcomes 
removes the determination of what is equitable from the reasons for existing 
representation of different groups in the specific workplace, substituting a value 
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judgement as to which external factors are relevant and should enjoy preference in the 
evaluation of 'equity'. These factors are those listed in section 42. The EEA's failure to 
explain the interaction between them is surprising, as they are not similar in nature: the 
first (in section 42(a)(i) - the demographic representation of different groups) is entirely 
divorced from the circumstances of the workplace, while all the other factors mentioned 
relate to either the pool of candidates qualified for employment in the workplace or the 
circumstances surrounding such workplace. This failure of the Act highlights the conflict 
between the terms 'under-representation' and 'equitable representation' employed in 
Chapter III. Under-representation of a designated group as a result of one or more of the 
job- or workplace-related factors (e.g. limited pool, low labour turnover) can surely not 
be marked as inequitable, if the reason for such under-representation is not due to 
inequitable treatment or discrimination by an employer. And why should under-
representation in terms of the first of the factors mentioned in section 41(a)(i) (the 
national or regional demographics) necessarily be viewed as inequitable? Surely we 
cannot rationally expect all occupations and workplaces to mirror the demographic make-
up of our population. The following remarks, which were made before the EEA came into. 
force, should provide some pause in the assessment of the real value of target setting 
based on demographics: 
'[M]any politicians and trade unions seem to argue that the workforce composition of an 
employer will be equitable only once it reflects or approaches the proportions found in the 
general population. The reasoning is straightforward: but for apartheid, the constituent 
parts of our population would have had equal absorption rates into the labour market ... 
The historical justification is of course a counterfactual hypothesis and there is no way of 
testing its historical accuracy, in the sense that one could accurately estimate, after having 
factored out historical discrimination, "equitable proportions" ... This is not to deny the 
pernicious effects of historical discrimination - it only serves to point out that the 
counterfactual historical construction is not the full story, and that proportionality may not 
be the appropriate or best employment equity standard (or that it should be adjusted to 
take into account other factors that could have caused disproportionate representation in 
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·society even if our society· had been characterized from its inception by the absence of 
discrimination) ... [H]ead count analysis assumes that one factor, and one factor only, 
namely past discrimination, explains the disproportional representation in the present 
labour force. However, perhaps other factors, such as certain demographic characteristics 
of a particular group, should also be included as explanatory variables, while 
acknowledging that past discrimination in all likelihood plays the dominant part in our 
present situation ... [W]e should question the unreflective assumption that a head count 
analysis is unchallengeabiy the only way to justify the crucial task of promoting greater 
social justice.'248-
97 ·By way of summary, therefore, it fs contended that the use or' 'affirmative action' 
in (professional) sport is illegitimate a's not being justified by the equality provisions 
contained in section 9(2) of the Constitution. When one examines such policies and 
measures in light of the test formulated in van Heerden's case, it is clear that, even 
though such measures target persons or categories of persons who have been 
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination, their objective of 'demographic representivity' 
appears to be irreconcilable with such measures as being 'designed to protect' such 
persons and also (as argued above) ·does not 'promote the achievement of equality'. It is 
especially the question of the dubious rationality of such measures which needs to be 
underscored. The highest courts in South Africa have, in other contexts, in recent years 
emphasized the need for all branches of the law to be developed in line with the 
foundational values which underpin the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. For example, 
in the fields of delict249 and contract law250 it has been affirmed that the common law 
must be developed in line with the values of freedom, equality and human dignity. It is 
248 Van Wyk & Hofmeyer 'Affirmative Action Target Setting: More than just a Head Count' South African Journal 
of Labour Relations 3/4 (21) 1997 5 at 6 
249 Carmichele v Minister of Safety & Security 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC) 
250 Brisley v Drotsky 2002 4 SA 1 (SCA); Afrox Healthcare Ltd v Strydom 2002 6 SA 21 (SCA); Napier v 
Barkhuizen 2006 (4) SA 1 (SCA); Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC). See also Lubbe, G 'Taking 
fundamental rights seriously: The Bill of Rights and its implications for the development of contract law' (2004) 
121 SA Law Journal 395;Bhana, D & Pieterse, M 'Towards a reconciliation of contract law and constitutional 
values: Brisley and Afrox revisited' (2007) 124 South African Law Journal 865; Bhana, D 'The law of contract 
and the Constitution: Napier v Barkhuizen (SCA)' (2007) 124 SA Law Journal 269; Woolman, S 'Category 
mistakes and the waiver of constitutional rights: A response to Deeksha Bhana on Barkhuizen' (2008) 125 
South African Law Journal 10 
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submitted that, apart from the substantive meaning ascribed to the self-standing right of 
equality as contained in section 9 of the Bill of Rights, an irrational application of 
'affirmative action' measures can never be consonant with the promotion of the 
foundational value of dignity; not for the beneficiaries of such measures a'nd even less so 
for those disadvantaged by them. 
98 Furthermore, as illustrated above, these policies and measures also highlight 
some conceptual problems arising from the Employment Equity Act's apparent pre-
occupation with demographics and the inherent tensions in respect of numerical goals 
and racial quotas. This pre-occupation with demographics, as well as the fact that the 
Employme;:nt Equity Act's provisions regarding affirmative .action go further than those 
contained in section 9(2) of the Constitution, have lead to a. si.tuation whereby 
transformation is pursued 'for transformation's sake': 
Section 2 of the EEA defines affirmative action measure~ as being aimed at 
redressing the disadvantages experienced in employment by designated groups, as well 
as ensuring their equitable representation in the workplace. One wonders whether this 
last part of the provision would not have been better left out of the Act, which might 
have gone some way towards avoiding the problems associated with goals and quotas. It 
has been attempted above to show that there .is not necessarily any correlation between 
the reasons for a specific group's under-representation and equity. So, if affirmative 
action is a remedial measure for past disadvantage, the level of representation of a group 
should not be the deciding factor of whether equity has been achieved. While the 
Constitution does not prescribe a balance for the representation of different groups in the 
workforce, 251 it appears that the EEA does. The Act goes beyond the requirements for 
achievement of equality included in section 9(2) of the Bill of Rights, by incorporating a 
251 Compare the condemnation of 'racial balancing' in other jurisdiction, e.g. the USA, where the US Supreme 
Court (by way of Powell J) observed the following in Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers' International Association, 
478 US 421 (at 487): . 
'The requirement of ... flexibility with respect to the imposition of a numerical goal reflects a recognition that 
neither the Constitution nor Title VII requires a particular racial balance in the workforce. Indeed, the 
Constitution forbids such a requirement if imposed for its own sake ... Thus, a court may not choose a remedy 
for the purpose of attaining a particular racial balance; rather, remedies properly are confined to the elimination 
of proven discrimination.' 
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controversial standard for the determination of equity in employment, which, it is 
submitted, is not sufficiently justified by the Act. 
99 A dangerous result of this legislatively couched license to promote certain groups 
under the guise of affirmative action in line with the constitutional equality provisions is, 
it is submitted, increasingly being evidenced in employment practice as well as the 
judgments of South African courts. This relates to the apparent recognition of 
. . 
transformation (in the meaning of the advancement of certain individuals and/or groups 
on the basis of demographic representativity) as an end in itself. In the _judgment by the 
Labour Court in Alexandre v Provincial Administration of the Western Cape Department of 
Health, 252 Murphy AJ accepted the substantive concept of equality as embodied in the 
constitution and the EEA and explained by Moseneke J in van Heerden. 253 Murphy AJ 
continued to evaluate an amendment to an institutional employment equity policy, which 
provided as follows: 254 
'Once the selection procedure has been completed, consideration may be given to the 
representativity profile of the organization/component. What this means is that while 
numerical targets have not been reached, affirmative action measures may be made 
applicable to the selection process in accordance with the requirements of the applicable 
affirmative action programme as stated in t_he departmental and regional employment 
equity plan as well as those developed at institutional level. In the event that the numerical 
targets in respect of representativity has been reached, or where no candidates from the 
designated group have applied or have been shortlisted, the candidate shall be assessed 
exclusively in terms of the core competencies/functional terrain of the job.' 
The judge continued to remark as foll6ws: 255 
252 (2005) 26 JU 765 {LC) 
253 See the discussion above 
254 As quoted at 7770-E of the judgment in Alexandre 
255 At 777F-H of the judgmeot 
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'The difference between the [employment equity policy applicable in Alexandre's case and 
the subsequently amended policy as quoted above] is that the earlier policy would allow 
consideration of employment equity issues, even where the numerical targets in respect of 
representativity have been reached. Whereas under the new policy it would be , 
impermissible to do so and decisions would have to be based exclusively on merit. One 
doubts whether such a policy advances the spirit and purpose of employment equity and 
the notion of substantive equality as endorsed by our legislative and constitutional 
framework. However, because the earlier policy applied in this matter, there is no need to 
adju_dge the implications of the new policy falling short of the con·stitutional and legislative · 
framework.' 
[Emphasis added] 
It is submitted, with respect, that this approach fails to appreciate the legislative 
framework within which the EEA operates to promote affirmative action to achieve the 
'equitable representation' of designated groups. Surely, once targets that were set for 
this purpose have been- reached, there is no more room for affirmative measures. If 
-
groups are equitably represented in accordance with rational and fair targets, the 
application of affirmative action beyond such point starts to smack of unfair 
discrimination against other groups or individuals. In such a case, one would be justified 
in considering this apparently sacrosanct 'spirit of employment equity' a tad more 
critically. Surely, even if one subscribes to a substantive notion of equality as the basis 
for affirmative action measures, equality can still only be pursued by means of measures 
. that are rational and justifiable in terms of the EEA and the Bill of Rights. Where such 
measures take the form of a target-setting exercise under the EEA in order to ensure the 
representivity of the workforce, the continued application of measures and consideration 
of 'employment equity issues' after such targets have been reached makes a mockery of 
equity as well as of the target-setting exercise employed. 
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It appears that this last was expressly recognized in the recent judgment by Ndlovu AJ in 
Reynhardt v University- of South Africa. 256 The use of 'targets' based on demographic 
representivity in respect of the selection of professional sports teams, however, are in 
this observer's view open to clear criticism in terms of the above. 257 
D Evaluating the legitimacy of affirmative action measures in the context of 
(professional) sport 
100 When one considers the issue of the application of 'affirmative action' to sport, a 
number of questions abound. This is especially clear if one considers the place of such 
measures.at·the top level of elite and international sporting competition, which is in 
modern sport largely a professional industry made up of professional athletes as 
participants. The discussion that follows will, for this reason, concentrate mainly on the 
position in professional sports. The following questions need to be considered: 
256 (2008) 29 Industrial Law Journal 725 (LC). After finding that the relevant employment equity targets had 
been achieved in terms of the university's applicable employment equity policy, Ndlovu AJ held that 'the 
[continued] application of the respondent's employment equity policy, plan and guidelines in the present 
instance was not only a contravention of s 15(4) of the EEA but also a violation of the respondent's own 
employment equity measures.' [At par 129 of the judgment]. See also the court's approach in Willemse v 
Patelia NO & Another (2007) 28 Industrial Law Journal 428 (LC) 
257 The author provided an example of the paradoxical nature of such targets elsewhere (see Louw, AM 
'Extrapolating "equality" from the letter of the law: The limits of affirmative action under the Employment 
Equity Act' (2006) 18 South African Mercantile Law Journal 336 at 353-4): During the Proteas tour of New 
Zealand in early 2003, convenor of selectors Omar Henry was embroiled in a controversy surrounding racial 
quotas (following the United Cricket Board's very public condemnation of quotas earlier). According to reports in 
the media during the tour, Henry had confirmed the UCB's abolishment of quotas in the national team, but had 
gone further to say that the UCB continues to pursue numerical goals for the representation of players of 
colour. These statements were made in the wake of the news that (reminiscent of the controversial axing of 
Jacques Rudolph on the eve of the third test against Australia in Sydney in January 2002) the selectors had at 
the last minute substituted 'coloured' spin bowler Robin Peterson for Nicky Boje for the first one day 
international match against New Zealand in Christchurch. The basis for the decision was said to be a policy that 
'coloured' players of more or less the same quality as white members of the team would in future enjoy 
preference in selection. It is in the very way in which Mr. Henry explained the working of these goals, that we 
find food for thought. A Western Cape newspaper (Christo Buchner and Johann de Jager 'Kwotas spook by 
Proteas', Die Burger, 16 February 2004) quoted Henry as stating the following: 
'Let me make it clear once and for all. Transformation is an integral part of the selection process, whether 
people like it or not. There are however no numbers that must be complied with. We do pursue targets. If there 
are two coloured players in the team, we strive for three; and if three make the team we try to use four.' (Own 
translation from the Afrikaans article) 
It is submitted that Mr. Henry should have given some more thought to this statement. Surely what he 
describes is no less than a quota. The constant striving to increase the representation of coloured players, in 
terms of a 'target' that entails that their representation will apparently never be viewed as being satisfactory, 
points to a preconceived notion of the 'equitable representation' of such players that smacks of tokenism, or the 
equation of 'diversity' or representivity with equity. Reminiscent of the reasoning of Murphy AJ in the Alexandre 
case above, this approach appears to reify transformation for transformation's sake. 
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• Is the use of measures aimed at achieving equality of participation consistent with 
the nature of sporting competition, and the natural inclination of any competitive 
team to field its strongest line-up in order to maximise its chances of success? 
• Does the idea of affirmative action also not ignore the individual performance 
nature of sport, where the value of a team member to the whole is determined 
not only by the position played but also the individual athlete's talent, form and 
unique characteristics? 
It is hoped that this discussion will serve to address the following specific questions 
raised by the application of affirmative -action in this context: 
(i) Whether "artificial", externally prescribed methods and criteria of team selection 
are consistent with the natural and inherent competitive object and nature of 
sport?; 
(ii) Whether the application of affirmative action tends to ignore the unique personal 
attributes of athletes and their role in competition?; and 
(iii) Whether the application of affirmative action in this context is acceptable in the 
light of its significant impact on the professional nature and status of the 
professional athlete, and the right and ability to earn a living from the pursuit of a 
chosen calling? 
101 It is clear that the competitive nature of sport is an inherent element and central 
determinant of the very activity of sport. 258 In the context of elite and professional sport, 
258 Compare the statement by the European Commissioner for Education and Culture (State-ment to the 
European Parliament, "Commission's Investigation into FIFA's Transfer Rules", Strasbourg, 7 September 2000 -
Speech/00/290), as quoted in the 5th Report of the European Committee of the Scottish Parliament at par 57). 
Szymansky "Income Inequality, Competitive Balance and the Attractiveness of Team Sports: Some Evidence 
and a Natural Experiment from English Soccer" March 2000 (available on the Net as 
http:/mscmga.ms.ic.ac.uk/stefan/EJCB.pdf) at 1, states the following regarding the importance of the 
competitive nature of sport: 
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and the enterprises undertaking the business of sport at the higher levels, the 
competitive nature and quality of the sporting event as an entertainment spectacle is the 
primary determinant of the financial success of the undertaking. It is submitted that 
there is sufficient difference between professional sport and "ordinary" businesses in 
other sectors or industries to necessitate a distinction in the application of affirmative 
action measures in terms of, for example, the Employment Equity Act. The argument 
extends to all the affirmative action measures prescribed by the EEA, inclusive of both its 
explicit prohibition on the use of racial quotas as well as the Act's support for measures 
aimed at preferential treatment of persons from designated groups. This becomes 
apparent when one considers the practicalities of professional sports employment, 
including the naJure·of the professional athlete and the activity performed on the field of 
play, the specifi.c cost of affirmative action in this context, and the professional nature of 
professional sport. It will be contended that, specifically in respect of the role and 
application of affirmative action, professional sport as an industry is unique. The gist of 
this view is as follows·: 
Professional sport is ari entertainment industry - the economic value of the 
sporting event lies in its interest to spectators. 
Spectators are interested in the uncertain outcome of the event - if the outcome 
was scripted or it was known beforehand that the match was fixed, spectators 
would not be interested. 
The uncertainty of the outcome revolves around the competitive nature of sport -
because more than one team or competitor is involved, the spectator is interested 
in seeing not only how the game is played, but also who will win. And the 
competitive strengths of the participants are determined by ~heir respective skills, 
abilities and form. 
'It is widely accepted that a degree of competitive balance is an essential feature of attractive team sports. 
Sporting competition is a process that establishes a hierarchy among the participants- winners and losers. 
Competitive balance refers to the rational expectations of fans about who will be the winners. In a perfectly 
balanced contest, each participant starts with an equal chance of winning, so that the outcome will be 
completely uncertain. If there is no competitive balance then the exact outcome can be predicted with 
probability one. Without at least a degree of competitive balance, fans will lose interest in a competition.' 
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The sporting merits of participants are therefore central to the competitive value 
of the match and the resultant financial success or failure of the business 
involved. Ultimately, because of the role of individual players as entertainers, 
merit not only determines the outcome of matches but also the entertainment 
value of the game. 
Accordingly, the importance_ of the merits of participants will be emphasised in light of 
the rationale for and practical way in which (especially strong) affirmative action 
measures function. And it will be shown that a policy or measure which prescribes the 
preferment of one participant over another on the basis of attributes unrelated to the 
sporting merits of such player, constitutes an unacceptable denial of the importance of 
merit which runs counter to the very core va·lues and characteristics of sport, and of the 
success of professional sport as an industry. 
102 In determining the place of affirmative action in sport, we must first ask: What 
does the concept of equity in sport involve? The following definition, which is taken from 
guidelines published by Sport England that were aimed at making sport in England more 
inclusive, appears to reflect the meaning attributed to equity in sport elsewhere: 
"'Sports equity" is about fairness in sport, equality of access, recognizing inequalities and 
taking steps to address them. It is about changing the culture and structure of sport to 
~nsure that it becomes equally accessible to all members of society, whatever their age, 
ability, gender, race, ethn.icity, sexuality or socio-economic status.'259 
The core of this definition is the equal access to sport of all members of society. But upon 
reflection, this consideration, viewed in such general terms, can surely only apply to 
amateur sports. Professional sport is an industry that performs an economic function and 
259 
'Making English Sport Inclusive: Equity Guidelines for Governing Bodies', available on the Net as 
www.sportengland.org/resources/pdfs/people/equity.pdf (emphasis added). 
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is based on economic foundations. With the involvement of money comes the inevitable, 
capitalist, consideration of competition. The inherent competitive element of sport is 
enhanced by the 'dog eat dog' nature of economic competition. Accordingly, professional 
sport has a different frame of reference in the determination of the access of athletes. It 
is doubtful whether the ability of an athlete· is similarly weighted in determining the 
access ·of participants who fulfill an economic, profit-generating function. Even the central 
element of fairness in this definition has a different meaning when applied to professional 
sport. Although fairness between players on·the playing field is an essential element of 
successful sports competitions, this fairness should not be read to include the right to 
participate being granted to all comers. While it is important to grant each and every boy 
and girl in a kindergarten class an equal opportunity to play, professional competitive 
sport as an industry and a public entertainment spectacle cannot afford to go this far. 
Accordingly, no person can be said to have a 'right to play' at the top level of a sport. 
103 The importance of the merits of an appointee in any business is self-evident, but 
the respective merits and demerits of professional athletes must be considered on a 
different level. The focus should be on the nature of the activity pursued and performed 
by the employee, as well as the environment where such activity takes place. When 
appointing a clerk or manager in an insurance company, bank or retail store, the 
experience, qualifications and abilities of the appointee are undoubtedly important to the 
undertaking for business reasons. It is possible that a previously disadvantaged 
appointee could have largely equivalent merits to those of a comparator. Due to the 
scope of the appointee's potential duties of service, however, differences may be less 
. important in the actual performance of the job. In a sense it may be said that the risks 
inherent in appointing a less qualified or less suitable candidate is spread or absorbed 
through the enterprise. When, however, an unknown is preferred over a professional 
athlete with unique talents, different elements come into play. The athlete's unique 
abilities in playing the specific sport, as well as attributes such as a personal drawing 
power and psychological impact on opponents undoubtedly distinguish these situations. 
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104 An important overarching consideration here is that ofthe entertainment nature 
of the professional sports industry. The point was made earlier that the quality of 
competition is the major determinant of success for businesses managing professional 
sport. Competitive sport is a spectacle, and revenues are earned through consumer-
interest in what the team has to 'sell'. While South African equity legislation such as the 
Employment Equity Act states that an affirmative action appointee may.be 'suitably 
qualified' for a position, by having the capacity to acquire the ability to<-do the job, it is 
doubtful whether this requirement is reconcilable with the nature of professional sport as 
an enterprise. Employees in other businesses can learn to perform the job requirements 
"behind the scenes", and.avoid endangering the operational requiremer:its olthe 
undertaking in th.e :pro·cess .. But where millions of consumers are watching, can 
professional sp6r:ts,teams afford to use professional competitions as a ·learning curve for. 
those not best qualified for the position? By way of analogy, it would be similarly doubtful 
whether an unknown actor selected for a film role in terms of an affirmative action policy 
would be able to replace a famous star without justified concerns over box office success. 
The emphasis is on the highly personalised.nature of the services rendered: While no 
right-thinking person would promote the application of affirmative action in other 
entertainment industries at the cost of uniquely gifted artists, this is prescribed in South 
African professional sport, where the value of personal characteristics and talents of 
individuals are often as significant. Even in team sports, the value and characteristics of 
the individual participant are paramount. 
105 When a national team is involved in international competition, such team is not 
composed of a 'neutral' or amorphous group of 'workers', in the sense that it is of n-o 
consequence to the public and supporters who the individuals are that take to the field. 
Each and every player in the team, whether in the starting line-up or on the bench, has 
unique value for the team as a whole and brings unique talents and ability to the game. 
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One must factor in the role and value of a number of 'intangibles', 260 in determining the 
potential value of each individual player. Different elements feature here: the player's 
skills on the field, his experience in big matches and pressure situations, his 
psychological impact on the opposition, his fitness, stamina and form, as well as his level 
of support from the fans. These factors distinguish the professional athlete from other 
workers, and it is submitted that this predominantly personal nature and value of the 
professional 9thlete, which stems from the actual physical activity of sport and the 
culture of the game, is a significant consideration in the evaluation of the role of 
affirmative action. 
106 In light of the key role of 'sporting merit' within this context, it is submitted that 
any preferential selection policy which is based on the consideration of non-sporting 
attributes (i.e. race) as a determining factor are highly suspect, and also not in line with 
th.e rationality requirement for affirmative action in terms of the Constitution. In the 
context of the application of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair 
Discrimination Act (or 'PEPUDA')261 to a dispute regarding the application of affirmative 
action in the appointment of regional magistrates, the court in Du Preez v Minister of 
Justice and Constitutional Development & Others262 had to consider the legitimacy of 
selection criteria (in the form of a score sheet) which placed disproportionate weight on 
the race and gender of applicants as opposed to their experience as magistrates. The 
court (by way of Erasmus J) found that the relevant selection policy constituted an 
absolute barrier to the appointment of a white male to the relevant position, and held 
that '[t]here is patent disproportionality in a selection policy based on race and gender to 
the absolute exclusion of a.II the other qualities required for a position as responsible and 
important as that of regional magistrate ... [s]uch a policy is irrational within its own 
260 A number of factors and personal attributes combine to determine the athlete's proficiency. Brown Sports 
Talent Human Kinetics (2001) 45, in discussing the role of so-called 'intangibles', states the following: 
'However elusive, intangibles are as much a part of sports performance as running, jumping, catching, hitting 
or throwing. They are the qualities an athlete possesses that cannot be measured by numbers ... At the highest 
levels of competition, everyone is talented. There, intangibles can mean the difference between winning and 
losing. Intangibles offer a window of opportunity for athletic success to athletes who might not make it on sheer 
physical talent. Nevertheless, some great athletes possess physical skills, emotional skills, and the intangibles 
that make for the complete athletic package.' 
261 Act 4 of 2000 
262 [2006] JOL 17157 (SE) 
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terms and objectives.' With. reference to the view expressed by Pretorius et a/263, the 
court observed the following: 
'[The authors] describe as "the most drastic form of preferential treatment" those 
employment policies or programmes which afford absolute preference to members of 
designated groups who meet the minimum job requirements. "The effect of such an 
approach is", they say, "that selection is done irrespective of how the preferred designated 
group candidate compare? with competitors from non-designated groups and sometimes 
irrespective of how the decision affects the excluded non-designated group members 
personally, as well as the specific operational needs of the employer or the special 
requirements ofthe job". The learned authors express the view that "such measures would 
not be compatible with the variety of factors that need to be taken into account for an 
employment decision to meet the constitutional requirements of fairness and 
·proportionality". "Fairness', as they put -it, "depends on the cumulative effect of all relevant 
concerns, including the extent of the impact of the measure on the rights and interests of 
the complainant". "Proportionality", they say, "requires, by definition, the balance of 
competing interests". "Affording automatic preferences for designated group members 
eliminates the possibility of affirmative action from being tested in respect of its fairness 
· and proportionality and elevates the affirmative action objective to the position of sole 
requirement for validity".'264 
Even though the court in Du Preez undertook its evaluation of the applicable affirmative 
action policy in terms of the provisions of PEPUDA and did not refer specifically to the 
internal compliance test in respect of section 9(2) of the Constitution as laid down in the 
Constitutional Court's judgment in the van Heerden matter, it is submitted that the 
judgment reflects proper acknowledgement of the important role of 'merit-based' 
considerations in the selection process during the application of affirmative action, which 
is in line also with Moseneke J's affirmation of the rationality requirement as set out in 
263 Pretorius, Klinck & Ngwena Employment Equity Law supra at Ch 9-59 
264 Du Preez supra at par 40 
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van Heerden. One should consider the observation in this last-mentioned case that, in 
the assessment of fairness in scrutinizing equality claims, a 'flexible but "situation-
sensitive" approach is indispensable because of shifting patterns of hurtful discrimination 
and stereotypical response in our evolving democratic society'. 265 Surely such a 
'situation-sensitive' .analysis, in order to interrogate not only the fairness but also the 
rati?nality of an affirmative action policy (in terms of the internal test in respect of 
section 9(2)),· must also give due weight to the peculiar characteristics of the industry or 
context where such policy is applied, must give due weight to 'efficiency' arguments 
regarding the consequences of preferential selection measures which by definition ignore 
merit, and must in the process give due weight to the relevance and specific importance 
of merit-based criteria in the specific context of their application. This is in. line also with 
divergent views regarding the role of efficiency. (i.e. where the importance of 'efficiency 
arguments' have been downplayed and it has been held that efficiency is not completely 
separate and antagonistic to representivity). 266 The importance of the nature and 
characteristics of the context within which affirmative action measures are applied was 
acknowledged by Pillay J in Gordon v Department of Health, KwaZulu-Nata/267 (in 
consideration during selection of the role of candidates' experience, within the context of 
transformation of the public service): 
'If experience is a compelling consideration transformation of the public service could be 
held to ransom. That is not to say that experience is not a relevant criterion. How 
important a criterion it is depends on the nature of the job, the risks attendant on it and 
whether the candidate has the potential for acquiring the experience in a reasonable 
time.'268 
265 Moseneke J in van Heerden supra par 27 
266 Compare the views of van der Westhuizen J in Stoman v Minister of Safety & Security & Others 2002 (3) SA 
468 (T), as approved in Gordon v Department of Health, KwaZulu-Natal (2004) 25 Industrial Law Journal 1431 
(LC) at par 64 
267 Ibid. 
268 Gordon op cit. at par 66 [emphasis provided]. See also Willemse v Patelia NO & Another (2007) 28 Industrial 
Law Journal 428 (LC), where the court observed (in the public service context) as follows (at par 87 of the 
judgment): 
'When applying affirmative action, employers should consider a variety of factors, of which past disadvantage is 
only one. Retention of skill and the efficient operation, particularly of state organs, clearly also require 
consideration,' 
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107 Apart from the 'inherent requirements of the job' defence to unfair discrimination 
claims as contained in section 6(2) of the Employment Equity Act, it is clearly not 
irrational per se for an employer to weigh up its operational requirements (which may 
include the necessity for a candidate to be able to.immediately take up a position with 
the requisite skills and ·experience, rather than such.candidate being suitably qualified in 
the meaning of section 20(3) and being.able to acquire such skills within a reasonable 
time) against its employment equity.requirements.- Where, after due consideration of 
these interests, operational requirements outweigh equity considerations regarding the 
target-setting exercise, the appointment of the more suitable candidate (on merit) would 
not be arbitrary, but based on a 'very relevant and acceptable criterion.'269 
In taking a practical view of the
1 
effects and consequences of applying strong 
affirmative action in the sporting context, on·e must ask whether. it is justifiable to replace 
superior talent and/or experience (if that is indeed the case) with a candidate whose 
abilities constitute a threat to the competitive strength of the team. With full 
acknowledgement of the risks inherent in making an assumption that players preferred in 
terms of an affirmative action policy are less likely to successfully compete, it is argued 
that in professional sport, as a consumer-based entertainment industry, even the 
perception of this assumption being correct or even just representing a likely result, 
serves to expose such policy to scrutiny regarding its rational and moral justification. In 
emphasizing the central role of competition in professional sport, it has been observed 
that this competition element has a sporting and an economic component. If 'quota 
players' truly are 'weak links' in a team, their participation on the field of play will 
obviously be detrimental to the team's competitive strength. But, even if such a player is 
in fact not less able than his white counterparts, it is submitted that the public perception 
of such players as being weak links will have as detrimental an effect on the economic 
component of this competition element. It is questionable whether this perception can be 
269 PSA obo Karriem v SA Police Services & Another [2007] 4 Butterworths Labour Law Reports 308 (LC) 
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faulted, if one considers that it is based on the inherent implication that merit selection is 
absent from a system employing race-based quotas. Either way, therefore, quotas will be 
bad for sport. The necessities of professional sporting competition require that such 
measures be labelled as contrary to the object purported to be pursued - and possibly 
counterproductive in the long term. It is indeed strange that so much lip-service has 
been paid to 'demographic repr'esentivity', which we have seen is just one of the factors 
listed in section 42 of the EEA to serve as a yardstick for the determination of 'equitable 
representation'. Nowhere has there been reference to one of the other factors listed in 
this same section, namely the '[e]conomic and financial factors relevant to the sector in 
which the employer operates.' 
108 ·. It is therefore submitted that even 'legitimate' affirmative action measures (in the 
meaning of measures that are truly aimed at redressing past unfair disadvantage against 
certain groups) can have no place in sport, and specifically professional, top-level sport. 
The use of measures that by their very definition are based on the application of 
preferential selection which demands the denial of the sporting merit and sporting 
attributes of individual participants runs counter to the core principles and characteristics 
of (professional) sport. 
E The dearth of jurisprudential justification for the application of 
'affirmative action' in professional sport (and the role of the rules and 
regulations of international sports bodies) 
109 The South African government's application and enforcement of race-based 
policies regarding participation in sport, which includes racial quotas and other measures 
that are purported to constitute 'affirmative action', is unique in world sport. Nowhere 
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t . 
else does one find similar measures and policies in sport; in fact, the closest parallel is 
found, ironically, in the experience of segregated sport under the control of the Apartheid 
state. While true affirmative action, in the meaning of measures and policies designed to 
redress past unfair discrimination against disadvantaged groups, has been accepted as 
legitimate in South Africa and elsewhere, the existing legal precedent and jurisprudence 
in this regard all d~al with other sectors, industries or activities - e.g. employment in 
industries other than professional sport, employment in the public service, etc. As it has 
been defined by an American commentator: 270 
'Affirmative action is a term that originated in the United States that refers to a range of 
programmes directed towards targeted groups in order to redress inequalities due to 
discriminatory practices. Broadly it takes two forms: policies to alter the composition of the 
Jabour force, and policies to increase the representativeness of public committees, political 
parties, and i:ducational institutions.' 
It is submitted that there is no legal precedent or jurisprudence, either in domestic 
national laws or in international law, in respect of the justification of 'affirmative action' in 
sport. This is further underscored by the conceptual objections to the place of affirmative 
action in an activity of the nature of sport, which was discussed above. 
110 As has been shown, the South African government's transformation agenda with 
its primary and overarching objective of achieving 'demographic representivity' of sports 
participants does in any event not constitute legitimate affirmative action in the accepted 
meaning of the term. It has been argued that such measures and policies constitute 
nothing more than attempts at what has come to be known as 'racial balancing', which 
270 Bacchi The Politics of Affirmative Action Sage Publication (1996) 15. Section 15(1) of the Employment Equity 
Act defines affirmative action measures as 'measures to ensure that suitably qualified people from designated 
groups have equal employment opportunities and are equitably represented in all occupational categories and 
levels in the workforce of a designated employer.' Gutto Equality and Non-discrimination in South Africa New 
Africa Education 2001, at 127, remarks that 'affirmative action' as used in other jurisdictions is a concept with a 
narrower meaning than the concept of 'corrective action' used in the South African interim and final 
constitutions. See also Bhoola 'Affirmative Action: A Commentary' in Thompson & Benjamin South African 
Labour Law Juta Law (Looseleaf) Vol 1 at CC1-B1 et seq. 
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has been consistently rejected as illegitimate in other jurisdictions. 271 What is more, it 
appears that these policies (and the South African government's intervention in their 
prescription and implementation) are contrary to fundamental principles of international 
sport and the rules of the international sports federations, which unambiguously and 
unequivocally prohibit any form of discrimination on the basis of race. Discussion of this 
issue is beyond the scope of this chapter, but the reader is referred to the following 
documents in this regard: The Olympic Charter, 272 the Constitution of the International 
Association of Athletics Federations (or 'IAAF'), 273 the Regulations and By-Laws of the 
International Rugby Board (or 'IRB'),274 the Anti-racism Code of the International Cricket 
271 For example, the US Supreme Court (by way of Powell J) observed the following in Local 28, Sheet Metal 
Workers' International Association v Equal Employment Opportunities Commission 478 US 421 [1986] (at 487): . 
'The requirement of ... flexibility with respect to the imposition of a numerical goal reflects a recognition that 
neither the ,constitution nor Title VII requires a particular racial balance in the workforce. Indeed, the 
Constitution forbids such a requirement if imposed for its own sake ... Thus, a court may not choose a remedy 
for the purpose of attaining a particular racial balance; rather, remedies properly are confined to the elimination 
of proven discrimination.' 
272 E.g. compare Principle 4 of the Fundamental Principles of Olympism, which provides as follows: 
'The practice of sport is a human right. Every individual must have the possibility of practising sport, without 
discrimination of any kind and in the Olympic spirit, which requires mutual understanding with a spirit of 
friendship, solidarity and fair play. The organisation, administration and management of sport must be 
controlled by independent sports organisations.' [Emphasis provided]. 
Principle 5 provides as follows: 
'Any form of discrimination with regard to a country or a persoQ on grounds of race, religion, politics, gender or 
otherwise is incompatible with belonging to the Olympic Movement.' [Emphasis provided]. 
Rule 2 of the Charter deals with the mission of the International Olympic Committee, and provides that the IOC 
must 'act against any form of discrimination affecting the Olympic Movement' (Rule 2.6), must 'oppose any 
political or commercial abuse of sport and athletes', and must 'encourage and support the development of sport 
for all.' 
In respect of national Olympic committees (such as SASCOC in South Africa), Rule 28.2.5 provides that such 
NOCs must 'take action against any form of discrimination and violence in sport', and Rule 28.5 provides as 
follows: · 
'In order to fulfil their mission, the NOCs may cooperate with governmental bodies, with which they shall 
achieve harmonious relations. However, they shall not associate themselves with any activity which would be in 
contradiction with the Olympic Charter. The NOCs may also cooperate with non-governmental bodies.' 
[Emphasis provided]. 
273 See specifically Article 3.4, which describes the objects of the organisation as including the following: 
'To strive to ensure that no gender, race, religious, political or other kind of unfair discrimination exists, 
continues to exist, or is allowed to develop in athletics in any form, and that all may participate in athletics 
regardless of their gender, race, religious or political views or any other irrelevant factor.' 
274 Regulation 20 ('Code of Conduct') of the IRB's Regulations provides that all Unions, Associations, Rugby 
Bodies, Clubs and Persons (as defined in terms of the Regulations) 'shall not do anything which is likely to 
intimidate, offend, insult, humiliate or discriminate against any other Person on the ground of their religion, 
race, colour or national or ethnic origin'. Bye-Law 3 of the IRB ('Objectives and Functions of the Board') 
provides that the IRB's functions and objectives include' [t]o prevent any discrimination against Unions or 
Persons on the grounds of race, sex, religious or political affiliations'. 
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Council (or 'ICC'), 275 and the Statutes of the Federation Internationale de Football 
Association (or 'FIFA'). 276 
111 Furthermore, it is submitted that the issue of team selection (and/or of access to 
participation at certain levels) in the different sporting codes is in essence an issue that 
resorts exclusively within the competence of the private sports federations, and is 
expressly excluded from the sphere of any government's intervention through the 
regulation of sport. Courts in a number of jurisdictions have excluded certain decisions 
and rules of sports governing bodies from judicial review on the basis that the subject 
matter of disputes were viewed as resorting under 'laws of the game' or as constituting 
issues of 'purely sporting interest' (a prime example being 'nationality quotas' enforced 
by organisations such as FIFA and UEFA in respect of the make-up of national teams in 
international competition). There is a growing body of international judicial precedent for 
this view, as illustrated in e.g. the European Union by cases such as Walrave and Koch 
(1974),277 Dona v Mantero (1976), 278 Bosman (1995), 279 Lehtonen (2000), 280 D~liege 
(2000),281 Kolpak (2003) 282 and Meca-Medina & Majcen (2006). 283 
While the above cases (and others, such as the decision of the international' Court 
of Arbitration for Sport in Mendy v IABA (1996) re the non-reviewability of purely 
technical sporting decisions) have limited application, i.e. as involving the application of 
the EU Treaty and specifically also the distinction between purely sporting matters and 
275 Which provides as follows: 
'As the international governing body for the sport of cricket the ICC is responsible for ensuring that the highest 
standards of moral and ethical behaviour are applied and upheld throughout the sport at every level. 
(a) ICC and all of its Members shall promote and encourage participation at all levels regardless of race, colour, 
religion, national or ethnic origin. 
(b) ICC and all of its Members shall ensure that there is no discrimination in any form against any person 
because of race, colour, religion, national or ethnic origin.' · 
276 Of which Article 3 declares as follows regarding non-discrimination and FIFA's stance against racism: 
'Discrimination of any kind against a country, private person or groups of people on account of ethnic origin, 
gender, language, religion, politics or any other reason is strictly prohibited and punishable by suspension or 
expulsion.' 
277 Walrave and Koch v Association Union Cycliste Internationale [1974] ECR 1405; [1975] 1 CMLR 320 
278 Dona v Mantero [1976] 2 CMLR 578; [1976] ECR 1333 
279 ASBL Union Royale Beige des Societes de Football Association & Others v Jean-Marc Bosman [1996] CMLR 
645 ECJ 
280 Lehtonen (Jyri) & Castors Canada Dry Namur-Braine v Federation Royale Beige des Societes de Basketball 
ASBL (Case C-176/96); judgment of 13 April 2000 
281 Deliege v Liege Ligue Francophone de Judo et Disciplines Associees ASBL [2002] ECR I-2549 
282 Deutcher Handballbund eV v Maras Kolpak C-438/00, 8 May 2003 
283 David Meca-Medina and Igor Majcen v Commission of the European Communities (Case C-519/04 P; 
judgment delivered 18 July 2006) 
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decisions and conduct by sports bodies of an economic nature or import, and furthermore 
involving the question of the susceptibility of such conduct to judicial review, it is 
submitted that the principle is· relevant also in respect of the proper scope of state 
regulation of sport (and of 'transformation' measures which are of such dubious 
- legitimacy). 
IV Race-based transformation as ensconced in the recent amendments to 
the National Sport and Recreation Act 
112 _ In 2007 South African sport saw the introduction of a potential basis for major 
upheaval in respect of its regulation. The passing of far-reaching amendments to the key 
sports-specificstatute, the National Sport and Recreation Act 110 of 1998, were critically 
received by many observers. The National Sport and Recreation Amendment Act, 2007 
was passed in the National Assembly on 16 May 2007 and signed into law in November 
2007. The provisions of the Act that hold the most potential to impact on the system of 
South African sports regulation and the private governance of different codes, relate to 
new-found powers accorded to the Minister of Sport and the South African Sports 
Confederation and Olympic Committee (SASCOC). These powers include inter alia the 
power to intervene in disputes in sport, and the Minister's power to issue directives to 
sports federations regarding a range of issues, which directives shall have binding 
force. 284 Most controversially, the Minister has now been empowered to also issue 
directives regarding the thorny issue of sports transformation. 
113 A new section 13A has now been inserted into the Act, which provides that '[t]he 
Minister must issue guidelines or policies to promote equity, representivity and redress in 
sport and recreation'. The new se~tions 13B and 13C require every sport or recreation 
body to submit, annually, statistics on its membership and also to report progress on the 
284 These amendments to the Act are discussed elsewhere in this chapter (see par 48 et seq) 
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I 
issues referred to in s 13A. The n.ew s 13(5)(a)(ii) empowers the Minister to intervene 'in 
any hon compliance with guidelines or policies issued in terms of section 13A or any 
measures taken to protect or advance persons or categories of persons, disadvantaged 
by unfair discrimination as contemplated in section 9(2) of the Constitution'1 by e.g. 
issuing a 'directive' which is binding on the parties to a dispute (or, specifically, a sport 
body in such cases). It is clear that these provisions have now afforded the Minister very 
substantial powers to enforce the 'transformation agenda' that has characterised South 
African sport post 1994. During early 2008, opponents of the Amendment Act were 
reported to be considering challenging these powers by means of representations to the 
relevant international sports federations (e.g. the International Olympic Committee, 
FIFA, the IAAF, the International Rugby Board and the International Cricket Council). It 
was also reported that opponents of the amendments were considering approaching the 
CAS for an advisory opinion on the legitimacy of such governmental powers in light of the 
international lex sportiva, accepted principles and practices regarding state regulation of 
sport, and the rules and regulations of said international federations. 285 
285 Rule 60 of the CAS Code of Sports-Related Arbitration provides that '[t]he IOC, the [International 
Federations], the [National Olympic Committees], the associations recognised by the IOC, the [Olympic Games 
organising committees], may request an advisory opinion from the CAS about any legal issue with respect to 
the practice or development of sports or any activity related to sports .. .' 
It was reported that an initiative was being considered whereby one or more of the appropriate international 
federations would be requested to approach the CAS for such an advisory opinion regarding the legitimacy of 
said amendments as state action regarding the regulation of sport, which was argued to constitute illegitimate 
political interference. 
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§8 The 2009 draft regulations in terms of the National Sport and Recreation 
Act, 1998 {as amended) 
114 At the time of writing, a stand-off between major federations and the South 
African government appears to be on the cards, following controversial draft regulations 
in terms of the above provisions of the National Sport and Recreation Amendment Act, 
which are apparently currently under consideration. Sport and Recreation SA sent 
correspondence to federations on 31 October 2008 (with a deadline for comments of 30 
November 2008) regarding draft regulations on 'The Control of Foreign Sports Persons in 
South Africa'. Correspondence was sent to federations on 17 December 2008 (with a 
deadline for comments of 20 January 2009) regarding 'Draft National Colours 
Regulations'. These regulations would be gazetted for public comment following 
submissions by sporting federations. The SA Rugby Union responded by referring these 
draft regulations to their legal advisors, and SARU has reportedly approached the two 
other major national federations, Cricket South Africa and the SA Football Association, 
with a view to a concerted challenge of government's alleged unlawful interference in 
sport as encompassed in the draft regulations. 
115 The following discussion of these draft regulations is speculative, as it is expected 
that any future incarnations of such regulations may differ significantly from the versions 
which were sent to federations. Also, according to media reports following the 
correspondence sent by the Ministry of Sport to federations, it was (rather inexplicably 
and embarrassingly) claimed that neither the Minister nor Deputy-Minister had in fact 
seen the draft regulations. It is submitted that, at the very least, it appears that 
regulations along the lines of these draft regulations are currently envisaged in very 
similar form, and that, obviousl.y, a lot of effort has apparently gone into the drafting 
thereof (even though these draft regulations are, generally, rather poorly drafted). 
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116 The draft regulations on the Control of Foreign Sports Persons shall apply to all 
instances where a foreign sports person 286 is recruited and contracted by a person, a 
sports body or any other body in South Africa to participate in a sports team in any sport 
inside the geographical boundaries of the country. According to draft Regulation 4, any 
sports body that recruits and contracts a foreign sports person or sports team to 
participate in South Africa in any sport, shall be required to contribute an amount as 
determined from time to time by the Minister towards a development fund for the sport, 
which fund shall be administered by Sport and Recreation SA. Draft Regulation 5 
furthermore provides for stringent requirements in the recruitment of foreign sports 
persons. A national federation must, in terms of section 6(3) of the Act, before recruiting 
a foreign sports person to participate in sport in South Africa, satisfy itself that 'there are 
no other persons in the Republic suitable to participate in such sport'. If there is such 
other person in the country, such a person 'must be given preference above (sic) a 
foreign sports person'. 287 A national federation must advise the Minister of Sport of the · 
full names and country of origin of a recruited foreign sports person and of the purpose 
and reason for recruiting such person, and must confirm that there is 'no other person in 
the Republic suitable to participate in such a sport.' This last requirement (at least in 
respect of the wording of the draft regulations which were circulated to federations) 
appears to be rather nonsensical; criteria to determine a person's suitability to 
participate in a sport would surely need to be much more clearly and definitively 
circumscribed. 
A failure to comply with these requirements would entitle the Minister to withdraw the 
recognition of a national federation by notifying it that it will not be recognised by Sport 
and Recreation SA with immediate effect,- or to withdraw funding allocated to the national 
federation. Federations would furthermore be obliged to ensure that the recruitment of a 
foreign sports person 'conforms to the guidelines issued by the Minister in terms of 
section 13A of the Act. As discussed elsewhere in this chapter, section 13A provides that 
286 A 'foreign sports person' is defined in the definitions section of the draft regulations as 'as any person 
recruited in terms of section 6(3) of the National Sport and Recreation Act, 1998 (Act 110 of 1998 as 
amended)'. See the text above regarding the provisions of section 6(3) of the Act 
287 Regulation 5(2) 
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_ '[t]he Minister must issue guidelines or policies to promote equity, representivity and 
redress in sport and recreation'. Section 13(5)(a)(ii) empowers the Minister to intervene 
'in any non compliance with guidelines or policies issued in terms of section 13A or any 
measures taken to protect or advance persons or categories of persons, disadvantaged 
by unfair discrimination as contemplated in section 9(2) of the Constitution', by e.g. 
issuing a 'directive' which is binding on the parties to a dispute (or, specifically, a sport 
body in such cases).' Accordingly, while the potential application of these sections and of 
the draft regulations is at the time of writing still speculative, it appears that the Minister 
of Sport would be empowered to intervene in· the appointment of foreign sportspersons 
(presumably players, coaches .as well as managers or other administrative staff) and may 
veto any recruitment by sports federations inter alia on the basis of the race of such 
persons -(i.e. if such persons are not from previously disadvantaged or designated 288 
groups) .. It is submitted that this apparently rather bizarre form of 'affirmative action' 
would most probably not pass muster in the event of legal or constitutional challenge, 
and that it specifically appears to provide for very substantial government intervention in 
respect of commercial decisions of private entities involved in the administration of sport 
as well as potentially severely. limiting the freedom of trade of foreign sports persons (in 
the light of international developments in e.g. football in the post-Bosman era, and 
recent calls for restraint of trade challenges in the context of !CL cricketers). 289 While, as 
will be pointed out in the discussion below, 290 the fundamental freedom to choose a 
trade, occupation or profession as guaranteed in section 22 of the Bill of Rights does not 
apply to non-South African citizens, 291 it is submitted that a limitation such as contained 
in these regulations may be open to challenge under the (extended 292 ) restraint of trade 
doctrine. It also flies in the face of the practical reality in most major professional sports, 
288 In terms of the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998, the 'designated groups' who are to be advantaged by 
means of affirmative action measures and policies in employment are defined as Black persons (including, 
Africans, Coloured and Indian persons), women and persons with disabilities. 
289 See the discussion elsewhere in this chapter 
290 See the discussion in par 370 et seq below 
291 Currie & de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook Juta (2005) point out that even though it has been held that in 
terms of section 38 of the Bill of Rights ('Enforcement of rights'), for an applicant to show sufficient interest in 
the outcome of constitutional litigation the enquiry is objective (it is sufficient to show that a right in the Bill of 
Rights has been violated by a law or conduct and it is not necessary to show that the rights of the applicant has 
been violated), section 22 could not be used to challenge laws that prohibit the employment of non-citizens - at 
490 note 38. 
292 See the discussion of the restraint of trade doctrine in South African law in par 353 et seq below 
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namely the widespread practice of recruiting foreign high profile coaching staff on the 
basis of their expertise and experience. 
117 The (in the opinion of this observer) rather bizarre nature of these draft 
regulations is further illustrated by-the requirements contained in draft Regulation 8, 
which a foreign sports person must comply with before s/he may be considered by a 
national federation to participate in a sports team in any sport in South Africa. These 
requirements include, inter a/ia, that a foreign sports person must have officially played 
for his or her country 'in at least 65% of competitive "A" team matches293 at senior 
level 294 for which he or she was available for selection, during a period of at least two 
years preceding the date of his or her recruitment' to participate in South Africa. 
Amongst other requirements for a foreign coach or manager, s/he must 'have coached or 
managed a national team for a period of at least five years' and may also be required to 
write 'an admission examination as determined from time to time by the relevant 
national federation', whatever this may entail. The wording of this draft regulation does 
not appear to be qualified, and it is difficult to divine the rationale behind a requirement 
that even a potential applicant for a coaching or manager's position in a Premier Soccer 
League club, a rugby Super 14 franchise or provincial team would apparently be required 
to have coached or managed a national team. A failure by a foreign sports person to 
comply with these requirements would entitle the Minister to disapprove of his or her 
participation in a sport in South Africa and 'to make recommendations to the Minister of 
Home Affairs to declare such a foreign sports person as an illegal immigrant.' 
It is expected that the effect of such a regulation would be very significant in a 
number of sporting codes. A number of Premier Soccer League clubs, for example, 
employ players from elsewhere in Africa, and other sports employers (such a number of 
domestic rugby and cricket franchises) would also be affected in terms of their foreign 
players. 
293 Which is defined as 'an international sports match or event organised by an international recognised body'. 
294 Or 75% of competitive 'A' team matches at junior level 
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Finally, the draft regulations on the control of foreign sports persons provides that 
recruiting a foreign sports person or directly or indirectly assisting in such recruitment 
without complying with the regulation would constitute an offence, and such offender 
would be liable to a fine or imprisonment of a minimum of five years and a maximum of 
ten years (or both such fine and imprisonment). 
118 The draft National Colours Regulations are aimed at regulating the awarding (and 
aspects relating thereto) of 'national colours', which are defined in the draft regulations 
as including the name, title or designation King·Protea, 295 and the colours green, gold 
and white. Draft Regulation 2 provides that '[t]he Sports Confederation hereby 
establishes the [National Colours Boa~rd] to administer the awarding of the national 
colours and to advise.the Sports Confederation and the Minister on any matter related 
thereto' [emphasis provided]. This provision·is rather surprising: The dis·cussion 
elsewhere in this chapter has referred to the strange and anomalous nature of the Sports 
Confede·ration (or SASCOC), which is a private section 21 company (i.e. an entity of civil 
society) which has apparently been clothed with governmental sports regulatory 
functions. It is questionable whether such an entity is clothed with the power to issue 
regulations in terms of the National Sport and Recreation Act, a power which is expressly 
reserved for the Minister of Sport. 296 
295 The King Protea is the national flower of the Republic of South Africa, and the symbol adopted for post-1994 
national sports teams such as the national cricket team (colloquially known as 'the Proteas') and the national 
football team (colloquially known as 'Bafana Bafana' or 'our boys'). In 2008 a row developed between the 
Minister of Sport and the SA Rugby Union regarding the continued use of the symbol of the Springbok on the 
national rugby team jersey. This much-publicised dispute caused great public controversy, with the sports 
Minister and the ANC's chair of the parliamentary portfolio committee on sport, Mr Buthana Komphela (amongst 
others), claiming that the Springbok was a divisive symbol of apartheid sport (one observer likened the symbol 
to Nazi Germany's swastika). The dispute involved claims by the sports Minister that Sport and Recreation SA 
(the government sports department) owns the intellectual property rights in the Springbok. Rather 
embarrassingly for the Minister, who had provided a number of trade mark registration numbers in support of 
this contention, it was shown through a trade marks registry search by one of the top intellectual property law 
firms that all these alleged registrations were invalid (and that SRSA had, in any event, failed to pay 
registration fees in respect of alleged registered marks), and that the Springbok emblem was in fact a 
registered trade mark of the SA Rugby Union. The dispute was settled when SARU agreed to move the 
Springbok symbol to the right breast of the national team jersey, and to place the King Protea symbol in pride 
of place on the left breast. 
296 Section 14 of the Act confers the power to make regulations in terms of the Act on the Minister (after 
consultation with SASCOC in certain matters) 
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119 The National Colours Board is to be made up of members of SASCOC, including a 
chairperson appointed by the Board of SASCOC, a secretary (who shall be the CEO of 
SASCOC or his or her nominee), and four to seven members, who may include non-
elected members appointed by the Board of SASCOC, based on their expertise and 
knowledge of sport. 297 The functions of the Board are described as including, inter alia, 
the power to 'award national colours to an athlete of a member298 who complies with all 
the requirements of [the draft] regulations'; to 'act as an advisory body of (sic?) the 
Sports Confederation and the Minister with regard to all matters affecting national 
colours, including but not limited to the awarding, control and use thereof, ·and to make 
rules in regard thereto'; to 'prevent any abuse or misuse of national colours and to 
protect same against any infringement or limitation'; to 'determine whether any 
application for national colours received by it from a member, warrants the award of 
national colours'; and to recommend disciplinary or legal action against any athlete, 
person, member or organisation as a result of any conduct, action or statement which, in 
the opinion of the Board, is considered to be in breach of the regulations or to ·constitute 
an abuse or misuse of the national colours,.or constitute bringing the national colours 
into disrepute. 299 Draft Regulation 4(2) provides that the Minister may, subject to the 
provisions of section 13 of the Act, 300 revoke any ratification, refusal or withdrawal of an 
award of national colours to an athlete of a member by the Board. 
120 Draft Regulation 8 prescribes the procedure for the awarding of national colours. 
An application must be made by a member (national federation) on behalf of an athlete, 
which must be submitted within thirty days of the event for which national colours are 
applied for. Such application must be accompanied by documentary proof of the status of 
the international sports event in question and confirming the invitation by the host 
country/organisation. 301 The Board must within fourteen days inform the applicant (with 
297 Draft Regulation 5(2) 
298 A 'member' is defined in the draft regulations as a national federation as per the Articles of Association of 
the SA Sports Confederation and Olympic Committee (SASCOC) - see the discussion in par 44 et seq above. 
299 Draft Regulation 4(1) 
300 See the discussion above 
301 Draft Regulation 10 
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written reasons) of its decision, and such applicant may within fourteen days lodge a 
written appeal with the Minister. Until any appeal has been decided by the Minister, the 
decision of the Board must be regarded to have been validly made or given. 302 
121 Draft Regulation 12(1) provides that national colours may only be awarded to an 
athlete of a member (i.e. a national federation which is a member of SASCOC). 
Reference has been made elsewhere in this chapter to the controversial nature of 
SASCOC as a representative body of different sporting codes and, specifically, to the 
apparently coercive nature of membership of the organisation. This last draft regulation 
seems to support such a view: While membership of SASCOC by national federations is 
ostensibly voluntary, it is clear that federations may owe a contractual duty to its 
member athletes to join SASCOC, in order for such athletes to be eligible for national 
colours in the sport. This is problematic not only in light of the anomalous, quasi-
governmental, nature of SASCOC (which has been referred to), but especially also in 
light of the fundamental right to freedom of association as guaranteed in section 18 of 
the Bill of Rights. 303 
122 The award of national colours shall only apply to an athlete who represents South 
Africa in an international competition 'of the required nature and standard as 
recommended by the relevant member [federation] against fully representative teams of 
individuals from another country or countries', and such recommendation must be 
approved by the Board in writing and must be consistent with SASCOC's 'High 
Performance System and any applicable policy of SRSA'.304 It is further provided that, for 
the purposes of awarding national colours, a selection process of a national team shall 
only be deemed fair if national trials with an approved selection process were held or 
conducted by the relevant member federation in order to select such national team(s) 
and if 'reasonable, fair and equal opportunities were provided for every eligible athlete 
302 Draft Regulation 8 
303 See the discussion in par 366 et seq below 
304 Draft Regulation 12(2) 
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that qualified to participate in such trials'. 305 A selection process shall be deemed to be 
unfair and inequitable if an eligible athlete is excluded from such national team on the 
basis of them not being able to finance their participation in the national trials and/or 
team. 306 It is specifically provided that this last provision shall not be construed as 
creating a financial obligation on the part of SASCOC to 'finance or find funding for any 
team, any trials, any member of any team or national federation'. In light of the 
preceding provision regarding the fairness of the selection process, it is submitted that 
these provisions may be interpreted to create a financial obligation on the relevant 
federation to finance the participation of such athletes, which raises interesting questions 
regarding the legitimacy (and practical viability) of the regulations. 
Draft Regulation 13(2) further provides that the selection process would be 
deemed to be unfair; and inequitable if an eligible athlete is 'excluded from such national 
team(s) because of negative discrimination, which grounds for discrimination may include 
religious (sic), gender, colour, sexual orientation or creed'. It is submitted that this last 
provision raises interesting questions regarding potential intervention by the proposed 
National Colours Board, SASCOC or the _Minister, in light of the sports transformation 
provisions as contained in the Act. This provision might provide grounds for intervention 
in national team selections on the basis of a perceived lack of 'players of colour'. While 
the draft regulations provide that the proposed National Colours Board 'may not 
intervene in the selection of national teams', the Board 'must at all times require proof of 
the standard and nature of the particular international competition, details about the 
selection panel, and the method employed regarding the selection process'. 307 Clearly (in 
this author's opinion), the scene would be set for intervention in team selection on the 
basis of alleged 'negative discrimination' by selectors on the basis of e.g. race. The draft 
regulations do not contain any provisions regarding the burden of proof of such 
discrimination, and one may speculate that a perceived lack of 'representativeness' of a 
national team may invite the ire of the Board, SASCOC or the Minister. In this regard it 
305 Draft Regulation 13(1) 
306 Draft Regulation 13(2) 
307 Draft Regulation 14 
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should be noted that draft Regulation 30(2) provides that '[t]he award of national colours 
for purposes.of these regulations, are done in the public interest in line with the nation's 
commitment to nation building', which, it is submitted, is open to interpretation favouring 
such intervention in the awarding of national colours in the pursuit of 'sports 
transfor·mati.on': · -· 
.... 
123 _·.A fUrther rather controversial provision of the draft regulations· is~ that '[n]ational 
colours•may:only be considered for an athlete who can submit proof that he or she is a 
South African national, i.e. they must be in possession of a valid South Afri·can passport' 
(and an athlete with a South African resident permit only is not eligible for national 
colours).-308 The SA Rugby Union has stated that these provisions are much more onerous 
than the eligibility -rules of the International Rugby Board, and would exclude current star 
Spr:ingbok·players such as Zimbabwean citizens Tendai Mtawarira, Brian Mujati and 
Tonderai Chavanga. It is interesting to speculate as to the legitimacy of this regulation in 
light of the much more lenient national eligibility standards of international sports 
governing bodies,:also in other sporting codes, and it is submitted that such regulation 
may be open.to legal challenge on such grounds. 
124 Apart from the issues referred to above, the draft regulations on national colours 
contain a number of other provisions which seem rather problematic (if only as a result 
of what appears to be rather sloppy drafting). For example, draft Regulation 25(3) 
provides that 'a national federation from whom the national colours in respect of an 
athlete or other individual have been withdrawn by the Board, shall under no 
circumstances make use of the national colours in relation to any sporting contest in 
which the country is represented, and the contravention of this sub-regulation shall 
constitute an offence'. The meaning of this provision is unclear. Would the SA Rugby 
· Union and other national team players, for example, be barred from using the team 
colours and the King Protea symbol in an international match in the event that the 
308 Draft Regulation 20 
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national colours of an individual player have been withdrawn? Such a provision would not 
make sense. Furthermore, draft Regulation 26(1) provides that a member federation 
shall be entitled to use 'its own colours, emblems and insignia that it awards and uses in 
its sole discretion', provided that member colours should be used in, inter alia, 'test 
matches'. 'Member colours' are nowhere further defined in the regulations, which raises 
questions regarding the use of colours in sports such as rugby and cricket, where official 
international competition involves national teams which compete in 'test matches'. The 
regulations further provide that a member federation 'shall not be allowed to use the 
national colours as its member colours'. 
Draft Regulation 27 provides that a member federation and SASCOC 'shall adhere 
strictly to the approved colour combinations, being predominantly green and gold for 
.home games, and predominantly white for away games insofar as national teams are 
concerned', but provides that a deviation may be allowed in exceptional cases. A member 
federation may deviate from the approved colour combinations 'only in cases where, in a 
code of sport, a specific colour uniform is mandatory (e.g. test cricket ... ) and then only 
with the written approval from the Board.' It appears nonsensical to acknowledge that 
e.g. test cricket requires a specific colour uniform (namely white clothing), and yet 
require Cricket SA to apply for written approval in this regard. 
125 Draft Regulations 29 and 30 relate to licensing and merchandising of national 
colours and the ownership of intellectual property in national colours. Draft Regulation 
30(1) provides that the national colours 'remain the intellectual property of the State' 
(which may or may not reflect the true position currently309). The draft regulations 
provide that Sport and Recreation SA may appoint a licensing agent to handle all aspects 
relating to the licensing and merchandising of the national colours. No member 
federation, person or organisation is entitled to use the national colours in whatever form 
for merchandising purposes without the written approval of Sport and Recreation SA, and 
309 See discussion elsewhere in this chapter regarding the recent dispute between the sports Minister and the 
SA Rugby Union over ownership of the 'Springbok' trade mark. It is unclear at the time of writing whether or to 
what extent intellectual property rights to the King Protea device and the colours of green, gold and white in 
terms of copyright and/or under the Trade Marks Act, 1993, vests in Sport and Recreation SA. 
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such use shall be subject to terms and conditions as agreed upon and to the payment of 
royalties in terms of certain terms and conditions as determined by the Minister by 
proclamation in the Government Gazette from time to time. 310 It is uncertain at the time 
of writing to what extent, if any, these provisions may potentially infringe on existing 
intellectual property rights which may vest in federations (and may even constitute 
illegitimate deprivation of property - if not expropriation - in contravention of the 
fundamental right to property as contained in section 25 of the Bill of Rights). 
126 The draft regulations provide for offences relating to national colours. An athlete, 
person, member federation or organisation which -
without the necessary authority from and agreement in writing with Sport 
and Recreation SA, uses the national colours for commercial purposes; 
is awarded national colours without complying with the terms and 
conditions and fees or royalties and arrangements with Sport and 
Recre-ation SA; 
uses the national colours or any colours confusingly or deceptively similar 
thereto in the course of trade or otherwise; 
project himself or herself or itself as representing South Africa in an official 
capacity in a sporting activity without the written consent of SASCOC or 
Sport and Recreation SA; 
unlawfully and without the written authority of the National Colours Board, 
misrepresents that s/he is entitled to wear national colours; 
commits any act, directly or indirectly, which brings the national colours 
into disrepute; 
contravenes any of the provisions of the draft regulations; 
310 Draft Regulation 29(4) 
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is guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to a fine or to imprisonment for a period 
not exceeding 10 years or to both such fine and imprisonment. 311 
Finally, draft Regulation 32 provides for punitive measures by the National Colours 
Board, which may cause an investigation into non-compliance with the regulations on the 
written recommendation of SASCOCor at the written request ofthe Minister. The Board 
must, after consultation with SASCOC or the Minister, identify any non-compliant ath,lete, 
person, member federation or organisation, and may recommend (inter aiia) -
that the Minister considers withdrawing or reducing governmen~ funding of 
a member federation or organisation; 
that the Minister considers withdrawing the recognition of such a member 
or organisation; 
that the Minister considers debarring such an athlete, person, member 
federation or organisation from participating in his/her/its sport in South 
Africa, or from administering such sport in South Africa; 
disciplinary or legal action to be taken against such athlete, person, 
member federation or organisation by a disciplinary committee or by the 
appropriate controlling body; or 
that SASCOC institute criminal charges against an athlete, person, member 
federation or organisation. 
These criminal and disciplinary provisions as contained in the draft regulations are of 
course very far-reaching (and may also open the draft regulations to scrutiny on the 
basis of accepted notions of criminal law in respect of the imposition of criminal 
sanctions). Developments in respect of these controversial draft regulations (for which 
the deadline for submission of comments by sports federations was extended to 11 
February 2009) will be watched with interest, and may lead to legal challenge in the near 
future. 
311 Draft Regulation 31 
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§9 DOPING REGULATION 312 
I The South African Institute for Drug-Free Sport 
127 The national anti-doping agency is an important body in the regulatory context of 
SA sport; it was established by legislation and with a regulatory mandate that covers all 
sports federations. The South African Institute for Drug-Free Sport (or 'SAIDS')313 was 
established in terms of the South African Institute for Drug-Free Sport Act, 14 of 1997 
(hereinafter the 'SAIDS Act'). The SAIDS Act came into force on 23 May 1997. SAIDS 
fulfills an independent testing, education and research function relating to drugs and 
doping in sport. 
128 The South African government made a formal commitment to the World Anti-
Doping Agency (or 'WADA') Anti-Doping Code and formally recognized the role of WADA 
through the Copenhagen Declaration on Anti-Doping in Sport in 2003, and SAIDS is the 
statutory body with the responsibility to promote and support the elimination of doping in 
sport in South Africa. 314 In 2006, the SAIDS Act was amended in order to give effect to 
the Copenhagen Declaration, and the South African Institute for Drug-free Sport 
Amendment Act, 2006315 provides for the adoption of matters contained in the World 
Anti-Doping Code and establishes a doping control programme in compliance with the 
Code. 316 This followed earlier criticism that the 1997 Act did not specifically refer to or 
incorporate the provisions of the World Anti-Doping Code. 317 Section 11(2)(a) of the Act 
(as amended) expressly provides that SAIDS 'shall adopt and implement anti-doping 
312 My sincere thanks go to Mr. Fahmy Galant, Doping Control Manager of the SA Institute for Drug-Free Sport, 
for kindly providing me with updated statistical and other information regarding the activities of the Institute. 
My sincere thanks also to Ms. Fikile Portia Ndlovu (Faculty of Law, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban) for 
permission to reproduce here sections of her article entitled 'Anti-doping law in South Africa - The challenges of 
the World Anti-Doping Code', as published in 2006/1-2 International Sports Law Journal 60-63. 
313 The organisation's web site, including helpful information and contact details, can be found at 
www .drugfreesport.org .za 
314 From the Introduction to the SAIDS Anti-Doping Rules, Version 2 (2009) 
315 No. 25 of 2006 
316 The 2009 version of the World Anti-Doping Code became effective on 1 January 2009, and replaces the 2003 
version of the Code 
317 See Ndlovu supra; Le Roux, R 'The World-Anti Doping Code: A South African Perspective' South African 
Journal for Research in Sport, Physical Education and Recreation (2004) Volume 26 (1) 67 
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rules and policies which conform with the [WADA Code] including the WADA Prohibited 
List'. 
129 An express goal of the SAIDS Act is to promote participation in sports, free from 
·the use of prohibited substances 'or methods intended to artificially enhance 
performance. Doping is defined in s 1 of the Act as the occurrence of one or more of the 
anti-doping rule violations as described in the Act. 318 Section 10 of the SAIDS Act sets 
out various objectives aimed at discouraging the use of drugs in sport. These objectives 
include; inter alia, the encouragement of development programmes aimed at more 
specifically educating the sporting communities about the dangers of doping in sport (s 
lO(l)(b)). While it is clear from a reading of the Act that its main aim is to eradicate the 
use of.prohibited substances in sport, these legislative objectives need to be 
accompanied by practical education for sportspersons against doping, because the reality 
for many athletes is that they use banned substances because they believe it is 
necessary:for achieving world-class performances. This mindset in many athletes places 
their health in danger as well as affecting the legitimacy of competitions and of sporting 
achievements. 
130 As mentioned, SAIDS is a statutory body, and all sports organizations and 
federations are obliged to recognize its authority and comply with its directives·. 319 
Section lO(l)(e) of the Act (as amended) provides that one of the objectives of the 
SAIDS is to 'ensure that national sports federations and other sports organizations adopt 
and implement anti-doping policies and rules which conform with [the WADA Code] and 
with the requirements set out in the anti-doping policy and rules of the Institute'. The 
Board of the Institute reports to the Minister of Sport, and SAIDS is funded by the 
national government department for sport (Sport and Recreation SA or 'SRSA'). The 
Institute's mission and activities include the development of national strategy on doping 
in sport, providing an independent drug-testing programme across the major sporting 
318 For the definition of 'anti-doping rule violations', see the footnotes to par 131 below 
319 
.See. discussion of the provisions of Article 1 of the SAIDS Anti-Doping Rules below 
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codes, the provision of information and education to athletes and federations regarding 
prohibited substances, and ensuring international harmonization of standards and 
practices in anti-doping. 
131 In terms of s lO(l)(d) of the Act (as amended), the Institute intends to promote 
and ensure the adoption of a centralised doping control programme, which 'may subject 
any athlete to testing, with or without advance notice, both in and out of competition'. 
SAIDS carries out in excess of 2 000 tests on elite athletes each year, at provincial, 
national and international events. 320 According to available figures at the time of writing, 
the number of tests conducted annually by SAIDS has steadily increased since its 
inception (with the Institute consistel)tly exceeding 2 000 tests per annum since the 
2002/3 reporting period). In the2007/8 period, a total of 2 541 tests were conducted 
over 52 different sports disciplines (of which 1 615 tests were in-competition). A total of 
23 anti-doping rule violations321 were found in this period (amounting to 0.91 % of tests). 
Since the inception of SAIDS testing, the percentage of anti-doping rule violations has 
consistently been under 2% of tests performed (with the exception of the 1998/9 and 
1999/2000 periods, when violations were 2.52% and 2.95% respectively). On average, 
around 65% of tests performed during each reporting period have been in-competition 
testing (with the exception of the 1998/9 and 1999/2000 reporting periods, when in-
competition testing constituted 86% and 82% of tests respectively). In the period 
320 See Cloete (ed.) Introduction to Sports Law in South Africa LexisNexis Butte~orths (2005) at 187 
321 
'Anti-doping rule violations' are defined in section 1 of the 2006 Amendment Act (these definitions 
correspond with the anti-doping rule violations as contained in Article 2 of the World Anti-Doping Code) as 
including any of the following: 
(i) the presence of a prohibited substance or its metabolites or markers in an athlete's bodily specimen; 
(ii) the use or attempted use of a prohibited substance or method; 
(iii) the refusal or failure, without compelling justification, to submit to sample collection after notification as 
authorised in terms of applicable anti-doping rules or otherwise evading sample collection; 
(iv) the violation of applicable requirements regarding athlete availability for out of competition testing, 
including failure to provide required whereabouts information and missed tests which are declared based on 
reasonable rules; 
(v) the tampering, or attempting to tamper, with any part of doping control; 
(vi) the possession of prohibited substances and methods; 
(vii) the trafficking in any prohibited substance or method; or 
(viii) the administration or attempted administration of a prohibited substance or method to any athlete, or 
assisting, encouraging, aiding, abetting, covering up or any other type of complicity involving an anti-doping 
rule violation or any attempted violation. 
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between the 1997/8 and 2007/8 reporting periods, a total of 304 anti-doping rule 
violations were reported. 
132 SAIDS develops sample collection and testing procedures (by virtue of 
international standards), and it is madatory for the Institute's testing procedures to be 
adopted by all national sports federations and organizations. They are to achieve this by 
adopting uniform iodependent and internationally acceptable sample collection and 
testing procedures. Further, in terms of s lO(l)(q of the Act (as amended), SAIDS must 
ensure, as far as reasonably possible, the establishment and maintenance of a WADA-
accredited laboratory in South Africa. At the time of writing, SAIDS is one of only a small 
number of anti-doping agencies worldwide with ISO 9001: 2000 certification in 
compliance with International Standards for Doping Control. 322 
It is important to mention that in·applying the local laws on practical testing processes 
due regard must be had to the World Anti-Doping Agency's tools for testing ethics, 
namely, an awareness of the rules regarding Laboratory Accreditation, Prohibited List and 
Therapeutic Use and Exemptions and Testing Standards as well as the Models for Best 
Practice, especially when securing attendance of athletes for unannounced, out-of-
competition testing. 323 At the time of writing, the first version of the SAIDS Anti-Doping· 
Rules (which was issued in 2007) has just undergone revision, and the 2009 revised 
version has been published. 324 The Anti-Doping Rules are modeled on the WADA Code 
and expressly incorporate the policies and minimum standards set forth in the Code 
(following formal acceptance of the Code by the SAIDS Board on 25 November 2005). A 
workshop was held with national federations on 28 February 2009 to disseminate the 
2009 anti-doping rules and the 2009 World Anti-Doping Code, as well as the 
requirements for all national federations to accept such rules. 
The Institute offers a range of other services, including maintaining a 
comprehensive database of banned and permitted products, the distribution of 
322 From the web site of the Institute at htto://www.druqfreesport.org.za 
323 Le Roux, R 'The World-Anti Doping Code: A South African Perspective' South African Journal for Research in 
Sport, Physical Education and Recreation (2004) Volume 26 (1) 67 
324 At the time of writing, the SAIDS Anti-Doping Policy is available online at the Institute's website, at 
http://www.druqfreesport.org .za 
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information guides to athletes and others, and the facilitation of 'Drugs in Sport' 
workshops for training purposes targeted at educators, schools, coaches and community 
workers. 325 Through SRSA funding, SAIDS also maintains the South African Doping 
Control Laboratory at the University of the Free State in Bloemfontein, which is one of 34 
WADA accredited laboratories in the world. 326 
133 To date South African efforts in achieving the objectives of the 1997 Act are 
laudable as many doping offences have been dealt with publicly and with proper 
sanction. It also appears that knowledge amongst athletes regarding the activities of the 
SAIDS and its advocacy, education and doping control programmes has steadily 
increased during the last decade. 327 Furthermore, the stakeholders in South African codes 
have reacted positively to the need for drug-free sport. This attitude is in line with 
international legal trends on anti-doping. On the international circuit the efforts of WADA 
and the International Olympic Committee should be r:ecognized as they have managed to 
punish various doping offenders through the annulment of.illegally obtained 
performances. 
II Doping regulation: Miscellaneous matters 
A The functions and duties of the Institute 
134 Section 11(2) of the SAIDS Act (as amended 328 ) provides for the following duties 
of the Institute: 
325 A telephonic Drug-Free Information Hotline, which was previously offered by SAIDS, has since been 
discontinued 
326 htto://www.drugfreesport.orq.za 
327 E.g compare the results of the study conducted by Coopoo, Y & Manjra, S I 'Knowledge and perceptions of 
elite South African athletes on doping and doping control, 1998 v. 2002' South African Journal of Sports 
Medicine Vol. 16 Issue 3 (2004) 14 
328 Section 11 of the Act amended by section 6(b) of the 2006 Amendment Act 
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a. To adopt and implement anti-doping rules and policies which 
conform with the [World Anti-Doping Code] including the WADA 
Prohibited List; 
b .. To establish and maintain a Register of Notifiable Events; 329 
c. To notify relevant persons and organisations of entries into the 
Register of Notifiable Events; -
d. To disseminate information relating to the sanctions likely to be 
imposed if athletes violate ann-doping rules; 
e. To select athletes for doping control according to a test distribution 
plan; 
f. To collect samples from athletes and secure the safe and tamper-
free transit of samples to WADA-accredited laboratories in 
accordance with the Code's International Standard for Testing; 
g. To. develop and implement educational programmes to discourage 
the practice of doping in sport; 
h. To consult with, assist, co-operate with and provide relevant 
information to governmental and non-governmental anti-doping 
organisations and other persons within South Africa and 
internationally, where appropriate; 
i. To take steps aimed at ensuring that South Africa complies with the 
Code, the UNESCO Convention 330 and any other anti-doping 
agreements or arrangements to which South Africa is a party; 
j. To undertake research or co-ordinate and arrange for research to 
be undertaken in the field of performance-enhancing substances 
and methods; 
k. To encourage the pursuit of optimal sports performances in an 
environment free from doping; 
329 A 'notifiable event' is defined in the Amendment Act as meaning 'any sports competition or event under the 
auspices of the South African Sports Confederation and Olympic Committee (SASCOC) or any national sports 
federation anywhere within or outside the Republic, with reference to which doping control is to be carried out, 
as determined by the Institute'. 
330 See the discussion in par 139 below 
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I. To establish and maintain a- Registered Testing Pool 331 of top level 
athletes who shall be subject to both in competition and out of 
competition testing; 
m. To requir~ that athletes who have been included in the testing pool 
provide accurate information on their current whereabouts which 
shall be made available to WADA and to other Anti-Doping 
Organisations having authority to test the athletes; and 
n. To ensure that a process for all athletes with documented medical 
conditions requiring the use of a prohibited substance or method 
may request a therapeutic use exemption: Provided that such 
requests shall be evaluated by a therapeutic use exemption 
committee in accordance with the International Standard for 
Th~rapeutic Use: Provided further that the Institute shall promptly 
report in writing to the WADA such granting of therapeutic use 
exemptions. 
B Duty to publish information on testing procedures 
135 Section 11( l)(g) of the SAIDS Act provides that the Institute may develop, 
maintain, distribute and publish information on procedures for, and developments 
concerning, the collection of testing samples. In terms of s 11(2)(a) of the 1997 Act, the 
Institute must adopt and implement rules and policies which conform with the WADA 
'Prohibited List', which is regulated in terms of Article 4 of the WADA Code. 332 Article 4.1 
of the SAIDS Anti-Doping Rules expressly incorporates the WADA Prohibited List as 
331 Section 1 of the Amendment Act defines a registered testing pool as 'the pool of top level athletes, 
established by the Institute, who are subject to both in competition and out of competition testing as part of 
the Institute's test distribution plan'. The Introduction to the SAIDS Anti-Doping Policy (version 1, 2007, 
currently in force) provides that [a]ny person who is not a member of a South African national federation and 
who fulfills the requirements to be part of the SAIDS registered testing pool, must become a member of the 
person's national federation, and shall make himself or herself available for testing, at least twelve (12) months 
before participating in international events or events of his or her national federation'. 
332 http://www.wada-ama.org 
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published and revised from time to time, and provides that SAIDS will make the List 
available to national federations who in turn shall ensure that the current List is available 
to its members and constituents. The annual updating of the WADA List suggests that the 
ongoing research and scientific developments that are taking place in the science of 
doping methods will continue to be reflected. 
In terms of s 11(2)(d) of the SAIDS Act, the Institute has a duty to disseminate 
information relating to sanctions that are likely to be imposed if athletes violate anti-
doping rules. A negative inference is drawn against any athlete who refuses to provide a 
sample for testing. With regard to who may be tested, s 11(2)(e) and (f) of the 1997 Act 
(as amended) provides that it is within the powers of the Institute to select the athletes 
to be tested in terms of a test distribution plan, and to collect samples from such athletes 
while securing a tamper-free transit of such samples to approved laboratories in terms of 
the International Standards for Testing. Therefore, where the legislative measures of 
testing have been properly adhered to it is likely that the results from the testing are 
true and correct, which would serve to counter the frequent arguments of offending 
athletes who may claim to be victims of incorrect testing procedures. 
Section llA of the Act333 contains a detailed description of a 'doping control 
programme', 334 while section llB contains provisions regarding the failure by an athlete 
to comply with a request to provide a sample.335 
333 As inserted by section 7 of the 2006 SAIDS Amendment Act 
334 A doping control programme is a programme that -
(a) applies to all athletes; 
(b) adopts and implements the applicable mandatory International Standards, including the Prohibited List, the 
Therapeutic Use Exemptions Standard and the International Standard for Testing in compliance with the Code; 
(c) authorises the Institute to request an athlete to provide a sample for the purpose of doping control; 
(d) requires the Institute to establish and maintain a doping register .for the programme; 
(e) requires the Institute to enter the name of an athlete or other person in the doping register when the 
athlete or other person is found guilty of violating an anti-doping rule as defined in section 1; 
(f) requires the Institute to give written notice of the making and particulars of an entry in the doping register 
to -
(i) each relevant sports federation in relation to the athlete concerned; and 
(ii) each relevant sports federation in relation to any athlete whose interests may have been affected 
by the anti-doping rule violation referred to in paragraph (e): Provided that such notice of information 
of an entry in the doping register shall be subject to the provisions of the Promotion of Access to 
Information Act and may include any or all of the following: 
(aa) Failure by an athlete to provide a sample; 
(bb) failure by an athlete to complete or sign any form or to perform any action during 
sample collection as required by the doping control programme; 
(cc) any attempt, whether successful or not, by an athlete or any other person to tamper with 
the doping control process; 
(dd) any other interference with the doping control process; 
(ee) the results of laboratory analysis; 
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C Anti-Doping Violations and the Burden of Proof 
136 The SAIDS Anti-Doping Rules336 provides for the following anti-doping violations, 
which correspond with the anti-doping violations as contained in Article 2 of the WADA 
Code: 
The presence of a prohibited substance or its metabolites or markers in an 
athlete's bodily specimen; 
Use or attempted use of a prohibited substance or a prohibited method; 
Refusing, or failing without compelling justification, to submit to sample 
collection: after notification as authorized in the Anti-Doping Rules, or 
otherwise evading sample collection; 
Violation of the requirements regarding athlete availability for out of 
competition testing including failure to provide required whereabouts 
information; 
Tampering, or ·attempting to tamper, with any part of doping control; 
(ff) any failure by an athlete to provide information on his or her whereabouts for out of 
competition testing; and 
(gg) any information relating to an athlete's adverse analytical finding or the failure by an 
athlete to comply with a request by the Institute to provide a sample; 
(g) authorises the Institute, subject to the Promotion of Access to Information Act, to disclose information -
(i) to the South African Police Service and the South African Customs Service on any of the following: 
(aa) the use by a person of a prohibited substance or method; 
(bb) the possession by a person of a prohibited substance or method; 
(cc) trafficking by a person in a prohibited substance or method; 
(dd) the administration by a person of a prohibited substance or method; 
(ee) a person attempting to engage in any conduct referred to in paragraphs (aa) to (cc); and 
(ff) a person aiding, abetting, covering up or being involved in any other type of complicity 
relating to any conduct referred to in paragraphs (aa) to (dd); 
(ii) relating to the return by an athlete of an adverse or negative analytical finding, or to an anti-
doping rule violation by an athlete or any other person, to the public; 
(h) requires the South African Police Service and the South African Customs Service to co-operate with the 
Institute -
(i) with any investigation pertaining to information disclosed in terms of paragraph (g); 
(ii) with regard to any illegal activities resulting from anti-doping rule violations; or 
(iii) in any other manner as may be required; or 
(i) may make provision for the application, adoption or incorporation, with or without modification, of any other 
instrument made by a sports administration body. 
335 For the purposes of the Act, an athlete fails to comply with a request by the Institute to provide a sample if -
(a) he or she refuses or fails to submit to sample collection as required by the doping control programme; 
(b) he or she fails to complete or sign any form required by the doping control programme to be completed or 
signed by the athlete; or 
(c) after providing the sample, he or she fails to comply with the required additional sample collection 
requirements. · 
336 Version 2, 2009 
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Possession of prohibited substances or methods; 
Trafficking in any prohibited substance or prohibited method; and 
Administration or attempted administration of a prohibited substance or 
prohibited method to an athlete, or assisting, encouraging, adding, 
abetting, covering up or any other type of complicity involving an anti-
doping rule violation or an attempted violation.337 
Article 3 corresponds with the similar provision in the WADA Code, and provides that 
SAIDS has the burden to prove that a doping violation has occurred, and that SAIDS 
shall have.the standard of.proof of establishing a doping violation 'to the comfortable 
satisfaction of the hearing body bearing in mind the seriousness of the allegation that is 
made.' This standard of proof is greater than a mere balance of probability but less than 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 338 It is further provided that, where the SAIDS Anti-
Doping Rules place the burden of proof on an athlete or other person alleged to have 
committed an anti-doping rule violation, to rebut a presumption or to establish specified 
facts or circumstances, the standard of proof shall be by a balance of probability. 339 
Article 3.2 of the Rules sets out the applicable rules of proof in doping cases in order to 
establish facts and presumptions, as per the corresponding provisions of the WADA Code. 
D The Anti-Doping Appeal Board 
137 The Institute's Anti-Doping Appeal Board, which is responsible for hearing and 
deciding on doping disputes, was established in terms of section 17 of the SAIDS Act340 
(as amended) In terms of s 17(2)(a), the Appeal Board has express power to hear and 
337 Articles 2.1 to 2.8 of the SAIDS Anti-Doping Rules (version 2, 2009) 
338 Article 3.1 of the Rules 
339 Ibid. 
340 South African Institute for Drug-Free Sport Act 14 of 1997 
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decide on any dispute relating to doping. The Appeal Board consists of a panel of nine 
persons, appointed by the Minister of Sport, possessing special knowledge and expertise 
relevant to doping. The Minister is empowered, on the recommendation of the Institute , 
and SASCOC, to appoint at least three members from the panel to constitute an appeal 
tribunal to hear and decide upon appeals against decisions made in terms of Article 13 of 
the Code. At least two members so appointed by the Minister shall be admitted and 
practicing attorneys or advocates with at least three years experience in their relevant 
fields of expertise. 341 The Appeal Board may hear appeals involving national level athletes 
arising from decisions regarding -
(i) sanctions for anti-doping rule violat_ions, including disqualification, provisional 
suspension or period of ineligibility;' ·'" 
(ii) the granting or denying of a· Therapeutic Use Exemption; 342 or .. 
(iii) any other dispute relating to .doping in sport. 
Appeals involving international level athletes shall be heard by the Court of Arbitration for 
Sport (CAS). 343 
The Appeal Board may confirm or set aside any sanction imposed by a sports 
administration body in respect of doping, and may in the place of any sanction so set 
aside, impose any sanction which in its opinion is appropriate. 344 In terms of s 17(8) of 
the 1997 Act (as amended), any sanctions imposed on persons founCl guilty of anti-
doping rule violations shall be in accordance with the sanctions laid down in the · 
constitutions of the respective sports federations. 
341 Section 17(2) (as amended) 
342 Article 4.4 of the SAIDS Anti-Doping Policy (version 2, 2009, currently in force) incorporates the WADA 
International Standard for Therapeutic Use Exemptions 
343 Section 17(4)(a) (as amended) 
344 Section 17(4)(b) (as amended) 
183 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
E The SA Institute for Drug-Free Sport and the World Anti-Doping Code 
138 The World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) has reacted to the problem of doping in 
world-wide sport by creating an international code in the form of the World Anti-Doping 
Code, to which South Africa is a signatory. 345 At the heart of the Code is the response by 
the international .community to harmonize the rules relating to anti-doping in order to 
preserve fair play .and prevent harm to the .health of sports people. 346 
The creation of the World Anti-Doping Code was a reaction to the reality of doping in 
sport, which is a legal difficulty that is uniqueto sport. As has been observed: 
'A large part of sporting jurisprudence deals with disciplinary proceedings, many of them 
pertaining to doping cases. It is in this context that the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) 
has developed principles, which it has applied consistently .... These principles were 
developed in an effort to fight dopi,ng in ,sport effectively and must be viewed against the 
backdrop of the increasing difficulty to be ahead of developments in laboratories.'347 
The World Ant_i-Doping Code deals aggressively with doping in the international sporting 
cot!Jmunity. This was confirmed, for example, in the case of World Anti-Doping Agency 
(WADA) v United States Anti-Doping Agency (USADA); United States Bobsled & Skeleton 
Federatio_n (USBSF); Zachery Lund and Federation Internationale de Bobsleigh et de 
Toboganning (FIBT) (as 'Interested Party')(2 February 2006), 348 an appeal by WADA 
against the decision of USADA in respect of a doping violation by Mr Zachery Lund. 
USADA had made a decision not to treat Lund as 'a cheat' because he had been using the 
banned substance for medical purposes. The CAS rejected the submissions by USADA 
345 Le Roux, R 'The World-Anti Doping Code: A South African Perspective' South African Journal for Research in 
Sport, Physical Education and Recreation (2004) Volume 26 (1) 65. (See paper for clarity on various specific 
aspects of the Code.) 
346 Ibid. 
347 Le Roux, R 'Under Starter's Orders: Law, Labour Law and .Sport' (2002) 23 Industrial Law Journal 1206 
348 Case: Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) Ad hoc Division - XX Olympic Winter Games in Turin 
CAS arbitration No CAS OG 06/001 (htto://www.tas-cas.org/en/code/frmco.htm) 
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and allowed the appeal by WADA which was calling for an appropriate sentence of a two 
year ban on the athlete. 349 
While the 1997 SAIDS Act did not contain any reference to the World Anti-Doping Code, 
the 2006 Amendment Act has specifically incorporated the provisions of the Code into 
South African anti-doping law. The Preamble to the Amendment Act specifically states 
that its purpose includes the adoption of matters contained in the Code and the 
establishment of a doping control programme in compliance with the Code. Section 
11(2)(a) of the Act (as amended) expressly provides that SAIDS 'shall adopt and 
implement anti-doping rules and policies which conform with the [WADA Code] including . 
the WADA Prohibited List'. As mentioned, the SAIDS Anti-Doping Rules are very closely 
modeled on the Code. 
F The International Convention against Doping In Sport 
139 One should note the distinction between The World Anti-Doping Code and the 
United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Convention 
against Doping in Sport. 350 There is no legal obligation for countries to adopt the WADA 
Anti-Doping Code into law. The UNESCO Convention against Doping in Sport, however, 
does create an obligation on the ratifying countries to pass legislation that is consistent 
with it. South Africa ratified the Convention against Doping in Sport in 2006. 351 It is clear 
from the preamble of the UNESCO Convention that it is an instrument that is in line with 
South African as well as international law on doping. This preamble assures all ratifying 
States that it is in the agenda of UNESCO to create the necessary legal instruments to 
eliminate practices that are contrary to the ethics of sport. This will encourage all those 
in the sporting community to behave with integrity. 
349 The decision of the CAS was handed down on 10 February 2006, and is indicative of vigorous endeavours by 
the World-Anti Doping Agency in ensuring that the laws relating to anti-doping are observed by the 
international community. · 
350 Paris, 19 October 2005 
351http://portal.unesco.org/la/convention .asp ?K0=31037&1a nguage= E&order=alpha # 1 
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G The World Anti-Doping Code and the South African Constitution 
140 The World Anti-Doping Code, similar to the UNESCO Convention against Doping in 
Sports352 is based on constitutional principles and human rights. 353 It is thus unlikely (but 
not impossible) that the legality of the rules of the Code may fail legal challenge based 
upon the provisions of the South African Constitution (although it should be noted that no 
such challenge has been brought to date). The Code itself appears to include no rules 
that may patently operate against public policy; and could be characterized as 
constituting international 'best practice' in respect of doping regulation. While the SAIDS 
Act is, of course, part of the domestic law, the WADA Code and decisions by courts and 
tribunals elsewhere regarding its application may be taken into account in any 
-
constitutional challenges to doping control. Section 232 of the Constitution provides that 
customary international law is law in the Republic unless inconsistent with the 
Constitution or an Act of Parliament. Section 233 provides the following: 
'When interpreting any legislation, every court must prefer any reasonable interpretation of 
the legislation that is consistent with international law over any alternative interpretation 
that is inconsistent with international law.' 
Section 39(1) deals with interpretation of the provisions of the Bill of Rights (which is 
contained in Chapter 2 of the Constitution), and provides as follows: 
'When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum 
d) 
e) must consider international law, and 
f) may consider foreign law.' 
352 See the Preamble of the Convention against Doping in Sports, Paris 19 October 2005. 
353 Le Roux, R 'The World-Anti Doping Code: A South African Perspective' South African Journal for Research in 
Sport, Physical Education and Recreation (2004) Volume 26 (1) 65 at 73 
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The Code can be characterized as an instrument that is based primarily on the promotion 
of human rights and which seeks to promote such rights through the eradication of 
immoral practices in sports. 3s4 However, such a view is not universally accepted and 
I 
others have observed that the WADA Code represents an imbalanced approach to the 
need to eradicate doping in sport at the cost of the rights and interests of individual 
athletes: 
'It is diffJcult to understand why it appears that only ''fundamental rights" are at issue. Why 
shouldn't a broader raft of rights, such as the right to be treated reasonably, fairly and 
equitably, bE;! considered? Certainly, in its preamble WADA does not attempt to promote the 
Code ·as a document pro~ecting athletes' rights. Indeed, the only "fund'!mental right" that 
the Code acknowledges athletes deserve is "to participate in doping-free sport and thus 
promote health, fairness and equality for athletes worldwide". There is a danger that 
WADA's utilitarian approach to athletes' rights, exemplified by the Code, and justified by 
that most nebulous of concepfs, "the spirit of sport", has resulted in an ·imbalance between 
sport and the rights of its most precious commodity.ass 
141 Apart from possible constitutional questions regarding the privacy rights of 
athletes and testing, the main issues of contention regarding the constitutionality of the 
applicable doping provisions relate to the fairness of disciplinary hearings following anti-
doping rules violations and the sanctions that are imposed. The punitive action taken 
against an athlete who is found guilty of a doping violation may, of course, fall foul of the 
relevant provisions of the Bill of Rights or of other common law or statutory rules. 3s5 The 
354 In support of this approach, see the findings of the legal opinion by Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Antonio 
Rigozzi & Giorgio Malinverni, Legal Opinion on the Conformity of Certain Provisions of the Draft World Anti-
Doping Code with Commonly Accepted Principles of International Law, Feb. 26, 2003, at 30, available at 
http://www. wada-ama .org/rtecontent/ document/kaufma n n-kohler-full. pdf 
355 Gardiner et al Sports Law 3rd ed Cavendish Publishing (2006) at 297 
356 It should be noted that the Introduction to the SAIDS Anti-Doping Policy (Version 2, 2009, currently in force) 
follows the wording of the introduction to the WADA Code in providing that [t]hese anti-doping rules are not 
intended to be subject to, or limited by, the requi~ements and legal §tandards applicable to criminal 
proceedings or employment matters.' It is doubtful whether these rules may validly be excluded in this way 
from the ambit of the rules of criminal procedure or employment laws (or that the powers of the courts to 
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World Anti-Doping Code's standard of strict liability, which provides that a violation 
occurs if a prohibited swbstance is found in an athlete's sample, irrespective of whether 
such athlete intentionally or unintentionally used the substance, 357 is apparently accepted 
as legitimate elsewhere on the utilitarian basis that, without such a standard, it would be 
impossible to enforce doping rules. 358 In the leading English judgment, for example, it 
was held that the International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF)'s strict liability 
rules were not in unreasonable restraint of trade on the basis that a less stringent rule 
would render the .organisation's efforts to prevent drug-taking by athletes futile. 359 It has 
been observed~ however~ that this utilitarian argument does not provide a sufficiently 
principled response to the concern regarding saddling athletes with the prejudicial effects 
(including moral stigma) of an ·offence for which they may not be morally to blame.360 
The SAIDS Rules also adopt the WADA Code's strict liability standard. 361 Such strict 
liability standard is relatively unproblematic in respect of the proof of a violation, the first 
phase of determi:ning the existence of a doping offence. 362 Strict liability in the second 
phase, where a sanction such as a ban or fine is imposed, would however not be in 
accordance with an athlete's constitutional rights (and the accepted principle of nu/la 
poena sine culpa). Sanctions can only-be imposed on the basis of culpability, taking into 
account the extent of fault.in accordance with generally accepted principles of law, and 
an automatic sanction would not be proportional and, thus, c;:ould be unconstitutional. 363 
It should also be noted that the WADA Code's provisions regarding athlete bans have 
been criticized as having been drafted with the intention of ensuring consistency of 
adjudicate disputes in this regard may validly be ousted) and, more specifically, the Bill of Rights applies to all 
law in South Africa and may not be validly excluded in this way. 
357 Rule 2.1 of the WADA Code contains the strict liability standard that is applied to positive tests, in terms of 
which the mere 'presence of a prohibited substance or its metabolites or markers in an athlete's bodily 
specimen' is sufficient to establish a doping violation, and intent, fault, negligence, or knowing use need not be 
demonstrated. 
358 See Gardiner et al supra at 274-5; Quigley v UIT CAS 94/129 
359 Gasser v Stinson (High Court, Chancery Division, 15 June 1988 - unreported); see Lewis, A & Taylor, J 
Sport: Law and Practice Butterworths LexisNexis 2003 at 945 
360 See Lewis & Taylor supra at 946 et seq. 
361 See Article 2.1.1 of the Rules 
362 For criticism of the WADA Code's strict liability standard, see Jessica K. Foschi 'A Constant Battle: The 
Evolving Challenges in the International Fight against Doping in Sport' Duke Journal of Comparative and 
International Law Vol. 16 (2006) 457 
363 See Cloete supra 189. See also the matters referred to by Lewis & Taylor supra at par. E4.118 note 3, where 
strict liability was held to be contrary to fundamental principles of law (In the Matter of Arbitration between 
Jessica Foschi and US Swimming Inc, AAA Case No. 77190003696 - 1 April 1996; Baumann v DLV, OLG 
Frankfurt/Main 13W29/00 - 18 May 2000), and the CAS matters mentioned by the authors where certain 
parameters were set in respect of the strict liability rules of different federations (at 950 et seq.), as well as the 
views of the panel in Aanes v FILA CAS 2001/A/317 (9 July 2001) (see Lewis & Taylor at 953-4). 
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duration, but not consistency of sanction across different sporting codes. 364 This might be 
a factor to be taken into account in the event of a challenge to the rationality of the 
sanction for a doping-rule violation. 
H The Responsibility to Apply the Code: Sporting Bodies in South Africa 
142 Mention has been made elsewhere in this chapter of the recent restructuring of 
the regulation of sport in South Africa, and specifically of the establishment of the South 
African Sports Confederation and Olympic Committee (SASCOC). 365 As has been 
observed, SASCOC now has far-reaching powers in respect of the regulation of a wide 
range of aspects of 'high performance sport'. With· regard to anti-doping law, SASCOC's 
Articles of Association provide in Article 26 that all members are to comply with and be 
bound by and procure that their members comply-with the WADA Code presently in force 
and adopted by South Africa and the·International Olympic Committee (IOC). 
Article 1.1 of the SAIDS Anti-Doping Rules366 provides that national sports federations 
shall accept the SAIDS Anti-Doping Rules and incorporate them either directly or by 
reference into their governing documents, constitutions and/or rules that are part of the 
rights and obligations governing their members and participants. The application of the 
Rules is based on the membership obligations that exist between national federations 
and their members or participants through those individuals' agreement to participate in 
the sport according to the rules. 367 It is further provided that, as a condition of receiving 
financial or other assistance from government and/or SAIDS, national federations shall 
accept and abide by the spirit and terms of the SAIDS Anti-Doping Programme and the 
Rules, including the application of its sanctions to individuals, and shall respect the 
authority of, and co-operate with, SAIDS and the hearing bodies in all doping matters 
that are not governed by the relevant international federation's rules in accordance with 
364 See Gardiner et al supra at 292 
365 See the discussion in par 44 et seq above. For more information on SASCOC, visit the organisation's web 
site at http://www.sascoc.co.za 
366 Version 2, 2009 
367 Article 1.1.2 of the SAIDS Anti-Doping Policy (2009) 
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the World Anti-Doping Code. 368 It is provided that, by adopting the Rules and 
incorporating same in its governing documents, national federations formally submit such 
federation and all athletes under its jurisdiction or control or subject to its governing 
documents or the rules of the sport to the Rules, and agree to abide by decisions made 
pursuant to such Rules. 369 Section 17 A of the Act370 provides for punitive measures 
against national federations by Sport and Recreation SA in respect of non-compliance 
with the provisions of the Act. 371 ~ 
143 · The SAIDS Anti-Doping Rules apply to all persons who -
are members of a South African national federation regardless of where 
they reside or are situated; 
are members of a national federation's affiliated members, clubs, teams, 
associations or leagues; 
participate in any capacity in any activity organized, held, convened or 
. authorized by a national federation ur its affiliated members, clubs, teams, 
associations or leagues; and 
participate in any capacity in any activity organized, held, convened or 
authorized by a national event organisation, or a national league not 
affiliated with a national federation. 372 
Participants (including minors) are deemed to accept, submit to and abide by the Rules 
by virtue of their participation in the sport. 373 
368 Ibid., Article 1.1.3 
369 Ibid., Article 1.1. 5 
370 As inserted by section 11 of the 2006 SAIDS Amendment Act 
371 Section 17 A provides as follows: 
'S 17A. (1) SRSA, on the written recommendations of SASCOC, may cause an investigation to be conducted as 
it deems fit to ascertain whetherall national sports federations have complied with the provisions contained 
in this Act. 
(2) SRSA must, after consultation with the Institute and SASCOC,identify any non-compliant national sports 
federations whereafter it may, amongst others -
(a) withdraw or reduce its or the Government's funding of any such federation; 
(b) bar any such federation from administering its sport in the Republic; or 
(c) recommend that SASCOC refuse to award national colours to the members of any such federation. 
(3) SRSA may only act against a federation in terms of subsection (2)after it has given that federation an 
opportunity to make oral or written representations with regard to any proposed action.' 
372 Ibid., Article 1.2 
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It is clear that the ostensible basis for the authority of the SAIDS Anti-Doping Rules over 
federations and individual participants is incorporation by reference of such Rules in the 
governing documents of federations, and the contractual nexus of membership of such 
federations. 374 
The Rules- place certain obligations on athletes (e.g. to be knowledgeable of and comply 
with all anti-doping policies and rules adopted pursuant to the World Anti-Doping Code, 
and to be available for sample collection in the event of testing). 375 
Finally, it should be noted that athletes in international competition are also subject to 
the applicable anti-doping rules of the relevant international governing body in the sport, 
for example the International Cricket Council (or ICC)'s Anti-Doping Code. 376 
144 In conclusion, it is important to remember that; in order to preserve the 
legitimacy of South African sporting achievements from the scourge of drug use, 
significant investment has been made to date in the form of legislation and scientific 
research. It·is also-evident in the creation of the UNESCO Conventicm against Doping in 
Sports and World Anti-Doping Agency's efforts, resulting in the creation of a World Anti-
Doping Code, that doping in sport is of significant international concern, as it represents 
a practice that has the potential to undermine the integrity of fair play. We live in a 
global village where sport plays an important role in internatior.tal relations, and 
harmonization and uniformity of laws relating to sport is clearly desirable. The 
establishment of SAIDS is an example of the increasingly international nature of sports 
regulation - international practice requires that South Africa should have an effective 
specialist body to deal with a specific problem area in modern sport. This obligation 
arises from international agreement as well as contractual obligations towards sports 
governing bodies. It is submitted that South Africa is currently compliant in respect of its 
obligations in this regard, as evidenced by the establishment and activities of the SA 
373 Ibid., Article 1.2.2 
374 This assumption is of course not unproblematic - see the Court of Appeal judgment in Modah/ v British 
Athletics Federation Ltd 2001 WL 1135166; Gardiner et al supra at 269 et seq. 
375 Ibid., Article 1.2.3 
376 The 2009 version of the ICC's Anti-Doping Code is currently in force (effective from 1 January 2009). Article 
17 .2 of the ICC Code provides that '[i]t shall be a condition of membership of the ICC that all national cricket 
federations shall comply with the ICC Code'. 
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Institute for Drug-Free Sport. It remains to be seen, however, whether such international 
rules as enforced through the SAIDS anti-doping rules might be open to constitutional 
challenge in terms of the South African Bill of Rights. 
In any event, South Africa may play an important role in future international 
doping regulation, especially on the African continent. The current Minister of Sport, 
Makhenkesi Stofile, is a member of°the WADA Foundation Board and Executive 
Committee, and South Africa is a member of the International Doping Arrangement 
(IADA) and of the Executive Committee of the Association of National Anti-Doping 
. ' 
Organisa.tions (ANADO). The WADA Africa Regional Office was established in 2004 in 
Cape Town, to co-ordinate the agency's anti-doping activities throughout Africa. 377 
377 From, the web site of the government department Sport and Recreation SA (at www.srsa.qov.za - accessed 
9 march 2009) 
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§10 SPORT AND TAX: The taxatiori of sportspersons 
{Chris Schembri) 
I Introduction 
145 Liability for taxation in South Africa is determined in terms of various statutes, the 
main one of which is the Income Tax Act. 378 There is no common law liability to pay tax 
in South Africa. Other pieces of fiscal legislation include the Value-Added Tax Act, 379 the 
Estate Duty Act, 380 and the Transfer Duty Act. 381 There are also a host of indirect taxes, 
such as levies on fuel sales, and levies or duties on luxury goods, such as tobacco 
products and alcohol. 382 All of these taxes, levies and duties are administered by the 
South African Revenue Service. 383 
146 A sportsperson active in South Africa would find himself contributing to the fiscus 
in a number of ways, both direct and indirect. The most obvious contribution would be in 
the form of 'normal tax'384 levied in terms of the Income Tax Act, on all income 
generated by the sportsperson that fell within the provisions of this Act. 385 Not only does 
the Income Tax Act set out the grounds for liability for normal tax386 but it also makes 
provision for the determination of the amount of tax payable, 387 as well as provisions for 
378 Income Tax Act 58 of 1962, as amended, hereafter referred to as the Income Tax Act. 
379 Value-Added Tax Act 89 of 1991, as amended, hereafter referred to as the Value-Added (or VAT) Act. 
380 Estate Duty Act 45 of 1955, as amended, hereafter referred to as the Estate Duty Act. 
381 Transfer Duty Act 40 of 1949, as amended, hereafter referred to as the Transfer Duty Act. 
382 An examination of all of these taxes and levies falls outside of the ambit of this work. A more 
comprehensive (but not complete) list of taxes, duties and levies would include the following: Taxes: income 
tax (described in the Income Tax Act as normal tax), donations tax, capital gains tax. Duties: estate duty, 
transfer duty, customs duty and excise duty. Levies: unemployment insurance contributions, workmen's 
compensation. 
383 Hereafter referred to as 'sARs'. This is an autonomous body created in terms of the South African Revenue 
Service Act 34 of 1997, as amended, to oversee the administration of fiscal legislation and the collection of tax 
on behalf of the South African government. The website www.sars.gov.za contains general information on all 
the forms of taxation, both direct and indirect, that are applicable in South Africa. 
384 It is ironic that the term 'income tax' appears in the title of the Income Tax Act only, and nowhere else in 
the Act. The 'tax on income' that the Act deals with is defined by the Act, in section 5, as 'normal tax'. 
385 This form of taxation will form the focus of this work. · 
386 In this regard see in general section 1, definition of 'gross' income'. 
387 In this regard, see section 5 of the Income Tax Act, especially section 5(2). This sub-section provides for 
the rates of tax chargeable to be fixed annually by Parliament. These rates are then published annually as 'tax 
tables', which are available on the SARS website, www.sars.gov.za 
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the administration of the Income Tax Act. 388 The Income Tax Act also deals with.any 
donations that may be made by the sportsperson, 389 as well as the 'capital gains' that he 
may make by, for example, disposing of certain immovable property. 390 
In addition to the taxes on income levied in terms of the Income Tax Act, there are taxes 
that are levied on transactions, as and when the transaction takes place. For example, 
the sportsperson would be liable for Value-Added Tax (or 'VAT') on all goods and services 
that qualified· as 'vattable' in terms of the Value-Added Tax Act, 391 when he purchased or 
made use of such goods or services. Should the sportsperson purchase or dispose of 
'property'392 he would be liable ·for transfer duty, calculated as a percentage of the value 
of the property purchased or sold, in terms of the Transfer Duty Act. 393 This is another 
example of a transaction-based tax. In addition, if the sportsperson were to purchase 
any of the goods covered by customs or excise duties, such as alcohol or tobacco 
products, he would pay the relevant duty, which is included in the price paid over the 
counter for such goods. 394 Finally, certain taxes or duties are. triggered by death or the 
happening of an event. An example of the former is estate duty. If the sportsperson 
were to die and leave assets accumulated during his lifetime, these assets would form an 
'estate'395 which may be subject to estate duty, 396 in terms of the Estate Duty Act. An 
example of the latter would be donations· tax, which would be triggered in the event of 
the sportsperson disposing of all.or part of his assets for a minimal or no 
consideration. 397 
A complete and detailed study of all of the above taxes, levies and duties is not possible 
in a work of this nature. Accordingly, only the most common tax, namely 'normal tax', in 
388 In this regard see Chapter III of the Income Tax Act. 
389 In this regard see Chapter II Part V of the Income Tax Act. 
390 In this regard see the Eighth Schedule of the Income Tax Act. 
391 In this regard, see in general section 7 of the VAT Act. 
392 As defined in section 1 of the Transfer Duty Act. 
393
.In this regard, see section 2(1) of the Transfer Duty Act. This transaction may also attract capital gains tax, 
in terms of the Eighth Schedule to the Income Tax Act. 
394 In this regard see the Customs and Excise Act 91 of 1964, as amended. 
395 In this regard see section 3 of the Estate Duty Act. 
396 In this regard see section 2 of the Estate Duty Act. 
397 In this regard see Chapter II Part V of the Income Tax Act. 
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terms of the Income Tax Act39.~ and its effect on a sportsperson will be examined in some 
detail, but the reader is cautioned that this is but a single example only. 
II 'Normal tax' in terms of the Income Tax Act 
147 A crucial date in South African tax law is 1 January 2001. Prior to this date, 
taxpayers were liable for normal tax on a 'source' basis only. 399 This meant that all 
'receipts and accruals'400 or income, howsoever derived, would only be considered for 
normal tax if they were derived from a source within the Republic of SolJth Af~ica.<1° 1 This 
meant that the income had to be generated by an activity that took place within the 
geographical borders of South Africa. 402 All non-?outh African sour_ce income, or foreign 
income, was disregarded for the purposes of determining a taxpayer's liability for nor~al 
tax within South Africa. The non-Sout~ African .source income would .stiJI attract liability 
for ta_x in the jurisdictions where it was generated, according to the laws of those 
jurisdictions. The 'source'. principle was applied irrespective of the status of the taxpayer, 
so foreign taxpayers who generated income within the borders of South Africa were 
obliged to pay normal tax on their South African source income. 
On the 1st of January 2001, South Africa moved from a 'source-based' to a 'residence-
based' means of determining which taxpayers were liable for normal tax in South 
Africa. 403 The I_ncome Tax Act was amended in several respects to effect this change, 404 
and thereafter, any taxpayer who qualified as a 'resident'405 would be liable for normal 
tax on his worldwide earnings, irrespective of the source of those earnings. Taxpayers 
who did not qualify in terms of the definition of 'resident' but who continued to generate 
398 Two comprehensive references to which the reader may make reference in respect of Income Tax are de 
Koker AP et al, Silke on South African Income Tax LexisNexis 2008, hereafter referred to as 'Silke', and Zulman 
RH et al, Income Tax Practice Manual LexisNexis 2008, hereafter referred to as 'the Manual'. 
399 As to the operation of the 'source' system, see in general CIR v Lever Bros & Unilever 1946 AD 441, Silke 
para. 8.4, The Manual para A:S33. 
400 Silke para 4.12, The Manual para. A:A4 
401 Hereafter referred to as 'South Africa'. 
402 As to the meaning of 'in the Republic' see Si Ike para 8.2. 
403 This was effected by the Revenue Laws Amendment Act 59 of 2000. 
404 The Revenue Laws Amendment Act 59 of 2000 amended the definition of 'gross income' in section 1 of the 
Income Tax Act to provide for 'resident' and 'non-resident' taxpayers, and inserted a comprehensive definition 
of the term 'resident' in the Income Tax Act. Various other amendments were effected to update the Act to one 
based on 'residence'. · 
405 See section 1 of the Income Tax Act. 
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income from within the geographic borders of South Africa would henceforth be labelled 
as 'non-resident'406 and would continue to be taxed on a 'source' basis. 
Based on this information, it is possible to sketch three scenarios, which will illustrate the 
operation of the provisions of the Income Tax Act in respect of a sportsperson. These 
are: 
A local sportsperson, earning income from sporting activities conducted 
locally; 
-· 
A local sportsperson, earning income from sporting activities conducted in 
a foreign jurisdiction; and 
A foreign sportsperson, earning income from sporting activities conducted 
locally (in South Africa). 
In each of the above scenarios, it is assumed that the sportsperson is a natural person. 
This is significant, because the definition 'of 'resident' in the Income Tax Act differentiates 
between natural and 'juristic' or 'artificial' persons.407 The definition provides two tests 
for residence, as a result of which a natural person may qualify for residence under 
circumstances where an artificial person may not, and vice versa. 408 This in turn would 
affect the income that the taxpayer is expected to bring into account in his South African 
assessment to normal tax. However, this difference aside, the consequences for both 
natural and juristic taxpayers would be broadly similar. Each scenario will be examined in 
turn. 
406 The term 'non-resident' is used for con_venience only. It is not defined in the Income Tax Act, which only 
contains a definition of 'resident'. For the purposes of calculating normal tax, one first has to determine 'gross 
income' . 'Gross income' is defined in section 1 of the Income Tax Act, and speaks of a 'resident', and 'any 
person other than a resident'. 
407 In this regard see the definition of 'resident' in section 1 of the Income Tax Act. 
408 Compare parts (a) [natural person] with part (b) [person other than a natural person, i.e. a juristic or 
artificial person] of the definition of 'resident' in section 1 of the Income Tax Act. 
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A · Local sportsperson, local income 
148 This scenario assumes that the sportsperson qualifies as a 'resident' in South 
Africa in terms of the definition of 'resident',409 and that the income in question is 
generated from a local source, i.e. one that could be regarded as being 'within the 
Republic of South Africa'. 410 The fact that the income is from a 'local source' removes 
any consideration of 'double taxation'411 and means that the sportsperson's tax liability 
falls to be determined solely in terms of the provisions of the Income Tax Act. 
The Income Tax Act defines a 'resident' as a natural person who is 'ordinarily resident'412 
in the Republic, or one who satisfies a 'physical presence1413 test. The concept of 
'ordinary residence' has not been defined in the Income Tax Act, but has been dealt with 
. by the South African courts. 414 
'[H]is ordinary residence would be the country to which he would naturally and as a matter 
of course return from his wanderings; as contrasted with. other lands it might be called his 
usual or principal residence and it would be described more aptly than other countries as 
.his real home.t415 
149 The concept of 'physical presence' applies a time-based test to determine 
residence, and is only applied if a person is not 'ordinarily resident'. The test is spelled 
out in some detail in the definition of 'residence', as follows: the person must be 
physically present in South Africa for a period or periods exceeding 91 days in 
aggregate416 during the year of assessment417 under consideration, and for a period or 
periods exceeding 91 days in aggregate in each of the 5 years of assessment preceding 
409 Definition of 'resident'· - section 1 of the Income Tax Act. 
410 See the discussion above as to what constitutes 'in the Republic'. 
411 The concept of 'double taxation' will be discussed further below. 
412 In this regard see part (a)(i) of the definition of 'resident' in the Income Tax Act. 
413 In this regard see part (a)(ii) of the definition of 'resident' in the Income Tax Act. 
414 Robinson v COT 1917 TPD 542, Cohen v CIR 1946 AD 174, CIR v Kuttel 1992(3) SA 242 (A) 
415 Cohen v CIR (above) at 185, quoted with approval in CIR v Kuttel (above) at 250; Silke para. 8.3.1 
416 The phrase 'in aggregate' means that continuous physical presence is not required: the time period may be 
broken up into several smaller periods of shorter duration, as long as these short periods total 91, days. 
417 A person's liability to tax is determined annually in South Africa, hence a 'year of assessment'. Silke para 
4.8. 
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the present year of assessment, and for a period or periods exceeding 915 days in 
aggregate during those previous 5 years of assessment. 418 Should the local sportsperson 
satisfy either of the above two tests, he will be regarded as a 'resident'. The next 
consideration would be whether he has any amount that qualifies as 'gross income'419 as 
defined in the Income Tax Act. This definition can be divided up into the following 
requirements: 
(i) An amount in cash or otherwise, 420 
(ii) Not of a capital nature; 421 
(iii)Received by or accrued to422 or in favour of. 423 
The requirement of 'an amount in cash or otherwise' contemplates the inclusion of all 
benefits received by or accrued to the sportsperson in the year of assessment. This 
would include cash payments,424 as well as payments 'in kind' that are capable of being 
valued in cash terms. 425 This could include, for example, items such as sponsored goods, 
and free or cheap services. 
418 In other words, in addition to the 91 days in each of the preceding 5 years, the person must accumulate 
additional days at any time during the preceding 5 years to bring the total up from 455 days (being 91 days per 
year X 5 years) to the 915 days required by the definition; Silke para. 8.3.1 
419 In this regard, see the definition of 'gross income' in section 1 of the Income Tax Act. This is a crucial 
definition in the Income Tax Act, the relevant portion of which reads as follows: 
"gross income" in relation to any year or period of assessment, means -
(i) in the case of any resident, the total amount, in cash or otherwise, received by or 
accrued to or in favour of such resident; or 
(ii) in the case of any person other than a resident, the total amount, in cash or 
otherwise, received by or accrued to or in favour of such person from a source within 
or deemed to be within the Republic, 
during such year or period of assessment, excluding receipts or accruals of a capital nature, 
but including ... 
See also Silke para. 4.2, The Manual A:A4. 
420 Silke para. 4.10 and 4.11. 
421 Silke para. 4.2. 
422 Silke para. 4.12. 
423 Si Ike para .4.13 
424 Lace Proprietary Mines Ltd v CIR 1938 AD 267 
425 A J Stander v CIR 59 SATC 212, Commissioner, South African Revenue Service v Brummeria Renaissance 
(Pty) Ltd and Others 2007(6)SA 601 (SCA) 
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'Not of a capital nature' means that the amount must not relate to a capital asset of the 
taxpayer, 426 and must be of a revenue nature. Payments for services rendered, match 
fees as well as awards427 would all be regarded as being of a revenue nature. 
'Received by' contemplates an actual receipt of money or some other benefit that can be 
valued in money, for one's own benefit, and not on behalf of someone else.428 'Accrued to 
or in favour of' contemplates that while one has not received the physical proceeds, one 
has acquired an unconditional right to receive these proceeds at some date in the 
future. 429 However, notwithstanding the non-receipt of the physical asset, this right must 
be valued and included in a taxpayer's gross income, in the tax year in which the right 
accrued. 430_ The taxpayer will not be taxed twice on the same amount however. 431 
Once a figure has been calculated for 'gross income', any exempt income432 is then 
deducted from this figure, leaving an amount known as 'income'.433 Any 'deductions'434 
and 'allowances'435 are then deducted from this amount, leaving an amount known.as 
'taxable income'. 436 
150 Deductions and allowances are determined in terms of a 'general deduction 
formula', 437 as well as in terms of special provisions of the Income Tax Act. 438 The 
Income Tax Act also prohibits certain deductions. 439 Essentially, these sections permit 
the deduction of certain expenses that the sportsperson may have incurred in the 
426 The Manual para. A:Cl, Silke paras 5.1-5.3. 
427 ITC 976 24 SATC 812, The Manual para. A:P22. 
428 CIR v Geldenhuys 1947(3) SA 256 (C), COT v G 1981(4) SA 167 (ZA) 
429 Lategan v CIR 1926 CPD 203, CIR v People's Stores (Walvis Bay) (Pty) Ltd 1990(2) SA 353 (A) 
430 Silke paras. 4.12-4.13. , 
431 In other words, if an amount first accrues to a taxpayer, and then he later receives it, SARS will not tax the 
taxpayer at the time of receipt and then again at the time of accrual. The taxpayer will be taxed only once on 
the same amount [CIR v Delfos 1933 AD 242] and it is the practice of SARS to tax an amount at the earliest 
possible date. 
432 In this regard refer to section 10 of the Income Tax Act. Si Ike Chapter 9. A common exemption relating to 
interest and dividends is contained in section lO(l)(i)(xv), which permits a capped exemption in respect of 
interest and dividends earned by a taxpayer during the year of assessment. Silke para. 9.21. 
433 In this regard refer to section 1 of the Income Tax Act, definition of 'income'. 
43
.
4 In this regard refer to section ll(a) of the Income Tax Act. Silke Chapter 10. 
435 In this regard refer for example to section ll(c) of the Income Tax Act, which permits a deduction for legal 
expenses under certain circumstances, Silke para. 11.2, and section ll(d) of the Income Tax Act, which 
permits a deduction for repairs of equipment used for the purposes of the taxpayer's trade, Silke para. 11.4.4. 
436 In this regard refer to section 1 of the Income tax Act, definition of 'taxable income'. 
437 In this regard, see section ll(a) of the Income Tax Act, which is read with section 23(g) of the same Act, to 
make up the 'general deduction formula'; Port Elizabeth Electric Tramway Co Ltd v CIR 1936 CPD 241; Silke 
para. 10.2. 
438 In this regard, see sections ll(b) - 22A of the Income Tax Act, Silke Chapter 11. 
439 In this regard, see section 23 of the Income Tax Act, Silke para.10.4. 
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production of income. 440 In order for the sportsperson to prove that any such expenses 
qualify as a deduction, s/he will have to establish that these meet the requirements of 
the 'general deduction formula' or of any specific allowance claimed. In respect of any 
expense claimed in terms of the 'general deduction formula' the sportsperson will have to 
satisfy the following criteria: 441 
(i) An expenditure or loss; 
(ii) Actually· incurred;. 
(iii) In the production of the income; 
(iv) Not of a capital nature;. 
(v) Resulting from the carrying on of a trade. 
In addition, the sportsperson will have to establish a 'negative test', namely that 
expenditure in question was not laid out for a purpose other than trade. 442 This would 
include all expenses that the sportsperson would normally incur that relate to the 
conduct of his sport, for the purpose of producing income. This would include expenses 
such as equipment, professional fees, travelling expenses and the like. 443 
44° For the purpose of this example, it is assumed that the sportsperson will be able to convince SARS that he 
satisfies the requirements of the 'general deduction formula' and that his participation in a sport qualifies as a 
'carrying on of a trade in the. production of income'. 
441 These requirements are drawn from the opening passage of section 11, and section ll(a) of the Income Tax 
Act, which reads as follows: . 
'For the purpose of determining the taxable income derived by any person from carrying on any trade, there 
shall be allowed as deductions from the income of such person so derived -
(a) expenditure and losses actually incurred in the production of the income, provided such 
expenditure and losses are not of a capital nature;' 
442 This is contained in section 23(g) of the Income Tax Act, which reads as follows: 
'No deductions shall in any case be made in respect of the following matters, namely -
(g) any moneys, claimed as a deduction from income derived from trade, to the extent 
to which such monies were not laid out for the purposes of trade;' 
443 This assumes that the sportsperson is carrying out the sporting activity as a trade, or in other words, as a 
means to generate income to earn a living. A sportsperson who is carrying out their activity for pleasure or 
recreation only, would not satisfy the requirement of 'carrying on a trade' in section 11. 
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The final figure of 'taxable income' is then cross-referenced to the tax tables444 for that 
tax year, to produce the sportsperson's final liability for normal tax for that tax year. 
This amount would then have to be paid over to SARS within a specified time period. 445 
B Local sportsperson, foreign income 
151 In respect of a local sportsperson who generates foreign income, the issue of 
double taxation446 becomes a problem. Since the local sportsperson qualifies as a 
taxpayer in South Africa447 he will be taxed on his worldwide earnings, irrespective of the 
source thereof. In this situation, double taxation occurs because the sportsperson may 
also be liable to pay tax on the foreign income in the jurisdiction where the foreign 
income was earned. This liability will depend entirely upon the national laws of the 
foreign jurisdiction. 
152 The process for determining the taxable income and the resultant liabil.ity for 
normal tax for this sportsperson in South Africa will be the same as that followed in the 
previous section. If the application of this process and of the laws of the foreign 
jurisdiction leads to a double taxation problem, there are numerous provisions that can 
assist in relieving the sportsperson in this position from the burden of double taxation. 
The first form of relief that must be considered is that which is contained in a Double 
Taxation Agreement. 448 South Africa has recognised the problem of double taxation, and 
as a result has concluded numerous double taxation agreements with various 
444 Discussed above 
445 This moves into the area of the administration of the Income Tax Act. Essentially any person who becomes 
liable for normal tax is obliged to register as a taxpayer in terms of section 67 of the Income Tax Act. This 
liability arises once one has earned taxable income above a certain threshold. Each taxpayer is then required 
to submit an income tax return annually in terms of section 65 of the Income Tax Act. Based on the 
information contained in the taxpayer's income tax return, SARS will assess the taxpayer's liability to normal 
tax, and issue an assessment indicating this liability in terms of section 77 of the Income Tax Act. This 
assessment will indicate the date by when any outstanding tax is to be paid. The assessment may also reveal 
that the taxpayer is entitled to a refund from SARS. More detail on the thresholds for registration as a taxpayer, 
as well as the process, is available on the SARS website, www.sars.qov.za. 
446 The Manual A: 047 
447 This assumes that they meet the 'residence' requirement as detailed in the previous section. 
448 Silke Chapter 30, The Manual A:D48 
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countries. 449 These double tax agreements contain provisions that may eliminate the 
problem of double taxation by indicating that one of the countries to the double tax 
agreement shall have full taxing rights in respect of the income in question. Another 
form of partial relief that these agreements contain is an agreement in terms of which 
the countries split the tax due on a sum of money, thereby lessening the burden on the 
. . 
taxpayer. The exact relief available can only be determined by reference to each double 
tax agreement, on a case-by-case basis. 
153 The second form of relief that a sportsperson in this position may have recourse 
to is the Income Tax Act itself. The Income Tax Act contains provisions450 that provide 
unilateral relief from double taxation under certain circumstances. In terms of section 
6quat451 a resident taxpayer will be granted a rebate in respect of any foreign tax paid in 
. ~ : 
respect of any income452 included in t~at taxpayer's taxable income in South Africa, 
according to a formula contained in the section. 453 Additionally, certain foreign amounts 
enjoy exemption in terms of section 10 of the Income Tax Act. An example454 is in 
respect of remunerati~rn earned by an employee of a South African employer, where the 
service is rendered outside South Africa and the employee is outside. South Africa for a 
period exceeding 183 days for any period of 12 months. If the sportsperson qualifies in 
respect of this exemption, any remuneration that falls into this category may be excluded 
from taxable income by virtue of section 10. 
449 A full list of the double tax agreements can be found on the SARS website www.sars.gov.za as well as in Silke 
para. 30.2 (comprehensive agreements) and para. 30.3 (restricted agreements). The texts of the double tax 
agreements are available in Volume 2 of Si Ike. 
450 In this regard, refer to section 6quat and section lO(l)(o)(ii) of the Income Tax Act. 
451 Income Tax Act 
452 Section 6quat(l) of the Income Tax Act. 
453 See in this regard, for example, section 6quat(1A) of the Income tax Act. 
454 Section lO(l)(o)(ii) of the Income Tax Act. 
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C Foreign sportsperson, local income 
154 Finally, a foreign sportsperson generating income locally will be liable to tax in 
South Africa on a 'source' basis.455 Like their South African counterpart generating 
foreign income, their liability for double tax depends upon the national laws of their home 
country, as well as the existence of a double tax agreement between South Africa and 
their home country. In this regard, the avenues of investigation in respect of the foreign 
sportsperson's liability to tax would be the same as for the South African sportsperson 
generating foreign income. 
155 The national law ofSouth Africa does, however, contain a provision456 that assists 
foreign sportspersons generating income from sporting activities in South Africa. This 
~ .. ' ' 
provision deals with the taxation of foreign sportspersons and entertainers, and provides 
that such persons are to be taxed 457 at a flat rate of 15%,458 provided that such persons 
do not qualify as a resident of South Africa, 459 and that they are taking part in a 
'specified activity',460 which is a 'personal activity ... to be exercised by a person as a ... 
sportsperson, whethe.r alone or with any other person or persons'. 461 To the extent that 
s/he qualifies in terms of this section, a foreign sportsperson's income derived from 
sporting activities within South Africa would then be subject to a flat rate tax, .with no 
exemptions, deductions or allowances. This section would not apply to any other income 
derived by any other means by the sportsperson from a South African source, for 
example, rental on property owned locally. This income would be dealt with in terms of 
the procedure for non-residents described above. 
455 Discussed above in. respect of the discussion of 'gross income'. 
456 In this regard, see sections 47A - 47H of the Income Tax Act, Silke para. 18.5. 
457 Section 47B(1) of the Income Tax Act. 
458 Section 47B(2) of the Income Tax Act. 
459 Section 47B(1) of the Income Tax Act. 
460 Section 47A(b) of the Income Tax Act. 
461 Ibid. 
203 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
III Conclusion 
156 The above information presents an overview of the taxation of sportspersons in 
accordance with South African law. Hopefully it demonstrates the complexity of such 
taxation, and the fad: that the applicable taxes, levies and duties, and the appropriate 
relief from taxation, varies according to the nationality and situation of each individual 
sportsperson. This underscores the need to seek further advice from the relevant taxing 
authorities and practitioners who are familiar with the jurisdictions in which the 
. . . 
sportsperson will operate. In respect of the taxation of sporting organisations (and, 
specifically, in respect of the different forms of associations), the reader is also referred 
to specialist texts on the subject and/or expert legal or other advice. 
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§11 SPORT AND GAMBLING LAW 
{Marita Carnelley) 
I Introduction 
157 In terms of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 a dual 
regulatory system has been introduced to administer the gambling industry within the 
country. 462 Lotteries and sports pools are regulated exclusively through national 
legislation, the Lotteries Act, 463 under the supervision of the National Lotteries Board. 
Casinos, gambling, racing and wagering (betting on both horse races and sporting 
events),464 are regulated in terms of the National Gambling Act465 and nine provincial 
statutes466, under the auspices of the National Gambling Board and the supervision of the 
nine provincial boards. In this regard the Constitution granted concurrent legislative 
powers to both the provincial and national legislatures with regard to these forms of 
gambling. Gambling on sporting events thus fall within both these regulatory categories -
each with its own set of rules. 
158 The basic premise of all these statutes is however similar: organised gambling is 
prohibited and criminal unless specifically legalised and regulated in terms of legislation. 
The regulatory principles in all instances specifically include limited legalisation; 
comprehensive governmental regulation; a competitive licensing process; strict probity of 
proposed licensees; protection of vulnerable persons such as minors and problem 
462 Ss 44(3) and 104(1)(b)(i) of the Constitution as read with schedule 4 part A of the Constitution. 
463 Act 51 of 1997. 
464 Ss 44(3) and 104(1)(b)(i) of the Constitution as read with schedule 4 part A of the Constitution. 
465 7 of 2004. The aim of this Act is to establish certain uniform norms and standards applicable to national and 
provincial regulation and licensing of certain gambling activities and to provide for the creation of additional 
uniform norms and standards applicable throughout the Republic that underpin the South African gambling 
industry as a whole (preamble). 
466 Eastern Cape Gambling and Betting Act 5 of 1997; Free State Gambling and Racing Act 6 of 1996; Gauteng 
Gambling Act 4 of 1995; KwaZulu-Natal Gambling Act 10 of 1996; Mpumalanga Casino and Gaming Act 5 of 
1995; Northern Cape Gambling and Racing Act 5 of 1996; Northern Province Casino and Gaming Act 4 of 1996; 
North West Gambling Act 2 of 2001 and the Western Cape Casino and Racing Law 4 of 1996. 
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gamblers; and stringent policing to enforce the legislation to eradicate illegal 
operators. 467 Certain forms of-gambling remain illegal and cannot be licensed, such as 
the wagering on dog racing.468 
II Legalized gambling opportunities on sports events 
The variou~·legatized gambling opportunities on sporting events are the following: 
- ' 
A Sports pools 
159 In terms .of the Lotteries Act a sports pool licence may be awarded to authorise 
the licensee to conduct a national sports pool. 469 Gidani (Pty) Ltd, the licensee, also 
referred to as the National Lottery Operator, has been licensed to run such a sports pool, 
Sportstake, which involves the prediction of the outcome of twelve football matches 
drawn from South Africa, English and other identified professional soccer fixtures. 470 
Any other sports pools run within the country would be in contravention of the statute as 
the Lotteries Act does not make provision for the licensing of any other sports pools. Any 
person conducting, participating in or advertising a sports pool in contravention of the 
provisions of the Act would be committing a criminal offence. 471 In a prosecution arising 
from anything done or not done in the country in connection with a sports pool, it will not 
be a defence merely to prove that the management, conduct or business of or concerning 
the sports pool in question is or was wholly or in part carried on at a place outside the 
Republic of South Africa. 472 
A 67 National Gambling Act (Preamble). 
468 United Greyhound Racing and Breeders Society (UGRABS) v Vrystaat Dobbe/ en Wedrenraad 2003 (2) SA 
269 (0). See discussion by Carnelley 2004 (1) SACJ 79. In early 2008, the Department of Trade and Industry 
revived the discussion on dog races by initiating research into the feasibility of legalising greyhound racing in 
South Africa, although this report is still being prepared. 
469 Provided that the licence shall specify the sports pools, or descriptions of sports pools, the conduct of which 
it authorises. A "sports pool" is defined to exclude horse racing (s 1). 
470 See website of the National Lottery: http://www.nationallottery.co.za/sport (last visited 26 April 2009). 
471 s 57-58 of the Lotteries Act. 
472 S 59 of the Lotteries Act. This section has not yet been tested in the courts. 
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It should be noted_ that 22% of the National Lottery Distribution Trust Fund, funded by 
the national lottery, is allocated to Sports and Recreaticin. 473 From 1 April 2007 to 31 
March 2008 alone an amount of ZAR 422, 4 million was allocated for this purpose.474 
B Wagering on horse racing and sporting events 
160 The National Gambling Act inter alia provides national guidelines regarding the 
regulation of wagering. The licensing of wagering operations and operators is done by the 
provincial gambling boards. Various boards, such as the Western Cape Gambling and 
Racing Board and the Gauteng Gambling Board, have awarded licenses to bookmakers 
and a totalisator operator running betting and wagering·operations. 475 Some of these 
operators, in terms of their licenses, are allowed-to also take· bets interactively.476 Again, 
any person who provides or accepts wagers on horse racing or sporting events outside 
the various statutes and without a license commits a criminal offence. 477 A further 
prohibition is placed on a person who is· in any way concerned with the management, 
supervision, control or administration of a gambling business or any gambling conducted 
at such business from participating ir.i gambling at such business or at any other 
gambling business operated by the same licence holder. 478 
With regard to the taxing of betting on sporting events, the 2008 Annual Report of the 
Gauteng Gambling Board noted that: 
'With the advent of the Soccer World Cup due to be held in South Africa in 2010, South 
African Gambling Regulators have resolved to eliminate the punter tax on betting on sport 
473 GN 1469 published in Government Gazette 27118 dated 15 December 2004. 
474 National Lotteries Board Annual Report (2008) 15. This money was distributed amongst 613 approved 
beneficiaries. · 
475 For a comprehensive list of the licensees in the Western Cape, see the board website: 
http://www.wcgrb.co.za/docs/Licensees.htm (last visited 26 April 2009); for those in Gauteng, see 
http://www.qgb.orq.za/index.php (last visited 26 April 2009); and for those in the Eastern Cape, see 
http://www.ecgbb.co.za (last visited 26 April 2009). For tote betting, see http://news.tabonline.co.za (last 
visited 26 April 2009) that caters for wagering on horse racing events as well as soccer and rugby. 
476 See E-bets (Pty) Ltd at http://www.exoticbets.co.za/content.asp?id=125. 
477 See as example chapter VI of the Western Cape legislation. The holding of unauthorised horse race meetings 
are also prohibited (s 66). 
478 s 71 of the Western Cape legislation. 
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and other events/contingencies in favour of a gross profit tax on bookmakers. The 
advantages of this move include: (1) the removal of the tax burden from the punter to the 
bookmak~r; (2) to enable.South _Africa to compete on an equal footing with foreign 
jurisdictions; and (3) to stimulate _and grow betting on sporting events. In the light of the 
above, the [Gauteng Gambling] Board recommended to the MEC for Finance and Economic 
Development ... to amend legislation to provide for the removal of the tax burden on the 
punter. With effect from 1 July 2008, punters in Gauteng will no longer pay gambling tax 
on sporting events excluding horse-racing.'479 
C Interactive wagering 
161 As mentioned above, interactive gambling is prohibited unless licensed by 
statute. 480 The legalisation and regulation of interactive gambling operators is expected 
within the near future in terms of the National Gambling Amendment Act481 once the 
regulations have been finalized. 482 However, the proposed Interactive Gambling 
Regulations specifically exclude electronic betting and wagering on horse racing and 
sports as a form of electronic communication for purposes of the regulation. 483 Wagering 
on horse racing and sporting events are thus excluded from the new developments and it 
is submitted that none of the interactive licenses would relate to wagering operations. It 
should be reiterated that these developments were never aimed at regulating interactive 
sports pools in terms of the Lotteries Act. Also in this regard the status quo remains. 
479 With regard to pool betting, the Annual Report noted that totalisator turnover increased by 11,93% during 
the current year to a total of Rl,88 billion (2007 : Rl,68 billion) and totalisator taxation amounted to R29,66 
million (2007 : R27,44 million). Regarding fixed odds betting the taxes collected from Gauteng bookmakers 
amounted to R38,70 million during 2008, compared to R33,97 million in 2007. 
480 Section 11 and llA(a) of the National Gambling Act. See also Casino Enterprises (Pty) Ltd (Swaziland) v 
Gauteng Gambling Board (TPD) 2006-11-27 unreported case number 28704/2004. 
481 10 of 2008. 
482 The draft Interactive gambling regulations have been published for comment (GN 211 in GG 31956 dated 
27 February 2009). See discussion infra. 
483 Draft regulation 3(3). 
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III Conclusion · 
162 Although the law with regard to wagering is clear, the enforcement of illegal 
operators, especially interactive operators that provide wagering opportunities to South 
Africans remains problematic in light of the issues of criminal jurisdiction and state 
sovereignty where the operators are not within the borders of the country.484 
484 See in general Carnelley 'Interactive Gambling. A South African Comparative Perspective. Part I - Universal 
Legal Challenges' 2001 (2) Obiter 273 - 299 as well as the Media Release by the Gauteng Gambling Board "On-
line gambling transactions are outlawed in South Africa" sourced electronically at 
http://www.qgb.orq.za/index.php?. 
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CHAPTER 2 PRIVATE GOVERNANCE OF SPORT485 
§1 The private organization of sport 
163 The private governance of sport in South Africa is based, at its foundational level, 
on the local club or sporting association, which is a voluntary association. 486 Apart from 
school sports, all other forms of amateur and professional sport are organized in the form 
of the following hierarchy of organization and control: 
At the base level, one finds the club, as an association of individuals 
(participants and those who have an interest in organizing competitions at 
club level and administering the affairs of the club and its members); 
These clubs may also organize collectively in terms of their geographical 
location or territorial affiliation, to form provincial or regional unions of 
clubs; 
These provincial or regional unions in turn collectively make up national 
unions in the specific sporting discipline (or multiple disciplines where such 
disciplines are connected in respect of competition or for the purposes of 
organization) .487 
The hierarchy of control over sport is based on association and, therefore, on contract. 
While the core club is made up of members who have concluded a contract of 
485 Reference is made in parts of the following discussion to the incorporation of associations in terms of the 
Companies Act 61of1973 (as amended). It should be noted that the Companies Act is at the time of writing in 
the process of very substantial amendment - the new Companies Act 71 of 2008 (Government Gazette 32121 
of 9 April 2009) has been promulgated, and is to come into force within a period of 12 months (date to be 
announced in due course). 
486 Basson (and Swart) in Basson & Loubser (Eds.) Sport and the Law in South Africa Butterworths (Looseleaf -
service issue 1) 2000 (at Ch 4-1) define the voluntary association as follows: 
'Voluntary associations can be defined as legal relationships that arise from an agreement between three or 
more persons to achieve a common object, primarily other than the making and division of profits. As such, 
voluntary associations are for the most part bodies of persons who combine to further some common end or 
interest that may be social, sporting, political, scientific, religious, artistic or humanitarian in nature, or that 
otherwise stands apart from private gain and material advantage.' 
See also Bamford The Law of Partnership and Voluntary Association in South Africa 3rd edition, Juta & Co. Ltd, 
Cape Town 1982 at 117; Cameron v Hogan (1934) 51 CLR 358 at 370 _ 
487 See, generally, the discussion by Basson (and Swart) in Basson & Loubser (Eds.) Sport and the Law in South 
Africa Butterworths (Looseleaf - service issue 1) 2000 at Ch 4-1 
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membership (embodied in and subject to the constitution of the association), clubs as 
associations also contract inter se in order to submit to the regulatory or governance 
authority of other associations higher up on the ladder - e.g. the provincial union and the 
national union in the specific sports code or the multi-coded sports organization. This 
contractual submission to authority finds its application for example in the rules of 
competitions and leagues. 488 The legal principles applicable to voluntary associations 
(discussed below) are applicable mutatis mutandis to such unions of clubs. 489 
164 The majority of South African sports follow the European model of sports 
governance, and in the three major sports (which also have the best-developed and most 
substantial professional leagues) the domestic bodies fit neatly in the international 
governance system with its international federations based in England and Europe. 490 In 
this model,. the role of international governing· bodies as 'trustees' of their sport, in terms 
of a mandate provided by representative groupings from national member states on the 
basis of a monopoly, has proved to be 'the most successful model of organization and 
diffusion of a sports discipline'. 491 In the case of FIFA, as a leading exemplar of 
governance in the world's most popular sport, this system has developed into a model 
that has consolidated other organisational layers and is known today as the 'Pyramid of · 
Football'. This structure is recognised as a prime example of the general European model 
-
of sport; whereby sport is organised in a hierarchical pyramid with international 
488 E.g. the ABSA Cup provincial rugby tournament. The hierarchy of national (and international) control over 
football was described as follows in the cape Provincial Division judgment of Coetzee v Comitis and Others 
2001 (1) SA 1254 (C) (at 1259F): 
'It is commor:i cause between the parties that professional football in South Africa is regulated and controlled by 
the NSL. Any club or footballer wishing to play professional football must be registered with the NSL. If a player 
is not registered he cannot play for any club that is affiliated to the NSL. The NSL is an association which has as 
its primary purpose the control and management of professional football in South Africa. All professional 
football clubs in South Africa are affiliated to the NSL, which in turn is affiliated to [the South African Football 
Association]. SAFA is in turn affiliated to [the Confederation of African Football Associations] and FIFA, the 
world body of professional football. The hierarchy is therefore: NSL; SAFA; CAF; FIFA.' 
489 Basson op cit. at Ch 4-19 
490 This has contributed to the influence of developments in 'sports law' from other jurisdictions on South 
African law. As has been remarked (Simon Boyes 'Globalisation, Europe and the Re-regulation of Sport', in 
Caiger & Gardiner Professional Sport in the EU: Regulation and Re-regulation TMC Asser Press, The Hague 
(2000) at 79): 
'The economic growth associated with media refinancing of sport has provided European law with a gateway 
into the sporting world and resulted in a significant re-regulation within Europe. Furthermore, the pivotal 
position which Europe holds in the power dynamics of the world sports system has resulted in European law 
exerting an influence beyond its own jurisdictional boundaries.' 
491 Ducrey, P; Ferreira, C; Huerta, G & Marston, K 'UEFA and Football Governance: A New Model' International 
Sports Law Journal 2004/1-2 
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(European) sports federations at the top, having as their members national federations 
(one per country) which in turn have as members regional federations and, finally, 
clubs. 492 Outside the European context, this structure is also found in most sporting 
disciplines, where the relevant international governing body is found at the top of the 
pyramid.493 
165 As mentioned above, most South African sports follow the organisational 
characteristics of the European model of sport, which also serves to distinguish sport 
from other businesses,494 and consist mainly of the following key elements: 495 
i) The 'Ein Platz Prinzip' (or·'one place principle') 
This principle means that only one association has exclusive competence 
for each sports discipline in each country. 496 The national associations are 
bound by the statutes, regulations and resolutions of the international 
492 European Model of Sport, Consultation Document of D_irectorate-General X of the European Commission 
(1998), at 2-3. Roger Blanpain The Legal Status of Sportsmen and Sportswomen under International, European 
and Belgian National and Regional Law Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2003 at 2, also distinguishes 
between the East European and West European models of sport that existed between the end of World War II 
and the mid-1980s, where the former was ideologically-oriented and sport constituted a part of the propaganda 
machine. 
493 For example, Chapter 1 section 1 (read with section 3) of the International Sporting Code of the FIA 
describes its role and powers as follows: 
'The [FIA] shall be the sole international sporting authority entitled to make and enforce regulations for the 
encouragement and control of automobile competitions and records, and to organise FIA International 
Championships and shall be the final international court of appeal for the settlement of disputes arising 
therefrom ... Each National Club or Federation belonging to the FIA, shall be presumed to acquiesce in and be 
bound by this Code. Subject to such acquiescence and restraint, one single Club or one single Federation per 
country ... shall be recognised by the FIA as sole international sporting power for the enforcement of the 
present Code and control of motor sport throughout the territories placed under the authority of its own 
country.' 
FIA International Sporting Code (as amended - 11 April 2005), available online at 
http://www. fia .com/resources/documents/1158037 540_Internationa l_Sport_ Code_a. pdf 
494 Even though the sports market shows increasing similarities with 'ordinary businesses' - see in general Tom 
Mortimer & Ian Pearl 'The Effectiveness of the Corporate Form as a Regulatory Tool in European Sport: Real or 
Illusory?' in Caiger & Gardiner Professional Sport in the EU at 217 et seq; and 'The Business of Football' in 
Gardiner et al Sports Law at 46 et seq. 
495 From the final report of the Sports Directorate of the Netherlands Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport, 
entitled The Balance Between the Game and the Money (2000). See also Roger Blanpain The Legal Status of 
Sportsmen and Sportswomen under International, European and Belgian National and Regional Law Kluwer Law 
International, The Hague 2003 at 2 et seq. 
496 A former competition commissioner (Karel Van Miert) of the European Commission has stated that 'it is 
generally acknowledged that the most effective institutional structure for promoting sport is the creation of a 
single federation in each Member State and a single international federation for each sport.' [1996] OJ 
C217/87, 12 April 1996. 
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(global or continental/regional) federations. 497 The monopoly position of 
the international federations is guaranteed because they prohibit (in their 
statutes) their members from joining other, competing international sports 
associations or membership of such an association is made dependent on 
their approval. National associations are also prohibited from allowing clubs 
to play matches against clubs of national federations that are not members 
of the international federation, without such federation's approval. 498 
ii) A system of promotion and relegation 
Operation of the European model is characterised by a pyramid structure. 
Regional champions compete against each other for a national title; 
amateur clubs can be promoted and compete in cup tournaments; winners 
of national competitions can compete in European competitions. This 'open 
competition', where clubs can be promoted or relegated, differs 
significantly from the more closed American system. 
iii) Horizontal and vertical solidarity 
Horizontal solidarity is pursued in the interests of limiting the differences 
between competitors within a competition. An example is the redistribution 
of income from the sales of television broadcasting rights within leagues. 
Vertical solidarity involves supporting the base of the pyramid (mass sports 
participation) with income from the top of the pyramid (elite competitions). 
497 In the South African National Sport and Recreation Act 110 of 1998 a 'national federation' is defined as 
follows (section 1 of the Act): 
'A national governing body of a code of sport in the Republic recognised by the relevant international controlling 
body as the only authority for the administration and control of the relative code of sport in the Republic'. 
The SA Sports Confederation and Olympic Committee (SASCOC)'s Articles of Association require national 
federations (for purposes of membership of SASCOC) to be the undisputed national federation for a specific 
sport and to be recognised as such by the relevant international federation (Article 5.1.2); and also that an 
international federation will only be recognised if it is affiliated to or recognised by the International Olympic 
Committee, the International Paralympic Committee, the Commonwealth Games Federation, the International 
World Games Federation, the All Africa Games, or if it is approved by a resolution of the members of SASCOC 
(SASCOC Rule). 
498 E.g. article 9(4)(e) and article 7(4) of the FIFA Statutes 
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The reason for this is mainly the interdependence of the different levels -
top class sport is dependent on new talent from amateur sport. 499 
166 As mentioned above, the most basic level of organization in South African sports 
is found at the local level in clubs, which are voluntary associations. Apart from the 
traditional unincorporated or incorporated voluntary association, South African law 
furthermore allows for sporting associations to be constituted in the form of companies in 
certain circumstances. Companies are incorporated associations registered in terms of 
the Companies Act, 500 and can be divided (loosely, for present purposes501 ) into 
corporations for gain 502 or corporations not for gain. 503 In- South Africa there is no legal 
requirement that sporting bodies or associations should follow a specific form of 
association; there is no special requirement that distinguishes sports associations or 
requires them to organize in a different way from other (.e.g. social ·or' humanitarian) 
organizations. 504 Of course, legal incorporation in the form of a cqmpany, 505 for instance, 
499 It is interesting to note that this system of top class sport's dependence on the lower tiers as a feeder 
system for talented athletes, may also play a determinative role in respect of important aspects of the 
employment of professional players at the top level. Preston, I; Ross, S & Szymanski, S Seizing the Moment: A 
Blueprint for Reform of World Cricket November 2000 (revised June 2001), in providing suggestions for 
reforming world cricket in order to eradicate corruption, discuss the very nature of the organisation of world 
cricket in this respect as a major factor in. the relatively low remuneration earned by international professional 
cricketers. The authors examine the English cricket scene and state that the central contracts offered to 
international players by the England and Wales Cricket Board (the ECB) leave the English squad with less than 
10% of the final take (in respect of the ECB's annual income and revenues generated for television rights) 
through contracted payments. The authors state that the principal reason for this very low percentage of 
trickle-down revenue for the international stars is the need for the ECB to subsidise county cricket, which is the 
feeder for top class professionals (see Szymanski et al at 5). 
500 Act 61 of 1973, as amended. It should be noted that the Companies Act is at the time of writing in the 
process of very substantial amendment. The new Companies Act 71 of 2008 (Government Gazette 32121 of 9 
April 2009) has been promulgated, and is to come into force within a period of 12 months (date to be 
announced in due course). 
501 The Companies Act 61of1973 distinguishes between two basic types of company, namely a (public or 
private) company with a share capital, and a company limited by guarantee (see section 19 of the Act). 
502 See Companies Act (1973) section 31, as discussed below 
503 Or companies incorporated in terms of section 21 of the Companies Act. The 'section 21 company' is a 
special type of privileged company limited by guarantee (a public company), which is incorporated not for 
commercial purposes but for the lawful promotion of religion, art, science, education, charity, recreation or for 
any other cultural or social activity, or communal or group interests. Such company is an 'association not for 
gain', and its profits must be applied to promote its main object. Dividends may not be paid to members. Upon 
its winding-up, deregistration or dissolution the assets of the association remaining after satisfaction of 
liabilities shall be transferred to some other association(s) or institution(s) with objects similar to its main 
objects. Such a company is required to have the phrase 'Association incorporated under section 21' as the last 
words of its name. See section 21 of Act 61of1973; Gibson South African Mercantile and Company Law 3th 
edition Juta & Co. Ltd 2003 at 264; Basson op cit. Ch 4-22. 
The main consideration for sports bodies to form a section 21 company are found in the tax exemption 
provisions of the Income Tax Act, 58 of 1962. 
504 The discussion below will examine the trend to split the activities of sports bodies into amateur and 
professional entities, mainly for tax reasons. This trend is widespread and now constitutes a specific form for 
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may have important consequences and benefits in respect of the rights and obligations of 
such an association, 506 but it is generally not a requirement in terms of statute or the 
common law. The main distinction between sports bodies as voluntary associations is 
whether they are incorporated or unincorporated. 507 
167 There is no obligation upon an unincorporated association to perform a formal act 
of registration or other act in order to obtain legal personality. South African law 
recognizes, in terms of a combination of Roman-Dutch principles and English law relating 
to clubs, the unincorporated association with legal personality, or universitas. 508 The 
determining factor is not incorporation under statute or otherwise, but rather the nature 
of the association, its constitution, and its objects and activities, as inferred from its 
rules. 509 ·The following are the main common law characteristics of a universitas: 
Perpetual succession; namely that the association continues to exist 
notwithstanding changes in its membership; 
The association holds property separate from its members; 
Plurality of members; and 
·A lawful object. 510 
the amateur and professional activities and structures of such bodies, but is not specifically required by 
legislation and rather constitutes developing commercial practice or custom. · 
505 In terms of the provisions of the Companies Act, 1973 (it should be noted that substantial amendments to 
the Companies Act are at the time of writing in progress and are expected to come into force sometime in 
2010) 
506 E.g. in respect of taxation 
507 Basson op cit.; Ahmadiyya Anjuman Ishaati-Islam Lahore (South Africa) and Another v Muslm Judicial 
Council (Cape) and Others 1983 (4 SA 855 (C) 
508 Bamford The Law of Partnership and Voluntary Association in South Africa 3rd edition, Juta & Co. Ltd, Cape 
Town 1982 at 127. The universitas has been defined as 'an artificial or juristic person constituting a legal entity 
apart from the natural persons (members) composing it, having the capacity to acquire rights and incur 
obligations and to own property apart from its members and to sue and be sued, and having perpetual 
succession' - see African National Congress and Another v Lomba 1997 (3) SA 187 (A) at 195; Magnum 
Financial Holdings (Pty) Ltd (In Liquidation) v Summerly and Another NNO 1984 (1) SA 160 (W); Lawe/aims 
(Pty) Ltd v Rea Shipping Co. SA; Schiffscommerz Aussenhandelsbetrieb der WB Schiffbau Intervening 1979 (4) 
SA 745 (N); Malebjoe v Bantu Methodist Church of South Africa 1957 (4) SA 465 (W) 
509 Basson op cit. Ch 4-2. It was held in the African National Congress case op cit. that, to determine whether 
an association is a universitas, it must in the first instance be looked at its constitution. Where its status cannot 
be determined from the express terms of the constitution or its implication, one must consider the nature of the 
association and its objects. 
510 Basson op cit. at Ch 4-3; Webb & Co Ltd v Northern Rifles 1908 TS 462; Nelson Mandela Metropolitan 
Municipality and Others v Greyvenouw CC and Others 2004 (2) SA 81 (SE) at 101; Gibson op cit. 259 
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Most sports clubs and unions of clubs in South Africa comply with the requirements for 
· universitates and are recognized as separate legal entities. 511 The main characteristics of 
such an association under South African law are that it exists as an entity with rights and 
obligations independent from the individual members' rights, and that it has perpetual 
succession. 512 
168 A voluntary association must be established for a purpose primarily other than the 
making and division of profits, 513 although it may conduct subsidiary activities to make 
profit as long as the main objective of the association is not the acquisition of gain. 514 An 
association formed with its object the acquisition of gain 515 must be incorporated as a 
company in terms of the Companies Act in order to be a body corporate. 516 An 
unregistered association that consists of more than twenty persons and was formed for 
the purpose of carrying on a business with the purpose of gain is an illegal association in 
terms of the Companies Act, and has no legal existence. 517 It may therefore not sue in its 
own name or be sued and no legal effect will be given to its constitution or any contracts 
purported to be entered into by it. 518 
169 While there was earlier uncertainty regarding whether a universitas could possess 
personality rights, 519 it is now recognized that such an association, either as a trading or 
a non-trading corporation, does indeed possess personality rights. These rights include a 
right to privacy, 520 while it has also been held a juristic person can be defamed. 521 These 
511 Sasson Ch 4-5 
512 Pienaar, G J 'Associations' in The Law of South Africa 2nd edition Volume 1, LexisNexis Butterworths 2003, at 
par. 618 
513 Bamford op cit. 117 
· 
514 Huey Extreme Club v McDonald t/a Sport Helicopters [2004] JOL 12875 (C) par. 20 
515 It is a question of fact whether an association's object is that of gain, and gain in this context has been held 
to mean 'a commercial or material benefit or advantage, not necessarily a pecuniary profit, in contradistinction 
to the kind of benefit or result which a charitable, benevolent, humanitarian, philanthropic, literary, scientific, 
political cultural, religious, social, recreational or sporting organisatio·n, for instance, seeks to achieve' -
Mitchel/s Plain Town Centre Merchants Association v Mcleod and Another 1996 (4) SA 159 (A) at 169-170 (as 
quoted in Sasson op cit Ch 4-4). 
516 Companies Act (1973) section 31; see Sasson op cit. Ch 4-4 
517 R v Twala 1952 (2) SA 599 (AD) 
518 Sasson op cit. Ch 4-4 to 4-5 
519 See Universiteit van Pretoria v Tommie Meyer Films (Edms) Bpk 1979 (1) SA 441 (A) 
52° Financial Mail (Pty) Ltd v Sage Holdings Ltd 1993 (2) SA 451 (A) 
521 Dhlomo NO v Natal Newspapers (Pty) Ltd & Another 1989 (1) SA 945 (A); Argus Printing & Publishing Co. 
Ltd v Inkatha Freedom Party 1992 (3) SA 479 (A) 
217 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
rights can be protected in the usual manner by means of interdict, the Aquilian action for 
damages (the general delictual action, or action in tort) or the actio iniuriarum for 
general damages. 522 
170 A universitas may furthermore hold property, and the property will vest in the 
association as a. legal person. This distinguishes the universitas from the unincorporated 
association, where the .members are limited co-owners of the property due to the fad 
that the association has no separate legal personality. 523 The constitution of the 
association (or an Act of Parliament) may determine that movable or immovable property 
of the universitas will vest in a trustee, other bodies or persons acting as the 
representatives of. the association :524 
171 The basic foundation of the sports club is therefore the mutual agreement 
between its members and the members and the universitas. 525 Unlike the position under 
English law, 526 where the club generally has no separate legal personality and is based 
solely on the horizontal matrix of contracts that binds each member to the other 
members, there is a vertical matrix of contracts between the club and its members. 527 
This contract between club and member(s) is embodied in the club's constitution 
(together with its rules and regulations). 528 The constitution manifests the members' 
522 See Pienaar, G J 'Associations' in The Law of South Africa 2nd edition Volume 1, LexisNexis Butterworths 
2003, at par. 618. For more on the Aquilian action and the protection of personality rights under the South 
African law of delict (tort), see Neethling, J; Potgieter J M & Scott, T J Case Book on the Law of Delict 4th 
edition Juta Law 2007; Visser PJ; Potgieter JM; Steynberg L & Floyd, TB Law of Damages Juta Law 2003; 
Burchell, JM Principles of Oelict Juta Law 1993; Burchell, JM Personality Rights and Freedom of Expression: The 
Modern Actio Iniuriarum Juta Law 1998. 
523 See Pienaar op cit. at par. 623 
524 Ibid. 
525 Pienaar ('Associations', in The Law of South Africa 2nd edition Volume 1, LexisNexis Butterworths 2003, at 
par. 617) observes that nowhere in the Roman-Dutch sources is it mentioned that the universitas personarum 
is based on contract. This latter view originated from a combination of Roman-Dutch principles and English club 
law. See, generally, Pienaar supra and the authorities cited there. 
526 In the English context, unincorporated associations have been described as 'essentially groups of individuals 
coming together to carry out a mutual purpose other than to distribute profit': 
'They are members' organisations and have no legal personality distinct from the individuals who comprise their 
membership. The rules regulate the relationship between the members and will usually give authority to a 
committee to run the affairs of the unincorporated association. The relationship between the members is a 
contractual one based on the provisions of the rules.' 
Lewis, A & Taylor, J Sport: Law and Practice Butterworths LexisNexis 2003 at 457-458. See also Beloff, Kerr 
and Demetriou Sports Law Hart Publishing 1999 at 19-20. 
527 Basson Ch 4-3 
528 Ex parte United Party Club 1930 WLD 277; Turner v Jockey Club of SA 1974 (3) SA 633; Natal Rugby Union 
v Gould [1998] All SA 258 (SCA); 1999 (1) SA 432 (SCA) at 440 
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agreement as to the essential characteristics and objects of the association, and 
constitutes a contract concluded by offer and acceptance and the intention to 
associate. 529 In accordance with the principle of privity of contract, the constitution, rules 
and regulations of a sports club or federation are not binding on non-members, even if 
such constitution, rules and regulations refer to non-members. 530 This contract 
determines the nature and scope of the association's. existence and activities, while also 
prescribing and demarcating the powers of the executive committee, secretary and 
general meeting, and expressing the rights of members. 531 In the field of sports, where 
matters of common concern are often organized in associations on a national, regional or 
provincial basis, the status, locus standi and interaction between the constituent 
associations or bodies are determined by the provisions of their respective constitutions 
or of the central association's (national body) constitution. 532 
The fact that the normal rules of contract apply to the constitution of a sports 
club, that the cons~itution and the rules and regulations of the club determine all 
questions regarding the association, 533 and the fact that the normal rules of 
interpretation of contract apply, 534 is important in respect of the position of members of 
such a club. Courts will usually not depart from the clear meaning of the terms of the 
constitution in order to give it a meaning it considers to be more reasonable in the 
circumstances. 535 
529 Basson Ch 4-5. For practical purposes it is advisable to have a written constitution, although this is not 
essential - see the authorities quoted by Pienaar, G J 'Associations' in The Law of South Africa 2nd edition 
Volume 1, LexisNexis Butterworths 2003, at par. 619 fn 4 and 5. 
For discussion of the most important aspects of a club or sporting body's constitution, and suggestions for what 
should be included in such document, see Basson Ch 4-5 to Ch 4-20, and Ch 4-33 to Ch 4-35 (in respect of 
requirements in terms of amendments of the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 regarding exemption from income tax 
in certain cases). 
530 Rowles v Jockey Club of South Africa 1954 (1) SA 363 (A); Johannesburg Country Club v Stott 2004 (5) SA 
511 (SCA) . 
531 Pienaar op cit. at par. 620 
532 Pienaar op cit. par. 624 
533 Rowles v Jockey Club of SA 1954 (1) SA 363 (AD); Bamford op cit. at 132. As to the supremacy of the 
constitution of a voluntary association in this regard and the fact that the rights and obligations that arise 
between a voluntary association and its members are private in nature, see Cronje v United Cricket Board of 
South Africa 2001 (4) SA 1361 (TPD) (as discussed below). 
534 Constantinides v Jockey Club of SA 1954 (3) SA 35 (C) and the authorities quoted in Basson op cit. Ch 4-6 
note 4 
535 Constantinides supra at 44; Basson Ch 4-6. See also, on the interpretation and amendment of a 
constitution, Pienaar op cit. at par. 621-622. 
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172 While the basis for the voluntary association is therefore contract, 536 and it is 
subject to the ·normal rules of contract, 537 it is important to note that certain statutory 
provisions may limit the traditional notion of voluntary associations by in essence limiting 
freedom of contract; e.g. in respect of ttie freedom of the association to refuse 
membership to certain individuals or groups. A prime example is found in section 29 of 
the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act (Act 4 of 2000), 
which contains an illustrative list of unfair.practices in terms of the Act and includes the 
following (in section 29(10); entitled 'Clubs, sport and associations'): 
'(a) Unfairly refusing to.consider a person's application for membership of the association 
or club on any of .the prohibited grounds; 
(b) Unfairly denying a member ~ccess.to or-limiting a member's access to any benefit 
proviped by the association or club; ~r. 
(c) Failure to promote_ diversity in selection of representative teams.' 
The prohibited grounds are defined in section 1 of the Act as including 
'(a) race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethn!c or social origin, colour, sexual 
orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth; or 
(b) any other ground where discrimination based on that other ground-
(i) causes or perpetuates systemic disadvantage; 
(ii) undermines human dignity; or 
536 It has been said that 'in many respects the relationship of a [universitas] to its members resembles that of 
principal and agent though in other respects it is a contractual relationship which ... [arises from] a contract sui 
generis' - Lewis & Co. (Pty) Ltd v Pietersburg Co-op BV and Others 1936 AD 344 at 353, as quoted by Bamford 
The Law of Partnership and Voluntary Association in South Africa 3rd edition, Juta & Co. Ltd, Cape Town 1982 
126 note 3. · 
537 Compare Jacobs v Old Apostolic Church of Africa and Another 1992 (4) SA 172 (TK) at 173 (per Haneke J): 
'. .. [A] voluntary association, is founded on a contractual basis. The constitution of an association, together with 
all its rules or regulations, collectively constitutes the contract which is entered into by its members ... The 
contract under which a voluntary association functions determines the nature and scope of the association's 
existence and activities, prescribes the powers to those who are charged with its affairs and demarcates and 
regulates the rights of members ... As far as the interpretation of [such an association's] constitution is 
concerned, the same principles of construction should be applied as in the construction of any written contract.' 
Compare, however, In re Cape of Good Hope Permanent Building Society (1898) 15 SC 323 at 336, where it 
was observed that voluntary association is a 'contract sui generis which does not fall within any of the well-
defined classes of contracts known to our law' - see Bamford The Law of Partnership and Voluntary Association 
in South Africa 3rd edition, Juta & Co. Ltd, Cape Town 1982 at 117 note 1. 
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(iii) adversely affects the equal enjoyment of a person's rights and freedoms in a 
serious manner that is comparable to discrimination on a ground in paragraph (a)'. 
These provisions would clearly outlaw e.g. excluding a person from membership of a 
sports club or organization on the basis of their race or gender. 
173 Apart from such considerations, 538 voluntary associations normally have an 
absolute discretion as to whether or not it admits a person to membership. 539 In light of· 
this discretion, and long established precedent540 regarding the powers of voluntary 
associations vis a vis applicants for membership, a refusal of membership will not, per 
se, involve (or entitle the unsuccessful applicant to rely on) ma/a fides or non-compliance 
with the rules of natural justice. 541 Furthermore, the courts- have on a number of 
occasions recognized that the fundamental right to freedom of association as contained in 
section 18 of the Bill of Rights includes the right of an organization such as· a sports 
governing body not to associate with an individual (e.g. where no contractual relationship 
exists between the association and such individual). 542 
174 South African courts, in the absence of express provisions to that effect, will not 
lightly infer a right to membership. 543 As the disciplinary powers of the voluntary 
association are based in the constitution, rules and regulations, such a body cannot 
discipline a non-member who has no contractual relationship with the association. The 
courts have furthermore held that a sports organisation's right to expel a member (i.e. as 
a form of disciplinary action against such member) must be stated expressly or by 
538 Compare also, rriore generally, the provisions of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996 (chapter 2), which prot~cts every person's fundamental rights of equality (section 9), human 
dignity (section 10), the freedom to pursue an occupation (section 22), etc. These rights may affect the 
association's freedom to exclude persons in certain circumstances (and depending on the extent to which the 
relevant right(s) may be subject to direct application to natural and/or juristic persons in terms of section 8 of 
the Constitution). 
539 See· Bamford at 139 et seq., and the authorities referred to. 
54° Compare the cases referred to by Bamford at 139 
541 Bamford 139 
542 Compare Cronje v United Cricket Board of SA 2001 (4) SA 1361 (TPD) (discussed in par 224 et seq below) 
543 Ngwenya v Mothol.o 1953 2 PH M24 (N); Pienaar op cit. par. 626 
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necessary implication in the constitution, rules or regulations of such organization. 544 The 
association has no inherent right to expel a member, and accordingly any such implied 
power must be clear and unambiguous. In cases of serious or repeated transgressions, 
the association may exercise its right at common law to cancel the contract with the 
member on the basis of the latter's breach. 545 
175 Of course, in the sports context, eligibility for membership to sports associations 
is not purely regulated at the domestic level i~ terms of the rules as contained in the 
constitutions of domestic associations. Eligibility rules (and also disciplinary rules and 
rules relating to ethical principles in a sport) are a specific example of the application of 
the often-intricate 'web of contracts' that affects athletes, in both amateur and 
professional sport. Eligibility rules are found in the rules of all international sports 
gove.rning bodies, and these same rules are incorporated, by means ofcontract or 
otherwise, 546 into an association's constitution (as well as other contracts with 
participants, e.g. employment contracts). The international element of such rules, and 
the role of the international associations, should at all times be borne in mind when 
interpreting or applying the constitution of a domestic sports association: 
176 Finally, in respect of the activities of bodies such as sports clubs in their 
interaction with their members, it should be noted that the Consumer Protection Act, 
200?547 contains quite far-reaching provisions regarding the rights of consumers who are 
involved in transactions under the Bill. Section 1 of the Bill defines a 'transaction' as 
including the following: 
'[A] "transaction" means-
544 See Conrad v Farrel 1974 (2) SA 200 (C) 
545 See Cloete et al Introduction to Sports Law in South Africa (2005) supra at 102 
546 See the discussion by Lewis & Taylor Sport: Law and Pr:actice Butterworths LexisNexis 2003 at 51 (par. 
A2.16) et seq. 
547 The Consumer Protection Act, 68 of 2008 was signed into law by the President of the Republic on 24 April 
2009 and published in the Goverment Gazette on 29 April 2009. The Act will come into force on a date 
unknown during the course of 2009/10 · 
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(a) in respect of a person acting in the ordinary course of business-
(i) an agreement between or among that person and one or more other 
persons for the supply or potential supply _of any goods or services in 
exchange for consideration; or 
(ii) the supply by that person of any goods to or at the direction of a 
consumer for consideration; or 
(iii)· the performance by, or at the direction of, that person of any services for 
or at the direction of a consumer for consideration; or_ 
(b) an interaction contemplated in section 5(6), irrespective of wl)ether it falls 
within paragraph (a)' 
Section 5(6) oJ.the Bill, whic_h deals with its application, provides as_ follows (specifically 
in section 5(6)(a)) in respect of clubs and associations: 
. . 
'Sec. 5(6) For greater certainty, the following arrangements must be regarded as a 
transaction between a supplier and consumer, within the meaning of this Act: 
(a) The supply of any goods or services in the ordinary course of business to 
any of its members by a club, trade union, association, society or other 
collectivity, whether corporate or unincorporated, of persons voluntarily 
associated and organised for a common purpose or purposes, whether for 
fair value consideration or otherwise, irrespective of whether there is a 
charge or economic contribution demanded or expected in order to become 
or remain a member of that entity;' 
The Consumer Protection Act clearly has wide application and also provides for far-
reaching consumer protection measures, discussion of which is beyond the scope of this 
chapter. 
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§2 :· The organization of competitions in the major South African professional 
· sports 
177 · The three major professional sports have seen exciting developments in the past 
decade, with especially the establishment of international regional tournaments in rugby 
and cricket contributing significantly to the growth of the sports as well the coffers of the 
respective governing bodies and their commercial arms. The following provides a brief 
overview of the organization of major competitions in football, rugby and cricket. 
Football 
178 The Premier Soccer League (or 'PSL', which was established in 1996) is the 
trading name .of the National Soccer League (NSL), which is made up of the Premier 
Division and the National First Division. 54~ It is an Affiliate Member of the South African 
Football Association (SAFA) and the administrator of professional football in the Republic 
of South Africa. The league was reduced from 18 to 16 teams after the end of the 
2001/2002 season to avoid fixture congestion, causing two teams, Ria Stars and Free 
State Stars, to be disbanded at the time. 549 
The Ned bank Cup (which has been ·called the South African version of the English FA 
Cup) sees teams from SAFA's regional leagues compete and play up to ten matches 
before entering the main draw. 32 teams enter the main draw, including 16 Premier 
League clubs, 8 National First Division clubs and 8 from SAFA's regional leagues. 
The Telkom Knockout is a lucrative tournament which features all 16 premier league 
clubs and is played in the first half of the season. 
548 Rule 1.2 of the National Soccer League's Rules (as amended 17 June 2008) 
549 From the web site of the Premier Soccer League. The rules and regulations and constitution of the PSL is 
available on the web site at http://www.psl.co.za 
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The MTN 8 tournament features the top 8 teams from the previous season's league, and 
is played at the start of the new season, with a ZAR 8 million winner takes all prize. 
The Telkom Charity Cup is the traditional season opener for the PSL, and this unique one 
day event sees fans of the 16 Premier League clubs vote for their favourite team, either 
via phone or by sms (text messages). All proceeds from the votes go towards charity. 
The tournament is a firm favour.ite amongst fans as they get to see three matches in orie 
day and also view the newest and latest signings·on offer. 
179 SAFA was established in 1991, following a unifying process which culminated in a 
single national football association (as opposed to the racially divided structures which 
had existed previously), and the organization has been a member of world governing 
body FIFA since June 1992. SAFA is closely involved with FIFA and the Local Organising 
Committee in organizing the 2010 FIFA World Cup South Africa™. 
SAFA has 52 regions and comprises a number of Associate Members (including the PSL), 
Regional Members (arranged along provincial lines) and its League. The League is made 
up of the National First Division (previously the 'Mvela League'), the 2nd Division (the 
'Vodacom League') and the 3rd Division (the 'SAB League'). 550 Rule 3 of the NS L's Rules 
regulates promotion and relegation in respect of the Premier and First divisions. 551 
The National First Division (or NFD) is the second-highest league of South African 
professional club football after the Premier Soccer League's Absa Premiership. From 2004 
until 2007 it was sponsored by the Mvelaphanda Group and known as the Mvela Golden 
League. The restructured NFD is divided into two streams, one inland and another coastal 
- each of which consists of 8 teams. 552 The winners of the two streams play against each 
other in a final at the end of the season - the victor of Which is promoted to the PSL. The 
loser of the final plays in a mini-tournament/play-offs against the two second-placed 
teams in each stream and the 15th-placed team on the PSL log. The winner of this 
tournament is also automatically promoted to the Premiership. The Premier League and 
55° From the organisation's web site at http//:www.safa.net 
551 National Soccer League Rules (as amended 17 June 2008) 
552 In terms of Rule 15 of the National Soccer League Rules (as amended 17 June 2008) 
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the National First Division are the only two leagues comprised of fully professional 
players (on average around 30 players contracted per club), and semi-professional 
players (whose registration is administered by SAFA) participate in the lower, 'amateur' 
leagues. 
The Vodacom Promotional League (the f~eder league to the NFD) is contested by 16 
clubs in each of the·9 provinces of South Africa. The winner of each Provincial League 
qualifies for the annual Vodacorn Promotional Play-offs where the winners of two streams 
(made up of 4 and 5 clubs respectively) qualify automatically for the National First · 
Division. Winners from the SAB Regional League qualify for promotion to the Vodacom 
Promotional League after a series of play-offs. 
The SAB Regional. League (formerly th~ Castle Regional League), comprising 832 clubs 
and over 20 000 registered playersj.is the largest senior league administered by SAFA. 
This club competition has been expanded from 25 to 52 SAFA regions (from the 2006/07 
season). Two regional winners (from each"of-the 9 provinces) are promoted annually to 
the Vodacom Promotional League after a series of play-offs in their respective 
provinces. 553 From the 2009 season this league·is operated as the SAB Regional under-21 
League, the first under-21 league ofits kind in the country, with the object of serving as 
a feeder league to the Vodacom League .. The'competition is to be phased in over a three-
year period, with a quota of under-21 players to be applied (i.e. 5 u-21 players per team 
in 2009; 8 u-21 players per team in 2010; full complement of 11 u-21 players per team 
in 2011). It is hoped that this new league will serve as a vehicle to provide opportunities 
to players who have not been scouted by professional clubs before reaching the ages of 
. ' 
19-21. 
553 From the web site of the SA Football Association at http://www.safa.net 
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Rugby union 
180 The national rugby team (the Springboks) is the current (2007) IRB Rugby World 
Cup champions (the Springboks also won the tournament in 1995, when it was staged in 
South Africa). 554 Apart from the international touring programme, the Springboks also 
compete in the Tri-Nations tournament against Australia and the New Zealand All Blacks. 
The Tri-Nations is an annual competition which was first played in 1996, which takes 
place in July and August, that decides the top international team in the southern 
hemisphere. 
The Super 14 competition features 14 regional teams from South Africa, New Zealand 
and Australia, with South Africa providing five teams (professional franchises), New 
Zealand five and Australia four. The forerunner of the competition was the Super 10, 
contested by provincial teams fr:om the three countries as·.well as Samoa in 1993 and 
1994 and Tonga in 1995. In 1996, the competition became the Super 12, featuring 
provincial and regional teams from South Africa, New·zealand and Australia, with the 
Tongans and Samoans dropping out. Two more teams were add_ed in 2006 and it became 
the Super 14. 
The Super 14 is an early season competition, startin_g in mid-February and finishing by 
mid-May. 
181 At the time of writing there is a measure of speculation regarding the 
restructuring of the Super 14 tournament for the 2011 season. There has been some 
debate regarding the length of the season, with South Africa preferring a maximum 17-
match programme while Australia and New Zealand want a 21-match schedule. All three 
partners to the SANZAR agreement have agreed on expanding the competition to 15 
teams in 2011, extending the play-offs with a quarter-final round for teams placed third 
to sixth and to adopt a three-conference system to ensure teams in each nation play 
554 The Springboks' victory in the 1995 IRB Rugby World Cup is generally viewed to be one of the most 
significant 'nation-building' events in the country's post 1994 era, and is soon to be immortalized in the Clint 
Eastwood-directed film 'The Human Factor', to star Morgan Freeman as Nelson Mandela and Matt Damon as 
former Springbok captain Francois Pienaar. The production began filming in Cape Town in March 2009 and is 
scheduled for release in December 2009. · 
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their countrymen home and away every season .. South Africa's concerns regarding the 
number of matches in the season relate to the ASSA Currie Cup tournament (an 
extended Super Rugby tournament would, as a result of the scheduling of the Tri-Nations 
tournament, result in the Springbok players being removed from the Currie Cup). 
The new franchise is to be identified through a tendering process, although SA Rugby has 
indicated that it will aggressively support a sixth South African franchise in the form of an 
Eastern Cape province-based team.sss It has been reported that SA Rugby has been 
adamant in stating that it will not let future developments in respect of the Super 14 
tournament devalue the provincial Currie Cup tournament (for which broadcasting rights 
for the period 2011 to 2015 have already been sold). South African sports broadcaster 
SuperSport contributes 65% of the revenues in terms of the SANZAR agreement, and 
this strengthens SA Rugby's bargaining power in respect of negotiations on the Super 
Rugby tournament (although this has not stopped SA Rugby from threatening to leave 
the Super 14 in order to send its teams to participate in the UK's Magners League).ss5 
182 The Currie Cup, the premier provincial rugby competition in South Africa, was first 
contested in 1892. The format of the Currie Cup varied from year to year, and finals were 
held intermittently until 1968, after which the final became an annual event. The Currie 
Cup takes place roughly between July and October. The format divides 14 teams into 
eight Premier Division and six First Division teams. 
The Vodacom Cuptakes place at the same time as the Super 14 competition - starting in 
late February and finishing in mid-May - and creates a platform for talented young 
players who might otherwise not get a chance to make their mark. It has also been a 
fertile breeding ground for strong players from previously disadvantaged backgrounds, 
thanks to the enforcement of racial quotas. The Vodacom Cup is divided into two sections 
sss See t~e discussion elsewhere in this chapter regarding the misadventures of the 'Southern Spears' (now the 
'Southern Kings') franchise during the last five years 
ss6 See the report entitled 'SA Rugby refuse to budge', 15 March 2009 (available online at 
http://www.iol.co.za/index.ohp?set id=6&click id=582&art id=nw20090315184456194C394357 - accessed 9 
April 2009) 
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(North and South) with the.top two teams advancing to the semi-finals and playing 
cross-section· matches of one-versus-two for a place in the final. 
Since early 2008 major bank First National Bank has sponsored ~~ inter-university rugby 
tournament. The FNB Varsity Cup was launched in Johannesburg on 31 January 2008. 
The league was contested by the top eight universities in South· Africa, which kicked off · 
with an inaugl:lral televised match on SuperSport between the University of Stellenbosch 
and the University of Pretoria on 18 February 2008. It is expected that this tournament 
will serve as a further feeder system for the top-level competitions .in future~ 
Cricket· 
183 The national cricket team;t.he !Proteas', are at the time of. writing ranked 1st in 
the world in the One Day International form'at, and ranked 2~d. after Austr:alia in the Test _ 
match format. South Africa hosted the ICC Cricket World Cup in 2003, but this title has 
eluded the national team since its re-admission to international cricket in 1992. 
The General Council of the United Cricket Board of South Africa (the 'UCB') voted in 
September 2003 to drastically cut the then existing 11 professional teams, which made 
up the domestic first class and limited overs competitions, to six franchises. 557 This 
·decision was implemented in the 2004/5 season. The reasons given for the decision were 
both economic and sporting in nature: the substantial losses incurred by professional 
cricket comp_etitions, due to the fact that revenue generated by gate money and 
sponsorship proved to be insufficient to cover the costs of such competitions; and also, it 
was believed that the competitive value of the. competitions needed to be enhanced as 
the existing system created too large a step up between provincial and international 
557 It is interesting to note that this development seems to run counter to developments elsewhere - compare 
the Pakistan Cricket Board's development of a new domestic cricket system in the 2001-2002 season, whereby 
more players were provided with an opportunity to compete at the higher levels of the game in domestic 
competitions. 
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professional cricket. 558 This decision was accompanied by the formation of Cricket SA 
(Pty) Ltd, a company formed to function as the commercial arm of the UCB (similar to SA 
Rugby (Pty) Ltd, the commercial arm of the South African Rugby Union). Cricket South 
Africa has recently converted to a section 21-company (an association not for gain) in 
terms of the Companies Act, 1973. Under the new system, domestic cricket in the 
Supersport and Standard Bank·sponsored competitions are played by six teams from six 
franchises. 5~9 .The.provincial affiliates (or partnerships between such affiliates) were 
entitled to tender for such franchises, on the basis of criteria set by the board of Cricket 
SA (Pty) Ltd and ratified by the UCB. 560 While this new system has limited the number of 
teams in professional competitions, the decision has been accompanied by a 
restructuring qf amateur cricket, to-increase the number of teams competing at amateur 
level from 11 to 16. The rationale for this is said to be the continued development of the 
game in order to provide an improved feeder system for players from the amateur to the 
' professional levels. More is said about the restructuring of the domestic cricket 
competition in par 308 et seq below. 
558 As explained by the Vice-President of the UCB, Robbie K_urz - see 'Kurz praises new vision for SA cricket', 
The Daily News, 8 September 2003, at 14. 
559 The new franchises commenced competition with the introduction of the new format of Standard Bank Pro20 
Cricket, in April 2004. 
560 The deadline for tenders for franchises was set as 23 January 2004, and the announcement of franchises 
awarded was made on 31 January 2004: The franchises are as follows: Western Province/Boland; Dolphins 
(KwaZulu-Natal); Eastern Cape (Border and Eastern Province); Eagles (Free State); Highveld Lions (Gauteng 
and North West); and Titans (Northens and Easterns). · 
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§3 Recent experience in the governance of elite and professional sport in 
South Africa 
184 Recent years, especially since 2000, saw both minor tremors and major upheavals 
in the landscape of private governance of sport in South Africa. Promising performances 
throughout the 1990s by the national teams in the major sports offootball, 561 rugby562 
and cricket, 563 immediately following the country's re-admission to international sport, 
failed to provide -a platform for the gr_owth and development of a sustained culture of 
success in SA sport. This was especially evident as it became clear that those governing 
and participating at the top levels were struggling to get to grips with the changing face 
of world sport, where developments included the increased influx of big money and the 
widespread and increasing moves towards professionalism. 564 Accompanying the 
international corruption scandal that rocked South African cricket in 2000, were 
increasing and very public examples of mismanagement and poor governance in South 
African sport, 565 which, sadly, are still prevalent from time to time at the time of writing. 
·In fact, these wide-spread misadventures have on occasion received express judicial 
recognition. 566 
185 The SA Rugby Union was embroiled in an ongoing and very public saga of 
sporadic 'palace revolutions' among the higher echelons of the organization. The 
casualties of these developments were a number of senior officials of the Union, who 
561 
'Bafana Bafana', the national football team, won the African Cup of Nations tournament in 1996, against 
some of the powerhouse teams of African football. 
562 South Africa not only managed to successfully host its first IRB Rugby World Cup in 1995, the Springboks, 
the national rugby team, won the tournament by beating the New Zealand All Blacks in the final. 
563 The SA national cricket team managed to reach the semi-finals of the ICC Cricket World Cup in 1992, 
immediately following South Africa's re-admission to world cricket late in 1991, and quickly established itself in 
the 1990's as one of the top teams in the world. 
564 E.g. in rugby union, which only officially embraced professionalism in 1996. For an interesting discussion of 
the problems faced in SA rugby, see 'Turning Buffalo into Businessmen', in Mark Keohane Springbok Rugby 
Uncovered: The Inside Story of South Africa's Rugby Controversies Zebra Press, Cape Town 2004 (at 19 et seq) 
565 See, for example, the discussion by Le Roux, R '2003: Annus Horribilis for South African Sport?' 
International Sports Law Journal 2004/1-2 47 
566 Froneman J observed as follows in his judgment in Yako v Border Rugby Football Union & Others [2006] JOL 
16944 (E) (Case number 3177/2005; judgment rendered on 20 January 2006): 
'For avid supporters of South African rugby the administration of the sport on national and provincial level has 
become an embarrassment. The perception, of which I think I may legitimately take judicial notice, is that 
many involved in the administration of the game are more concerned with their own personal interests than 
with the good of the sport in general. This application will do nothing to dispel that perception. Fortunately, 
however, the players and the sport still thrives, despite (and not necessarily because of) these kind of disputes 
at the higher levels of the administration of the sport.' 
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resigned for a variety of reasons related to allegations of mismanagement, double-
dealing and poor governance of the affairs of rugby. In April 2005, the then president of 
the then newly established SA Sports Confederation (SASCOC), 567 Moss Moshishi, 
threatened to appoint a three-man team to take over the reins at SARU. Matters came to 
a head in August 2005 with the publication of a damning 338-page report by SARU's in-
house lawyers (the 'Heunis•/ Brand report'), which focused its findings on alleged 
mismanagement by the Union's then president, Brian van Rooyen, as well as other 
instances of.breakdown in the decision· making structures of SARU. 568 In October 2005 it 
was announced that former SA cricket supremo, Dr. Ali Bacher, had been appointed to 
the Board of the SA Rugby Union by the major sponsors of rugby, in order to oversee 
their substantial commercial interest in the game and to contribute towards rationalizing 
the governance of the Union. According to reports at the time, Bacher's intervention 
included the brokering of a deal with then SARU president van Rooyen, whereby van 
Rooyen had allegedly undertaken to withdraw from the race for the presidency during 
elections held in February 2006, in return for the Union abandoning its investigation into 
irregularities based on the Heunis / Brand report. 569 Following these events there were 
calls for a Ministerial Committee of Inquiry into the affairs of SARU or a judicial inquiry 
with presidential approval. 
186 South African cricket was also embroiled in persistent rumours surrounding the 
poor financial position of the United Cricket Board. This followed a commission of enquiry 
instituted by the General Council of the UCBSA, which investigated and ultimately cleared 
UCB CEO Gerald Majola of alleged misconduct connected with misappropriation of funds 
by the previous General Manager: Finance and Administration. It appeared from this 
enquiry that the organization had for a significant amount of time been operating with 
very little in the way of written policies and procedures relating to the financial affairs of 
567 See the discussion elsewhere in this chapter 
568 The Heunis/Brand report, entitled 'Report on the Investigation into Complaints Lodged with the South 
African Rugby Union', dated 16 August 2005, is available online on the SA Rugby Union's web site at 
http://images.supersport.co.za/SARUReportFinalAuqust2005.doc (last accessed 2 November 2005). 
569 Although it appears that van Rooyen subsequently denied these reports. Brian van Rooyen was voted out at 
the February 2006 elections, when the current SARU president, Mr Oregan Hoskins, was elected to the position. 
Dr. Bacher has ·since been replaced on the Board of SARU by another representative of the major sponsors. 
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the Board, while it also appeared that there were a number of instances of senior officials 
holding financial interests in companies that provided goods or services to the UCB. 570 
187. In football, it appears that the period from 2000 to the present has not seen much 
improvement over the troubles experienced by those governing the sport in the late 
1990s. In 1999 the former Minister of Sport, Mr. Ngconde Balfour, had given the SA 
Football Association an ultimatum to get its house in order or face intervention by 
government to run the sport. This followed a period of media reports of prolonged 
irregularities in SAFA's governance, especially in respect of the Premier Soccer League -
this included reports of personality clashes between top officials in the League, 
allegations of kidnapping and death threats, and of financial irregularities. 571 This led to 
various commentators expressing doubts about expectations for SAFA's successful 
hosting of the 2010 FIFA World Cup, especially following the SA national team's dismal 
performance in the 2006 African Cup of Nations tournament._572 
188 Apart from the above examples, there have been countless reports of 
management problems in many South African. sporting codes. While it appears that at 
times the executives in control of the major sports have experienced an attrition rate 
comparable to that among national team coaches, 573 the general perception of apparently 
systemic incompetence, corruption and widespread dissatisfaction with those at the top 
has proved to be a hard pill to swallow for a sports-mad nation. Calls have been made for 
570 See the report of a UCBSA media release available online at 
http://www.vivacricket.eo.za/html/news2074.shtml (last accessed 3 November 2005) 
571 E.g. see the report entitled 'Balfour lays down law to soccer bosses', Dispatch Online, 27 November 1999 -
available online at http://www.dispatch.eo.za/1999/11/27/sport/AABALFOU.HTM (last accessed 3 November 
2005) 
572 The SA team lost all 3 its group matches in the tournament and failed to score a single goal, prompting the 
coach (Ted Dimutru, who was subsequently axed) to remark that the team failed to meet even the lowest 
expectations of the SA footballing public. It also failed earlier to qualify for the FIFA World Cup 2006 in 
Germany. 
573 The national football team, 'Bafana Bafana', at one time had 12 coaches in a 13 year-period (dubbed the 
'Dirty Dozen' by some - see the report entitled 'SAFA's record speaks for itself: Phillips', available online on the 
web site of the South African Broadcasting Corporation at 
http://www.sabcnews.com/sport/soccer/0,2172,120907,00.html [last accessed 10 February 2006]). The 
position of national rugby coach post 1994 has also not been synonymous with job security. 
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sports administrators to adhere to good governance principles and practices as set out in . 
the King (I, II and III) Reports on Corporate Governance. 574 
§4 The trend of splitting the functions of sports bodies 
189 Sp0.rts bodies in South Africa have in recent years increasingly started to follow 
developments elsewhere in respect of the separation of functions between those that 
relate to 'the game' and those that relate to its commercialisation . .This is in line with 
developments at the top level of the international organisation of sport as well as in the 
domestic_ governance of sport in 3urisdictions elsewhere. These developments have 
mostly touched sports that have a significant professional component. As a combination 
of developments in resped of the emergence of professionalism in sport and the 
accompanying recognition of the role of good governance principles and promotion of the 
public interest-element of sports regulation, recent years have seen widespread calls for 
a separation of the economic/commercial and 'sporting' functions of international sports 
governing bodies. It has generally been recognised that governing bodies nowadays are 
more and more involved in administering not only the 'rules of the game' (namely those 
rules, regulations and aspects of the sport that are necessary for the very playing of the 
game -: the traditional function of such bodies at the time of their establishment and 
early deve_lopment), but also rules relating to_ the commercial spin-offs of the playing of 
the game. Examples of the latter are rules regarding the licensing of broadcasting rights 
to matches and events, rules regarding the sharing of the spoils from such sources 
between leagues and between clubs and teams within leagues, exploitation of intellectual 
property ri_ghts (for example in respect of logos and trade marks associated with events), 
rules regarding the exploitation by players (and others, e.g. merchandisers) of 
574 See, generally, the discussion in Cloete et al Introduction to Sports Law in South Africa (2005) chapter 4. 
The first King Report on Corporate Governance was released by the Insitute of Directors in 1994, to set 
guidelines for good corporate governance to companies and directors. The 2nd King Report ('King II' was 
released in 2002, as a non-legislative code which is applicable to companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange (the JSE). The 3rd King Report ('King III') was released in early 2009. 
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commercial opportunities arising from participation in competitions (e.g. sponsorships), 
etc. 575 
190 Not only has the development of this sphere of economic activity prompted the 
need for special knowledge and skills on the part of those governing sport, it has also 
opened the door to new conflicts of interest between the interests of governing bodies 
and others (e.g. players, merchandisers, sponsors, broadcasters and the media, and 
supporters576). Accordingly, recent years have seen more and more international sports 
governing bodies implement a separation of sporting and commercial fundions, primarily 
by means of the establishment of separate entities (who often operate as businesses) to 
undertake the latter role. A prime example is that of the FIA, 577 the world governing body 
for motor sport: While the FIA continues to promulgate the rules of the sport and 
sanctions international competition, the entities of Formula One Administration Ltd and · 
Formula One Management Ltd (in the case of the FIA Formula One World Championship) 
stage the events and exploit the commercial rights, under sanction of the FIA. 578.This is 
also true in other sports such as football and rugby union. 579 
191 It seems that the increased commercial nature of the activities of sports leagues 
in the modern era has exposed the inherent contradictions in their governance. As we 
575 Rodney Hartman (Ali: The life of Ali Bacher Viking 2004, at 406) discusses the unique nature of the ICC 
Cricket World Cup 2003 in South Africa. This event was the first cricket World Cup, since the inception of the 
competition in 1975, which involved three major role-players in its organisation. These were the International 
Cricket Council (who owned the property rights in the event and its commercial rights), Rupert Murdoch's 
Global Cricket Corporation (who had bought the sponsorship and television rights as part of a 7-year package 
at a cost of $550 million), and the United Cricket Board of South Africa, through its Cricket World Cup 2003 
organising committee. 
576 As has been observed above,· a key element in the development of professional sport to the major 
international phenomenon it has become has been the fans' interest and support for representative teams 
and/or individual athletes on the domestic and international stages. It is interesting to note the substantial 
commercialisation of sport in recent times, which is illustrated by the extreme example from American 
professional sport where 'fans' interests are so subservient to the profit motive that teams can leave town and 
move hundreds of miles because the economic grass is greener' - see Ken Foster in Caiger, A & Gardiner, S 
(eds.) Professional Sport in the EU: Regulation and Re-regulation T.M.C. Asser Press (2000) at 60. 
577 Federation Internationale de !'Automobile 
578 The separation of the functions of the FIA resulted from the intervention of the European Commission 
following a complaint in 1999 that the FIA had abused its de facto regulatory monopoly by refusing to authorise 
a rival championship in order to ensure that FIA-organised events continued to be a commercial success. For 
discussion of this complaint, see Lewis & Taylor at 370-371; Gardiner et al Sport Law 2nd Edition 2001 at 410-
415. The authors remark that the FIA's response to the Commission's objections to the complaint, which 
involved the assignment of commercially valuable commercial rights to the FIA Formula One world 
championship for a 100-year period to a company controlled by a vice-president of the FIA, Mr. Bernie 
Ecclestone, would normally have been an issue that would 'arouse the suspicion of the competition authorities'; 
this assignment however appeared to be part of the solution suggested by the Commission. 
579 See the discussion in Lewis & Taylor at 87 (A3.3) note 1 
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have seen, the very core function of governing bodies has traditionally been viewed to be 
the trusteeship of a public interest in the sport. Ironically, the development of 
commercial exploitation of the substantial entertainment value of sports (an important 
element of the public interest in such activity) has served to spawn an ever-widening 
chasm between the teams as commercial enterprises and their multi-millionaire players, 
on the one hand, and their fans and supporters, on the other hand. 58° Commercialisation, 
which has largely been a product of the activities of these same governing bodies, 
appears to be making a mockery.of this 'sacred trust'. 581 
192 A prime reason for the emerging conflicts and the problems associated therewith 
is the monopolistic nature of sports governing bodies. As Gardiner et al observe: 
'In recent years sport governance has fallen into disrepute primarily because of the 
involvement of sports federations not only in the rules of the game but also in wide 
ranging commercial activities. Because of the monopolistic position of virtually all 
sports federations, this distinction which appeared so clear in the past when 
governing sport for the 'good of the game' has become blurred by commercial 
activities. '582 
580 See, in general, Tom Mortimer & Ian Pearl 'The Effectiveness of the Corporate Form as a Regulatory Tool in 
European Sport: Real or Illusory?' in Caiger & Gardiner Professional Sport in the EU at 217 et seq; Adrian Budd 
'Sport and Capitalism' in Levermore and Budd (eds.) Sport and International Relations: An Emerging 
Relationship Routledge, London and New York 2004 at 36. 
581 It is interesting to note what (it is submitted) amounts to a rather blatant recent example of the way in 
which the pursuit of profit has assumed a dominant role over the promotion of sport for the greater good: The 
South African organisers of the 2010 FIFA World Cup have apparently experienced difficulty in negotiations with 
FIFA regarding ticket prices for the event. While the organisers (and other forums across Africa) have insisted 
that tickets should be affordable to the masses, FIFA have apparently pegged the prices, insisting on the 
maximisation of profits in order to finance their own activities for the four years before the next World Cup. 
Apparently, FIFA have emphasised the fact that the event is a FIFA event and that South Africa has little 
bargaining power in this respect - even to the point of stating that the organisation could take away the World 
Cup if they chose (from a briefing to the parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Sport and Recreation, Cape 
Town, 14 June 2005). 
Another interesting development is that the interaction between commercialisation of sports and traditional 
notions of participation have also on occasion been utilised by those involved in the governance of sport in 
order to promote its global appeal. For example: FIBA, the world governing body for basketball that had made 
professional players eligible for the 1992 Barcelona Olympic Games, had voted against sending the world 
famous American professionals (players like Michael Jordan, Magic Johnson and Larry Bird - members of the 
'Dream Team'). However, the representatives of the sport from other countries 'wanted the basketball 
explosion on an international level to continue, and they were more than willing to sacrifice their own teams if 
the American superstars who appeared in [Nike] commercials would be willing to play' - Donald Katz Just Do It: 
The Nike Spirit in the Corporate World Adams Publishing, Massachusetts 1994 at 19. 
582 Gardiner et al. Sports Law 2"d edition, Cavendish Publishing Ltd 2001, at 168. 
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Developments in tile law relating to competition, coupled with developments in 
the actual nature and socio-economic characteristics of sport, have therefore also 
occasioned a shift in the balance between the traditional virtues of governing bodies (we 
have seen that the monopolistic nature of the 'FIFA model' of sports governance is one of 
its prim~ components) and their continued legitimacy in terms of regulatory functions 
and powers. Interestingly, the increased commercial role and activities of sports 
governing bodies have also exposed them to increased scrutiny from the law. In the 
European Union, for example, regulatory functions that were traditionally viewed as 
outside the scope of the lawmakers have now started to fall within the purview of legal 
regulation. As Boyes has observed: 
'[T]he economic activity prompted by the commodification of sport has provided EU 
law with an entree)nto sporting regulation in relation to the competency to ensure 
effectiv~ competition.'583 
And, as judgments such as .Bosman in the European Union have shown, such intervention 
may have quite far-reaching consequences. 5?4 This is indeed a major challenge for 
international as well as domestic sports governing bodies in the modern era of world 
sport. 
583 Simon Boyes 'Globalisation, Europe and the Re-regulation of Sport', in Caiger & Gardiner Professional Sport· 
in the EU at 73. In respect of EC competition law's stance towards 'sporting' vs. 'economic' competition, and the 
role for legal intervention in this regard, see Klaus Vieweg 'The Legal Autonomy of Sport Organisations and the 
Restrictions of European Law', in Caiger & Gardiner Professional Sport in the EU at 100 et seq. 
584 ASBL Union Roya le Beige· des Societes de Football Association & Others v Jean-Marc Bosman [ 1996] CMLR 
645 ECJ. See the discussion of the judgment in Le Roux 'Under Starter's Orders: Law, Labour Law and Sport' 
(2002) 23 ILJ 1195 at 1201 et seq. 
It is interesting to note the aftermath of the ECJ's finding in Bosman's case that Article 48 of the EC Treaty 
(now Article 39) precludes the application of rules laid down by sporting associations under which, in matches 
in competitions which they organise, football clubs may field only a limited number of professional players who 
are members of other Member States of the EU. In the wake of this judgment, on 19 January 1996, the 
European Commission officially informed FIFA and the UEFA that the so-called '3+2 rule' restricting the number 
of foreign players in national and international club competitions could not be exempted from the EC Treaty 
provisions. UEFA and FIFA were given six weeks to inform the Commission on what steps had been taken to 
comply with the court ruling, and this rule was subsequently abolished. [See paragraph 39-40 of the 5th Report 
of the European Committee of the Scottish Parliament ('Report on the Inquiry into Football Transfer Fees and 
the Position of the European Commission') 2000 - available on the Net at 
www.scottish.parliament.uk/official report/cttee/europe-00/eur00-05-02.htm. The '3+2 rule' does however still 
apply to non-EU nationals]. 
Continuing uncertainty surrounding the effects of the Bosman decision on FIFA's transfer rules resulted in a 
compromise, which was reached between FIFA, UEFA and the European Commission in March 2001. In July 
2001 FIFA adopted the Regulations for the Status and Transfer of Players, which came into effect on 1 
September 2001. 
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193 A significant number of sports associations, unions and federations in South Africa 
have in recent times followed this trend of splitting the commercial functions associated 
with professional sport from the traditional; rule-making and administrative functions of 
the amateur bodies; As mentioned earlier, there is no specific legislative or other 
prescription to sports. associations regarding the form.in which they must organise. The 
two mai.n reasons for the development described above, are the tax benefits involved and 
the benefits of limited liabil·ity for those administering the sporting activity that are found 
in incorporation into the corporate form. 
194 One major problem, however, in the splitting of functions and entities involved in 
the 'amateur'· and 'professional' aspects of sports such as rugby and cricket in South 
Africa, has beer:i. the trend for existing administrators and functionaries to 'wear two 
hats'. For example, until Januar::y 20.07 the vice-president of the SA Rugby Union was· also 
the CEO of SA Rugby (Pty) Ltd, the company responsible for administering the 
commercial arm of the game. This has·contributed to a limit on the de facto separation of 
powers and functions of such different bodies and organisations. Indications are that 
there is a growing realisation of the problems inherent in this, and that more and more 
specialist corporate functionaries are appainted who can bring a measure of business 
acumen to the commercial entities involved in the major professional sports. 
At the time of writing the commercial arms of the national governing bodies in two of the 
major professional sports (namely rugby union and cricket), have been reported to be 
considering conversion from private companies to section 21 companies (or non-profit 
organisations) in terms of the Companies Act. 
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§5 Dispute resolution in sport 
195 The section that follows will attempt to provide a brief overview of dispute 
resolution in sport in South Africa. The discussion should not be read in isolation, and will 
contain numerous cross-references to other sections that follow, as and where they are 
relevant in this regard. For example, the issue of disciplinary proceedings within sports 
associations will be discussed here, as an important manifestation or form of disputes 
that occur frequently in the sporting context. This section will focus on the disciplinary 
powers of sports associations vis a vis their members, the rules regarding such 
proceedings as well as the recourse of members to the courts. In respect of athletes, as 
members of such associations, the discussion will deal primarily with the position in· 
amateur sporting codes. In respect of professional athletes and players in professional 
team sports, the chapter below on employment in professional sport will specifically 
address the disciplinary powers of sports associations as employers, in terms of labour 
legislation and the common law or collective bargaining agreements, where applicable. 
I Introduction: Sports disputes and ADR 
196 The main avenues for dispute resolution in South African sport are litigation, 
arbitration and alternative dispute resolution (or ADR, including e.g. mediation, 
conciliation and 'med-arb' proceedings). Nothing will be said here regardi"ng litigation, 
and in the rest of this chapter numerous examples are provided of matters which 
resulted in judgments or awards by the various divisions of the High Court, the Supreme 
Court of Appeal and (in the context of employment disputes) the Commission for 
Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (or CCMA) and the Labour Court. 
Alternative dispute resolution methods, such as arbitration, of course hold various 
benefits over the more traditional route of litigation, not least being the potential for 
more speedy (and less costly) resolution of disputes. The choice of such dispute 
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resolution procedures in respect of certain types of matters has in certain instances led to 
_streamlined and generally welcomed commercial expediency (compare the internet 
domain dispute mechanism that is curre·ntly in place, and which uses adjudicators from 
the SA Institute for Intellectual Property Law to resolve disputes in a speedy fashion). 585 
Various sports-related contracts (includi~g players' contracts and sponsorship 
agreements) in professional sport frequently contain arbitration provisions, which provide 
for private arbitration of disputes that may arise in terms of such agreements as an 
alternative to the more time-consuming and e;xpensive avenue of litigation. 
197 Both the South African common law and the Constitution prohibit ouster clauses 
or similar provisions which have the effect of ousting the-jurisdiction of the civil courts. 
Sports governing bodies may not validly seek to oust the jurisdiction of courts (which 
would generally be held to be against the public interest and public policy, as contractual 
provisions which are injurious to the administration of justice586), except by means of a 
valid agreement to arbitrate a dispute. An arbitration clause, however, can also not oust 
the jurisdiction of a South African court, which retains discretion as to whether it should 
itself determine the dispute or whether to stay the proceedings. 587 Section 34 of the Bill 
of Rights provides for the fundamental right of access to courts, and reads as follows: 
'Everyone has the_ right to have any dispute that can be resolved by the application of law 
decided in a fair public hearing before a court or, where appropriate, another independent 
and impartial tribunal or forum.' 
585 See the discussion in par 599 et seq below 
586 See section 34 of the Bill of Rights, which guarantees the right of access to court; Zondi v MEC for 
Traditional and Local Government Affairs & Others 2005 (3) SA 589 (CC); Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 
(CC) (in respect of the application of sec. 24 in respect of a 'time-bar' or time limitation clause in a contract). In 
respect of the common law right of access to court, see Schierhout v Minister of Justice 1925 AD 417; Jones v 
Jones 1963 (2) SA 193 (SR); Astra Furnishers (Pty) Ltd v Arend 1973 (1) SA 446 (C); Standard Bank of SA 
(Ltd) v Essop 1997 (4) SA 569 (D) 
587 See Minister of Law and Order and Others v Hurley and Another 1986 (3) SA 568 (A). Arbitration clauses 
have long been held not to oust the jurisdiction of the courts, but to delay their interposition (see Davies v 
South British Insurance Co (1885) 3 SC 416). An arbitration clause may, however, not purport to deprive the 
court of its power to set aside or to enforce the arbitrator's award. 
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The rationale behind this provision was,.predominantly., in order to safeguard against the 
ousting of the jurisdiction of the co·urts by means of ouster clauses in legislation (a 
practice that was prevalent in the old apartheid legal order). 588 It does, however, provide 
a fundamental guarantee to have justiciable disputes resolved by means of recourse to 
alternative tribunals or fora (such as arbitration). Apart from the issue of ousting the 
jurisdiction of the courts, private arbitration may raise other, constitutional, issues (e.g. 
in respect of the privacy of an arbitration hearing). 589 
198 A league such as the Premier Soccer League (or PSL, which is the professional 
league of the National Soccer League, or NSL), for example, offers a Dispute Resolution 
Chamber in order to· resolve disputes arising from the league's activities. 590. The Chamber 
hears disputes on ·a variety·of matters, including player transfers; contractua1 issues and 
player signings591 (at the time of writing, a dispute is in progress between- PSL clubs 
Orlando Pirates and Supersport United over the signing of national team mid-fielder 
Lance Davids for Supersport United).592 The National Soccer League Rules593 contains the 
following in Rule 4,2 (regarding 'participation and entry') in respect of the application of 
disciplinary rules and .proceedings: 
'On entering the League's competitions, clubs undertake to observe these rules and those 
of particular competitions, and to accept that all administrative, disciplinary and refereeing 
588 For example, certain provisions in the much maligned Internal Security Act 74 of 1982 - see Currie & de 
Waal Bill of Rights Handbook (2006) at 708 note 20; Bernstein v Bester NO 1996 (2) SA 751 (CC) 
589 See Total Support Management (Pty) Ltd v Diversified Health Systems (SA) (Pty) Ltd 2002 4 SA 661 (SCA) 
at 674C-H, where the court left open the question whether the words 'another independent and impartial 
tribunal or forum' in the context of the section 34 right applied to arbitration proceedings pursuant to an 
agreement (as opposed to statutory arbitrations). It was remarked that in a private arbitration the parties may, 
by agreement, exclude any form of public hearing, as the need for secrecy may underlie the decision to resort 
to arbitration. See Butler, D W 'Development and Practice of Arbitration and ADR in South Africa' (Paper 
prepared for presentation at the 2nd International Workshop on Arbitration & ADR in Africa, Johannesburg, 14 
June 2006 - copy on file with the author) at 13 et seq. 
59° For discussion of a contractual clause pertaining to the Dispute Resolution Chamber of the National Soccer 
League, see Monei and Manning Rangers Football Club, National Soccer League Arbitration (DRC 075) (2006) 
27 Industrial Law Journal 242 (ARB). 
591 Rule 23.3 of the National Soccer League Rules (as amended 17 June 2008) provides as follows: 
'23.3.1 [T]he Dispute Resolution Chamber will, in cases of dispute, determine the status of any player 
registered with a club falling within its jurisdiction. 
23.3.2 Any dispute regarding the status of a player involved in aninternational transfer will be settled by the 
FIFA Player's Status Committee.' 
592 The matter was postponed to 19 February 2009, with the PSL's chief prosecutor, Zola Majavu, refusing to 
disclose any information regarding the dispute prior to its resolution 
593 As amended 17 June 2008 
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decisions connected with the competitions will be dealt with in terms of these rules, and 
where the rules are silent, by the decisions of the Executive Committee and the Board of 
Governors and thereafter the peremptory regulations of SAFA, CAF and FIFA will apply.' 
Rule 38 of the ~ational Soccer League Rules provides as follows regarding the powers of 
the Dispute Resolution Chamber: 
. .... ' 
.'38.1 The Dispute ~esolution Chamber may impose any sanctions in respect of a matter 
determined by it which may include but is not limited to an order for the payment 
of damages or compensation, payment of a transfer fee, specific performance, a 
declaratory order or a cost award. 
38.2 The Dispute Resolution Chamber may vary or rescind any award or ruling made by 
if provided this is done before the time allowed for an appeal to SAFA has expired.' 
199 The Standard Rugby Players' Contract 2008 (which is, at the time of writing, in 
place between the professional players' association, SARPA, and the organisation of 
provincial union employers, SAREO) provides for the referral of any disputes between the 
parties to final and binding arbitration. 594 
200 .Jn the context of labour law, the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and 
Arbitration (CCMA) has on more than one occasion bowed to the 'supremacy' of players' 
contracts in respect of dispute resolution provisions, usually on the basis of the 
specialised nature of sport as an activity and the need for specialised knowledge on the 
594 Clause 55 of the Standard Players' Contract (which is included as a schedule to the applicable collective 
bargaining agreement) provides as follows: 
'Any dispute between you and the Province involving the.interpretation, application or implementation of this 
Schedule, or any employment law, or any other dispute arising out of your employment by the Province 
including the termination of your employment shall, unless otherwise resolved between you and the Province, 
be referred to and determined by final and binding arbitration in terms of clauses 21 to 23 of the 2008 
Collective Agreement signed between SAREO and SARPA'. 
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part of arbitrators. 595· Arbitrators have also on occasion apparently applied 'sports-
specific' principles to such disputes. 596 
201 South Africa does not possess a specialist sports dispute resolution body such as 
the UK Sports Dispute Resolution Panel. 597 The former Sports Law Association of South 
Africa (or SLASA), which was disbanded at the beginning of 2008, had earlier 
championed a private initiative relating to sports dispute resolution. SLASA established a 
panel of sports law experts to serve as adjudicators of sports-related disputes, on an ad 
hoc basis, in order to bring impartiality as well 'as expertise and experience in relevant 
sports-related legal issues to such disputes. A number of governing bodies and 
federations in different sporting codes (including Cricket South Africa) elected to 
incorporate provisions relating to the referral of disputes to the SLASA ADR panel. At the 
time of writing it appears that this pan.el h<:!S disb9nded following the disbandment of 
SLASA. It is submitted that a similar _initiative sho~ld be considered, a_s the advisability of 
specific expertise in sports-related matters in ADR proceedings is generally 
acknowledged, also in other jurisdictions. 
202 Finally, it should be noted that the South African Sports Confederation and 
Olympic Committee (or SASCOC)598 and the Minister of Sport have certain very 
significant powers in terms of intervention in sports disputes, in terms of the provisions 
of the National Sport and Recreation Act, 1998 (as amended by means of the National 
Sport and Recreation Act, 18 of 2007). The amendments to Section 13 of the Act provide 
as follows: 
595 Compare Augustine and Ajax Football Club (2002) 23 JU 405 (CCMA); Treswill Overmeyer and Jono Cosmos 
Football Club WE 39134; Vaisili Sofiadellis & Others and Amazulu Football Club KN51728. 
596 Compare the reference to 'sporting justice' in the Monei and Manning Rangers matter supra, which concept 
was unfortunately not explained further (although it was probably derived from the concept of 'sporting just 
cause' as contained in article 21(1)(a) of FIFA'S Regulations for the Status and Transfer of Players - the concept 
of 'sporting just cause' is also included in the regulations of the South African National Soccer League; see 
McCarthy v Sundowns Football Club [2003] 2 BLLR 193 (LC) at 1950 of the judgment), 
597 For more on the UK Sports Dispute Resolution Panel, see Gardiner et al Sports Law 3rd ed Cavendish 
Publishing (2006) at 245 et seq. 
598 See the discussion on SASCOC in the section above on state regulation of South African sport 
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Every sport or recreation body must, in accordance with its internal 
procedures and remedies provided for in its constitution, resolve any dispute 
arising among it? members or with its governing body; 599 
Sport or recreation bodies are in terms of the amended s 13(1)(b) of the Act 
obliged to notify· the Minister in writing of any dispute arising between its 
members or with its governing body, as soon as it becomes aware of such 
dispute; 
SASCOC (or 'the Sports Confederation', in terms of the wording of the Act) 
must notify the "Minister in writing of any dispute referred to it by a sport or 
recreation body in terms of s 13(2)(a); 
The amended s 13(3) now provides that SASCOC ('the Sports Confederation') 
must in relation to any such dispute referred to it notify the relevant parties of 
the allegations, invite the parties to make representations to it, convene 
where necessary an inquiry into the dispute, and in accordance with the 
provisions of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act (No. 3 of 2000) 
'notify the parties of the decision'; 
In respect of the i.nsertion of ss (5) to (8) in s 13 of the Act, the Minister has 
now been clothed with quite far-reaching powers of intervention in disputes. 
These include the right to intervene 'in any dispute, alleged mismanagement, 
or any other related matter in sport or recreation that is likely to bring a sport 
or recreational activity into disrepute'; 
The Minister is furthermore empowered to intervene in 'any non compliance 
with guidelines or policies issued in terms of s 13A600 or any measures taken 
to protect or advance persons or categories of persons, disadvantaged by 
599 Section 13(1)(a) . 
600 S 13A as inserted in the Act provides that' [t]he Minister must issue guidelines or policies to promote equity, 
representivity and redress in sport or recreation'. 
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unfair discrimination as contemplated in section 9(2) of the Constitution', 601 by 
referring the matter for mediation or issuing a directive; 
·The amended s 13(5)(b) provides that the Minister may not 'interfere in 
matters relating to the selection of teams, administration of sport and 
appointment of, or termination of the service of, the executive members of the 
sport or recreation body'; 
If a national federation fails to adhere to the decision of a mediator or a 
· directive issued by the Minister in terms of s 13(5), the Minister may direct 
Sport and Recreation SA to refrain from funding such federation and notify the 
federation in writing that it will not be recognised by Sport and Recreation SA 
(amended s 13(5)(c)); and 
-... FinaMy, the amended s 13(8) provides that, subject to the Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act; 2000 and 'without derogating from the rights of the 
affected parties, a decision taken in terms of subsection (5) shall be binding 
' 
on the parties'. 
It is clear that the amended s 13 of the Act now clothes the Minister (and to a significant 
extent, SASCOC) with very far-reaching powers in respect of intervention in dispute 
resolution within a sport or within sporting federations. The terms 'any dispute' and 'any 
other related matter' in the news 13(5)(a) are of course very wide; on the wording the 
I 
only type of matter which would be expressly excluded is a dispute relating to team 
selection, 'administration of sport' and appointment or termination of executive members 
of sports federations (which is excluded in the news 13(5)(b)). The question of whether 
a dispute is likely to 'bring a sport ... into disrepute' could conceivably cover a very wide 
spectrum of matters, and is reminiscent of the use of this same concept in the 
disciplinary codes of many (international) sports governing bodies. The types of disputes 
601 The provisions in the fundamental right of equality (in section 9 of the Bill of Rights) which deal with positive 
measures to address past unfair discrimination (e.g. affirmative action measures) - see the discussion · 
elsewhere in this chapter 
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that coald fall under these wide provisions are legion - these could include employment 
disputes between federations or franchises and athletes and/or their trade unions and 
players' associations, disputes regarding commercial issues with sponsors or 
broadcasters, disciplinary conduct against athletes or officials, disputes between such 
sports federations and international governing bodies, etc. 
203 It is·interesting also to note SASCOC's proposed powers in terms of the amended 
s 13(3) and (7) of the Act, namely to convene an inquiry in respect of a dispute and to 
notify the parties of a decision (Note: according to the final form of the amended Act as 
passed into law this decision does no longer have to be one 'that best serves the 
interests of the sports or recreation body in question', as per the original wording of the 
Amendment Bill in its initial form - in fact, it appears that such decision may be one that 
best serves the'interests of SASCOC and/or the Minister, for that matter), and also the 
power to submit 'recommendations for the resolution of the problem' to the Minister. 
These powers, as also SASCOC's power in terms of the amended s 13( 4) to mero motu 
'cause an investigation', are not qualified in the Act, and one can only speculate as to 
what its ambit would be. For example, it is unclear on the wording whether SASCOC now 
has the powerto make such recommendations or decisions in respect of a dispute 
involving a sports federation that is not a member of the organization. Mention was made 
above of the provisions regarding membership of SASCOC as contained in the 
organisation's founding documents and the National Sport and Recreation Amendment 
Act. A sports federation which is not recognized by SASCOC or which does not apply for 
membership of the organisation would not qualify for membership (and would apparently 
occupy a no-man's land of non-recognition, also by Sport and Recreation SA). It appears 
that the amended s 13 now empowers SASCOC to make recommendations to the 
Minister for the resolution of disputes within or involving even such a non-member sports 
body. 
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204 It could be argued that these amendments, as far as they empower the Minister 
of Sport and SASCOC to intervene in nominally private disputes within a sport or its 
governing body, infringe on the constitutional guarantee of access to the courts. Section 
34 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 provides as follows: 
'Everyone has the right to have any dispute that can be resolved by the application of law 
decided in a' fair public hearing before a court or, where appropriate, another independent 
and impartial tribunal or forum.' 
It has been held that the forerunner to this right, as contained in section 22 of the 
interim Constitution,602 had the purpose to 
'emphasise and protect generally ... the separation of powers, .Particularly the separation of 
the judiciary frqm the other arms of the State ... It is a provision fundamental to the 
upholding of the ru!e of law, the constitutional state, the "regstaatidee", for it prevents 
legislatures, at whatever level, from turning themselves by acts of legerdemain, into 
'courts'.'603 
It is contended that the amendments to section 13 of the Act now empower the Minister 
and/or SASCOC to remove private disputes from the domestic courts, as well as from any 
other relevant dispute resolution forum as may.be prescribed by an International Sports 
Federation (e.g. the Court of Arbitration for Sport - compare, for example, Articles 60-61 
of the FIFA Statutes). It is contended that the purport of these provisions is that the 
parties to such a dispute could be denied their constitutional right to refer such a dispute 
to a court or independent and impartial forum. While the new s 13(8) provides that the 
binding nature of directives issued by the Minister will, subject to the Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act of 2000, not derogate from the parties' rights (e.g. the 
602 Act 200 of 1993. 
603 Bernstein and Others v Bester NO and Others 1996 4 BCLR 449 (CC) par 105 (per Ackermann J). 
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constitutional right of access to the courts), 604 it is submitted that the wording of the new 
s 13(5) might have precisely this effect. It is conceivable that any subsequent referral of 
a dispute to a court following a directive by the Minister could in the specific 
circumstances of a given case be viewed by the Minister as 'likely to bring the sport into 
disrepute'; in such a case the Minister would effectively be able to exclude such referral 
by means of a directive, .within his or her (apparently largely unfettered) discretion. 
These-provisions su·rely.raise the spectre of an over-stepping of the bounds of Ministerial 
power in respect of private disputes. 
205 It was argued· at the time of parliamentary debate on the then proposed 
amendments to s 13 that they 'intrude upon the ordinary private law functions of the 
national federations, which are private and not public law bodies, and the provisions will 
be ultra vires as a result'. 605 It was also argued that the amendments regarding 
SASCOC's power to make recommendations to the Minister do not provide for a 
procedure that is reasonable and procedurally fair, and are accordingly in contravention 
of the constitutional right to fair and administrative action as contained in section 33(1) 
of the Bill of Rights. 606 
II Disciplinary proceedings in sport 
206 Mention has been made above to the role of the law of contract in the 
organisation of sport (and, specifically, of the constitution, rules and regulations of a 
604 The SRSA's senior legal adviser was quoted as follows in the minutes of the portfolio committee deliberations 
of 7 October 2006 (available at http://www.pmg.org.za): 'The Minister would receive recommendations 
resulting from the dispute resolution process so that he or she could make a decision. This decision could either 
be the issue of a directive, or referring the matter to arbitration. SARU had said that there was no definition of 
a directive in the Bill. They had asked if such a directive would be binding. Once the Minister had made a 
decision it would become binding. However, parties could still appeal in court or approach the international 
sports mediation forum (CAS).' 
605 From the Memorandum to the SA Rugby Union's submission to the portfolio committee in the session on 13 
October 2006 (par. 2.8). 
606 The SARU Memorandum par. 2.9. 
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sports association as a contract between the members and the voluntary association and 
between members inter se). Accordingly, a sports body may not take steps to discipline a 
non-member of the association (e.g. by means of an enquiry before a disciplinary 
tribunal), as such conduct would not be in line with the doctrine of privity of contract. 607 
The association is, however, not without remedy in such cases. In terms of the common 
law principle of freedom of contract, which is one of the cornerstones of South African 
contract law, the association can freely resolve not to deal with the individual in future. 
Furthermore, it has been held that a sports association may exercise its right to freedom 
of association608 as provided for in section 18 of the Bill of Rights, to resolve not to 
associate with an individual. 609 
207 A sports association may only _discipline a member within the scope of its 
constitution, rules and regulations, and a-failure to comply with the constitution, .rules 
and regulations (or, more specifically, with any disciplinary code contained therein), is a 
fatal flaw in disciplinary proceedings and would invalidate any decision taken by a 
disciplinary tribunal. 610 
208 Disciplinary proceedings are subject to two principles of the rules of natural justice 
that are recognised by South African law, namely that the parties to proceedings be 
given adequate notice and the opportunity to be heard (audi alteram partem), and that 
the adjudicator must be disinterested and unbiased (nemo iudex in sua causa). 611 
Accordingly, it has been held that a disciplinary tribunal must observe certain standards 
in the.exercise of disciplinary powers: 
To act in accordance with its rules and constitution; 
To discharge its duties honestly and impartially; 
607 Jockey Club of South Africa v Symons 1956 (4) SA 496 (A) 
608 For more on this fundamental right, see the discussion in the section on Sport and Employment below 
609 Cronje v United Cricket Board of South Africa 2001 (4) SA 1361 (T) - discussed below 
610 Jockey Club of South Africa v Forbes 1993 (1) SA 649 (A); Constantinides v Jockey Club of South Africa 
1954 (3) SA 35 (C); Cloete et al Introduction to Sports Law in South Africa (2005) supra at 97 
611 See Cloete et al supra 98 
249 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
· T.o afford all· persons charged a proper hearing and the opportunity to 
adduce evidence and to contradict or correct adverse statements or 
allegations; 
To listen fairly to both sides and observe the principles of fair play and 
.natural justice; 
To make fair and honest findings based on the facts; and 
. To conduct an active investigation into the truth of any allegations made 
against the person charged. 612 
The rules of natural justice have been subsumed in section 33 of the Bill of Rights, which 
deals with the right to procedural fairness in the event of administrative action. Section 
33 provides as follows: ........ 
'S 33 (1) Everyone has the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and 
procedurally fair. 
(2) Everyone whose ri_ghts have been adversely affected by administrative action has the 
right to be given written reasons. 
(3) National legislation must be enacted to give effect to these rights, and must -
(a) provide for the review of administrative action by a court or, where appropriate, 
an independent and impartial tribunal; 
(b) .. . 
(c) ... ' 
The legislation which has been enacted in furtherance of the provisions of section 33 (3) 
(a) is the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act, 2000 (or 'PAJA'). 613 Detailed discussion 
of the complicated interaction between the application of PAJA and of the section 33-right 
612 Cloete et al supra 98; Turner v Jockey Club of South Africa 1974 (3) SA 633 (A); Jockey Club of SA v Forbes 
supra 
613 Act 3 of 2000 
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is beyond the scope of this chapter, and the reader is referred to more specialised texts 
in this regard. 614 Suffice it to say that, following the enactment of PAJA, there are now 
three 'regimes' in place in respect of the judicial review of administrative action. Common 
law review of administrative action is still applicable.to the conduct of private entities 
when not exercising statutory or public powers, in circumstances where such entities are 
required to observe principles of administrative law (e.g. where private associations such 
as sports bodies exercise disciplinary powers over their members). 615 Everything else is 
'administrative action', and subject (in most instances) to PAJA or, in certain limited 
instances, to section 33 of the Bill of Rights. 616 It is expected, however, that increasing 
congruence between these systems is to be expected in light of the provisions of section 
39(2) of the Bill of Rights. 617 
209 It has been observed that, while courts have held that the constitution or 
disciplinary code of a sports organisation may exempt a tribunal from the application of 
the principles of natural justice, 618 such a provision would now most likely fail to pass 
muster in terms of the constitutional entrenchment of the right to administrative justice 
in section 33. 619 It is also accepted that the fundamental right of access to the courts as 
contained in section 34 of the Bill of Rights620 contains a guarantee of impartiality and 
independence on the part of courts, tribunals and forums, as well as a 'due process' 
guarantee, requiring the legal disputes to which it applies. to be decided in a fair and 
public hearing. 621 
210 The denial of fair procedure through violation of the principles of natural justice 
constitutes a fatal irregularity, which will lead to a court on review overturning the 
614 E.g. Currie, I & de Waal, J The Bill of Rights Handbook 5th ed Juta & Co Ltd (2005) chapter 29 
615 See Ismail v New National Party in the Western Cape [2001] JOL 8206 (C) 
616 Currie & de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook (2005) supra at 645-6 
617 Which section requires the courts to develop the common law in light of constitutional values; see Currie & 
de Waal supra 
618 Jockey Club of South Africa v Transvaal Racing Club 1959 (1) SA 441 (A) 
619 Cloete et al supra at 99 
620 Section 34 provides as follows: 
'Everyone has the right to have any dispute that can be resolved by the application of law decided in a fair 
public hearing before a court or, where appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or forum.' 
621 See Currie & de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook (2005) supra at 704 
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decision (even if the same decision would have been arrived at if the tribunal had 
followed a fair procedure). 622 Application of the principles of natural justice demands that 
certain specific requirements in respect of the disciplinary process should be observed. 
These include that the party (e.g. member of a sports association) must be properly 
informed of the case against them, that the party must be provided an opportunity to be 
heard, that the party must be allowed representation of some sort,623 and that the 
hearing must be conducted impartially. 624 
211 The relevant provisions of the 2008 Standard Players' Contract currently in force 
in rugby union (in terms of the collective bargaining agreement between SARPA and 
SAREO in respect of provincial professional rugby players), which are contained in 
Schedule VI to the collective agreement, provides as follows in respect of disciplinary 
proceedings: 
'A disciplinary hearing should comply with the following principles -
i. The Chairperson of the hearing must be unbiased. If practicable, the Chairperson 
should be a person who was not directly involved in the incident. However, there is 
no duty upon the Province to use an outside Chairperson. 
ii. A Player must be notified in writing of the alleged offence, and the date, time and 
venue of the hearing. Written notification must be given to the Player at least three 
working days before the date of the hearing. Should the Player require additional 
time, he must request a postponement in good time, setting out why the time is 
insufficient and how much time he needs. The request must be directed to the CEO 
of the Province. 
iii. At the hearing a Player may be represented by an official of SARPA or a fellow 
Player, the Player's registered agent or manager, or a fellow player. For the 
purposes of this clasue, a fellow Player means a Player who is employed by the 
same Province. 
iv. Should the hearing be conducted in a language with which the Player is not fully 
conversant, the Player shall be entitled to an interpreter. 
v. The Player shall be entitled to call witnesses of his own, and will be given an 
opportunity to cross-examine any witnesses that the Province calls. 
622 Cloete et al supra at 99 
623 The question of whether a right to representation includes a right to legal representation depends on the 
facts of the case. Where the constitution or rules of an association make provision for such representation it can 
be claimed. Otherwise, tribunals have a discretion whether to allow the party legal representation, and the facts 
to be considered in exercising such discretion include the seriousness of the case or potential penalty, whether 
points of law are likely to arise, procedural difficulties and the need for fairness. While the rules of natural 
justice therefore do not require that a party should be allowed legal representation, the denial of legal . 
representation in especially complex cases may lead to the conclusion that a party has not been afforded an 
opportunity to be heard - see Cloete et al supra at 100-101 
624 See the discussion in Cloete et al supra at 99-102 
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After the hearing the Province must communicate the Chairperson's decision to the Player 
in writing.' 
· 212 It should also be noted, of course, that the rules of participation in specific 
tournaments may include specific rules regarding disciplinary proceedings, sanctions for 
disciplinary offences, appeals processes and the like. As an example (from rugby union), 
the disciplinary rules of the SANZAR organisation in respect of the South African, 
AL!tralian and New Zealand franchises and players participating in the Super 14 
tournament and the Tri-Nations tournament are based on (and incorporate the provisions 
of) the International Rugby Board's Regulation 17 (which was adopted by SANZAR). 
Each of the three SANZAR Unions is responsible for appointing a Disciplinary Committee 
for each Super 14 match played in their country. A Disciplinary Committee consists of 
three members and is chaired by a senior legal practitioner experienced in rugby 
disciplinary hearings. The make-up of the Disciplinary Committee is determined in 
advance of matches, and decisions of the Disciplinary Committee are made in private and 
based on simple majority (members cannot abstain). 
A hearing is to be convened before a Disciplinary Committee if a player is red-carded by 
the match referee, cited by the Citing Commissioner or receives three yellow cards in the 
Super 14 competition. Players are entitled to attend hearings (which are gene~ally held in 
the country where the match was played, although consideration may be given to have 
he hearing in another country taking into account e.g. procedural fairness, player travel 
schedules, etc). Players are entitled to legal representation and are provided with 
sufficient opportunity to consider the available evidence prior to the hearing. 
SANZAR is bound by IRB's Regulation 17 which sets out a schedule of penalties. Players 
have the right of appeal to an independent SANZAR Appeal Committee. The Appeal 
Committee for the Super 14 competition comprises orie appointee from each of Australia, 
New Zealand, and South Africa. Except in cases where the Appeal Committee decides 
exceptional circumstances exist to warrant conducting a fresh hearing, the player has the 
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burden of proving the decision being challenged should be overturned or varied. The 
Appeal Committee has the power to dismiss, quash, or vary the Disciplinary Committee's 
decision and/or penalty. It also has the power to take what steps it deems necessary to 
deal justly with the appeal. 625 
In other tournaments (and codes) special attention should be paid to any relevant and 
applicable disciplinary rules and procedures. For example, the National Soccer League's 
Rules626 contain specific provisions regarding protests627 and complaints628 and 
disciplinary proceedings. 629 
III The Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS): An eligibility dispute - Pistorius 
v IAAF (.the 'Blade-runner case') 
213 Sports disputes can.of course, where applicable, be referred to the international 
Court of Arbitration for Sport (or CAS) in Lausanne. This chapter will not include 
discussion of CAS as a dispute resolution body in world sport, and the reader is referred 
to more specialised texts on the subject. 630 The discussion that follows will focus on a 
recent high profile matter involving a South African professional athlete. 
South African disabled athlete Oscar Pistorius was recently involved in a dispute with the 
International Association of Athletics Federations (or 'IAAF)' which culminated in an 
arbitral award by a panel of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) 631 in which the 
President of the panel, Prof. Martin Hunter, described the history of the dispute as 
'remarkable' and 'possibly without precedent'. Elsewhere it has been observed that this 
dispute 'confronts the sports lawyer with issues of discrimination, equality of opportunity 
625 Based on information published by the South African Rugby Union in respect of the 2006 Super 14 
tournament. 
626 As amended 17 June 2008 
627 Rule 47 
628 Rule 48 
629 Chapter 5 of the NSL Rules (which deals with dismissals, cautions and misconduct on the field of play) 
630 See Blackshaw, I Mediating Sports Disputes: National and International Perspectives TMC Asser Press 2002; 
Blackshaw, I; Siekmann, RCR; Soek, J (eds.) The Court of Arbitration for Sport, 1984-2004 Asser International 
Sports Law Centre 2006; Gardiner et al Sports Law 3rd ed (2006) supra at 232 et seq; Cloete et al Introduction 
to Sports Law in South Africa (2005) chapter 12 
631 CAS 2008/A/1480 Pistorius v/IAAF (award delivered 16 May 2008) 
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ori the one hand, and competitive advantage as well as endangering the safety of other 
c~mpetitors on the other hand.'632 
A The facts 
214 The facts of the matter were as follows: 633 · 
Pistorius is a South African athlete who was born without fibula bones in his legs, and at 
the age of 11 months his legs had been amputated below the knees. While he had used 
prosthetic lower limbs all his life, Pistor:ius has led ·an .active sporting life. He started 
running competitively in January 2004 when, after seriously injuring his knee on the. 
rugby field, he took up sprinting as part of a rehabilitation programme. Pistorius uses a 
prosthesis known as the 'Cheetah Flex-Foot' for participation in sporting activities. This · 
device is designed for single and double transtibial (below-the-knee) and transfemoral 
(above-the-knee) amputees who intend to run at recreational and/or competitive levels. 
As a result of Pistorius's use of this device he has been dubbed the 'Bladerunner' by the 
media. 
In 2004, Pistorius competed in the Athens Paralympics, where he won the Gold Medal in 
the 200-metre event and the Bronze Medal in the 100-metre event. At the time of the 
arbitration proceedings before the CAS in May 2008 he was the paralympic world record-
holder in the 100, 200 and 400 metres disciplines. In 2004 Pistorius also started to 
compete in IAAF-sanctioned events in South Africa alongside able-bodied athletes, and 
he managed to win a 100-metre open competition and, in 2005, finished sixth in a 400-
metre event. In March 2007 he finished in 2nd place in the South African Championships 
400-metre event. 
On 26 March 2007 the IAAF Council met in Mombassa, Kenya and introduced an 
amendment to IAAF Rule 144.2 in order to regulate the use of technical devices in 
632 Sport and the Law Journal Issue 2 Vol. 16 (March 2009) 'Sports Law Foreign Update' at 28 
633 Taken from the report of the CAS arbitral award 
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sanctioned competitions. The new rule prohibits the use of any 'technical device that 
incorporates springs, wheels or any other element that provides the user with an 
advantage over another athlete not using such device'. 
Following the withdrawal of an invitation to Pistorius to run in the 2007 Norwich Union 
Glasgow Grand Prix as a result of IAAF intervention, the IAAF president declared that 
Pistorius was eligible to compete against other athletes but would be excluded if the IAAF 
received scientific evidence demonstrating that his prosthetic gave him an advantage .. 
Pistorius ran in a specially-staged 'B' race· in ·Rome on 13 July 2007. The IAAF had 
arranged for this race (in which Pistorius finished 2nd) to be video-taped by an Italian 
sports laboratory, and the initial scientific ·analysis of the videotapes indicated that 
neither Pistorius's stride-length n·or the length of time that his prosthesis was in contact 
with the ground was significantly different from those of the other runners. During 
November 2007, Prof. Peter Bruggemann of the Institute for Biomechanics and 
Orthopaedics at the German Sport University in Cologne conducted a biomechanical 
study of Pistorius at the request of the IAAF. The testing protocol used was designed to 
evaluate Pistorius's sprint movement using an inverse dynamic approach and to study 
the athlete's oxygen intake and blood lactate metabolism over a 400-metre race 
simulation. The report of these tests was issued on 15 December 2007 by Prof 
Bruggemann (along with colleagues Messrs Arampatzis and Emrich), and concluded as 
follows: 
'The joint kinetics of the ankle joints of the sound legs [of control athletes of similar 
sprinting ability to Pistorius who had participated with the athlete in a number of test 
sprints on an outdoor track and in the laboratory] and the "artificial ankle joint" of the 
prosthesis were found to be significantly different. Energy return was clearly higher in the 
prostheses than in the human ankle joints ... In total the double transtibial amputee 
received significant biomechanical advantages by the prosthesis in comparison to sprinting 
with natural human legs ... Finally it was shown that fast running with the dedicated 
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Cheetah prosthesis is a different kind of locomotion than sprinting with natural human legs. 
The "bouncing" locomotion is related to lower metabolic cost. '634 
215 Based on this report (the 'Cologne Report'), the IA~F issued a Decision (IAAF 
Council Decision 2008/01) on 14 January 2008, which included the following findings 
regarding use of the Cheetah Flex-Foot prosthetics: 
(a) That running with the device requires a less-important vertical 
movement associated with a lesser mechanical effort to raise the 
body, and 
(b) That the energy loss resulting from the. use of the device is 
significantly lower than that resulting from a human ankle joint at a 
maximal sprint speed. 
Accordingly, the IAAF ruled that the Cheetah prosthesis was a technical device within the 
meaning of amended IAAF Rule 144.2(e), and Pistorius was declared ineligible to 
compete in IAAF-sanctioned events with immediate effect. Pistorius appealed the IAAF 
ruling to the CAS, and requested that the IAAF Decision be vacated and that he be 
allowed to participate in competitions held under the IAAF Rules using the Cheetah 
prosthetic limbs. The issues in terms of the appeal were categorised by the President of 
the panel under four general headings: 635 
i) Did the IAAF Council exceed its jurisdiction in taking the IAAF Decision? 
ii) Was the process leading to the IAAF Decision procedurally unsound? 
iii) Was the IAAF Decision unlawfully discriminatory? 
634 From the findings of the 'Cologne Report' as summarised in par. 50 of the CAS award 
635 From par. 53 of the CAS report of the arbitral award 
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iv) Was the IAAF Decision wrong in determining that Pistorius's use of the 
Cheetah Flex-Foot device contravenes Rule 144.2(e)? 
The jurisdictional objection (issue (i)) was subsequently abandoned by Pistorius's counsel 
during the hearing of the matter, which took place during April 2008. 
B The CAS Arbitration Panel's analysis of.the issues 
1 Was the process leading to the IAAF Council Decision 2008/01 procedurally 
unsound? 
216 The Panel held that it was likely that the IAAF Council's adoption of the new Rule 
144.2(e) in March 2007 was introduced specifically with PistoriusJn mind, and found 
evidence led on behalf of the IAAF, to the effect that the Rule had been introduced in 
order to counter the use of spring technology in running shoes, to be unconvincing. The 
Panel found further that the process of scientific testing began to 'go off the rails' in 
respect of the biomechanical and metabolic tests carried out at the Cologne Institute. 636 
The Panel held that the IAAF's instructions to Prof. Bruggemann (in effect to only test the 
phase when Pistorius was running in a straight line after the acceleration phase, which 
was shown to be the part of the race in which the athlete usually ran at his fastest) 
created a. distorted view of Pistorius's advantages and/or.disadvantages by not 
considering the effect of the device on the athlete's performance during the entire race. 
This factor (along with Prof. Bruggemann's testimony at the hearing that he did not 
believe his mandate for the Cologne tests was to determine all of the advantages or 
disadvantages of the Cheetah prosthesis) was held to call into question the validity and 
relevance of the test results upon which the Cologne Report was based. The Panel held 
that other elements of the process which had been followed by the IAAF also gave rise to 
636 In par. 60 of the report of the arbitral award 
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concern (e.g. the fact that Pistorius had been given less than a month to respond to the 
findings of the Cologne Report following his receipt of same, as well as the voting 
procedure and method of the subsequent announcement of the IAAF Council's decision to 
ban Pistorius from competition). 637 The Panel held that the process created an impression 
of prejudgment of the issue of Pistorius's eligibility, and held that, all in all, the manner in 
which the IAAF handled the situation 'fell short of the high standards that the 
international sporting community is entitled to expect from a federation such as the 
IAAF'. 638 However, the Panel conceded that these findings made no difference to the 
outcome of the appeal, which was a de nova process. 
2 Was the IAAF Council's Decision unlawfully discriminatory? 
217 Pistorius claimed that the IAAF Decision was in breach of the federation's 
obligation of non-discrimination; because it did not search for an appropriate _ 
accommodation as required by law. It was argued on behalf of the appellant that, ir:i 
finding Pistorius ineligible in all IAAF-sanctioned events without attempting to seek an 
alternative solution, modification or adjustment that might permit him to participate in 
such events on an equal basis with able-bodied athletes, the IAAF had denied Pistorius 
his fundamental rights, including equal access to Olympic principles and values. 639 This 
argument was based on the parties' agreement that the law applicable to substantive 
issues was the law of Monaco (as the law governing the IAAF Constitution pursuant to its 
Article 16), and a further argument that the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities640 applied. The Panel rejected this argument, finding that the principality of 
Monaco had not ratified the Convention and it had not been enacted in its law. The.Panel 
held further that the Convention could not apply to the dispute, as its objective was (in 
the sporting context, and with reference to Article 30.5 of the Convention) to promote 
637 Para 64-69 of the report of the arbitral award 
638 Par 70 of the arbitral award 
639 Par 72 of the report of the arbitral award 
640 Adopted on 13 December 2006; in force from 3 May 2008 
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equal·participation between disabled and able-bodied persons in mainstream sporting 
activities. The issue to be decided by the panel was whether Pistorius is competing on an 
equal basis with other athletes not using the Cheetah prosthetic device; if it were to be 
held that the athlete gained an advantage through the use of the device, the Convention 
could not assist his case. 641 The submission based on unlawful discrimination was 
accordingly rejected. 
3 Was the IAAP-Coancil's Decision wrong in determining that Pistorius's use of the 
Cheetah Flex-Foot device contravenes IAAF Rule 144.2(e)(as amended)? 
218. The Panel considered the wording of the ·amended IAAF Rule 144.2( e) and 
observed that the provision is a 'masterpiece of ambiguity'. The critical question, which 
the Panel identified,_related to the ·meaning of the words 'an advantage ... over another 
athlete'. ~The IAAF's counsel argued that the ordinary and natural meaning of these words 
must oe followed, and that the prohibition must be read to include any device which 
provides an athlete with any advantage,. however small, in any part of a competition. The 
Panel rejected this interpretation and held that there should be convincing scientific proof 
that a device such as the Cheetah prosthesis provides an athlete with an overall net 
advantage over other athletes; anything less 'would fly in the face of both legal principle 
and common sense'. If the use of such a device provides more disadvantages than 
advantages, then it cannot reasonably be said to provide an advantage over other 
athletes~ because the athlete is actually at a disadvantage. 642 On the basis of this finding 
regarding the interpretation of the IAAF Rule, and the Panel's earlier finding regarding 
the limited nature of the testing undertaken at the Cologne Institute (as referred to 
above), the Panel held that the Cologne Report did not address the central question in 
the appeal. 
641 Ibid. par 77 
642 Ibid. par 83 
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219 After briefly.examining the issue of proof and finding that the IAAF had the burden 
of proving on a balance of probability that the Cheetah device contravened Rule 
144.2(e), the Panel proceeded to assess the evidence. Such evidence will not be 
canvassed here; suffice it to say that the· Panel found that the IAAF had failed to meet.its 
burden of proof, based on the following reasons: 
i) As the Panel had found, the testing protocol for the Cologne tests 
was not designed to provide a scientific opinion as to whether the 
Cheetah device provided Pistorius with an overall net advantage 
over other athletes not using such a device; 
ii) The Panel was not persuaded that there was sufficient evidence to 
find any metabolic advantage in favour ·of a double amputee using 
the Cheetah device; 
iii) The Panel held that the IAAF had not proven that the biomechanical 
effects of using the Cheetah device gave Pistorius an advantage 
over other athletes not using that device. In light of the available 
scientific evidence and the curren_t state of scientific knowledge. The 
Panel observed that the fin9ing that Pistorius uses less vertical force 
and runs in a flatter manner than able-bodied athletes may be a 
disadvantage rather than an advantage. Accordingly, and based on 
current scientific knowledge, the Panel held that it apP.eared to be 
'impracticable to assess definitively whether the Cheetah Flex-Foot 
prosthesis acts as more than, or less than, the human ankle and 
lower leg, in terms of "spring-like" quality'. 643 
The Panel observed that it was re-enforced in its conclusion by the fact that the Cheetah 
device had been in use for a decade, and that no other runner using them had run times 
fast enough to compete effectively against able-bodied runners until Pistorius had done 
643 Par 96 of the report of the arbitral award 
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so; accordingly, even if the device provided an advantage, such advantage may be quite 
limited. 
220 Accordingly, the Panel upheld the appeal and ruled that the IAAF Council's 
Decision of 14 January 2008 be revoked .with immediate effect and that Pistorius be 
eligible for participation in IAAF-:sanctioned events by using the Cheetah device. The 
Panel did stress, however, that the scope of the application of its ruling was limited to the 
eligibility of Pistorius only, and only to his use of he specific prosthesis in issue in the 
appeal. Furthermore, it also held that the ruling has not application to the eligibility of 
any other amputee athletes or to any other model of prosthetic limb, and that it is the 
IAAF's responsibility to review the circumstances in any similar case on a case-by-case 
basis, impartially, in the context of up-to-date scientific knowledge at the time of such 
review. 
221 While the ruling in Pistorius's appeal to the CAS is thus of limited relevance in 
respect of the use of prosthetic devices by amputee athletes in IAAF-sanctioned events, 
it is submitted that this appeal has.at least been an historic one in respect of its 
importance for the rights of Pistorius as an individual disabled athlete as well as in terms 
of its implications regarding the nature of the required scientific evidence to establish 
whether the use of a device such as the Cheetah Flex-Foot is consonant with the rules of 
the IAAF and with the principle of fair competition. 
Pistorius was unsuccessful in late round qualifying for the 2008 Beijing Olympics, but the 
athlete has been reported as expressing confidence that the CAS ruling has opened the 
way for him to participate in the 2012 London Olympics. It remains to be seen whether 
Pistorius will remain eligible for participation in IAAF-sanctioned events in future, in light 
of both the limited scope of application of the CAS ruling in this matter (as referred to) as 
well as possible future developments in respect of scientific knowledge regarding the 
issues which confronted the Panel in the appeal. 
262 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
IV Judicial review of the decisions of sports bodies in terms of South African 
law 
222 Once a domestic tribunal has rendered its decision it is functus officio; and it 
would thus be irregular for such tribunal to·revisit the matter (even if the parties agree to 
resubmit the matter to the same tribunal). 644 If the constitution, rules or regulations of 
the association allow for avenues of appeal against the decision of the tribunal, the 
::~:e:;;:~::::ir:i:::::: ~:d:~:~e:f t::c:,;:~::l~se:~:~:: b:n:: l:;~n:e::~ :;:e:~ mar 
proceedings have been exhau·sted (unless it i.s clear that it would-be futile to pursue the:· 
interna·1 proceedings). 6~5 
223 The High Court, in terms of the common law as well as section 173 of the 
Constitution, has an inherent power of review of the decisions of domestic tribunals. 
Administrative action can thus be challenged on the basis of the common law grounds 
(e.g. failure to observe the principles of natural justice). A court can reviewthe decision 
of a tribunal on two grounds, namely -
where there has been a failure to comply with the association's rules or the 
rules applicable to the disciplinary tribunal; and 
where there has been a violation of the principles of natural justice. 646 
Review by the court is limited to a determination of whether a proper procedure has been 
followed and will not include consideration of the merits of the matter, unless there is a 
clear disparity between the tribunal's finding and the evidence that was before it (which 
644 Middelburg Rugbyklub v Suid-Oos Transvaalse Rugby-Unie 1978 (1) SA 484 (T); Cloete et al 102-3 
645 Ibid. 
646 Cloete et al at 103; Constantinides v Jockey Club of South Africa 1954 (3) SA 35 (C) 
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may, in itself, poiot towards a gross proce·dural irregularity). 647 A court will only in 
extraordinary circumstances substitute its·decision for that of the tribunal (e.g. where it 
would be a waste of time to order the.tribunal to reconsider the matter648 , where further 
delay·would cause unjustifiable prejudice649 , where the court is in as good a position to 
make the decision itself650 , and where the original tribunal (or decision-maker or 
functionary) has exhibited bias or incompetence to such a degree that it would be unfair 
to re'ltert· th·e matter to the tribunal651 ). 652 
224 In the case of Cronje v United Cricket Board of South Africa, 653 the High Court 
affirmed the supremacy of the constitution of a voluntary association on the basis of the 
private,- contractual, basis and nature of this type of entity. This case is important in 
respect.of·the very nature of sports governing bodies in the evaluation of the traditional 
notion of a 'voluntary association', which. notion has played a· key role in determining the 
extent to which the conduct of such bodies is open to review by courts of law. 
The Cronje case involved an application by the late Hansie Cronje, former national cricket 
captain, for an order reviewing and setting aside a resolution by the United Cricket Board 
of South Af.rica (the 'UCB', the national governing body for the game of cricket in South 
Africa~) 6~4 • The resolution by the UCB was issued following the international scandal that 
arose from Cronje's proven involvement in large-scale and repeated offences involving 
corruption and 'match fixing', which conduct was held (by the International Cricket 
Council and the UCB) to constitute conduct 'wholly inimical with the whole ethos of 
cricket'. 655 Following the public scandal, Cronje was replaced as captain of the national 
647 Ibid. 
648 Hartman v Chairman, Board of Religious Objection 1987 (1) SA 992 (0) 
649 SA Freight Consolidators v National Transport Commission 1988 (3) SA 485 (W) 
650 Theron v Ring van Wellington van die NG Sendingkerk van Suid-Afrika 1976 (2) SA 1 (A) 
651 Oskil Properties v Chairman of the Rent Control Board 1985 (2) SA 234 (SE) 
652 Cloete et al at 103 
653 2001 (4) SA 1361 (TPD) 
654 The UCBSA is the national governing body for cricket in South Africa 
655 Then President of the UCB, the late Mr. Percy Sonn, as quoted at 1368J of the judgment. 
For further reading on the 2000 match fixing scandal in cricket, see Deon Gouws '-and nothing but the truth?' 
Zebra Press, Cape Town 2000; Andre Oosthuizen & Gavin Tinkler The Banjo Players: Cricket's Match Fixing 
Scandal Riverside Publications, Hout Bay 2001; Gardiner et al Sports Law 2nd Edition 2001 at 365 et seq; Sir 
Paul Condon Report on Corruption in International Cricket (Report of the ICC's Anti Corruption Unit, April 2001), 
available online as http://www.icc-cricket.com/corruption/condon report.html; Judge Edwin L King Final 
Report: Commission of Inquiry into Cricket Match Fixing and Related Matters 2001, available online at 
http://www.info.qov.za/otherdocs/2001/kingfinal.pdf; Qayyum, Justice M.M. Report of Judicial Commission, 
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team and he subsequently withdrew from the team; when his contract with the UCB 
expired shortly thereafter,' the UCB did not renew it. After Cronje decided to quit 
representative cricket and his association with the UCB, the Board passed a resolution 
banning him for life from all its activities and those of its affiliates. 656 Cronje challenged 
this resolution, inter alia on the grounds that it constituted an infringement of his right to 
fair administrative action as contained in section 33 of the Constitution, 657 and that he 
had been denied the right to a fair hearing as guaranteed in terms of the rules of natural 
justice. 
225 The court, by way of Kirk-Cohen J, dismissed Cronje's application and held that 
the UCB's resolution had not amounted to disciplinary action. Also, the court emphasised 
the fact that the only powers the UCB had were those derived from its constitution, which 
was a contract between the Board and its members. At the time of issuing of the 
resolution, Cronje was not a member of the UCB, as there was no contract of 
membership or employment in place between the applicant and respondent. The court 
accordingly found that the UCB had been entitled to pass the resolution as a means of 
exercising its right of non-association against Cronje, as guaranteed in section 18 of the 
Constitution - in fact, the court held that the organisation had not only been entitled but 
. . 
also 'correct' in doing so. 
On the issue of whether the rules of natural justice applied to this resolution, the Judge 
held that these rules come into play 'whenever a statute empowers a public official or 
body to do an act or give a decision prejudicially affecting an individual in his liberty or . 
property or existing rights'. 658 Kirk-Cohen J continued to state that this did not apply to 
the UCB, by remarking as follows: 
Pakistan Cricket Board, Lahore 1998; Central Bureau of Investigation Report on Cricket Match Fixing and 
Related Ma/practices, New Delhi 2000; Simon Rae It's Not Cricket Faber & Faber 2001 at 254 et seq. 
656 The facts appear from the judgment (at 1365-1370). For a brief summary of the case, see Basson in Basson 
& Loubser Sport and the Law in South Africa Butterworths (Looseleaf - service issue 3) at Ch 4-12 to Ch 4-
12(2); Ch 6-4 et seq. 
657 Act 108 of 1996 
658 With reference to the Appellate Division judgment in South African Roads Board v Johannesburg City Council 
1991 (4) SA 1 (A), as quoted at 1375 C-D of the Cronje case. 
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'The [UCB] is not a public body. It is a voluntary association wholly unconnected to the 
State. It has its origin in contract and not in statute. Its powers are contractual and not 
statutory. Its functions are private and not public. It is privately and not publicly funded ... 
The conduct of private bodies ... is ordinarily governed by private law and not public law. It 
. does not exercise public power and its conduct is accordingly not subject to the public law 
rules of natural justice ... The respondent is not vested with any statutory powers, nor is it 
subject to any statutory duties ... '659 
The court in Cronje held that the United Cricket Board had recourse to the same right as 
guaranteed to natural persons in terms of section 18 of the Constitution, namely the 
right to associate and the· right not to associate. 660 
226 The Cronje judgment has been the subject of criticism, especially as it relates to 
an association that is squarely involved in the commercial exploitation of aspects of the 
game of cricket. 661 It is undear whether the courts will in future follow its apparently 
supreme devotion to the essentially private nature of sports associations, especially as it 
appears that the judgment ignores developments elsewhere in recognition of the 
changing face of sports governance; specifically the challenges posed by the continued 
commercialisation of sport and its governance,662 as well as case law in respect of other 
sports governing bodies. 663 
659 At 13750 - 1376C of the judgment 
660 See also Woolman, S ('Association'), in Currie, I & de Waal, J The Bill of Rights Handbook 5th ed. Juta & Co. 
Ltd, Cape Town (2005) (and at 442-3 specifically) 
661 Andrew Caiger 'Sports Contracts, Governance and the Image as Asset' Unpublished paper delivered at the 
Sports Law Conference held at the University of Cape Town, 6-7 February 2003 (copy on file with the author), 
at 10-11, in characterising the judgment as 'a case that causes or should cause concern', has expressed his 
reservations about the correctness of Kirk-Cohen J's reasoning in rather strongly worded terms: 
'[T]he court insisted on maintaining the public/private dichotomy which severely militates against a realistic 
approach in sports law and is tinged with a sense of unreality ... It is this type of thinking which will do nothing 
for the development of sports law. It is this attitude which is almost anti-diluvian, which refuses to acknowledge 
the public dimension of private acts.' 
662 See discussion of the trend 'towards a conflation of public and private law in respect of disciplinary 
proceedings as a form of administrative action affecting individuals' - Basson 'Disciplinary Proceedings in 
Sport', in Basson & Loubser Sport and the Law in South Africa Butterworths (looseleaf) at Ch 6-37 to Ch-45. 
663 Compare the judgment of the Constitutional Court in President of the Republic of South Africa and Others v 
South African Rugby Football Union and Others (which involved the national governing body for rugby union, 
and where the court referred to the New Zealand case of Finnegan v New Zealand Rugby Football Union Inc 
[1985] 2 NZLR 175 (CA)) 2001 (1) SA 1 (CC); Coetzee v Comitis and Others 2001 (1) SA 1254 (compare the 
court's remarks at 1264 of the judgment on the nature of the National Soccer League, in determining the 
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227 It should be noted that in the subsequent decision of the Cape High Court in the 
Tirfu Raiders case664 the court (in the course of reviewing the powers of the South African 
Rugby Union, the national governing body for rugby) chose to follow a different route 
from the reasoning in Cronje, which held that the UCBSA's actions did not constitute the 
exercise of public power in the meaning of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act. 
Cronje had relied on the provisions of this Act665 to aver that the UCB's actions did not 
constitute just administrative action, and that he was ~ntitled to relief on that basis. Kirk-
Cohen J held that, on the basis of his finding that the United Cricket Board constituted a 
private body, its conduct did not involve the exercise of public power and thus did not 
qualify as 'administrative action' in terms of the Act. 666 In Tirfu, the court (by way of 
Yekiso J) examined the nature of the powers exercised by the SA Rugby Union, the fact 
that it had jurisdiction over the game of rugby throughout the ~epublic, the. hierarchical 
authority exercised over provincial rugby unions in terms of its constitution,_ as well as 
the public interest in the game and its administration, which 'cannot be 
overemphasised'. 667 The court held that SARU's cqnduct was sufficiently public in nature 
to warrant application of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act. 668 
228 It is submitted that this approach is more in line with recent developments in 
Europe and elsewhere, regarding the justiciability of the conduct and decisions of sports 
question of the applicant player's standing) and Tirfu Raiders Rugby Club v SA Rugby Union & Others 
(Unreported, Case No. 8363/2005). 
664 Ibid. The Tirfu case involved an application by a rugby club to review a resolution by the President's Council 
of the SA Rugby Union (SARU) to change rules of fixtures of club championship games, instituting play-off 
games for clubs to qualify for promotion to the Supersport Club Championship tournament instead of the 
existing system of automatic progression for certain clubs based on log standings. 
665 Act 3 of 2000 
666 Cronje at 1382G and 1383A-B of the judgment. 'Administrative action' is defined in section 1 of the Act as 
follows: 
'[A]ny decision taken, or any failure to take a decision, by-
(a) an organ of state, when-
(i) exercising a power in terms of the Constitution or a provincial constitution; or 
(ii) exercising a public power or performing a public function in terms of any legislation; or 
(b) a natural or juristic person, other than an organ of state, when exercising a public power or performing a 
public function in terms of an empowering provision, 
which adversely affects the rights of any person and which has a direct, external legal effect ... ' 
667 At paragraphs 27-30 of the judgment 
668 Or 'PAJA' - see discussion above 
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governing bodies.669 At least, it is suggested that courts should examine the nature of 
such bodies and of the powers exercised on the facts and circumstances of each case, 
and not with blind adherence to the traditional notions670 of the private nature of 
voluntary associations engaged in the governance of sport. The view expounded in 
Cronje's case is not in line with earlier case law in South Africa regarding the 
public/private divide of the courts' powers of review, specifically the earlier judgment of 
the Appellate Division in Jockey Club of South Africa v Forbes. 671 
229 The Promotion of Administrative· Justice 'Act (or 'PAJA') 672 does not confine the 
definition of ad~inistrative action to decisions by organs of state or public bodies. Section 
l(b) of the Act defines 'administrative action' as including 'any decision taken, or any 
failure to take a decision, by .... a natural or juristic person, other than an organ of state, 
when exercising a public power or performing a public function in terms of an · 
empowering provision, which adversely affects the rights of any person and which has a 
direct, external legal effect ... ' An 'empowering provision' is defined in the Act as including 
'a law, a rule of common law, customary law, or an agreement, instrument or other 
document in terms of which an administrative action was purportedly taken'. This would 
clearly include the constitution, rules or regulations of a sports association. 
Currie & de Waal 673 observe that PAJA clearly envisages the public nature of the power 
exercised rather than the person or entity exercising it to be the determining factor 
regarding the applicability of the Act. The authors state that, in determining whether the 
669 See the New Zealand and Australian cases referred to in Beloff et al at 228-230 
670 What Beloff et al describe (as to the position in English law) as 'the tail of procedure wagging the dog of 
substance' (at 230). 
671 1993 (1) SA 649 (A). The Forbes case involved a trainer who had been found guilty of contravening the 
Jockey Club's rules regarding the doping of horses, and had been fined. The trainer brought an application 
challenging the disciplinary decision under Rule 6 of the Uniform Rules of Court, requesting that the imposition 
of the fine be voided and that an order for repayment be made. The Jockey Club argued that such application 
had taken the wrong form, and that the application should have been made under Rule 53 for a review of the 
disciplinary proceedings. The Court (by way of Kriegler AJA), while acknowledging that the Jockey Club was a 
voluntary association and that the relationship between the parties was contractual, proceeded to accept 
('albeit with some reservations') that the relief requested constituted relief 'tantamount to that afforded by a 
superior Court in the exercise of its so-called review jurisdiction'. The Judge continued: 
'It can further be assumed, once again with reservations ... that Rule 53 extends to decisions of domestic 
tribunals and does not apply only to breaches by officials of duties imposed on them by public law.' [At 659 of 
the judgment]. While these remarks do not display unqualified support for the view that a body such as the 
Jockey Club exercises public functions, the judgment does display a willingness to accept that the (disciplinary) 
decisions of such a body are not purely private and relating only to contract, and may have consequences that 
are more akin to those of public bodies. See also Beloff et al 229-230 
672 Act 3 of 2000 - see the discussion above 
673 Currie, I & de Waal, J The Bill of Rights Handbook 5th ed Juta & Co (2005) at 658 
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exercise of a particular power constitutes public power, the overriding consideration is 
that 'the power, whether exercised by a public or private body, must have "regulatory" or 
"compulsory" characteristics corresponding to the traditional relationship between the · 
state and its subjects, between the government and the governed.'674 
230 Other aspects related to acceptance of the traditional notion of the supremacy of 
contract in respect of voluntary associations, e.g. the freedom to determine or refuse 
membership,675 may need to be reviewed in light of such developments regarding the 
justiciability of the conduct of sports associations. 676 Even though the trend is for sports 
governing bodies (e.g. national or provincial unions and federations) to establish a 
separate commercial arm, usually in the form of a commercial company, to deal with 
aspects of the governance and commercial exploitation of professional sport, 677 it is trite 
that the regulatory conduct of the existing, 'amateur' governing bodies often have 
substantial impact on commercial aspects and the rights and interests of a variety of 
persons and stakeholders in sport. Judicial evaluation of the nature of the powers 
exercised by such latter bodies should duly acknowledge these grey areas. 678 
674 Ibid. 659 
675 See the discussion above 
676 For example, it could be argued that the traditional adherence to the absolute freedom of voluntary 
associations to refuse membership may need to be reviewed in light of the nature of organisation of the 
governance of modern sport. Where such governance is based on a monopoly of control (e.g. one supreme 
national governing body for the sport, exercising control over provincial or regional unions and clubs) it might 
be argued that the freedom of associations to limit access to membership should be curtailed, and at least be 
based on reviewable and just administrative action. This is especially relevant in the context of professional 
sport, where potential participants' rights of access relate also to constitutional guarantees regarding the 
freedom to pursue an occupation or engage in economic activity. Similar considerations apply in respect of 
disciplinary action by such associations and the imposition of sanctions on members. The potential role of the 
restraint of tr.ade doctrine (and, especially, in its extended form - i.e. its application where there is no contract 
in force between the parties) is discussed in more detail elsewhere in this chapter. 
677 See the discussion above 
678 One of the significant elements that is part of this grey area is that of the technical 'rules of .the game' and 
rules relating to the ethical principles of a sport. In this regard, see the discussion by Ken Foster 'Is There a 
Global Sports Law?' Entertainment Law Vol. 2 No. 1, Spring 2003, pp. 1-18. An example can be found in the 
CAS arbitral award in the matter of Yang Tae Young and the FIG (CAS 2004/A/704), where the arbitration panel 
examined the extent to which a court can intervene in respect of the decision of an official in sporting 
competition. The panel remarked that an absolute refusal to recognise such a decision as justiciable and to 
designate the field of play as 'a domain into which the King's writ does not seek to run' (in the words of Lord 
Atkin in the case of Balfour v Balfour 1919 2KB at 919) would have a defensible purpose and philosophy. 
However, the panel continued to state that sports law does 'not have a policy of complete abstention. It referred 
to the award in Mendy and the AIBA (CAS OG 96/06), where it was remarked as follows regarding the 
jurisdiction of a CAS ad hoc panel over a game rule: 
'The Panel is competent. However, exercising this competence must, in our view, be tempered by the respect 
due to the particularities of each sport as defined by the rules established by the sports federations ... The 
above-mentioned restraint must be limited to purely technical decisions or standards; it does not apply when 
such decisions are taken in violation of the law, social rules or general principles of law .. .' (Mendy at par. 12-13, 
as quoted in Yang Tae Young at par. 3.14). 
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Another example of 'rules of the game' issues, or issues which are generally considered to be 'sporting interest 
only' is that of athlete eligibility rules - in this regard, see developments in case law in the European Union in 
recent times. 
These and other issues are often encountered in the decisions, rules and regulatory conduct of amateur 
voluntary associations in sport, and it is submitted that the law needs to sufficiently acknowledge the potential 
problems and the ways in which they are being addressed in other jurisdictions. 
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PART II SPORT AND EMPLOYMENT . 
' ' 
(Andre Louw with Benita Witcher) 
§1 Introduction . 
231 South African.~mployment law finds its main sources, and the substance of its 
regulation of the rights and obligations of the different parties to the employment 
relationship, in the common law of contract, labour legislation and, more generally, the 
overarching guarantees contained in the Constitution679 and its Bill of Rights. 680 The past 
. .. · ... 
apprm~imately fourty. years have seen a major shift in the regulation of employment in 
South Africa in respect of the legislative and judicial processes of giving substance to the 
rights and duties of the parties and the demarcation of the employment relationship 
between them. Most.central to such developments has been the shift from the primacy of 
the employment con~ract under the common lai,y to that of equity or fairness under the 
applicable legislation and in terms of constitutional guarantees. 
232 In line with developments elsewhere, and in parallel with more general 
developments in South African society and its new constitutional order in the movement 
towards democracy, freedom and respect for human rights, South African employment 
law saw the development of a more rights-based approach to the employment 
relationship in a bid to counter the traditionally strong employer-biased relationship 
occasioned by the nature of the common law contract of employment. While the common 
law contract often left employers largely to their own devices in denying employees the 
right to challenge unfair conduct in terms of the contract, the 'unfair labour practice' 
doctrine was introduced into labour legislation in 1979 and led to the development of 
679 Act 108 of 1996 
68° Contained in Chapter 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
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equity jurispruclence by the erstwhile industrial court: 681 Such developments were in line 
with wider societal developments in the negotiation and formulation of a democratic 
constitutional order, and today equity and respect for fundamental human rights infuse 
South African labour legislation as well as the jurisprudence of the Labour Court. Central 
to these developments also has been the recognition of the modern role and importance 
of collective bargaining to the employment relationship. Accordingly, today the main 
sources for the content of the employment relationship are the common law contract of 
employment, labour legislation, collective bargaining agreements and ministerial sectoral 
determinations, and the Constitution. 
233 The most important statutes that deal specifically with and impact most directly 
on the employment relationship are the Labour Relations Act, 682 the Basic Conditions of 
Employment Act, 683 .the Employment Equity Act, 684 the Unemployment Insurance Act, 685 
the Occupational Health and Safety Act, 686 the Compensation for Occupational Injuries 
and Diseases Act687 and the Skills Develop.ment Act. 68? The Bill of Rights in the South 
African Constitution contains a ·right to fair labour practices in section 23, 689 which forms 
the foundational standard for the employment legislation and also infuses the · 
jurisprudence of the dispute resolution forums established under the Labour Relations Act 
6
.
81 See Cloete (ed.) Introduction to Sports Law in South Africa LexisNexis Butterworths 2005 at 69; Du Toit, D; 
Bosch, D; Woolfrey, D et al Labour Relations Law 4th Ed. LexisNexis Butterworths 2003 at 459. As to 
shortcomings of the common law contract of employment, see John Grogan Workplace Law 8th edition Juta Law 
2005 at 4-5. 
682 Act 66 of 1995 
683 Act 75 of 1997 
684 Act 55 of 1998 (see also the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000, 
which sometimes applies to certain employment relationships such as the contracts of independent contractors, 
who are not covered under the EEA). 
685 Act 63 of 2001 
686 Act 85 of 1993 
687 Act 130 of 1993 
688 Act 97 of 1998 
· 
689 Sections 23 (1) - (3) provide as follows: 
'(I) Everyone has the right to fair labour practices. 
(2) Every worker has the right-
(a) to form and join a trade union; 
(b) to participate in the activities and programmes of·a trade union; and 
(c) to strike. 
(3) Every employer has the right-
(a) to form and join an employers' organisation; and 
(b) to participate in the activities and programmes of an employers' organisation. 
(4) Every trade union and every employers' organisation has the right-
(a) to determine its own administration, programmes and activities; 
(b) to organise; and 
(c) to form and join a federation.' 
273 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
(or 'LRA'), namely the labour courts and the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and 
Arbitration (or CCMA). 690 The Labour Relations Act also contains a statutory definition of 
an 'unfair labour practice', which is wide and may constitute a very important source for 
relief against employers (also in the professional sports context). 691 
The common law encompasses all non-statutory legal rules, including general principles 
of law deriving from Roman-Dutch and English law as well as new principles developed 
by the superior courts. 692 
234 In matters concerning employment disputes in sport (e.g. professional sports, 
athlete-management disputes), the options for dispute resolution are one or more of the 
followirig: c. 
The use of private dispute resolution methods (e.g. private arbitration); 
Application for conciliation (and/or arbitration) of the dispute through the 
CCMA; 
Application for adjudication of the dispute by the Labour Court; or 
690 South. African labour legislation and the Constitution encourage the promotion of voluntary and orderly 
collective bargaining between labour and management in the interests of reaching collective agreements, as 
well as democratisation of the workplace. However, the regulatory system acknowledges the inevitability of 
disputes between these parties, and the jurisdictional framework for such disputes as contained in the 
legislation generally distinguishes between 'disputes of right' and 'disputes of interest' between the parties to 
the employment relationship in determining which forum should be used for the purposes of dispute resolution. 
The Labour Relations Act generally requires that industrial action (e.g. strikes and lockouts) should only be 
taken in respect of disputes of interest (i.e. disputes that involve frustrated wants or perceived needs to which 
the grievants are not legally entitled - e.g. disputes as to pay increases). Where a legal right or entitlement 
forms the basis for a dispute (a dispute of right), the preferred avenue is arbitration or adjudication. See 
Grogan Workplace Law op cit. chapter 21; Du Toit et al 11-12. 
The Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) is an independent, state-funded body with 
jurisdiction throughout the Republic, with its main function being to resolve disputes that are not handled by 
private procedures or by bargaining councils by means of conciliation and arbitration - see, generally, Grogan 
op cit. 382 et seq. Generally, most disputes are referred to the CCMA for conciliation; if conciliation fails, the 
dispute is than referred for arbitration by the CCMA or adjudication by the Labour Court. Labour Court 
judgments can be taken on appeal to the Labour Appeal Court (or LAC). LAC judgments may be taken further 
on appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal (the appellate division of the High Court), while the Constitutional 
Court may also hear appeals from the LAC on constitutional matters (if certain requirements are met). 
691 Section 186(2) of the LRA provides that an 'unfair labour practice' means (inter alia) any unfair act or 
omission that arises between an employer and employee involving unfair conduct by the employer relating to 
the promotion, demotion, probation (excluding disputes about dismissals for reasons relating to probation) or 
training of an employee or relating to the provision of benefits to an employee, or the unfair suspension of an 
employee or any other unfair disciplinary action short of dismissal in respect of an employee. 
This section is relevant to professional athletes (especially players in the professional team sports) who are not 
given sufficient match time on the field of play or are not chosen to play in certain matches etc, thus affecting 
their promotion prospects and the provision of benefits. The section is also relevant to players who may be able 
to challenge (through the CCMA) disciplinary sanctions short of dismissal, such as suspensions and warnings. 
692 See Jordaan 'Sport and the Law of Employment' in Basson & Loubser Sport and the Law in South Africa 
Butterworths 2000 (loose-leaf) at Ch 8-10 
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Application for adjudication of the dispute by the High Court (the civil 
-courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the Labour Court in respect of any 
matter concerning a contract of employment693 - although it should be 
noted that the extent of such concurrent jurisdiction has in recent years 
been a matter of contention694). 
The Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration is·a statutory body 
established by the Labour Relations Act, with the primary function of resolving disputes 
arising within the context of the Act by means of conciliation and arbitration. Conciliation 
refers to any process (including mediation) which is aimed at achieving agreement 
between the disputing parties. The commissioner (who is appointed by the CCMA from a 
panel of full-time or part-time commissioners) has no power to impose a settlement on 
the parties or to make a binding award; his or her role is purely to ·lead the parties to an 
agreed settlement of the dispute, if possible. The commissioner may provide a non-
binding 'advisory' award, which the parties may or may not accept: If the parties reach 
agreement during conciliation the dispute is at an end. Unresolved disputes may be 
693 See the cases quoted for authority of this proposition by Le Roux in Cloete et al Introduction to Sports Law 
in SA at 70 
694 In Fedlife Assurance Ltd v Wolfaardt (2001) 12 BLLR 1301 (SCA) the court held that an employee may sue 
for damages in the High Court provided the challenge is based on unlawfulness rather than the fairness of the 
termination (see also Dene/ (Pty) Ltd v Vorster (2005) 4 BLLR 313 (SCA); Old Mutual Life Assurance Co SA Ltd 
v Gumbi (2007) 8 BLLR 699 (SCA) and Boxer Superstores Mthathwa & Another v Mbenya (2007) 8 BLLR 693 
(SCA); In Buthelezi v Municipal Demarcation Board (2004) 25 IU 2317 (LAC) it was suggested that if the relief 
sought by the claimant is not provided for by the LRA or other labour legislation (e.g. damages for the 
premature cancellation of a fixed term contract), then the claimant may approach the High Court and proceed 
in terms of the common law contract remedies (e.g. a claim for damages). In Media 24 Ltd & Another v Grob/er 
(2005) 26 IU 1007 (SCA) the court (relying on Fedlife) found that the High Court retained its jurisdiction to 
consider delictual claims (claims in tort; in that case relating to sexual harassment) that arise in an 
employment context. 
However, a number of recent Constitutional Court decisions may change this aspect regarding the jurisdiction of 
the High Court and the concurrency of the common law and the LRA in respect of disputes which are essentially 
employment disputes. SANDU v Minister or Defence & Others (2007) 9 BLLR 785 (CC) held that in instances 
where parliament has enacted legislation regulating a particular aspect, it is not appropriate to bypass that 
legislation. In Sidumo and another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd and Others (2007) 12 BLLR 1097 (CC) the 
court held that the LRA regulates a specific relationship, namely the employer-employee relationship, and that 
the LRA supersedes any other law that may be in conflict with its provisions. In the United Kingdom, the House 
of Lords has refrained form extending common law remedies in instances where labour legislation established 
remedies for a relevant labour dispute. In Chirwa v Transnet Ltd and Others (2008) 2 BLLR 97 (CC) the court 
held that if a dispute is an employment dispute contemplated by the LRA/labour legislation and/or initiated 
under the LRA, then the Labour Court and other relevant labour dispute resolution forums (e.g. the CCMA & 
bargaining councils) have exclusive jurisdiction, not the High Court (accordingly, the parties cannot 'forum 
shop'); the dispute may only be referred to the High Court if the party relied directly on the Bill of Rights - the 
High Court should not usurp the remedial functions of the institutions established under the LRA. But in terms 
of earlier case law (which Chirwa did not seem to overrule), if the CCMA has jurisdiction over the dispute the 
party may refer the matter to the High Court because the CCMA/a bargaining council is not a High Court and 
thus one cannot oust the jurisdiction of a High Court. 
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referred either to arbitration or to the Labour Court (if such disputes are 'rights disputes') 
or may be the subject of industrial action such as a strike or lock-out695 (if such dispute is 
an 'interest dispute'). 696 
It should be noted that (in respect of unfair dismissal disputes) in terms of section 
191(4) of the Labour· Relations Act, an unfair dismissal dispute which is referred to the 
CCMA 'or' a bargaining council for conciliation must be referred within 30 days of the date 
of dismissal. In a CCMA arbitration a commissioner resolves a dispute by making a final 
and binding award, which is not open to appeal but may be subject to a limited right of 
review. 697 
235 1-The: .Labour Relations Ac~ also encourages. parties to resolve disputes, by 
agreement, through private dispute resolution structures. In the event of a matter 
referred to the CCMA where a private dispute resolution forum has been agreed to, 
section 147(6) of the Act confers a discretion on a CCMA commissioner to proceed with 
the matter or to refer it for resolution through the private structure. On this basis, the 
CCMA preferred the private dispute resolution route in the matter of Augustine and Ajax 
Football C/ub 698 (a dispute between a professional footballer and his club based on unfair 
dismissal), where it was held that one of the reasons for preferring this method of 
resolution was the possibility of utilizing the services of an arbitrator with specialist skills 
and knowledge in the field. 699 
236 In light of the array of sources of rights and obligations in the employment 
context, the hierarchy in respect of determining what law applies in employment-related 
di.splltes has been explained as follows: 
695 See the discussion regarding collective bargaining in sport in par 374 et seq below 
696 A rights dispute is any dispute which the Labour Relations Act requires to be referred for resolution to 
arbitration or the Labour Court (e.g. a dispute regarding interpretation of the Act, a dispute regarding an 
alleged unfair dismissal, and a dispute regarding an unfair labour practice). All other disputes are deemed to be 
interest disputes, which are, typically, economic disputes (e.g. on an increase in wages or a demand for 
changes to existing terms and conditions of employment) - see Jordaan in Basson & Loubser Sport and the Law 
in South Africa supra at Ch 8-12 n2, and the section on collective bargaining in the text below 
697 Section 145 of the Labour Relations Act; Jordaan in Basson & Loubser Sport and the Law in South Africa 
supra at Ch 8-11 to Ch 8-12 
698 (2002) 23 Industrial Law Journal 405 (CCMA) 
699 See Le Roux, L 'Labour law in South African sport: A season of expectations?' in 2006/1-2 International 
Sports Law Journal 56 at 57 
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'The starting point is the individual contract of service. If the contract contains terms or 
conditions that are more favourable to the employee than a sectoral determination under 
the Basic Conditions of Employment Act, if any, or the provisions of the Act itself, they 
must be applied. If, however, the employee is a member of a union that is party to a 
binding collective agreement, that agreement takes precedence over the individual contract 
as far as it regulates any term or condition not dealt with in the contract. Where th~re is no 
col.lective agreement, a sectoral determination promulgated by the Minister [of Labour] 
under the Basic Conditions of Employment Act takes precedence over individual 
agreements, to the extent that they contain provisions less favourable to the employee. 
Beyond that, the rights conferred by the Basic Conditions of Employment Act and the 
Labour Relations Ac::t come into play. One must note that certain rights conferred by these 
Acts cannot be waived by individual or collective a-greement. If neither the individual 
contract, collective ag~eement, a sectoral determination, nor the stat_ute regulates the 
issue, one turns to custom and practice in the industry or trade concerned and the common. 
. . 
law, interpreted ... in the light of the Constitution, to the extent that it permits Of!e to read 
implied terms and conditions into the contract.'700 
§2 The common law contract of employment 
237 The rules of the common law employment contract are especially important in 
respect of the employment of players in professional team sports, specifically as a result 
of the prevalence of fixed-term (standard form) players' contracts. The discussion in the 
rest of this section will (in parts) focus specifically on the labour law provisions regarding 
the termination of fixed-term contracts (and unfair dismissal of the employee in this 
context), as well as the common law remedies for breach of the employment contract. 
700 Grogan, J (Workplace Law 4th Ed. Juta & Co. 1999) as quoted by Jordaan in Basson & Loubser Sport and the 
Law in South Africa supra at Ch 8-11 
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238 · The South African law of contract encompasses both the Roman-Dutch and 
English law concepts of the requirements for and consequences of a legally enforceable 
contract. For example, while it is generally accepted that the enforceability of a contract 
is based on the subjective consensual theory (which requires a meeting of the minds of 
the parties, or consensus ad idem on the material terms of such contract, the parties 
thereto and the intention to create legally enforceable obligations, or animus 
contrahendi), this premise is tempered by application of the reliance theory (or doctrine 
of quasi-mutual assent) which had its roots iri English law and was so famously explained 
by Blackburn J iri the English judgment of Smith v Hughes. 701 702 Similarly, a number of 
principles of the English law of contract find application also in South Africa (for example 
the doctrine of privity ·of contract, application of the parol evidence rule Ln the 
interpretation of written contracts, and use of the test of the 'officious bystander' in 
reading a tacit term into a contract7°3), .while others have been expressly denounced by 
South African courts as notin line with Roman-Dutch law (e.g. the doctrine of valuable 
consideration as requirement for a valid and .enforceable contract7°4 ). 
239 In recent years, the South African common law of contract (along with other 
branches of the common law) has been increasingly exposed to a 'constitutional 
colonization'705 in-light of the influence of the Constitution and, specifically, its Bill of 
Rights. 706 Probably-the single most important issue currently facing the courts is the role 
-of the specific fundamental rights as well as the foundational values which underpin the 
Constitution (most notably freedom, equality, dignity, non-racialism and non-sexism) on 
701 (1871) LR 6 QB 597, where Blackburn J stated the following: 
'If, whatever a man's real intention may be, he so conducts himself that a reasonable man would believe that 
he was assenting to the terms proposed by the other party, and that other party upon that belief enters into 
the contract with him, the man thus conducting himself would be equally bound as if he had intended to agree 
to the other party's terms.' 
The reliance theory is accepted in South African law as a basis for the validity of a contract in circumstances 
where there may be no real consensus between the parties to a contract as a result of a mistake by one of the 
parties - see National and Overseas Distributors v Potato Board 1958 (2) SA 473 (A); George v Fairmead 1958 
(2) SA 465 (A); Du Tait v Atkinson's Motors 1985 (2) SA 893 (A); Steyn v LSA Motors Ltd 1994 (1) SA 49 (A); 
Fourie NO v Hanson and Another 2001 (2) SA 823 (W). 
702 See, generally, the discussion in Christie, R H The Law of Contract in South Africa 5th Ed. LexisNexis 
Butterworths, Durban 2006 22 et seq. 
703 Reigate v Union Manufacturing Co (1918) 1 KB 592 (CA) 
704 See the judgment of the then Appellate Division in Conradie v Rossouw 1919 AD 279 
705 Bhana, D & Pieterse, M 'Towards a reconciliation of contract law and constitutional values: Brisley and Afrox 
revisited' (2005) 122 South African Law Journal 865 at 893 
706 Contained in Chapter 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
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the development of the common law of contract. More specifically, the courts have in 
recent years been required on a number of occasions to interrogate the bases for 
challenging the validity and/or unenforceability of contracts or contractual terms in this 
regard. 
240 . Recent judgments by the Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitutional Court . 
have been criticized for their unwillingness to directly apply the Bill of Rights as contained 
in the Constitution to contractual disputes and/or the common law of contract. 707 What 
has emerged in terms of the case law is that the courts appear to have preferred the 
more open-ended mechanism of the grounds for common law illegality of contracts which 
are deemed to be against public policy (as well as the role of the principle of bona tides 
or good faith in contracting708 ) for challenging contracts or contract terms that are 
tainted by issues such as inequality of bargaining power or the pernicious effects of the 
wide-spread use of standard-form contracts and imposed contractual terms. 709 
In Brisley v Drotsky710 the Supreme Court of Appeal (by way of Cameron AJ) observed · 
the following in respect of the proper content of public policy in this regard: 
'Public policy ... nullifies agreements offensive in themselves - a doctrine of considerable 
antiquity. In its modern guise, 'public policy' is now rooted in our Constitution and the 
fun~amental values it enshrines. These include human dignity, the achievement of equality 
and the advancement of human rights and freedoms, non-racialism and non-sexism. It is 
not difficult to envisage situations in which contracts that offend these fundamentals of our 
new social compact will be struck down as offensive to public policy. They will be struck 
down because the Constitution requires it, and the values it enshrines will guide the courts 
707 See Bhana, D & Pieterse, M 'Towards a reconciliation of contract law and constitutional values: Brisley and 
Afrox revisited' (2005) 122 South African Law Journal 865; Bhana, D 'The law of contract and the Constitution: 
Napier v Barkhuizen (SCA)' (2007) 124 South African Law Journal 269; Woolman, S 'Category mistakes and the 
waiver of constitutional rights: A response to Deeksha Bhana on Barkhuizen' (2008) 125 South African Law 
Journal 10; Lubbe, G 'Taking fundamental rights seriously: The Bill of Rights and its implications for the 
development of contract law' (2004) 121 South African Law Journal 395; Woolman, S 'The amazing, vanishing 
Bill of Rights' (2007) 124 South African Law Journal 762 
708 See First National Bank of South Africa v Saayman 1997 4 SA 302 (A); compare, however, Brisley v Drotsky 
2002 4 SA 1 (Supreme Court of Appeal) and South African Forestry Co Ltd v York Timbers Ltd 2005 3 SA 323 
(SCA) 
709 For development of the doctrine regarding contracts against public policy, see Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 
1989 (1) SA 1 (A); Botha (now Griessel) v Finanscredit (Pty) Ltd 1989 (3) SA 773 (A) 
710 2002 ( 4) SA 1 (Supreme Court of Appeal) 
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in doing so ... What is evident is that neither the Constitution nor the value system it 
embodies give the courts a general jurisdiction to invalidate contracts on the basis of 
judicially perceived notions of unjustness or to determine their enforceability on the basis 
of imprecise notions of good faith ... On the contrary, the Constitution's values of dignity 
and equality and freedom require that the courts approach their task of striking down 
contracts or declining to enforce them with perceptive restraint. One of the reasons ... is 
that contractual autonomy is part of freedom. Shorn of its obscene excesses, contractual 
autonomy informs also the constitutional value of dignity.' 711 
Such application of the testing of contracts against public policy, as informed by the 
foundational values underlying the Bill of Rights and its more specific substantive rights, 
appears to reflect a leaning by the courts towards indirect application of the Bill of Rights 
as opposed to its direct application. While the Bill of Rights makes provision for the direct 
(or horizontal) application of rights to private individuals, specifically in terms of section 
8(2), 712 and the Constitutional Court appears to have sanctioned such direct application 
to rules of the common law,713 recent judgments714 appear to have shied away from such 
direct application in favour of indirect application of the values underlying the Bill of 
Rights (through the means of the common law doctrine of testing the validity of contracts 
against public policy) in terms of section 39(2) of the Constitution. 715 
711 At par 91-94 of the judgment. See also Afrox Healthcare Ltd v Strydom 2002 6 SA 21 (SCA); Napier v 
Barkhuizen 2006 (4) SA 1 (SCA) and Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) 
712 Section 8 of the Bill of Rights provides as follows: 
'8(1) The Bill of Rights applies to all law, and binds the legislature, the executive, thejudiciary and all organs of 
state. 
8(2) A provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or a juristic person if, and to the extent that, it is 
applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and the nature of any duty imposed by the right. 
8(3) When applying a provision of the Bill of Rights to a natural or juristic person in terms of subsection (2), a 
court -
(c) in order to give effect to a right in the Bill, must apply, or if necessary develop, the common law 
to the extent that legislation does not give effect to that right; and 
(d) may develop rules of the common law to limit the right, provided that the limitation is in 
accordance with section 36(1) [the limitation clause contained in the Bill of Rights] ... ' 
713 As to direct application of the Bill of Rights to the common law of delict (or 'tort'), see the judgment of the 
Constitutional Court in Khumalo v Holomisa 2002 (5) SA 401 (CC) 
714 See the judgment of the majority of the Constitutional Court (by way of Ngcobo J) in Barkhuizen v Napier 
2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) 
715 Section 39(2) of the Bill of Rights provides a vehicle for the 'indirect' application of the Bill of Rights to 
disputes between private individuals or natural and juristic persons (e.g. contractual disputes), and states as 
follows: 
'When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or customary law, every court, 
tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights .. .' [Emphasis provided] 
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241· In light of these judgments and academic commentary (which has criticized this 
apparent reluctance to directly apply the fundamental rights to contractual disputes, 
which judicial conservatism has been attributed to an unjustifiable adherence to the 
traditional principles of freedom of contract and sanctity of contract in the interests of 
promoting certainty in the law of contracting 716 ), it appears that there is currently a 
measure of uncertainty in South African contract law regarding, specifically, the 
following: 
The extent to which the Bill of Rights (and the fundamental rights which it 
guarantees) are directly applicable to contractual disputes and/or the 
development of the common law of contract; 
The extent to which the common law of contract will deal with the 
.; 
commonly perceived problems of wide-spread inequality of bargaining 
power and of the use of standard-form contracts as 'contracts of adhesion'; 
, . 
and 
The future role of the principle of 'good faith' in contracti~g as a 
touchstone for determination of the validity of contracts or contractual 
terms or to_ challenge manifestly unfair, unreasonable or oppressive 
contracts. 717 
It remains to be seen to what extent, if any, the courts will opt in future for more direct 
application of the fundamental rights in the context of contractual disputes between 
private actors. Although these issues may all be relevant in a contractual (employment or 
otherwise) dispute involving athletes and sports governing bodies, clubs, sponsors, etc, 
716 See Bhana & Pieterse supra; Bhana supra.and Woolman supra 
717 The South African Law Commission, in its Report on Unreasonable Stipulations in Contracts and the 
Rectification of Contracts (Project 47, April 1998) made certain recommendations regarding the passing of 
specific legislation to deal with unfair contract terms and related matters (in line with legislative regulation of 
such matters in other jurisdictions). To date these recommendations have not been specifically implemented, 
although certain recent legislation or proposed legislation incorporate provisions relating to unfair contract 
terms (compare the Consumer Protection Act, 68 of 2008, which is not at the time of writing in force but is 
expected to come into force during the course of 2009/10, and the provisions of certain sector-specific 
legislation such as the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 and the Rental Housing Act 50 of 1999). See also Naude, 
T 'Unfair contract terms legislation: The implications of why we need it for its formulation and application' 
(2006) Vol. 3 Stellenbosch Law Review 361 
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no more will be said about the matter here. For more detailed discussion of these issues 
in South African contract law, the reader is referred to expert works on the subject. 718 
242 The employment contract in South African law has been defined as 'a contract 
whereby one party (the employee), in return for payment of remuneration by the other 
(the employer), puts his personal services at the disposal of the employer in such a way 
that the employer is entitled to define his duties, and, at least to some extent, to control 
the manner .in which he discharges them'. 719 Distinguishing features of the contract are 
the render:ing of personal services, remuneration and ·a measure of subordination. 
The legislative definition of an 'employee' as contained in the Basic Conditions of 
Employment Act 197 (the 'BCEA') and the Labour Relations Act 1995 (the 'LRA') 720 
contains an extended definition, and accordingly a person may qualify as an employee in 
circumstances where no legally enforceable contract of employment may exist in terms of 
the above definition. 721 
243 The employment of players and athletes in professional team sports in South 
Africa is not regulated by specific sports employment legislation, as is the case in other 
countries (such·as Italy, with its Law 91of1981). 722 Accordingly, the employment 
relationship of such persons is to be evaluated in terms of the more generally applicable 
labour legislation referred to. Professional sportsmen and -women in team sports are 
nowhere excluded from the relevant statutory definitions and are thus generally deemed 
718 Se e.g. Christie, R H The Law of Contract in South Africa 5th ed LexisNexis Butterworths 2006; Kerr, A J The 
Principles of the Law of Contract 5th ed LexisNexis 2002; and the articles referred to in the footnotes to paras 
239-241 above 
719 Sharrock, R Business Transactions Law 7th Ed. Juta & Co. Ltd, Cape Town 2007 at 387. See also Thompson & 
Benjamin South African Labour Law Vol 2 Juta Law (Looseleaf), at El-1, who define the employment contract 
as follows: 
'A contract of employment is established where two persons agree that one, the employee, will make his or her 
personal services available and be subordinate to the other, the employer, for a fixed and indefinite period in 
return for remuneration. The distinguishing features of the contract, therefore, are the rendering of personal 
services, remuneration and subordination.' 
720 Which definition is similarly applicable to the application of other employment legislation, such as the 
Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 
721 Ibid. 389. The legislative definition of an 'employee' as contained in these statutes defines an employee as 
(a) any person, excluding an independent contractor, who works for another person or for the state and who 
receives, or is entitled to receive, remuneration; and (b) any other person who in any manner assists in 
carrying on or conducting the business of an employer.' Certain persons (apart from independent contractors) 
are excluded from such definition by other provisions of the applicable legislation, notably members of the 
South African National Intelligence Agency, the SA Secret Service and the SA National Defence Force. 
722 See discussion of this statute in Colluci, M 'Italy', in International Encyclopaedia of Sports Law Kluwer Law 
International (Supplement 1, August 2004) 61 et seq. 
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to be employees whose relationship with their employing clubs, franchises or unions are 
subject to the labour legislation. The courts and the Commission for.conciliation, 
Mediation and Arbitration (established under the LRA to determine certain classes of 
employment disputes) have confirmed this on a number of occasions. 723 It should also be 
noted that the courts have held that the right to fair labour practices contained in section 
23(1) of the Constitution applies to all employees, also those excluded from the 
application of legislation such as the Labour Relations Act, 1995.724 The protection of 
workers has been held to extend even to non-South African citizens who are engaged in 
employment within South Africa without the required work permit, as the employer's 
duty of care and duty to respect statutory employment rights have been held to apply 
even to such illegal workers. 725 
244 As has been mentioned above, it is generally accepted that professional athletes 
in team sports are employees for purposes of application of the relevant labour 
legislation referred to. It should however be noted that such status is a question of fact in 
any given case, and a professional athlete (also in a team sport context) could on the 
facts of a given case be deemed to be an independent contractor operating under a 
contract for the rendering of services. 726 In such case the relationship between the 
723 It is generally accepted that professional players in team sports qualify as 'employees' for the purposes of 
the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, and accordingly the employment relationship between such players and 
their employers (sports federations, governing bodies and the team management) fall under the provisions of 
this Act. For recognition of the employment status of players, see generally Le Roux 'Under Starters Orders: 
Law, Labour Law and Sport' (2002) 23 ILJ 1195; Jordaan in Basson & Loubser Sport and the Law in South 
Africa Butterworths (2000) Ch 8-1; Prinsloo 'Enkele Opmerkinge oor Spelerskontrakte in Professionele 
Spansport' 2000 (1) TSAR 229 at 229-30; Van Niekerk, A 'Labour Law in Sport: a Few Curved Balls' in 
Contemporary Labour Law Vol 6 No 11June1997 at 91; Smailes, S 'Sports law and Labour Law in the Age of 
(Rugby) Professionalism: Collective Power, Collective Strength' (2007) 28 Industrial Law Journal 57; and in the 
case law McCarthy v Sundowns Football Club & Others [2003] 2 BLLR 193 (LC); Augustine and Ajax Football 
Club (2002) 23 ILJ 405 (CCMA)(where the CCMA assumed jurisdiction over an unfair dismissal dispute between 
a professional footballer and his club, although preferring to refer such dispute to private arbitration as agreed 
between the parties in the employment contract); Smith v United Cricket Board [2003] 5 BALR 605 (CCMA); 
SARPA obo Bands & Others/SA Rugby (Pty) Ltd [2005] 2 BALR 209 (CCMA); SA Rugby (Pty) Ltd v CCMA [2006] 
1 BLLR 27 (LC); Botha v The Blue Bulls Co & Another (Case JR1965/2005, unreported - judgment handed down 
27 June 2008). 
724 See the (at the time of writing unreported) judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal in Murray v The 
Minister of Defence (Case number 383/2006; handed down on 31 March 2008), where the SCA held that the 
constitutional guarantee of fair labour practices applied to an employee of the South African National Defence 
Force (whose employees are expressly excluded from the ambit of the Labour Relations Act, 1995) in the 
. context of a claim of constructive dismissal. 
725 See the (at the time of writing unreported) judgment of the Labour Court in Discovery Health v The CCMA & 
Another (judgment handed down 28 March 2008) 
726 It should be noted that professional athletes outside the team sports context (e.g. professional golfers or 
tennis players) are usually self-employed, and no contract of employment or for the rendering of services would 
exist. 
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parties would not fall within the ambit of the labour legislation, which expressly exclude 
independent contractors, and .the relationship would be almost exclusively governed by 
the terms of the parties' contract. 727 Other important reasons to distinguish the contract 
of employment frbm the contract for the -rendering of services are that the doctrine of 
vicarious liability728. does not apply in the case of an independent contractor, that 
independent contractors do not enjoy social security benefits (e.g. unemployment 
insurance), th.at different tax regimes apply to employees and independent contractors, 
and that employees have a preferential claim in terms of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 
(as amended") .against the insolvent estate of their employer for arrear wages. 729 
Furthermore, it should be noted that a professional athlete (e.g. a rugby player) may be 
an employee ot"more than one organisation or may even be an employee of one or more 
.. - : . 
organisation and an independent contractor in relation to another (e.g. a provincial union 
and a Super 14 franchise730). 
§3 Employment of players in the major professional sports 
245 What follows is a very brief overview of the nature of the employment nexus of 
professional athletes or players in the three major South African professional sports. 
Football (or 'soccer') 
246 Professional footballers are contracted by professional soccer clubs. These clubs 
are affiliated to the National Soccer League (the NSL), which trades as the Premier 
Soccer League (the PSL). The NSL promotes, organizes, controls and administers 
727 See Jordaan 'Sport and the Law of Employment' in Basson & Loubser Sport and the Law in South Africa 
Butterworths 2000 (loose-leaf) at Ch 8-1. It should be remembered that it has been held that the right to fair 
labour practices as contained in section 23(1) of the Bill of Rights in the South African Constitution is applicable 
to 'everyone', and not only to employees - see the discussion elsewhere in this chapter. 
728 In terms of which a person (an employer) can be held delictually liable (i.e. liable in tort) for damages 
caused by someone under his or her control (an employee) 
729 Jordaan in Basson & Loubser Sport and the Law in South Africa op cit Ch 8-13 to Ch 8-14 
730 See discussion elsewhere in this chapter of the regional Super 14 rugby union tournament, which is played 
(currently) between 14 regionally representative teams from South Africa, Australia and New Zealand 
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professional soccer in South Africa (in the Premier and National First Division leagues}. 
All professional players therefore resort under the NSL's rules and regulations~ Any club 
or footballer wishing to play professional football in South Africa must be registered with 
the NSL. If a player is not registered he cannot play for an affiliated club. All professional 
clubs are affiliated to the NSL, which· is affiliated to SAFA (the South African Football 
Association), which in turn is affiliated to CAF and FIFA. 731 
Rule 23 of the National Soccer League Rules732 provides for Players' Status, as follows: 
'23.1.1 Players under the jurisdiction of the League are classified as either amateur or 
professional. 
23.1.2 Amateur players are players who have never received any remuneration other than 
reimbursement of their actual expenses incurred during the course of their 
participation in any activity connected with association football. 
23.1.3 Travel and hotel expenses incurred through involvement in a match and the costs 
of a player's equipment, insurance and training may be reimbursed without 
jeopardising a player's amateur status. 
23.1.4 Any player who is not an amateur player is classified as a professional player.' 
Par. 1.8 (of the definitions section) of the NSL Rules provides that a 'contracted player' is 
a professional player who has entered in a written contract of employment with a club. 
Rule 35.l provides that '[e]very club employing a professional player must have a 
written contract with the player.' The 2002 version of the rules provided that '[t]he 
minimum wage for players under contract shall be determined by the [NSL] Executive 
Committee in accordance with the Labour Relations Act. 733 The current (June 2008) 
version of the Rules contains no provisions regarding minimum remuneration in respect 
of players' contracts. 
731 See Coetzee v Comitis & Others 2001 (1) SA 1254 CPD at 1257 
732 As amended 17 June 2008 
733 Rule 5.2. 7 
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Rugby union 
247 Professional rugby in South Africa is played under the auspices of the SA Rugby 
Union (SARU), and its commercial arm SA Rugby (Pty) Ltd. In terms of a substantive 
collective agreement concluded between the SA Rugby Players' Association (SARPA)734 
and the provincial unions, all professional rugby players are employed by the unions in 
terms of a standard players' contract,. the standard terms and conditions of which are 
negotiated periodically by $ARPA and· the unions/35 The collective agreement currently in 
place obliges provincial unions, who are classified in three categories, to employ a 
minimum number of their professiona·I players in terms of the standard players' contract, 
with a minimum monthly remuneration determined in accordance with the province's 
classification as category A, B or C province (such remuneration to increase significantly 
where such player is contracted to a Super 14 franchise during the currency of the 
contract with the provincial union). 736 A category A province must contract at least 34 
players, a category B province at least 20 players, and a category C province at least 10 
(12) players for a minimum uninterrupted peri<?d of 12 months. Additional players may 
be contracted for shorter periods. The collective bargaining agreement provides that all 
professional players employed in terms of the standard players' contract must be 
members of a medical aid scheme nominated by SARPA, as well as an income 
replacement insurance scheme. 737 It is also provided that, from 1 November 2008, all 
provinces shall oblige their players to join SARPA's retirement fund. 738 The collective 
agreement furthermore provides, in respect of Super 14 players, minimum match fee 
and win-bonuses for both the overseas and South African legs of the competition. 739 
734 The provincial unions have recognised SARPA as the sole collective bargaining agent of professional players, 
as it represents the majority of players. 
735 At the time of writing, the employment of professional players is regulated in terms of the collective 
agreement between SARPA and the unions dated 5 June 2008. 
736 Clause 6 of the collective agreement 
737 Clause 13 of the collective agreement differentiates between the different unions in respect of the duration 
for which players shall be entitled to payment of their full monthly remuneration during the period such player 
is unable to play due to injury 
738 Clause 19 of the collective agreement 
739 Clauses 9 and 10 of the collective agreement 
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Cricket 
248 Professional cricket players are contracted as employees of their respective unions 
or clubs, which are affiliated to the United Cricket Board of South Africa. At national level, 
these players are also viewed as employees of Cricket South. Africa (the commercial arm 
of the UCBSA): 
'[The UCB] contracts players to play international cricket. 740 The relationship with the 
contracted play.ers is a direct employer-employee relationship and .is governed by the terms 
of their contracts of employment. National players are also membe.rs of clubs and play 
provincial cricket for the affiliates ... Players who are not selected for international cricket, 
but who play regular provincial cricket are contracted by the affiliates. The players' 
contracts bind them to the UCB and ICC codes of conduct. However, even players who are 
. . 
not contracted to an affiliate or to the UCB are bound by the code of conduct as 
participants:'741 
In terms of the Memorandum of Understanding (collective agreement) currently in place 
between the SA Cricketers' Association (SACA), Cricket South Africa (Pty) Ltd and the 
domestic franchises, provision is made for a standard national player contract (for 
players categorized from A+ to C), a standard national match/tour contract, and a 
standard franchise player contract. More is ?aid regarding the content of this collective 
agreement in the section on collective bargaining in professional sport below. 
249 As mentioned above, it is important to note the· distinction between employees 
and independent contractors. Only employees and their employers are subject to labour 
legislation, while the conditions of 'employment', rights and obligations of independent 
740 It should be noted that Cricket South Africa, the commercial arm of the United Cricket Board of SA, was 
since established, and that cricketers in the national team are now contracted to CSA 
741 Cronje v United Cricket Board of South Africa 2001 (4) SA 1361 (T) at 1367 
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contractors are solely regulated by .the contract for the rendering of services as agreed 
upon between the parties involved. 742 
In determining the exact nature of the professional player's contract, one can resort to 
the various tests developed by our courts, which seem to mirror developments in English 
law in this regard. While the various tests, the 'control' test, the 'organization' or 
'integration' test, and the 'dominant impression' test, have all been criticized as rather 
simplistic or vague and nebulous, 743 our. courts have in recent years appeared to favour 
the last-mentioned of these tests in su.ch cases where the specific relationship between 
the parties is difficult to pin down. 744 This test seeks to ensure that, in the determination, 
no single factor is isolated - the method is to weigh up the indicia tending to show the 
existence of a contract of employment against those indicating a contract for services. 745 
Of course, this test is not necessarily appropriate in the context of statutes such as the 
Labour Relations Act and the Basic Conditions of Employment Act: due to the very wide 
definitions of 'employees' contained in these Acts, their operation does not depend on the 
existence of an employment contract, but rather on the fact of employment as such. 746 
Finally; it should be noted that the nature of the relationship between a player and e.g. a 
club or professional franchise is not dependent upon the label the parties to such 
742 Thompson & Benjamin South African Labour Law Vol 2 Juta Law (Looseleaf), at E1-1 and E1-7, note that the 
existence of a contract of employment automatically renders the parties to it subject to labour legislation. 
However, as the authors point out, the converse is not true: due to the wide definitions contained in these 
statutes, they may also apply to persons who do not fall under the common law definition of employer and 
employee. 
743 See Thompson & Benjamin at E1-5 . 
744 The Supreme Court of Appeal and the Labour Court have embraced the dominant impression test as the 
most suited to provide answers to the multitude of questions· that may arise regarding a worker's status in the 
context of modern workplaces - see Liberty Life Association of SA Ltd v Niselow (1996) 17 IU 673 (LAC); 
Niselow v Liberty Life Association of SA Ltd 1998 (4) SA 163 (SCA); SABC v McKenzie [1999] 1 BLLR 1 (LAC). 
This approach is in line with developments elsewhere, e.g. in English law, where the following has been stated 
regarding the application of this 'test': 
'There is no one test which is conclusive for determining whether services are performed by an employee under 
a contract of service or by a person carrying on business on his own account: There are a number of badges of 
one or other of the relationships and those badges, depending on the context, may carry greater or lesser 
weight, an overall view must be formed.' 
(Barnett v Brabyn (HM. Insp. -Of Taxes) 1996 STC 716, 69 TC 133 at 134). See Du Toit et al Labour Relations 
Law 68-72; Grogan Workplace Law 19 et seq. 
745 Thompson & Benjamin E1-5 
746 Thompson & Benjamin at E1-7. For a general discussion of the application of the dominant impression and 
other tests, as well as a useful analysis of the practical problems and intricacies involved in determining the 
true nature of a specific relationship in this context, see South African Revenue Service (SARS) Circular Minute 
No 22/1999, entitled 'Employees' Tax: Independent Contractors' (available on the internet as 
http://www.sars.qov.za/it/qeneral/independent contractors.pdf). This circular contains a handy 'common law 
dominant impression test grid' (as Annexure A to the circular), which summarises a number of relevant 
indicators in the determination of 'employee' and 'independent contractor' status. See also Brassey, M 'The 
Nature of Employment' (1990) 11 Industrial Law Journal 889; Mureinik, E 'The Contract of Service: An Easy 
Test for Hard Cases' (1980) 97 South African Law Journal 246. 
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relationship have placed on it; while the wording and provisions of the parties' contract 
are important elements to be considered in classifying the relationship as either one of 
employment or as a contract for the rendering of services by an independent contractor, 
what matters is the substance of the relationship rather than the name which the parties 
have chosen to call it. 747 
It was reported in May 2008 that the SA Rugby Union is considering abolishing the use of 
one-year standard players' contracts in order to retain the services of players in the 
national team, in favour of simply contracting players upon remuneration on a match-by-· 
match basis. The outcome of such proposal is unknown to the author at the time of 
writing. 
§4 Necessary elements of the employment contract 
250 There are nq formalities (such as e.g. writing748) prescribed at South· African 
common law for the validity of a contract of employment, and such contract will come 
into being as soon as the parties have reached agreement either expressly or tacitly 
(through the parties' non-verbal conduct) on the necessary elements of the contract. 
Generally, the following elements must be present to constitute an employment contract: 
The employee undertakes to provide personal services to the employer 
(and the parties must have reached agreement on the type of work to be 
performed in terms of the contract); 
In return for the personal services provided by the employee, the employer 
is to pay remuneration to the employee (such remuneration may be in 
money, in goods or partly in money and partly in goods; the amount of 
747 Jordaan in Basson & Loubser Sport and the Law in South Africa supra Ch 8-14 
748 Note however that section 29(1) of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act, 1997 obliges the employer to 
provide the employee, upon the commencement of his or her employment, with a written statement containing 
particulars of such employment (e.g. working hours, remuneration and other benefits, type of work, 
termination and the relevant notice periods, etc). 
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remuneration need not be fixed·but must be ascertainable by reference to 
some objective standard); and 
The employee's services must be defined and controlled by the employer 
(this does not require complete control, depending on how specialized the 
services are; the greater the measure of control exercised by the employer 
the more likely the contract is to be deemed to be one of employment). 749 
Of course, such contr:act must also satisfy the more general requirements for a valid and 
enforceable contract (e.g. legality, certainty and possibility of performance). 750 In terms 
of the 'dominant impression test' referred to supra, the degree of control that the 
employer exercises;over the services of. the employee is an importantfactor in 
distinguishing the-contract of employment751 from that of the contract for services752 of 
an independent contractor (which is generally not subject to labour legislation). 
251 Professional athletes in the three major sports undoubtedly qualify as employees 
for the purpose of this distinctia.n, if one notes the following characteristics of the 
relationship of these persons to the unions or governing bodies to whom athletic or 
sporting services are rendered: 753 
(i) The standard players' contracts all provide for an obligation on the part of 
the player to perform personal sporting services to the other party; 
(ii) These athletic services are rendered subject to the control and direction of 
such other party - although the measure of such control may differ from 
that found with other employees, the inherent element of control is always 
749 Sharrock Business Transactions Law op cit. 389; South African Broadcasting Corporation v McKenzie (1999) 
20 Industrial Law Journal 585 (Labour Appeal Court) 
75° Christie, R H The Law of Contract in South Africa 5th Ed. LexisNexis Butterworths, Durban 2006; Grogan 
Workplace Law chapter 3 
751 Or locatio conductio operarum 
752 Or locatio conductio operis 
753 See also Smailes, S 'Sports law and Labour Law in the Age of (Rugby) Professionalism: Collective Power, 
Collective Strength' (2007) 28 Industrial Law Journal 57 
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present and.especially evident in for instance the practice of selection of 
players for matches; 
(iii) These agreements all provide for the absorption of the player's labour 
power in respect of the rendering of athletic services, either to the 
exclusion or semi-exclusion of other employers; 754 
(iv) The remuneration·payable as a reciprocal obligation in return for services 
rendered contains traditional elements found in the employment of other 
employees, e.g. medical aid and retirement contributions paid by the 
employer; 
(v) These agreements provide for powers on the part of the· employer to 
discipline and dismiss players for misconduct or poor work performance, 
which in some cases exceed the measure of control (as found in 'ordinary' 
employment contracts) over the autonomy of the employee in respect of 
their physical integrity and the pursuit of outside or personal interests and 
activities; 755 
(vi) The wording of the players' contracts in all these cases explicitly refer to 
the relationship as one of 'employment', and to the parties as 'employer' 
and 'employee'; 756 
(vii) The relationship between the parties falls squarely within the legislative 
definition of employment, and such players are nowhere expressly 
excluded from the ambit of such legislation; 
(viii) The 'dominant impression' of the nature of the relationship between the 
parties is that of employment, in light of the factors mentioned above. 
An amendment of the Labour Relations Act 757 inserted a rebuttable presumption that a 
person will be deemed to be an employee, if any one of a number of factors is present. 758 
754 In the latter case where players are allowed to be contracted by national governing bodies for selection to 
representative teams - see the discussion below. 
755 See for instance clauses 9, 10 and 17 of the SARPA Standard Players' Contract 2008 
756 See for instance the SARPA Standard Players' Contract 2008 
757 Inserting section 200A, by means of the Labour Relations Amendment Act No 12 of 2002 
758 These factors include the following: 
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It does however seem clear that this presumpti~m will in most instances favour the view 
that a professional athlete is an·'employee'. 759 
§5 Requirements for the formation of the player's employment contract 
I Contracts with minors 
252 The basic requirement for formation of a valid contract of employment is that the 
player should have the necessary capacity to contract. A minor (an unmarried natural 
person of either sex under the age of 18 who has not been declared a major by the High 
Court760 ) has limited capacity to enter into a-valid contract. Such minor may enter into a 
contract in his or her name only with the assistance of his or her legal guardian, which 
assistance may be given before or at the time of contracting or may take the form of 
ratification a~er the fact. In professional football, Rule 35.7 of the National Soccer 
League's Rules761 specifically provides as follows: 
'No club may enter into an employment contract with a player who is a minor unless such 
player is duly and lawfully assisted by a parent or legal guardian. Such assistance will be 
evidenced by the countersignature on the contract of the parent or legal guardian, in the 
absence of which countersignature the contract will be invalid.' 
- whether the manner in which the person works is subject to the control or direction of another person; 
- whether the person's hours of work are subject to the control or direction of another person; 
- whether a person who works for an organisation forms part of that organisation; 
- whether that person works for and renders services only to that other person; and 
- whether that person is economically dependent on the other person for whom he or she works or renders 
services. This Amendment Act also enjoins the National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC) 
to issue a Code of Good Practice setting out guidelines for determining whether persons are 'employees'. The 
Act also empowers the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (the CCMA) to make advisory 
awards in certain instances, as to whether persons involved in an arrangement are 'employees'. 
759 Van Niekerk, A 'Labour law in sport: A few curve balls' (1997) 15(6) Contemporary Labour Law 1. Note 
however that the application of this legislative presumption in any given case is subject to the level of 
remuneration earned by the 'employee', and the presumption may not be applicable in cases concerning highly 
paid professional athletes. Notwithstanding the applicability of the presumption, these athletes may of course 
still qualify as employees in terms of the common law dominant impression test referred to supra. 
760 The age of majority was reduced from 21 to 18 by section 17 of the Children's Act, Act 38 of 2005 (which 
came into operation on 1 July 2007) 
761 As amended 17 June 2008 
292 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
253 A minor may also be emancipated by his or her guardian, in which case such 
minor's contractual capacity is not limited and s/he can validly enter into a contract 
without the guardian's assistance. Such emancipation can also be effected tacitly. The 
courts have held that the test to determine tacit emancipation requires that the guardian 
must have been completely discharged from parental authority; namely that as far as the 
guardian is concerned the minor has 'complete freedom of action with regard to his mode 
of living and earning his livelihood'. 762 Separate residence and financial independence are 
only factors to be taken into account in determining whether a minor has been tacitly 
emancipated; 763 and it must be shown that the guardian has actually consented to the 
release of the minor from his or her authority: 764 It has also been accepted that if a 
guardian corisent,s tothe minor carrying on his or her own business or.enter-the , -
employment of his .. or her choice, the minor has capacity to make contracts unassisted in 
connection with.·that business or employment. 765 
254 When a minor enters into a contract with the assistance of his or her guardian, 
the minor is bound by the contract and the guardian does not incur any liability. If the 
contract later becomes patently. prejudicial to the minor, s/he may (with- the assistance of 
his or her guardian or a curator ad /item, before the minor reaches the age of majority 
or, once the minor has reached the age of majority, the minor him- or herself) may 
approach a court to order restitutio in integrum (rescission of the contract and mutual 
restitution of performances), whereby the contract is retrospectively declared void, the 
obligations are forthwith unenforceable and the parties are obliged to return any 
performances received there-under. 766 
762 Dickens v Daly 1956 (2) SA 11 (N) at 16; see also Sharrock Business Transactions Law op cit. 41-42 
763 Dickens v Daly supra 
764 Grand Prix Motors WP (Pty) Ltd v Swart 1976 (3) SA 221 (C) 
765 Sharrock supra 43; Ahmed v Coovadia 1944 TPD 364 
766 This last duty to return performances received is subject to the courts' discretion to relax the obligation in 
certain instances where the inability to return the performance (or a performance of the same value as received 
in terms of the contract) is not due to the fault of such party - see Feinstein v Niggli 1981 (2) SA 684 (A); Extel 
Industrial (Pty) Ltd v Crown Mills (Pty) Ltd 1999 (2) SA 719 (A) 
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When a minor enters into a contract without the assistance of his or her guardian, s/he is 
not bound to such contract (even if the contract is as a whole to the benefit of such 
minor) and is entitled to return of any performances or payments made. The contract is 
.. 
not deemed to be void, however, and will be binding on the other party to the extent that 
the minor performs any of his or her reciprocal obligations. 767 
255 Finally, it should be noted that section 43 of the Basic Conditions of Employment 
Act, 1997 provides that it is a criminal offence for a person to employ a child who is 
under 15 years of age (or un9er the minimum school-leaving age in terms of any law, if 
this is 15 or older). No-one may employ such a child for work that is 'inappropriate' or 
that P.)aces~at.risk such child's 'well-being, education, physical or m~ntal hea_lt~, or 
. ~ . . -. .. . ,.. .. 
spiritual,_ moral or social development'. 768 According to section 55(6)(b) of the Act, the 
employme.~~ ?f children in certain activities such as sports and advertising may be 
permitted by sectoral agreements. Rule 35.8 of the NSL Rules specifically provides as 
follows: 
. 'No club may enter into an employment contract with a playe~ who has not yet attained his 
fifteenth birthday. It will be misconduct to enter into a contract with a player's parents 
where the purpose of such contract is to circumvent this rule.' 
Rule ·40 of the NSL Rules p·rovides as follows in respect of minors who are not South 
African citizens: 
'40.1 Unless [the SA Football Association], on application of the parent or legal guardian 
of the minor concerned rules otherwise, 
40.1.1 international transfers of players under the age of eighteen (18) 
will only be permitted when the family of the player moves to 
South Africa for reasons that are not linked to football, and 
767 Sharrock supra 45 
768 BCEA section 43; see Grogan Workplace Law 39 
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40.1.2 no player under the age of eighteen (18) who is not a South 
African national will be registered as a professional player for the 
first time with a club falling under the jurisdiction of SAFA unless 
he and his parent or legal guardian are lawfully resident in South 
Africa.' 
II Employment contracts of non-South African citizens 
256 Apart from the contractual capacity of the athlete in terms of his or her age at the 
time of entering into a contract of employment, it is important to briefly examine the 
position of persons who are not South African citizens or who otherwise require work 
permits to legally take up employment in South Africa. 
The South African Immigration Act, 2002769 and applicable Regulations provide for 13 
types of temporary residence permits and four types of work permits for foreign visitors 
to South Africa. 770 No decision on an application for a permit is left to the discretion of an 
official and there is provision for an applicant to lodge an appeal against any decision 
which may adversely affect such applicant. 771 The main objective of the Act is to ensure 
that South African citizens and permanent residents are not disadvantaged in access to 
employment by the employment of foreign workers. Accordingly, the Department of 
Home Affairs will consider an application for a general work permit on submission of 
proof of a conditional offer of employment in a confirmed position from a recognized 
organization as well as documentary proof that such South African employer has fully 
endeavoured to recruit South African citizens or residents. Foreigners who have been in 
769 Act 13 of 2002, implemented 7 April 2003 
770 The four types of work permits are a quota work permit issued to applicants for employment in certain 
identified scarce skills categories (as determined by the Minister of Home Affairs in consultation with the 
Ministers of Labour and Trade and Industry), a general w·ork permit, an exceptional skills work permit and an 
intra-company transfer work permit. 
771 South African Department of Home Affairs web site - accessed 4 April 2008 
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possession of a· general work permit for a period of five years may apply for a permanent 
residence permit. 
It should here be specifically noted that the absence of a valid work permit may not 
necessarily serve to deny an illegal alien protection under the labour legislation (or, more 
specifically, in terms of the right to fair labour practices contained in section 23 of the Bill 
_of Rights), in the event that it can be shown by such person that there was a de facto 
employment relationship between him or her and a South African employer. 772 
257 It should ·further be noted that specific provisions and requirements may be set 
for access of foreign athletes or players in specific sports, through the rules and 
regulations of the relevant domestic governing bodies or through collective agreements 
with representative players' associations. In football, Rule 25.5.8 of the National Soccer 
League Rules773 requires, in 'the event th-at a player was previously registered for a club 
in another country, an International Transfer Certificate requested by the SA Football 
Association (SAFA) from the national association of the player's previous club. Rule 35.14 
provides further that [c]lubs may not lodge a contract [with the League] which causes 
the club to exceed five foreign players, and a work permit will have to be lodged with a 
foreign player's contract.' -
In professional cricket, the Memorandum of Understanding that is currently in force 
between Cricket South Africa, the six domestic franchises and the professional players' 
association (SACA)774 provides that a distinction is made between 'Foreign Overseas 
Players' and 'Kolpak Overseas Players'. A Foreign Overseas Player is a player who is a 
non-South African citizen or non-permanent resident (except if such player has Kolpak 
rights in South Africa and has not played international or first class cricket for or in 
another country in the past 12 months). A Kolpak Overseas Player is a player who is 
contracted in the EU under Kolpak but who is not seeking to qualify to play for another 
country. A franchise may contr_act a maximum of 1 Foreign Overseas Player during a 
772 Cf. the (at the time of writing unreported) judgment of the Labour Court in Discovery Health v The CCMA & 
Another (judgment handed down 28 March 2008) 
773 As amended 17 June 2008 
774 This Memorandum of Understanding is in force from 1 May 2007 to 30 April 2010, subject to the current 
structure of 6 franchises remaining in place for such period. 
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season (and maximum 2 Overseas Players). Prior to contracting an Overseas Player the 
franchise mu,st obtain the consent of Cricket South Africa (in the case of a Foreign 
Overseas Player through means of a written motivation regarding the value that such 
player is expected to add to the franchise and to South African domestic cricket, and CSA 
is obliged to consider such motivations in granting or refusing consent). In addition, a 
franchise must show that it has a sponsor to pay at least 50% of the amount payable to 
the Foreign Overseas Player (the other 50% to be paid by the franchise from its budget). 
Franchises are obliged to contract a minimum of 13 and a maximum of 16 players on 12 
or 24 month contracts. Kolpak Overseas Players.shall be included in the number of 
franchise contracted players, while Foreign Overseas Players are viewed to be· in addition 
to such contract numbers. 775 
258 With a view specifically to the 2.0lOFIFA World Cup South Africa, it should be 
noted that section 4(2)(a) of the 2010 FIFA World. Cup South. Africa Special Measures 
Act, No. 12 of 2006,. provides that '[a]ny person;'including team members, intending to 
conduct work in the Republic in connection with.and for the duration of the 2010 FIFA 
World Cup South Africa must, in support of an application for authorization in terms of 
section 11(2) of the Immigration Act, submit a letter to the Minister of Home Affairs from 
FIFA approving the work to be conducted'. Section 4(3) of the Act deals with the position 
of dignitaries attending.the 2010 World Cup event, and provides that '[t]he Minister of 
Home Affairs may allow dignitaries identified as such by FIFA to be admitted to and 
sojourn in the Republic for the duration of the 2010 FIFA World Cup South Africa in terms 
of section 3 1(2)(a) of the Immigration Act if a list containing the personal particulars of 
the dignitaries prepared by FIFA is received by the Minister of Home Affairs at least 30 
days before the dignitaries intend to depart for the Republic'. 
Section 4( 4) of the Act furthermore provides as follows: 
'(a) If any person intends to conduct work, or establish or invest in a business, in 
775 Par. 3.2 of the Memorandum of Understanding 
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the Republic for a period exceeding six months in connection with the 2010 FIFA World Cup 
South Afric?, such person.must, when applying for a work permit or a business 
permit in terms of the Immigrati.on Act, provide the Director-General of Home Affairs 
with-
(i) proof of accreditation with FIFA in support of the application at least 30 days 
(ii) a description of the activities that will be undertaken in the Republic; and 
(iii) the duration of the intended stay 
prior to proceeding to the Republic; 
(b) Ii a person contemplated in paragraph (a) wishes to be exempted from having to 
comply with any of the., requirements for a work permit or business permit prescribed in 
the Regulations made under section 7 of the Immigration Act, that person must ensure 
that the· Minister of Home Affairs receives an application in terms of section 31(2)(c) of 
. . ' . -
the Immigration Act for the waiver of those requirements at least 60 days prior to that 
person proceeding to the Republic. 
(c) The application referred to in paragraph (b) must be approved by the Minister of 
Home Affairs before the Director-General of Home Affairs may consider the application 
for a work permit or business permit contemplated in paragraph (a).' 
259 The National Sport and Recreation Amendment Act, 2007 includes a provision with 
potentially far-reaching implications regarding the employment of foreign sports persons 
in South Africa. Section 6(3) provides that national federations must 'before recruiting a 
foreign sport person to participate in sport in the Republic, satisfy themselves that there 
are no other persons in the Republic suitable to participate in such a sport' (s 6(3)(a)). 
Section 6(3)(d) provides that national federations must 'ensure that [such] recruitment 
conforms to the guidelines issued by the Minister in terms of s 13A. Section 13A provides 
that '[t]he Minister must issue guidelines or polities to promote equity, representivity and 
redress in sport and recreation'. The new sections 138 and 13C require every sport or 
recreation body to submit, annually, statistics on its membership and also to report 
progress on the issues referred to in s 13A. The new s 13(5)(a)(ii) empowers the Minister 
to intervene 'in any non compliance with guidelines or policies issued in terms of section 
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13A or any measures taken to protect or advance persons or categories of persons, 
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination as contemplated in section 9(2) of the 
Constitution', by e.g. issuing a 'directive' which is binding on the parties to a dispute (or, 
specifically, a sport body in such cases).' Accordingly, while the potential application of 
these sections is at the time of writing still speculative, it appears that the Minister of 
Sport is empowered to intervene in the appointment of foreign sportspersons 
(presumably players, coaches as well as managers or other administrative. staff) and may 
veto any recruitment by sports federations inter alia on the basis of the race of such 
persons (i.e. if such persons are not from previously disadvantaged or designated776 
groups).777 
At the time of writing, these (what are submitted to be) rather controversial provisions 
have not been the subject of legal challenge. It is however doubtful that these provisions 
would withstand any potential constitutional testing, especially in light of accepted . 
standards in other jurisdictions (e.g. the protection of freedom of movement of 
sportspersons in the European Union in the wake of judgments such as Bosman and 
Kolpak, referred to elsewhere) and, possibly, the application of the restraint of trade 
doctrine and the provisions of the Competition Act 89 of 1998778 (although the section 22 
right of freedom to choose one's trade, occupation or profession would not apply to 
foreign sportspersons779). 
776 In terms of the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998, the 'designated groups' who are to be advantaged by 
means of affirmative action measures and policies in employment are defined as Black persons (including, 
Africans, Coloured and Indian persons), women and persons with disabilities. 
777 The application of the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 (which provides for the application of affirmative 
action in the workplaces of designated employers) is discussed in more detail elsewhere in this section as well 
as in the section on race-baced transformation of sport elsewhere in this chapter. For present purposes (in 
respect of discussion in the text above), the following should just be noted regarding enforcement of the 
application of affirmative action: The designated employer has obligations in terms of the EEA to transform 
within certain time frames and to draw up equity plans in this regard, and the Director-General of the 
Department of Labour can bring legal proceedings against recalcitrant employers. But, because the plan is 
based on figures, targets and time periods, it does not allow for the Director-General, an individual employee or 
a union to dictate on the application of affirmative action in a particular case or in respect ofa particular 
individual employee (e.g. to demand that an employee should be appointed or promoted on the basis of 
affirmative action). Arguably, it follows that the Minister of Sport will not be able to do so either (in terms of the 
EEA, which only permits the Director-General to bring action against the employer for failing to meet targets 
within certain timeframes) - see Dudley v City of Cape Town (2004) 5 BLLR 413 (LC); Thekiso v IBM South 
Africa (2007) 3 BLLR 253 (LC); Cupido v Glaxosmithkline SA (Pty) Ltd (2005) 26 IU 868 (LC); PSA obo Karriem 
v South African Police Services & Another (2007) 4 BLLR 308 (LC). 
778 See the discussion in par 457 et seq below 
779 The section 22 right is only available to South African citizens (compare the wording of the section, and the 
Constitutional Court's finding in Certification of the Amended Text of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996 (2°d Certification decision) 1997 (2) SA 97 (CC) that the right of occupational choice could not be 
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260 The discussion elsewhere in this chapter has referred to the draft Regulations in 
terms of the Act which were circulated to sports federations for comment at the 
~eginning of 2009. As mentioned, these draft Regulations include specific regulations 
dealing with the Control of Foreign Sports Persons in South Africa, which regulations 
appear to envisage quite substantial control over the foreign athletes as well as South 
African sporting bodies. It remains to be seen in what form such regulations may be 
published in due·c::ourse.(if at all), but it has been suggested that the draft regulations in 
their current form are open to potential legal challenge on a number of grounds. The 
reader is referred to the discussion in par 114 et seq above. 
·III ·South African athletes and employment abroad 
261. South Africa is a signatory to the Cotonou Agreement between the European 
Union and 77 African, Caribbean and Pacific Islands (or 'ACP') states, of June 2000. The 
Agreement's purpose is to expedite the economic, cultural and social development of the 
ACP states, with a view to contributing to peace and security and to promoting a stable 
and democratic political environment. 780 Article 13(3) of the Agreement provides as 
follows: 
'[T]he treatment accorded by member States to workers from ACP countries legally 
employed in its territory, shall be free from any discrimination based on nationality, as 
regards working conditions, remuneration and dismissal, relative to its own nationals. 
Further in this regard, each ACP State shall accord comparable non-discriminatory 
treatment to workers who are nationals of a Member State.' 
considered a universally accepted human right - see Currie, I & de Waal, J The Bill of Rights Handbook 5th ed 
Juta & Co 2005 at 489) 
780 Article 1(1) of the Agreement 
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South African citizens are thereby entitled to enter employment within the European 
Union as so-called 'Kolpak players', who, as non-EU nationals who are lawfully employed 
within a Member State of the EU, are protected from discrimination on the basis of their 
nationality781 and would thus qualify as domestic players. To date, the impact of Ko/pa k's 
ruling has mostly assisted South African cricketers to gain access to employment in 
English county cricket (subject to the relevant UK work permit directives and the 
eligibility criteria·of the England & Wales Cricket Board) and for South African rugby 
players to gain access to employment with UK and European rugby union and.. rugby 
league teams. 782 Between Aug us~ 2003 and February 2005 young persons from 
Commonwealth countries Were allowed to work in professional sports (especially cricket 
and rugby union) in the UK on the Working Holiday Maker Scheme (a special visa to 
young persons which allowed them to work legally in Britain for two years whilst 
traveling). Following lobbying by the Professional Cricketers' Association and others this 
relaxation of the requirements for entry into employment in professional sports was 
scrapped, and potential Kolpak players from South Africa currently require a Work permit 
just as other overseas profession-als do. The work permit requirements are more 
stringent than those of the working holiday visa. 783 
262 At the time of writing it appears that the European Commission is set to give 
rugby and cricket authorities within EU member states the right to deny access to their 
leagues to non-European players who have used the Kolpak ruling to gain entry, which 
could potentially impact significantly on the access of South African athletes to 
employment in these states. Such action appears to be a reaction against the opening of 
the floodgates to foreign players in terms of Kolpak. According to reports, English county · 
cricket had in 12 months seen an increase from 30 players who are not qualified to play 
781 In terms of the judgment of the European Court of Justice in Deutcher Handballbund eV v Maras Kolpak c-
438/00, 8 May 2003 
782 Eligibility requirements for participation in domestic leagues may differ (e.g. to qualify for a ist 
Division/Premiership rugby club in England a player must have played for South Africa or another national team 
during the previous 18 months; this is not a requirement for French and Italian clubs - source: The web site of 
the SA Rugby Players' Association (SARPA): http://www.saroa.net - accessed 3 April 2009) 
783 From a report available on the web site of the Professional Cricketers' Association at 
http://www.thepca.co.uk [accessed 4 April 2008] 
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for the England team to 60, and that there are approximately 150 South Africans who 
are playing top-level rugby union for clubs in France. It has been reported that Michal 
Krejca, head of the EC's sports unit, told the congress of UK sports bodies (at a congress 
organized by the Central Council of Physical Recreation in June 2008) that the decision to 
admit Cotonou players is the decision of individual member states and not that of the EU. 
It has been spec·urated that this will mean that the Home Office in Britain will come under 
pressure from sports bodies to treat every application on its merits rather than on the 
nationality of the .applicant (although those athletes with valid EU work permits will 
continue to benefit from the free movement provisions). 784 
263 Tier 2 of the United Kingdom's Points Based Managed Migration system (which has 
replaced the previously applicable work_ permit scheme) was implemented on 27 
November 2008, and it offers an entry route into the UK for skilled workers who are 
citizens of countries outside the European Economic Area. Tier 2 contains a specific 
category in respect of 'Sports People', for elite sports persons and coaches whose 
employment will make a significant contribution to the development of their sport at the 
highest level in the-UK. Sports persons on temporary assignment should apply for entry 
as temporary workers under Tier 5 (this is applicable, for example, to non-First Class 
cricket clubs who recruit players). 
A requirement for qualification under Tier 2 is a job offer from a UK employer, and 
the applicant must intend to base themselves in the UK and must be established at the 
highest level of their particular sport. In respect of county cricket, for example, this 
requires that an applicant player must have -
played 1 Test match in the last 2 years; or 
played 15 One Day International/T20 international matches in the last 2 
years; or 
784 From a report by Matt Scott 'Sports given go-ahead to block overseas players', The Guardian, 12 June 2008 
.302 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
played in the latest Test/One Day International team or be contracted to 
his home (national) Board; or 
played 5 Tests in the last 5 years and he is stil eligible, or 
been granted a work permit in 2008. · 
For club cricket, a player must have played 5 first class matches in the last 2 years or a 
coach must have a level 2 coaching qualification.785 
The employer who wishes to appoint a sports person in terms of the Tier 2 
category must register with the UK Border Agency and obtain a Sponsorship License, 
obtain an endorsement for the applicant player from the sport's governing body,786 and 
issue a· job offer and a Certificate of Sponsorship to the applicant player. In respect of 
professional cricket, for example, the governing body·endorsement.must be obtained 
from the England & Wales Cricket Board for both the sponsor license and for individual 
players and coaches who are recruited (and the application for the endorsement must be 
made prior to the application to the UK Border Agency for a Sponsor:-ship License). The 
applicant player must satisfy the Tier 2 Points Test (i.e. such applicant must acquire a full 
70 points, of which .10 points are awarded for the Maintenance Requirement,787 10 points 
are awarded for the English Language Requirement, and 50 points are awarded for 
possession of a valid Certificate of Sponsorship). 
It is clear ~hat the Tier 2 system has now made it significantly harder for South 
African athletes to enter the UK for work purposes, and it is believed that these more 
stringent requirements will serve to address some of the problems which have been 
reported regarding the influx of players under the Kolpak regime (while, of course, 
limiting the potential employment opportunities abroad of e.g. South African professional 
cricketers and rugby players). 
785 Source: The web site of the SA Cricketers' Association (available at http://www.saca.orq.za - last accessed 
on 6 April 2009) 
786 The endorsement by the appropriate governing body must confirm that the player or coach is internationally 
established at the highest level, that s/he will make a significant contribution to the development of his or her 
sport at the highest level in the UK, and that the post cannot be filled by a suitable settled worker. 
787 The applicant must be able to show personal savings equivalent to €. 800 at the time the application is made, 
or the applicant must have written confirmation from their sponsor that the sponsor will maintain and 
accommodate them until the end of their first month in the UK. From March 2009 the amount of savings must 
have been held at all times during the preceding 3 month period. 
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264 Clause 3 of the Memorandum of Understanding (collective agreement) currently in 
place between SACA, Cricket South Africa (Pty) Ltd (or 'CSA') and the domestic 
professional franch.ises, 788 provides as follows regarding South African professional 
cricketers playing overseas: 
'Playing Overseas 
3.3 Any Player who is contractep by CSA or a Franchise who wishes to play overseas 
during his contract must first obtain a written release from CSA (National Players) 
or the Franchise concerned (Franchise Players). 
3.4 A standard form release application will be used by the Player and when applying 
for a release the Player must state the duration of the overseas contract. 
3.5 A National Contracted Player must ensure that the Overseas Contract contains a 
carve-out clause to ensure that the Player is able to fulfil any official training or 
playing commitments he may have to the National Team during the overseas 
period. 
3.6 If Jhe carve out is to include any comn:iercial obligation for which the National 
Player must return during the period of the Overseas Contract then this shall be 
stipulated by CSA at the time that it grants the release and CSA shall pay the cost 
of a return economy class air-ticket to enable the return of the Player for such 
commercial obligation. 
3.6 CSA or the Franchise may impose conditions to any release granted by it provided 
these are lawful and relate to cricket playing matters. The release and any 
conditions must be in writing and a copy provided to SACA. 
3. 7 Where a Player is released to play county cricket in the UK as a Kolpak Player then 
the Franchise may reduce his Franchise retainer amount by up to thirty-five 
percent (35%) of such retainer for the period that he is away on contract to the 
county. This shall not however affect any other remuneration benefits such as 
contributions to medical aid. The Player must be notified of any such reduction at 
the time of the granting of the release.' 
788 The current MOU is in place for a three year-period from 1 May 2007 until 30 April 2010 
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265 At the time of writing, the impact of the 'rebel' Indian Cricket League (or 'ICL') 789 
and the resultant, officially sanctioned and phenomenally successful new Indian Premier 
League (or 'IPL') has, not unexpectedly, also been felt by a number of South African 
professional cricketers under contract abroad. In April 2008 the Professional Cricketers' 
Association (PCA) in the UK filed an appeal against the refusal by the England & Wales 
Cricket Board (ECB) to register three South African ICL players to play county cricket. 
The PCA was reported as threatening a High Court action in the event of its appeal being 
denied. The three ex-SA national team players, Justin Kemp (contracted with Kent 
county), Andrew Hall and Johan van der Wath (both contracted with Northamptonshire), 
had been refused registration by the ECB in terms of Regulation 2. l(b) (Regulations 
Governing the Qualification and Registration of Cricketers) as a result of their 
participation in, the~unsanctioned ICL during 2007 (which is not reco~nized by the ECB as 
official first class cricket). 790 The refusal to register these players (even ~hough they had 
already been contracted as Kolpak players) was as a result of Cricket South Africa's 
refusal to issue the required No Objections Certificates791 to the players as a result of 
their ICL affiliafion. Hall had reportedly also been refused permission by CSA to play for 
the Lions franchise in the 2008 domestic Pro20 competition. Following reports that other 
ex-international cricketers792 had also been refused entry to county cricket on the same 
grounds, the ICL was in 2008 reportedly in the process of instructing their legal 
representatives for purposes of legal action against the ECB. 793 The appeal (heard on 30 
April 2008) of the three South African players against the ECB ruling (which Hall's 
789 The 'Indian Cricket League' (or 'ICL') was established to operate a Twenty20 tournament between (initially) 
six teams or clubs on a home-and-away basis, playing over a period of about three weeks for an ultimate 
winners' purse of US$1 million. Each team would consist of two Indian players registered with the BCCI, four 
foreign players and eight budding players sourced through talent scouts. It was planned that the ICL would 
develop over a three-year period to a 50-over a side (or One Day International format) tournament, which 
would be better suited to develop talented young players for the rigours of international cricket, while the 
number of teams competing would increase from six to sixteen. The inaugural ICL competition was held in 
November and December 2007. 
790 See the short article entitled 'PCA to appeal to High Court if appeal against player bans fails' World Sports 
Law Report, May 2008 Cecile Park Publishing Ltd 
791 A certificate of clearance by the players' domestic cricket board, required for entry into the English country 
cricket scene by the rules of the ECB 
792 Namely the West Indies' Wavell Hind and New Zealand's Hamish Marshall 
793From an article in Rapport, 23 March 2008 
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barrister characterised as an 'unlawful, unreasonable, capricious and discriminatory' ban) 
was ultimately successful. 794 
266 The ECB's response to the three South African professional cricketers is just one 
example of th.e response to the ICL by domestic governing bodies in a number of 
cricketing nations, which followed the massive exodus of star cricketers to this lucrative 
new competition .. Throughout the first season of the ICL it was reported that a number of 
top-class international cricketers from across the spectrum of test-playing nations, both 
current and retired players, had signed up for the ICL. It was reported that, apart from 
well-known names such as Pakistan's Inzamam Ul-Haq, former West Indies star batsman 
Briar:i La·ra, New Zealand's Craig McMillan, Chris Cairns and Nathan Astle (to name just a 
few), a:number of ex-South African stars such as Andrew Hall, Lance "Klusener, Nicky 
Boje, Dale Benkenstein and Mornantau Hayward (and current player J:ohan van der 
Wath), had all signed up to earn the big money on offer in the ICL. It was reported that 
these players were contracted to earn in the region of ZAR2.5 million each for a few 
weeks' work. The BCCI in India condemned the ICL from the outset, and made it clear in 
media statements that players who signed up to play would jeopardise their international 
careers and prospects for selection to represent India in officially sanctioned matches. 
Other domestic boards followed suit. New Zealand cricket (or the 'NZC'), which has 
probably been hardest hit by the exodus of players to the ICL, appears to have heeded a 
call by the ICC to domestic boards not to recognise 'rebel' players participating in the ICL 
for national selection. It has been reported that countries like New Zealand and Pakistan 
are affected most, as their players are generally not as well paid as those of countries 
like England and Australia (e.g. it was reported that regular England internationals could 
earn as much as £400 000 in a season, while a New Zealand player might earn 10% of 
that, and can reap as much in one month of ICL participation). While one possible 
solution for the NZC's dilemma would be raising the pay of their contracted players, the 
board was reported as having responded by threatening to exclude players who joined 
794 From a report entitled 'Trio successful in county appeals', 30 April 2008, available online at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk (last accessed 7 May 2008) 
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the ICL. It was reported that New Zealand's star fast bowler, Shane Bond, had signed a 
three-year contract with the ICL for US$ 3.1 million, even though while still under 
retainer with the NZC until 1 June 2008 for more than US$ 120 000; The outcome of the 
Shane Bond matter, which has been referred to as an expected 'test case in an expensive 
legal battle that will leave all Test nations nervously awaiting the outcome', is at the time 
of writing unknown to the author. 
Developments in this regard are also being watched closely in South Africa, with the 
potential for legal challenges against Cricket South Africa (Pty) Ltd's sanctions against 
'rebel' ICL players (and even, in one rather interesting instance, an ex-player cricket 
commentator795), which, it is submitted, may be open to scrutiny on the basis of unlawful 
restraint of trade and/or as infringement of such players' constitutional rights. 796 The ICC 
Board agreed on regulations regarding 'disapproved' cricket in January 2009 (which are · 
due to be implemented from 1 June 2009), which appear to place the power to determine 
sanctions against disapproved competitions in the hands of domestic boards. 
267 Finally, it should be noted that,_iruespect of employment disputes in terms oflhe 
South African labour legislation in'.'folving South African athletes competing abroad, the· 
locality of an employee's undertaking or workplace is relevant to the jurisdiction of the 
Labour Court. The Labour Appeal Court797 has confirmed that the South African labour 
courts have jurisdiction and the Labour Relations Act applies if, in terms of the contract 
of employment, the locality of the employee's undertaking (workplace) is in South Africa. 
795 In December 2007 it was reported that Cricket South Africa had withdrawn former national player Daryll 
Cullinan's media accreditation as television commentator for local pay-TV broadcaster Supersport during the 
West Indies tour to SA, as a result of his involvement in the ICL as coach of the 'Kolkata Tigers' team. At the 
time of writing it appears that the matter regarding termination of Cullinan's contract has not yet been settled 
by way of legal action or otherwise. 
796 Specifically, the guarantee of freedom to choose an occupation or profession as contained in section 22 of 
the Bill of Rights - see the discussion in par 370 et seq below. 
797 Astral Operations Ltd v Parry (LAC) 2008 CAS/05. This case involved the retrenchment of an employee (a 
South African citizen) while he was working in Malawi. The employee returned home to South Africa and 
brought an action against the employer for breach of contract in the Labour Court. The court had to consider 
whether the Labour Court has jurisdiction to hear a dispute arising from an international employment contract. 
The employer's argument was that the dispute arose at the workplace in Malawi and therefore the Malawian 
courts had jurisdiction over the contractual dispute. The employee argued that it was clear from the contract 
that the parties had implicitly elected South African law as the governing law and thus only South African courts 
had jurisdiction to hear the dispute. The LAC held that the question of jurisdiction and of which law applied 
were two distinct questions. While South African law governed the contract, the South African courts did not 
have jurisdiction. Jurisdiction was governed by the locality of the employee's workplace and where he 
performed the work. 
307 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
This may be of particular importanceto South African athletes employed abroad, as they 
will not be able to sue their o.verseas employers in South Africa under the LRA if their 
workplace is not situated within the Republic. -
§6 The-rights and ·duties of the respective parties to the employment 
contract.·_ 
268 The common law and applicable employment statutes provide for certain basic 
rights and duties for both the employer and employee to an employment contract. While 
t~e parties-may bf course expressly agree to (or exclude) certain terms in this.regard, 
the following are rights and duties implied by the common law and/or by the provisions 
of the labour legislation. 
I The employer 
A ·The -duty to receive and retain the employee in service 
269 The employer is first and foremost obliged to receive the employee into 
employment and to retain his ·services. An employer's refusal to accept the 
employee's.tender of service would constitute a serious breach of contract. 798 
While the employment contract commences at the moment when the parties 
reach agreement on its essential terms, it was only recently settled that a 
repudiation of the contract by the employer prior to the date when the employee 
is to commence service constitutes a dismissal in terms of the definition of a 
dismissal as contained in the Labour Relations Act. 799 Once an employee has been 
798 Kinemas Ltd v Berman 1932 AD 246 
799 The Labour Appeal Court, in Wyeth SA (Pty) Ltd v Manqele & others (2005) 6 BLLR 523 (LAC), settled the 
question and held that such a repudiation does constitute a dismissal. The earlier case of Whitehead v 
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appointed to a certain position, any unilateral change of the employee's position 
without his consent (even if at the same level of remuneration) would constitute a 
repudiation of the employment contract by the employer and would entitle the. 
employee to pursue the normal remedies for breach of contract800 (and may even 
constitute constructive dismissal in terms of section 186( 1)( e) of the Labour 
Relations Act). Due to the personal nature of the employment contract and of the 
services rendered by the employee, the employer cannot validly assign the 
contract to another party without the employee's consent. 801 
270 This obligation of the employer to receive the employee into service does 
not normally include a duty to provide.the employee: with work,802 although there 
are certain exceptions:. 
Woolworths (Pty) Ltd (1999) 20 IU 2133 (LC) held that individuals only become employees (and can therefore 
only be dismissed) when they are actually working or entitled to receive remuneration from an employer. 
Accordingly, it was held that the claimant's only remedy in that case was a civil damages claim in the ordinary 
civil courts. Later Labour Court judgments held Woolworths was wrongly decided. In Jack v Director-General 
Department of Environmental Affairs (2003) 1 BLLR 28 (LC) the court held that it has jurisdiction to entertain a 
claim for relief under the Basic Conditions of Employment Act by a person who has concluded a contract of 
employment with his future employer, but has not yet commenced working. The employer had cancelled the 
contract before the employee could commence working, claiming that he had been offered the position because 
of an 'administrative error'. The employee sought enforcement of the contract. The court held that, although 
the statutory definition of 'employee' requires a person to actually work for an employer, the legislature could 
not have intended to exclude from the protection of the Act (the BCEA) persons who had concluded contracts 
with employers, but had not yet commenced working. The employer was accordingly ordered to accept the 
employee into employment. In a later case decided under the Labour Relations Act (Wyeth SA (pty) Ltd v 
Manqele & others (2003) 7 BLLR 734 (LC)); the court expressly held that the Woolworths judgment was wrong. 
Manqele was appointed as a sales representative in terms of a written contract of employment with Wyeth. Just 
before he was due to start work the company informed him that it was no longer prepared to employ him. 
Manqele referred a dispute to the CCMA concerning an alleged unfair dismissal. Relying on Woolworths, the 
company took the point that he was not an employee. On appeal to the Labour Court, it was held that the 
approach in Woolworths was wrong. The court reasoned that confining the reference to the word 'work' in the 
statutory definition of 'employee' to work that is actually performed is not justified by the wording of the 
definition or the statutory attempt to protect work security. The statutory definition of 'dismissal' makes no 
reference to an employee, but simply requires (inter alia) the termination of a contract of employment by an 
employer. To restrict the definition of 'employee' to exclude those who have concluded a contract of 
employment but have not yet commenced work would be to plase persons like Manqele into a 'jurisprudential 
limbo'. According to Wyeth a less than literal interpretation of the definition of employee is supported by the 
Constitution, which affords everyone the right to a fair labour practice. The Labour Appeal Court in Wyeth 
rejected Woolworths and confirmed the Labour Court (a quo)'s reasoning and held that, taking cognizance of 
section 23 of the Constitution (which provides that 'everyone' has a right to fair labour practices), the court is 
entitled to depart from such literal and ordinary construction and to extend the definition (of an 'employee') as 
including a person who has concluded a contract of employment which is to commence at a future date. 
800 Sharrock 417. See the discussion of common law remedies for breach of contract in par 323 et seq below 
801 As to the application of section 197 (as amended) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 to the position 
regarding the transfer of a business as a going concern, see Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law 427 et seq. 
802 Turner v Sawdon [1901] 2 KB 653; Toerien v Stellenbosch University (1996) 17 Industrial Law Journal 56 
(C); Grogan op cit. 62 
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Where one of the purposes of the appointment is the training of the 
employee; 
Where the employee's remuneration is dependent on the volume of work 
performed; 803 or 
·Where the employee's professional reputation would be adversely affected 
.by not working (e.g. such as the position of a professional actor804). 805 
As Lewis & Taylor have argued (in the sporting context), it is unclear whether or 
to what extent such a duty to provide work might translate to a duty on the part 
of the·employ.er to select the professional. athlete· employee for first team 
matches, although the position might be different in respect of reserve matches if 
the failure to allow the player time on the field might adversely affect such 
· player's skills and match fitness. 806·As th~ authors point out, the employer's 
failure to provide game time to this ·limited extent may give such player 'sporting 
just cause' to terminate his employment. 807 Here it might be argued that the 
player employee in this position might - within very narrow limits as determined 
by. the circumstances of the case - be able to sue for constructive dismissal in 
terms of section 186(1)(e) of the Labour Relations Act. This section provides that 
'dismissal means that an employee. terminated a contract of employment with or 
without notice because the employer made continued employment intolerable for 
the employee'. The case law has interpreted this section to mean that the onus is 
803 Faber/an v McKay & Fraser 1920 WLD 24 
804 Compare also Herbert Clayton and Jack Waller Ltd v Oliver [1930] AC 209, HC and, in respect of the position 
of skilled workers, Langston v Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers [1974] IRLR 15 - see Lewis & Taylor 
Sport: Law and Practice Butterworths LexisNexis 2003 at 814-815 
805 Stewart Wrightson (Pty) Ltd v Thorpe 1977 (2) SA 943 (A); Muzondo v University of Zimbabwe 1981 (4) SA 
755 (Z); Sharrock supra 417 
806 Lewis & Taylor Sport: Law and Practice supra 815 
807 Ibid. E.g. in football, Article 2l(l)(a) of the FIFA Regulations for the Status and Transfer of Players provides 
for the application of sanctions and payment of compensation in cases of a unilateral breach of contract without 
just cause or "sporting just cause". An indication of the meaning of this term is found in the regulations, which 
provide that a player is entitled to terminate his contract if he can show at the end of a season that he was 
fielded in less than 10% of the official matches played by his club. See the discussion in Le Roux, R 'Under 
Starters Orders: Law, Labour Law and Sport' (2002) 23 Industrial Law Journal 1195 at 1203. The concept of 
'sporting just cause' is also included in the regulations of the South African National Soccer League - see 
McCarthy v Sundowns Football Club supra at 1950 of the judgment. 
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. on the employee to show thatthe employer has committed some serious breach 
or grossly unfair act which goes to the heart of the employment and trust 
relationship between the parties, and that the circumstances are such that the 
employee cannot reasonably be expected to remain in the employer's employ in 
the circumstances. Depending on the circumstances, the employee will have to 
show that,. before he resigned, he did attempt to resolve .the problem and that the 
employer failed to deal with the matter at all or not reasonably - in other words, 
the employee had no option but to resign in order to protect his interests. 
271 This last raises one particular area of interest in the South African 
professional sports context, namely the role of sports transformation policies in 
respect of an athlete's 'right to play'. Even though, as indicated, there may .at best 
be a very limited right in this regard available to player employees, ,ane must 
question the position where a player who has been contracted· as part .of a touring 
squad is excluded in selection for touring and. replaced by another player on the 
basis of the enforcement of a racial quota or target for the representation of 
'players of colour'. 808 This might raise questions regarding the fairness of such 
conduct and/or policies by the employer (e.g. which m'ight open the door to an 
unfair discrimination claim against the employer under the Employment Equity 
Act, 809 or an 'unfair labour· practice' claim under the Labour Relations Act if the 
dispute concerns and detrimentally affects the player in respect of 'training', the 
provision of benefits and/or promotion, or amounts to an unfair 'demotion'). 810 
808 Compare the events of March 2008 when South African national cricket team fast bowler Andre Nel was 
selected for the team's tour to India and subsequently replaced by medium fast bowler Chari Langeveldt, on the 
basis of Cricket South Africa's Transformation Charter which (at the time) required 7 'players of colour' in a 
touring squad of 14. Even though the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998, which applies to designated 
employers (such as Cricket South Africa), places a duty on such employers to implement affirmative action 
measures for persons from designated groups (section 13(1) of the Act) - and such duty constitutes an implied 
term in the players' employment contract - it is unclear whether such conduct would justify any alleged 
infringement of a player's 'right' to selection when fit and in form. This is especially pertinent as the author has 
argued elsewhere that the use of demographically-based 'targets' for representation of players of colour in 
sports teams is in essence and in practice indistinguishable from the use of race-based quotas, which last are 
specifically prohibited by section 15(3) of the Employment Equity Act (see the discussion in par 83 et seq 
above). 
809 See the discussion elsewhere in this section regarding the unfair discrimination provisions of the EEA 
810 Section 186(2) of the Labour Relations Act 
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Furthermore (although this issue will not be elaborated on here), one might need 
to consider the possible relevance of the freedom of trade, occupation and 
profession as contained in section 22 of the Constitution. 811 As has been observed, 
this section does not only protect the right to choose one's trade, but also affords 
a degree of protection for the freedom .to practice a chosen occupation. 812 
B ·. T:he duty to remunerate the employee 
272 At common law the employer is obliged to pay the employee remuneration 
at .a· reasonable rate, .in the absence of agreement on the actual remuneration to 
be paid. The parties· are generally free to .negotiate the remuneration payable to 
the·employee for making his or her services available to·the employer, in the 
absence of a minimum wage prescribed in terms of a collective agreement or a 
sectoral or wage determination under the labour legislation. Under the common 
law the employment contract is viewed as a reciprocal agreement whereby the 
employee's duty to make his or her services available to the employer and the 
employer's duty to pay remuneration are reciprocal obligations, which are to be 
performed in exchange for one another. Accordingly, a failure by the employee to 
make his services available to the employer for the whole period of service in 
question can be met by the defence of the exceptio non adimpleti contractus. 813 
An employee who has tendered their services to the employee is accordingly also 
811 See the discussion in par 370 et seq below 
812 Currie, I & de Waal, J The Bill of Rights Handbook 5th ed Juta & Co 2005 (at 492) observe as follows: 
'It would not make sense to allow people the freedom to choose a trade, but not allow them to practice it once 
the choice is made and the necessary training, preparation and legal requirements have been complied with. As 
the German Constitutional Court has emphasised, choice and practice of an occupation "constitute poles of a 
continuum". The freedom to be occupationally active and to pursue a livelihood therefore involves more than 
the freedom to choose a trade, occupation or profession.' 
813 This defence under the common law acts as an excuse for non-performance by a party to a reciprocal 
contract where the other party to the contract claims performance but has not performed or tendered 
performance (see Motor Racing Enterprises (Pty) Ltd (in liquidation) v NPS Electronics Ltd 1996 (4) SA 950 (A) 
- the exception was successfully raised by a party to a sponsorship contract for a Formula 1 Grand Prix motor 
racing event at Kyalami on the basis of the event organisers' failure to perform reciprocal obligations regarding 
use of the sponsor's brand name, logo, circuit advertising and signage, etc). The exception does not always 
function as a complete defence and its working may be relaxed by the court e.g. when there has been 
substantial performance by the other party of their obligations under the contract and the application of the 
exception as an excuse for non-performance by the other party would lead to such other party being unjustly 
enriched as a result - see BK Tooling (Pty) Ltd v Scope Precision Engineering (Pty) Ltd 1979 (1) SA 391 (A). 
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entitled to payment of remuneration even in circumstances where the employer 
had no work available for the employee to perform durihg the period. 814 Also, 
workers who refuse to work if their employer fails to pay them are riot deemed to 
be on strike.or otherwise in breach of the contract. 815 
The Basic Conditions of.Employment Act, 1997. provides fo~.payment of 
remuneration to employees in respect of a number of specific categories of 
remuneration, which are more or less applicable to professional athletes as the 
case may be (as a result of the.peculiar characteristics of such employment). 
These include payment for overtime, meal intervals, work on Sundays, work on 
public holidays, annual leave, sick leave, maternity leave and family responsibility 
leave. 816 Section .34 o.f the BC EA-also imposes restrictions on the employer's 
power to make deductions· from the·employe~'s remuneration. These provisions 
will not be discussed here. Such- aspects of the employment of pr.ofessional 
athletes are usually regulated exh.austively in the standard players' contracts 
which are prevalent in the major professional sports. 
C The duty to provide safe working conditions 
273 Under the common law the employer owes a duty to the employee to take 
reasonable care for his or her. safety in the workplace. This duty has been 
·significantly supplemented by the provisions of the Occupational Health and 
Safety Act, 1993 (or 'OHSA'), which is complemented by the applicable 
regulations issued in terms of the Act. The fundamental duty of the employer is to 
provide and maintain, as far as is reasonably practicable, a working environment 
that is safe and without risk to the health of the employee. 817 The Act furthermore 
lists certain steps to be taken by employers to provide for the safety of 
814 Sharrock op cit. 412-413 
815 Grogan op cit. 63 
816 Sections 10, 14, 16, 18, 21, 22, 25 and 27 of the Act. See Sharrock op cit. 413-417 
817 Section 8(1) of the Act · · 
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employees818 , ·provides for the appointment of employee safety representatives in 
certain workplaces and·circumstances819 , provides for the reporting to inspectors 
appointed in terms of the Act of work-related incidents involving death, serious 
injury or illness820, and provides for employees' entitlement to obtain an interdict 
to prevent the employer from maintaining unsafe or unhealthy workplace 
p{actice·s or for breaching any of its duties in terms of the Act. An employee who 
is cover..ed under the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act, 
1993 (or 'COIDA') cannot recover any damages in delict (tort) against the 
employer for an occupational injury or disease resulting in disablement or death. 
Such employee is limited to obtaining compensation under and as provided for in 
COIDA. 821 The·employer is required.to register with and make regular prescribed 
payments to the Compensation .Fur:id·:under ttie provisions of COIDA. 822 
The application of such provisions-.and, in fact, of the applicable common law 
. duties, is of course not straightforw.ard in the profe.ssional sports context. The· 
peculiarities of sports employment require context-specific determination of the 
extent to which the employer's obligations should apply; e.g. in contact sports 
such as rugby union as opposed to the less clear-cut although potentially 
hazardous situations one might encounter in cricket. 
D The duty not to discriminate unfairly against the employee (and the 
duty to implement affirmative action measures) 
274 The Employment Equity Act, 1998823 aims to promote equity in 
employment in twO primary ways, which are described in section 2 as constituting 
the purpose of the Act. The Act, in sections 5 and 6, commences with a 
818 Section 8(2) of the Act 
819 Section 17 
820 Section 24 
821 Section 35 of COIDA 
822 See Sharrock op cit. 419-420 
823 Act 55 of 1998 
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prohibition of unfair discrimination, and lists a number of specific grounds upon 
which discriminatory employment policies and practices will be deemed to be 
unfair. Section 6(1) provides that no person may unfairly discriminate, directly or 
indirectly, against an employee, in any employment policy or practice, on one or 
more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, family 
responsibility, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual o~ientation, age disability, 
religion HIV status, conscience, belief, political opinion, culture, language and 
birth. 
275 The Act goes further, by also obligating designated employers824 to 
implement affirmative action measures to redress the disadvantages in 
employment experienced by designated groups825 , in order to ensure their 
equitable representation in all occupational cate,gories and levels in the workforce. 
It should be noted that, while the Act places a duty on designated employers to 
implement affirmative action measures, no employee has a 'right to affirmative 
action'. 826 
The EEA constitutes an embodiment of the legislature'.s and Constitutional Court's 
embracing of the concept of substantive equality, as a specific legislative measure 
'designed to protect or advance persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged 
by unfair discrimination', in the meaning of section 9(2) of the Constitution. 
Section 6(2)(b) of the EEA provides that it is not unfair to 'distinguish, exclude or 
prefer any person on the basis of an inherent requirement of a job'. As Grogan 
points out, the legislature has left it to the labour courts to fashion a test for 
establishing when the various 'arbitrary grounds' of prohibited unfair 
824 A 'designated employer' in terms of section 1 of the Act is 
- an employer who employs 50 or more employees or who has a total annual turnover that equals or exceeds a 
stipulated amount (as laid down in Schedule 4 of the Act in respect of different types of businesses); 
- a municipality; 
- an organ of state (excluding local spheres of government, the National Defence Force, the National 
Intelligence Agency and the South African Secret Service); and 
- an employer bound by a collective agreement which appoints it as a designated employer. 
825 
'Designated groups' in terms of section 1 of the Act means 'black people (i.e. Africans, Coloureds and 
Indians), women and people with disabilities'. 
826 The contrary view expressed by Wag lay J in Harmse v City of Cape Town [2003] Butterworths Labour Law 
Reports 557 (Labour Court) was subsequently rejected in Dudley v City of Cape Town (2004) 25 Industrial Law 
Journal 305 (Labour Court); see also Grogan Workplace Law 295-298. 
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discrimination as contained in section 6(1) of the Act can be said to be related to 
an inherent requirement of the job.827 As has been observed in the sporting 
context, differentiating between professional players on any of the listed grounds 
contained in section 6 of the Act may be justified if such differentiation relates to 
qualities that are peculiar to the nature of the sport and the inherent 
requirements for participation in it (e.g. Jitness, particular physical attributes or 
even gender). 828 
Chapter III of the EEA, which deals with affirmative action measures, places a 
duty on designated employers to do a number of things, which include 
consultation with employees regarding equity issues (section 16), conducting an 
organisational analysis of the representation of designated groups in the 
workplace and the compliance of employment policies and practices (section 19), 
preparing an employment equity plan (section 20), and reporting to the Director-
General of the Department of Labour annually on the implementation of such plan 
(section 21). 
276 Section 15 of the Act deals specifically with the concept of affirmative 
action. Section 15(1), however, is rather vague in its definition of what this 
entails. It states that affirmative action measures are measures 'designed to 
ensure that suitably qualified people from designated groups have equal 
employment opportunities and are equitably represented in all occupational 
categories and levels in the workforce of a designated employer'. The 
determination of under-representation of designated groups is central to the 
formulation of numerical goals - the yardstick of 'equitable representation' is the 
primary determinant of not only the extent of such goals but also whether their 
existence is in fact justified at all. Section 42 of the EEA lists a number of 
indicators to be used in assessing an employer's compliance with the Act, and 
specifically the determination of whether designated groups are equitably 
827 See, generally, Grogan Workplace Law 298-300 
828 Jordaan in Basson & Loubser Sport and the Law in South Africa supra Ch 8-8 
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represented in a specific workplace and the legitimacy of targets set. These 
include the following: 
The demographic profile of the national and regional economically active 
population; 
The pool of suitably qualified persons from designated groups from which 
the employer may reasonably be expected to promote or appoint 
employees; 
Economic and financial factors relevant to the sector in which the employer 
operates; 
Present and anticipated economic and financial _circumstances of.the· 
employer; and· ·. 
The nu_mber of present and planned· vacancies that exist in·the varipus 
categories and levels, and the employer's labour turnover. 
Sections 15(2) and (3) continue to state, more specifically, what affirmative 
action measures must include. Chapter III of the Act, therefore, prescribes an 
institutional analysis of the relative representation of different racial and gender 
groups within the organization of a designated employer, the identification of 
underrepresented groups, the setting of goals for the-improvement of such 
groups' representation, and the implementation of affirmative action measures to 
achieve such goals. 
277 The Employment Equity Act, 1998 has not been universally welcomed, and 
has been the subject of criticism regarding its somewhat dubious introduction of a 
statistical measure such as 'demographic representativity' as yardstick for the 
achievement of equality in the workplace. 829 Others have criticized this piece of 
829 Brassey 'The Employment Equity Act: Bad for employment and bad for equity' 1998 Industrial Law Journal 
Vol 19 Part 6 1359; Louw, AM 'Extrapolating "equality" from the letter of the law: The limits of affirmative 
action under the Employment Equity Act' (2006) 18 South African Mercantile Law Journal 336; Louw, AM 
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legislation, the first post-1994 statute·in South Africa to contain reference to and 
in fact to promote racial classification of persons, as inimical to the new, non-
racial, democratic order. Be that as it may, the Act applies to the federations in 
the major South African professional sports (as well as other employers such as 
the Premier Soccer League clubs, Super 14 rugby and domestic cricket franchises) 
as designated employers in the meaning of section 1 of the Act. The reporting and 
other requirements regarding the drafting of 'equity plans' accordingly.apply to 
suth employers. What is less clear is to what extent sports transformation 
measuresthat have been implemented by sports federations to date are 
consonant with the Act's provisions - the reader is referred to the more detailed 
discussion of the race-based transformation of South African (professional) ·sport 
_elsewhere in this chapter. While race-based quotas have frequently been 
·'employed in top level rugby and cricket teams, it appears that the Employment 
Equity Act itself prohibits the use of quotas as opposed to numerical targets or 
goals regarding the representation of designated groups in the workplace. 830 It 
should also be noted that the application of affirmative action in terms of the EEA 
is different to a 'straight quota system', in that the EEA refers to the application of 
affirmative action measures in respect of 'suitably qualified' persons from the 
designated groups. This means that race is not the sole determining factor (the 
affirmative action candidate must be suitably qualified), so appointing a person 
just because s/he is 'black' or female alone is not permitted. The employer must 
'Should the Playing Fields be Levelled? Revisiting Affirmative .Action in Professional Sport' 2004 Stellenbosch 
Law Review Vol. 15 No 1 119, Vol. 15 No 2 225, Vol. 15 No 3 409 
830 Section 15(2)(d) reads as follows:'Affirmative action measures implemented by a designated employer must 
include ... subject to subsection (3), measures to ... ensure the equitable representation of suitably qualified 
people from designated groups in all occupational categories and levels in the workforce ... ' 
Section 15(3) states that 'the measures in subsection (2)(d) include preferential treatment and numerical goals, 
but exclude quotas'. 
While section 15(4) states that '[n]othing in this section requires a designated employer to take any decision 
concerning an employment policy or practice that would establish an absolute barrier to the prospective or 
continued employment or advancement of people who are not from designated groups', it is submitted that the 
wording of section 15(3) is not merely negatively permissive but constitute an express prohibition on the use of 
quotas as an affirmative action measure. A possible interpretation of section 15(3) read with 15(2)(d) is that 
the legislature has simply indicated that the measures prescribed in order to achieve the goal (of ensuring 
equitable representation of suitably qualified people from designated groups) do not include quotas, although 
quotas are still permissible as long as they are designed to achieve this goal. However, it is submitted that the 
preferable interpretation is the following: Section 15(2)(d) states that measures to ensure this goal of equitable 
representation must be taken, and this includes any and all possible measures designed to this end. However, 
this prescription is subject to section 15(3), which explicitly states that the measures referred to in 15(2)(d) 
(therefore all possible measures to achieve the goal) exclude quotas. Therefore, the two subsections read 
together constitute an express prohibition on quotas. 
318 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
also show that the person is 'suitably qualified' to do the job and that the 
affirmative action decision does not-jeopardize the efficient and effective running 
of the undertaking, especially if it is a public enterprise. 831 The cases show that 
the courts will balance considerations of efficiency and important operational 
needs of an enterprise with those of representivity. If there is a tension between 
the two ideals, the court will attempt to strike a balance between these 
interests. 832 It is submitted that an analogy can be drawn in respect of the 
application of affirmative action in sport (as argued elsewhere in this chapter) .. 
Very little analysis has been done of the role and place of the Employment Equity 
Act in professional sport, and no more will be said here in this regard. The reader 
is referred to the relevant sections of this chapter which deal with the key issue of 
race-based sports transformation in South Africa post 1994. It should also be 
noted, however, that another piece of legislation, the Promotion of Equality and 
Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act, 2000 ('PEPUDA' or 'the equality Act')S.33 is 
an important equality statute which was published to further the provisions of the 
fundamental right of equality as contained in section 9 of the Bill of Rights. 
PEPUDA also contains anti-discrimination provisions linked with prohibited grounds 
of unfair discrimination, and applies in all situations where the Employment Equity 
Act does not apply (i.e. PEPUDA may also be invoked by persons not protected 
under the EEA, e.g. independent contractors and others). The application of the 
831 See the preamble to the EEA, which refers to the promotion of economic development and effkiency in the 
workforce. See also Coetzer & Others v Minister of Safety and Security & Another (2003) 24 IU 163 (LC), which 
held that the state's obligation is not merely to improve representivity of black persons in the public service, 
but also to ensure that other constitutional imperatives, such as maintenance of an efficient public service, are 
complied with. The individual applicants in Coetzer were all highly trained (white) bomb squad unit employees 
in the South African Police Services (or SAPS). They applied for promotion posts in the unit but were not 
considered despite the fact that some of the posts were vacant, because there were no suitable candidates from 
the designated groups. It was common cause that the SAPS's refusal to appoint them was based purely on the 
need for promoting representivity in the service. The applicants were therefore excluded on the basis of their 
race. The court held that the employer must also show that its affirmative action measures/decisions are in 
harmony with its other obligations (in this case the state's constitutional imperative to provide an efficient 
service). A balance must therefore be struck between these imperatives. No evidence was led that the 
employer had considered the efficiency imperative at all. Accordingly the court held that the employer had 
failed to show that its decision not to appoint the applicants met the requirements for a successful reliance on 
the affirmative action defence. See also PSA obo Karriem v SAPS & Another (2007) 4 BLLR 308 (LC), where the 
needs of the enterprise required the appointment of an employee who was immediately skilled, while the 
relevant affirmative action candidate would have needed 16 to 36 months to fully acquire the skills for the post. 
832 See also Stoman v Minister of Safety and Security (2002) 23 IU 1020 (T) 
833 Act 4 of 2000 
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Act is wide; for example, the Cape Town equality court834 was recently confronted 
with a claim by a juristic person that if was unfairly discriminated against on the 
basis of race in not being awarded ·civil engineering contracts. The court held that 
a juristk person is capable of being unfairly discriminated against on the ground 
of race (and that its racial profile is determined by the racial profile of its 
controlling shareholders).835 
. . 
. 
278 Furthermore, regarding the ambit of the Employment Equity Act and the 
protections which it affords to employees, it should be noted that the Act also 
regulates medical and psychological testing in the workplace.836 Section 7 of the 
EEA provides as follows: 
's7(1) Medical testing of an employee is prohibited unless 
(c) legislation permits or requires the testing; or 
(d) it is justifiable in the ligh~ of medical facts, employment conditions, social 
policy, the fair distribution of employee benefits or the inherent 
requirements of a job.' 
It is submitted that mandatory drug testing and other counter-doping measures 
do not violate the provisions of section 7 of the EEA. 837 It should also be noted 
that specific provisions may be included in the rules of professional sports leagues 
in respect of subjecting the validity of players' employment contracts to medical 
testing (compare the following provisions of the National Soccer League Rules) :838 
'35.10 The validity of an employment contract between a player and a club 
cannot be made conditional upon the positive results of a medical 
834 A number of equality courts have been set up in order to hear disputes (e.g. claims of unfair discrimination) 
in terms of the Act 
835 Manong & Associates (Pty) Ltd v City Manager, City of Cape Town & Others 2009 (1) SA 644 (EqC) 
836 Sections 7 and 8 of the Act 
837 For more on drug testing and doping control in South African sport, see par 127 et seq above. 
838 As amended 17 June 2008 
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examination or upon_ the acquisition of a work permit. The player's-
prospective new club will accordingly be required to make any 
necessary investigations, studies, tests and/or medical examinations 
or to take any appropriate action before concluding the contract. 
35.11 After the signing of an employment contract, no club may avoid 
liability to pay the full amount of the salary due on the basis of facts 
revealed by any investigations of the sort contemplated by rule 35.10 
above.' 
Finally, section 7(2) of the Act deals specifically with testing for HIV and AIDS and 
states that testing of an employee in order to determine their HIV status is 
prohibited unless such testing is determined to be justifiable by the Labour Court 
in terms of section 50(4) of the Act. By way of summary, and in terms of these 
provisions of the Employment Equity Act as read with the Code of Good Practice 
on Key Aspects of HIV/AIDS and Employment (2000) 1839 the position regarding 
HIV testing in the workplace is as follows: 
In certain situations the employer must obtain prior Labour Court approval for 
such testing, namely in the event of: 
Pre-employment testing; 
Testing as a condition for employment; 
During procedures related to termination of employment; 
As an eligibility requirement for training or staff development 
programmes; or 
As an access requirement to obtain employee benefits. 840 
839 As issued by the South African Department of Labour in terms of section 54 of the Employment Equity Act 
55 of 1998 
840 Par 7 .1.4 of the Code of Good Practice supra 
321 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
In certain situations the employer may test if such testing is justifiable, i.e. the 
Labour Court must give prior approval of such testing or otherwise condone such 
testing upon application after the fact. The factors to be taken into account by the 
Labour Court include the following (note that these are not a closed list): 
Medical facts (e.g. how· invasive is the test?) 
The inherent requirements of the job 
Pre- and post-test counselling 
The categories ·of jobs / workers to be tested 
Confidentiality of results 
In certain cases the employer may test without Labour Court approval: 
At the request of the .employee, e.g. as part of health care service 
in the workplace or in case of an occupational accident. 841 In both 
such instances such testing must follow the South African 
Department of Health's National Policy on Testing for HIV; 842 
Where there is informed consent - this would constitute either a 
waiver of the protection of sec 7(2) of the Employment Equity Act 
or a waiver of the fundamental right to bodily and psychological 
integrity as guaranteed in sec 12(2) of the Constitution; 
Where testing is both voluntary and anonymous. 843 
841 See Par 7 .1.5 of the Code of Good Practice supra 
842 SA Department of Health National Policy on Testing for HN (issued in terms of the National Policy for Health 
Act 116 of 1990) 
843 See, generally, Joy Mining Machinery v NUMSA & Others (2002) 23 IU 391 (LC); Irvin & Johnson Ltd v 
Trawler & Line Fishing Union & Others [2003] 4 BLLR 379 (LC); PFG Building Glass (Pty) Ltd v CEPPAWU [2003] 
5 BLLR 475 (LC); SA Department of Labour HIV/AIDS Technical Assistance Guidelines Chapter 2 par. 2.2; 
Basson, A in (Strydom, ed.) Essential Employment Discrimination Law Juta 2004.at 203-216 
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II The employee 
A The duty to enter into and remain in service 
279 The employee's main obligation under the common law contract of 
employment is to place their personal services at the disposal of the employer, 
and in light of the reciprocal nature of the contract as referred to supra, the 
tender of such services is a pre-requisite to the employee's right to claim 
remuneration from the employer. 844 Failure of the employee to render services 
entitles the employer to deduct from the employee's wages an amount 
proportional to the absence. It is less clear-cut whether absence from work 
entitles the employer to cancel the contract on the basis of breach of contract, 
and determination of this question depends on the facts of each case. No 
universal test can be derived from disparate decisions in cases of this nature, 
although the courts tend to consider the following factors in order to determine 
whether an employee's absence constitutes a breach of a vital term of the 
contract: 845 
The nature of the employee's work (i.e. dismissal might be justified where 
the employee's work is of especial strategic importance); 
Whether the employee's absence disrupted the normal course of the 
employer's business; 
The length of the employee's service; 
The reason for the employee's absence (i.e. whether such absence was 
willful or due to circumstances beyond the employee's control); 
The duration and frequency of the employee's absences; and 
The provisions of any applicable disciplinary code in the workplace. 
844 Smit v Workmen's Compensation Commissioner 1979 (1) SA 51 (A); Grogan Workplace Law 52 
845 Grogan Workplace Law 52-.53 
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Under the Labour Relations Act, absence from work may be treated as either a 
":form of misconduct or as incapacity; depending on the reason for such abseilce. 846 
Under the common law, the employee's absence due to ill health or incapacity is 
treated as due to vis maior and provides the employer with a choice to elect to 
terminate the contract on the basis of supervening impossibility of performance in 
appropriate circumstances. 847 It should be noted that the (un)fairness of an 
employee's dismissal should be considered in light of the guidelines provided in 
the Code of Good Practice: Dismissal issued in terms of the Labour Relations Act, 
1995 and, specifically, that dismissals for misconduct and incapacity are to be 
treated differently. Dismissals for incapacity are treated as 'no fault'-dismissals, 
which are due not to the fault of the employee. Accordingly, a special procedure is 
prescribed by the Code for such cases (which includes inter alia an obligation on 
the part of the employer to consider alternatives to dismissal and to attempt to 
accommodate the employee in another job or capacity within the workplace). 848 
280 . Players' employment contracts will usually contain provisions which 
-.. exhaustively regulate the rights of the parties to the contract in the event of 
injury .or other form of incapacity. Such provisions would usually be coupled with 
income replacement or protection insurance schemes in order to provide injured 
players with a source of income for the duration of their injury or incapacity, as 
well as regulating payment of monthly contributions to such scheme by the 
-- employer. 
For example, the 2008 Standard Players' Contract in rugby in force between 
provincial unions and players (as negotiated between SARPA849 and SARE0850 ) 
provides that the contract of employment is conditional upon the player passing a 
846 Grogan op cit 53 
847 Ibid. 
848 For more on the provisions of the Code in respect of dismissal for incapacity or ill health, see Grogan 
Workplace Law 216 et seq. 
849 South African Rugby Players' Association, the registered trade union which represents the majority of 
professional rugby players and which is the recognised collective bargaining agent for professional rugby 
players in terms of the provisions of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 
850 South African Rugby Employers' Organisation, the registered employers' organisation which represents the 
14 provincial rugby unions which employ professional rugby players and which is the recognised collective 
bargaining agent rugby employers in terms of the provisions of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 
. 324 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
medical and fitness examination prescribed by the province, 851 and the player 
·warrants that he has no illness or injury that could affect his performance under 
the contract (other than any condition disclosed to the employing province in 
terms of the agreement). 852 The player is furthermore obliged853 to participate in 
an income replacement insurance scheme, medical scheme and retirement 
benefits as set out in the collective agreement between the players' association 
and the employers' orga:nizatio.n. 854 
B The duty to exercise reasonable skill and diligence 
281 In terms of the common.:law an_ employee is deemed to impliedly. -
guarantee thats/he can perform the ta·sks s/he has agreed to perform, and that 
such tasks will be carried out with rea?onable efficiency. 855 Employees may be 
held bound by any representations made prior to employment to the employer 
regarding their abilities, and the standard of competence that an emp·loyer is 
entitled to expect is that of persons comparable with the employee having regard 
to training, experience and any-special claims the employee may have made 
regarding their competence. 856 While the reasons for an employee's incompetence 
appear to be irrelevant at common law857 , it should be noted that the labour 
legislation prescribe certain procedures to be followed before an employee can be 
dismissed for poor work performance. 858 Such dismissal may proceed on the basis 
851 Clause 9 
852 Clause 10 
853 In terms of clauses 19 and 20 of the 2008 Standard Players' Contract 
854 The 2008 Collective Agreement between SARPA and SAREO (to which the Standard Players' Contract is 
annexed as a First Schedule) 
855 Grogan Workplace Law 54 and the authorities cited there 
856 Ibid. 
857 Grogan op cit. at 55 
858 According to the Code of Good Practice: Dismissal, issued in terms of the Labour Relations Act, 1995, any 
person who considers whether a dismissal for poor work performance was unfair must consider 
'(a) whether or not the employee failed to meet a performance standard; and 
(b) if the employee did not meet a required performance standard whether or not -
(i) the employee was aware, or could reasonably have been expected to have been aware, of the required 
performance standard; 
(ii) the employee was given a fair opportunity to meet the required performance standard; and 
(iii) dismissal was an appropriate sanction for not meeting the required performance standard.' 
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of section 188(l)(a)('i} of the Labour Relations {\ct, which allows an employer to 
dismiss an employee for a fair reason related. to the employee's capacity. The 
Code of Good Practice: Dismissal, issued in terms of the Labour Relations Act 
distinguishes in cases of incapacity between incapacity due to ill health and injury 
and incapacity due.to_poorwork performance. 859 More will be said on this in the 
section on dismissal below (specifically also of the relevance of the different forms 
of incapacity in respect of-players in professional team sports). 
Furthermore it should be noted that pt-ayers' employment contracts may include 
performance clauses dealing specifically with the required performance standards 
set for such players and/or which may make the level of remuneration of the 
employee dependent on the standarc:I of on-field performance (e.g. also in respect 
of match· or win bonuses). 
C The duty to serve the employer in good faith 
282 The employee's duty to serve the employer in good faith includes a 
number of facets: 
The employee must devote all his working hours to furthering the 
employer's interests, and may not work against those interests (e.g. by 
conducting unauthorized business during working hours or working for a 
competitor of the employer). This includes a duty not to become involved 
in spare-time activities that prevent him from carrying out his duties in the 
workplace. 860 As referred to elsewhere, this specific aspect of the 
employee's duties towards the employer is often regulated extensively by 
means of specific provisions in players' contracts in respect of prohibited 
859 Although incapacity can of course also be due to reasons other than these two mentioned categories, e.g. 
incompatibility (i.e. an inability on the part of an employee to work in harmony either within the 'corporate 
culture' of the business or with fellow employees - see Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law supra 402). 
860 Sharrock supra 409 
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free-time activities (such as participation in extreme sports) that carry a 
risk of injury to the player; 861 also, there may be a measure of overlap in 
respect of the employee's duties to the employer and such player 
employee's duties to other parties such as sponsors in respect of e.g. 
endorsemen~ contracts, where other activities (e.g. that relate to public 
drunkenness, recreational drug use or sexual impropriety) may be 
prohibited in light of the value of maintenance of the player's good 
reputation for endorsement purposes. 
It is interesting to speculate as to the role of the common law duty of good 
faith in respect of players' participation, while under contract with a club, 
franchise or union, in other leagues or competitions. While player contracts 
may contain express terms which attempt to prevent such players from 
playing in particular circumstances during the term of the contract or which 
attempt to curtail their freedom after the contract has come to an end, 
such provisions may be open to testing in terms of the doctrine of restraint 
of trade or on other grounds.862 As has been observed, however, the 
employee's duty of loyalty to his or her·employer may leave little room for 
a complaint of restraint of trade in respect of such provisions during the 
term of the agreement. 863 Elsewhere in this chapter there is discussion of 
the (at the time of writing) current issues surrounding Cricket South 
Africa's apparent banning of cricketers who have participated in the 'rebel' 
Indian Cricket League from participation in the domestic professional 
competition in South Africa or from eligibility for selection to the national 
side (such 'ban' apparently based on the relevant domestic franchises' 
refusal to release the players under their contracts for participation in the 
861 Compare clause 17 .10 of the 2008 Standard Players' Contract in rugby currently in force between provincial 
unions and players, which places a duty on players to refrain from 'participating in any hobby or sport which 
would ordinarily be regarded as highly dangerous or which involves a significant risk of personal injury. 
Examples of such hobbies or sports include, without limitation, rock-climbing, bungee jumping, sky-diving, 
water skiing, white water rafting, skateboarding, hang-gliding, quad-biking and motor-racing.' 
862 E.g. in the South African context, on the basis of the freedom of trade, occupation and profession as 
contained in section 22 of the Bill of Rights - see the discussion elsewhere in this chapter 
863 See Lewis & Taylor Sport: Law and Practice supra 812 
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864 Ibid. 
865 Ibid. 
. ICL). It is interesting to speculate as to the legitimacy of such player 
restrictions in light of the nature of international cricket, and especially 
whether such restrictive practices are legitimate in light of the short 
duration of a competition such as the ICL and, especially, where such 
·participation is in overseas competitions which may be viewed as being 
out-of:·seasori in terms of the domestic game. It is submitted that this 
exercise would require weighing up the employers' interests against the 
nature of the professional cricket labour market and players' rights to 
· ·pursue employment elsewhere (where such alternative employment does 
not 'directly infringe on the rights or interests of the employer); 
The employee may not appropriate the employer's property to himself or 
make unauthorized use of it for a private enterprise; 864 
The employee may not use confidential information acquired during the 
course of his employment for his own benefit, or disclose such information 
to competitors (also following termination of the employee's employment). 
·.This prohibition does not relate to the employee's own knowledge or skills 
· (.even if acquired during employment with the employer) or to information 
that is generally known in the trade. 865 The information must be 
confidential, although this is a wide category of information and there are 
various types of information which .have been held by the courts to 
constitute confidential information. 866 In the sports context, this duty may 
be less applicable to players in most cases, although coaches and team 
managers may often be in possession of confidential information regarding 
team strategies, game plans, and even information regarding the fitness 
levels of or injuries to players at any given time. It is submitted that e.g. 
the disclosure of such confidential information to competitors or others 
(e.g. bookmakers in a cricket match-fixing scenario) may constitute breach 
866 Meter Systems Holdings Ltd v Venter & Another 1993 (1) SA 409 (W) 
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of the common law duty of an employee. This is especially poignant if one 
notes that another facet of the employee's duty of good faith relates to 
employees who are in a fiduciary position vis a vis their employer (i.e. in. a 
position of trust and confidence). Such an employee. may not place himself 
in a position where his own interests conflict with those of his employer, 
where he receives a secret profit' at the expense of the employer or where 
hE;! receives a bribe or commission from a third party by reason of his 
employment with the employer. 867 The existence of a fiduciary relationship 
is a question of fact and such a relationship is not limited to managerial 
emplo¥ees but may include others with a measure of discretionary 
- power. 8·68 
D The duty to obey the employer's instructions 
283 The employee is under a common law duty to obey the.reasonable and 
lawful instructions of the employer, and to behave in a respe.ctful mannerto the 
employer or other superiors. The refusal to obey a reasonable and lawful 
command may constitute insubordination, which at common law would justify 
summary dismissal of the employee if the refusal to obey the instruction or 
request is willful and serious. Persistent insolence (i.e. mere disrespect of the 
employer) may justify summary dismissal, as may an isolated instance which is of 
a very aggravated nature.869 
It is submitted that, while instances of insubordination may occur in the 
professional sporting context, it is debatable to what extent the willful refusal by a 
867 Sharrock supra 410 
868 Ibid. In Phillips v Fieldstone Africa (Pty) Ltd & Another 2004 (3) SA 465 (SCA) the court held that the 
following factors are relevant to determining whether a relationship is a fiduciary one: 
1) Whether the employee had scope for the exercise of some discretion or power; 
2) Whether that discretion or power can be used unilaterally to affect the beneficiary's legal or practical 
interests; and 
3) Whether there existed a peculiar vulnerability to the exercise of that discretion or power. 
869 Sharrock supra 411 
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player to obey the instructions of coaching staff on the field of play during a 
match would justify dismissal. The exigencies and characteristics of dynamic on-
field performances may make it very difficult to prove that the player's conduct 
constituted a willful refusal to perform in terms of e.g. a game plan or strategy of 
play. It is less clear whether blatantly unlawful conduct by a player on the field of 
play (e.g. attacking a spectator or certain instances of brawling with opponents) 
may~ constitute grounds for inferring a refusal to obey an implied instruction by 
the employer to refrain from unlawful play, thus constituting grounds for 
summary dismissal on the basis of breach of the common law duty. This would 
depend on the circumstances of any given case. 
E The duty to refrain from misconduct 
284 There is a general duty on the employee to refrain from miscond.uct (over 
and above the specific duties discussed above), which includes drunkenness, 
idleness or sleeping on the job, and lying to the employer. Negligent conduct by 
the employee may suffice to constitute misconduct. Misconduct need also not be 
directed at the employer himself (e.g. sexual harassment of a co-employee would 
constitute misconduct). 870 
The employer's remedies for the employee's_ misconduct may vary according to 
the provisions of the contract of employment as well as the degree of seriousness 
of the misconduct, between disciplinary action short of dismissal (e.g. a warning) 
or dismissal. It should be noted that the Labour Relations Act allows for an 
employee to be fairly dismissed on the basis of misconduct. The reader is referred 
to par 286 et seq below for discussion of the requirements in this regard. 
Apart from the applicable implied common law duty to refrain from misconduct as 
contained in the employment contract, it is important to note also that the rules of 
870 Sharrock supra 411-412 
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sports organisations often (invariably) also place a duty on professional athletes 
to refrain from 'bringing the sport into disrepute', what has been described as 
often functioning as a 'catch all' provision designed to cover misconduct which is 
not specifically provided for in more focused rules (and often including misconduct 
off the field of play and strictly s.peaking outside the player employee's direct 
employment). 871 As has been observed, there may be different standards for 
·different sports and even that a different level of behaviour may be expected from 
players in, different positions; accordingly, it is important that such a rule should 
be applied consistently by a disciplinary committee. 872 
285 Furthermore, the employment contract may of course also contain specific 
provisions regarding misconduct as well as sanctions for such misconduct. By way 
of example, the 2008 Standard Players~ Contract in rugby in force between 
provincial unions and players (as negotiated between SARPA873 and SARE0874) 
contains the following Annexure ('AnnexureVI: Disciplinary Code and Procedure'): 
DISCIPLINARY CODE AND PROCEDURE 
1. Purpose 
1.1. The purpose of this code is to inform Players of the standards of conduct 
required of them, and to assist administrators to apply discipline in a fair 
manner. 
1.2. The Code will not be applied in an inflexible manner. In particular, the 
merits of each case will be considered. 
871 See Lewis, A & Taylor, J Sport: Law and Practice Butterworths LexisNexis 2003 at 61-62 
872 Ibid. 
873 South African Rugby Players' Association, the registered trade union which represents the majority of 
professional rugby players and which is the recognised collective bargaining agent for professional rugby 
players in terms of the provisions of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 
874 South African Rugby Employers' Organisation, the registered employers' organisation which represents the 
14 provincial rugby unions which employ professional rugby players and which is the recognised collective 
bargaining agent rugby employers in terms of the provisions of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 
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2. Principles 
2.1.1. Players have rights and responsibilities. They are entitled to be treated 
fairly, and the Province is entitled to expect satisfactory conduct and 
performance. 
2.1.2. The Provinces endorse th·e corrective approach to discipline. They will 
seek to address unacceptable conduct through counseling and 
warnings, and will only impose disciplinary suspension or dismissal 
where Players are gu.ilty ·of serious misconduct have not responded to 
corrective disciplinary m~asu·res. 
3. Misconduct and Action to be Taken 
3.1. Counseling 
The purpose of counseling is to~advise the Player that his conduct is 
unacceptable and to secure his undertaking to address it. Unless the situation 
demands otherwise, the Province will always consider the use of informal 
counseling prior to other disciplinary action. 
3.2. Warnings 
·Depending on the seriousness of the offence, and taking all circumstances into 
.consideration, the. Province may issue a verbal warning, a written warning or a 
final written warning. The Province shall ask the Player for his side of the story 
before issuing a warning. 
The person issuing the disciplinary warning must decide the period for which 
the warning will be valid. The following will be used as a guideline: verbal and 
written warnings will remain valid for up to 6 months, and final written 
warnings for up to 12 months. An expired warning may be taken into account 
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as an aggravating factor where a pattern of misconduct has been established, 
and in cases of serious misconduct. 
3.3·. Termination. of Service 
.A Player's services may be terminated where the Player is found guilty of 
misconduct justifying dismissal under the Code of Good Practice: Schedule 8 
Labour .Relations·Act 66 of 1995. 
Save in exceptional.circumstances, a disciplinary hearing must precede 
termination of services. The purpose of a disciplinary hearing is to enable the 
Province to: establish the facts; reach a fair decision regarding the players' 
guilt; and decide on an applicable sanction. 
A disciplinary hearing should comply with the following principles -
i) The Chairperson of the hearing must be unbiased. If practicable, the 
Chairperson should be a person who was not directly involved in the 
incident. However, there is no duty upon the Province to use an outside 
Chairperson. 
ii) A Player must be notified in writing of the alleged offence, and the 
date, time and venue of the hearing. Written notification must be given 
to the Player at leastthree working days before the date of the hearing. 
Should the Player require additional time, he must request a 
postponement in good time, setting out why the time is insufficient and 
how much time he needs. The request must be directed to the CEO of 
the Province. 
iii) At the hearing a Player may be represented by an official of SARPA or a 
fellow Player, the Player's registered agent or manager, or a fellow 
player. For the purposes of this clause, a fellow Player means a Player 
who is employed by the same Province. 875 
875 It should be noted that even if a disciplinary code does not expressly permit legal representation, or its 
wording, as here, implies no legal representation, a disciplinary chairperson must still entertain applications to 
be represented by a legal representative and permit it if it would be unfair not to permit it. The chairperson, 
333 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
,. • < 
·iv) Should the hearing be conducted in a language with which the Player is 
not fully conversant, the Player shall be entitled to an interpreter. 
v) The Player shall be entitled to call witnesses of his own, and will be 
·. given an opportunity to cross-examine any witnesses that the Province 
calls. 
vi) After the hearing the Province must communicate the Chairperson's 
decision to the Player in writing. 
3.4. Sanctions 
Before imposing a sanction for misconduct the Province will take into 
consideration the guidelines set below. 
GUIDELINES FOR IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS 
NATURE OF MISCONDUCT SANCTION 
.. 
1. VERY SERIOUS OFFENCES INCLUDE OFFENCES 
SUCH AS: 
~"{ 
1.1. Dishonesty of any nature, for example, theft_, 
bribery, fraud, falsification, forgery. Dismissal 
L2. Misrepresentation or false declaration of any 
nature. Dismissal 
1.3. Use or disclosure of confidential information 
relating to .the Province or another Player. Dismissal 
when considering the application, may take into account relevant issues, including whether the matter will deal 
with complicated issues of fact or law, the relative abilities of the parties etc - see Hamata and Another v 
Chairperson, Peninsula Technikon Internal Disciplinary Committee and Others 2002(7) BCLR 756 (SCA). 
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1.4. . Assault, intimidation, harassment of, or 
threats to, employees of the Province, 
supporters etc. 
1.5. Bringing or attempting to bring the name of 
the Province into disrepute. 
1.6. Refusal without good reason to obey lawful 
and reasonable instructions. 
1. 7. Absence from work without permission and/or 
not advising the Province for a period of 5 or 
more consecutive working days without good 
reason. 
1.8. Willful or malicious damage to property of the 
Province and/or of fellow Players. 
1.9. Willful non-performance. 
2. SERIOUS OFFENCES INCLUDE OFFENCES SUCH AS: 
2.1. Being under the influence of drugs or intoxicating 
liquor (excluding drugs prescribed by a medical 
practitioner to remedy a medical condition). 
2.2. Being rude, abusive or unapproachable and 
exhibiting other disruptive behavior that affects 
the relationship with colleagues and the 
Province. 
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2.3. Failure to ad.here to the Province's laid~:down 
procedures, policies, rules and regulations that 
_apply from time to time. Final warning 
3. LESS SERIOUS OFFENCES INCLUDE OFFENCES SUCH 
AS: 
3.f.' F=ailure to ~se the Grievance Procedur~ and 
instead, discUS$ing grievances with third parties 
I non-involved Players. Written warning 
. ' . :. !" 
3.2. Extended breaks, late arrival I early departure. Written warning 
- .. 
3.3. Short absences from work without a valid reason 
-·-or permission. Written warning 
§7 Termination of the contract 
I Termination by the employer 
286 At common law a contract can be lawfully terminated in whatever way the 
contract provides (e.g. the giving of the requisite notice where such notice is 
provided for in the contract would not amount to breach). Acceptance of 
repudiation of his or her obligations by the other party to the contract would also 
bring the contract to an end. In terms of the common law contract of 
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employment, the employer woufd "also be entitled to summarily dismiss the 
employee in cases of serious breach of such employee's duties (e.g. for willful and 
serious insubordination). These common law rights in respect of termination of 
the employment contract must however be read in light of the requirement of 
fairness deriving from the labour legislation and which infuses the relationship. 
In terms of the Labour Relations Act the dismissal of an employee must be both 
for a fair reason and in terms of a fair procedure. A fair reason in terms of the Act 
entails a reason related to the employee's conduct or capacity _or the operational 
requirements of the business. 
287 'Dismissal' is defined in the LRA876 as including the following situations: 
Where an employer has terminated a contract of employment with or 
without notice; 
Where an employee reasonably expected the employer to renew a fixed 
term contract of employment on the same or similar terms but the 
employer offered to renew it on less favourable terms, or did not renew 
it;877 
Where an employer refused to allow an employee to resume work after she 
took maternity leave in terms of any law, collective agreement or her 
contract of employment; 
Where an employer who dismissed a number of employees for the same or 
similar reasons has offered to re-employ one or more of them but has 
refused to re~employ another; or 
876 Section 186 
877 As has been observed, the origin of this ground for unfair dismissal in the Labour Relations Act is found in 
the previous unfair labour practice as developed by the erstwhile industrial courts. Under the common law, the 
failure or refusal to renew a fixed-term contract was not open to challenge by the employee, even if there were 
indications that the contract would be renewed, provided the employer had provided the required notice. This 
practice was open to abuse by employers. With the introduction in 1979 of the unfair labour practice doctrine in 
the then Labour Relations Act of 1956, the courts started to require the employer to provide a good reason for 
the non-renewal of the contract, and this·concept of fairness in the context of this type of dismissal was 
eventually incorporated in the right to fair labour practices contained in section 23 of the Bill of Rights as well 
as the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 - Le Roux 2006/1-2 International Sports Law Journal 56 at 57. 
This form of dismissal, which is especially relevant in the context of professional sport (and the prevalence of 
fixed-term player contracts), will be examined in more detail below 
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Where an employee terminated a contract of employment with or without 
notice because the employer made continued employment intolerable for 
the employee (so-called .'constructive dismissal'). 
288 The employee bears the onus of proving that a dismissal within the above 
meaning of section 186 of the LRA has taken place, and once such a dismissal has 
been established, the employer bears the onus of establishing that such dismissal 
was both substantively (i.e. for a. reason related to the employee's conduct, 
capacity or the operational requirements of the business) and procedurally fair. 
Section 187 marks certain forms of dismissal to be automatically unfair. These 
include a dismissal based on the employee's participation in protected strike 
action,878 a dismissal aimed at compelling an _employee to accept the employer's 
demand in respect of any matter of mutual interest between the employer and the 
employe·e, 879 a dismissal based on the employee's taking action or indicating an 
intention·to take action against the employer by exercising any right conferred by 
the LRA or for participating in any proceedings in terms of the LRA,880 a dismissal 
based on an employee's pregnancy, intended pregnancy or any reason related to 
her pregnancy,881 and a dismissal where the reason for such dismissal is that the 
employer unfairly discriminated against the employee, directly or indirectly, on 
any arbitrary ground (including, ?ut not limited to, race, gender, sex, ethnic or 
social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, 
political opinion, culture, language, marital status or family responsibility). 882 In 
terms of this last, section 187(2) provides that a dismissal may be fair if the 
reason for such dismissal is based on an inherent requirement of the particular 
job, and that a dismissal based on age is fair if the employee has reached the 
normal or agreed retirement age for persons employed in that capacity. 
878 Section 187(1)(a) 
879 Section 187(1)(c) 
880 Section 187(1)(d) 
881 Section 187(1)(e) 
882 Section 187(1)(f) 
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In a case where the employer.is unable to,show that dismissal was substantively 
fair, the employee is in principle entitled to reinstatement or, alternatively, 
compensation not exceeding twelve months' remuneration 883 (or a·maximum of 
24 months' remuneration where the dismissal was an automatically unfair 
dismissal884). If the dismissal was found to have been only procedurally unfair, the 
employee is only entitled to compensation (also subject to a maximum of twelve 
months' remuneration) and not to reinstatement. 885 
289 By way of summary in respect of the difference between the common law 
rules relating to termination of the contract and those as established in terms of 
the labour legislation, the following sho1.:Jld be noted. At common law an indefinite 
contract can be terminated by either party by giving the·agreed notice and in 
most cases it can be given in the absence of any reason to terminate; The 
statutory position is that the dismissal must be fair aryd the requirements for a fair 
dismissal are the existence of a fair reason.and the following of fair pre-dismissal 
procedures (e.g. in dismissals relating to conduct, even if there is a breach of 
contract, dismissal will only be warranted if the breach is serious or repeated and 
the sanction of dismissal is appropriate). Also, the -statutory right not to be 
unfairly dismissed (in terms of section 185 of the Labour Relations Act) trumps an 
employer's common law entitlement to terminate a·contract of employment by 
giving the required notice or by terminating the contract without notice where 
summary dismissal is warranted. Moreover it has been held886 that the common 
law rules relating to the contract of employment, developed in accordance with 
section 39(2) and section 23(1) of the Bill of Rights, incorporate the right not to 
be unfairly dismissed as an implied contractual term. The statutory concept of 
dismissal is wider than the common law concept of a termination of employment 
and includes a number of situations that would not ordinarily be thought of as 
883 Section 194(1) 
884 Section 194(3) 
885 See Jordaan in Basson & Loubser Sport and the Law in South Africa supra at Ch 8-27 
886 Old Mutual Life Assurance Co SA Ltd v Gumbi (2007) 8 BLLR 699 (SCA); Boxer Superstores Mthathwa & 
Another v Mbenya (2007) 8 BLLR 693 (SCA) 
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dismissal (e.g. a failure to renew.a fixed-term contract or a resignation may 
constitute a dismissal in certain circumstances, 887 and not every termination of 
employment is a dismissal - e.g. the expiry of a fixed term contract of 
employment). 
A Dismissal through non-renewal of fixed-term contracts in sport 
·290 - In the context of professional sport, and specifically in light of the 
prevalence of fixed-term player contracts, the form of unfair dismissal as provided 
for in section 186 of the LRA is of special importance. Section.186(1)(b) provides 
that it is a dismissal where 'an employee reasonably expected the employer to 
renew a fixed term contract of employment ori the same or similar terms but the 
employer offered to renew it on less. favourable terms, or did not renew it.' Le 
Roux888 has pointed out that, in order to prove this type of dismissal, the 
employee must show that s/he harboured a reasonable expectation that the 
contract would be renewed on the same or similar terms: 
'Employees either have a reasonable expectation of renewal or they do not. They 
have a reasonable expectation of renewal if the objective facts ... show that the 
employee reasonably expected the contract to be renewed.'889 
The factors to be taken into account in making this determination regarding a 
reasonable expectation include assurances given by the employer, the reason for 
entering into a fixed-term contract in the first place, and the number of times (if 
any) that the contract has been renewed. 890 Once the fact of the dismissal has 
been shown by the employee (in the light of the existence of a reasonable 
887 See the discussion in the section that follows 
888 Le Roux 2006/1-2 International Sports Law Journal 56 at 58 
889 Grogan, J ('Great expectations' (1999) 15(6) Employment Law 10 at 11), as quoted in Le Roux 2006/1-2 
International Sports Law Journal 56 at 58 
890 Le Roux 2006/1-2 International Sports Law Journal supra 58 and the authority quoted there in note 30 
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891 Ibid. 
expectation), such dismissal will be presumed to be unfair, and the employer will 
bear the onus (in terms of section 192 of the LRA) to prove that such dismissal 
was both substantively and procedurally fair in the circumstances. 891 
291 Professional athletes in the major sports have in recent years increasingly 
been faced with the situation of non-renewal of contracts and section 186(1)(b) 
has been invoked on a number of occasions where players have claimed a 
reasonable expectation of renewal and consequent unfair dismissal. Former star 
national. cricket batsman, Lance Klusener, reached a reportedly lucrative out-of-
court settlement with the United Cricket Board in 2003 after referring an unfair 
dismissal claim to the CCMA following the non-renewal.of his contract to play for 
the national team. 892.Cricket coach Hylton Ackerman also succeeded· in the CCMA 
with an unfair dismissal clai.m against the United Cricket Board oil the basis of 
non-renewal of his contr.act. 893 The following discussion will focus on a case study 
of the application of section 186(1)(b) in the sports context. 
-. 
Case study - SARPA on behalf of Bands & Others v SA Rugby (Pty) Ltd 
292 In a high profile matter involving three national team ('Springbok') rugby 
players, the CCMA made a ruling of unfair dismissal in terms of section 186(1)(b) 
in the 2005 case of SA Rugby Players Association {SARPA) on behalf of Bands & 
Others I SA Rugby {Pty) Ltd. 894 Le Roux has succinctly summarized the facts and 
the reasons for the CCMA's finding :895 
892 Le Roux 2006/1-2 International Sports Law Journal supra 57 
893 Ackerman & Another and United Cricket Board (2004) 25 Industrial Law Journal 353 (CCMA); Le Roux supra 
57 
894 [2005] 2 Butterworths Arbitration Law Reports 209 (CCMA) 
895 Le Roux 2006/1-2 International Sports Law Journal supra 58-9 
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'This arbitration· award deals with the contractual position of three rugby players, 
- [Victor] Matfield, [Christo] Bezuidenhout and [Richard] Bands ... At the time, once a 
player was selected for the national team he would normally be contracted by SA 
: Rugby (Pty) Ltd (the employer in this matter), either on a match-by-match basis or 
for a period. All 3 players were given contracts for the 2003 [IRB Rugby World 
·Cup]. These contracts were for three months and commenced in September 2003 
~· and terminated at the end of November 2003. In addition to this, Matfield already 
- ~·had a twelve month contract to play for the national team during 2003. The 
contract terminated in December 2003. He had had a twelve month contract with 
~··the emp.loyer since 2000, which had been renewed in 2001, 2002 and 2003. Since 
2003 the players had no direct dealings with SA Rugby. All the national players 
negotiated their contracts directly with [the national team coach at the time, Rudolf 
Straeuli] and he in turn liaised with the CEO of SA Rugby (Pty) Ltd. 
Despite the team's poor performance all three players performed well at the 2003 
[Rugby World Cup] and were generally complimented by the coach (Straeuli) and 
the media. After the 2003 RWC all three received letters from the coach which they 
interpreted as suggesting that they formed part of his future plans. Subsequently 
all three were told in person by Straeuli that they formed part of his future plans. 
Straeuli resigned during December 2003 when new management took over the 
affairs of SA Rugby and the three players' contracts were not renewed for 2004. 
The South African Rugby Players Association (SARPA) referred an unfair dismissal 
dispute to the CCMA on behalf of the players, relying on section 186(1)(b) of the 
LRA: The arbitrator had little difficulty in finding that the players had a reasonable 
expectation that their contracts would be renewed and that they were thus 
dismissed. 
[The arbitrator made the following observations regarding SA Rugby's argument 
that there was no objective basis for the players' reasonable expectation as a result 
of the team's poor performance, the coach's subsequent resignation and its change 
of management:] 
The evidence before me (from both parties) indicates that the professional 
rugby environment is insecure and uncertain, characterised by a frequent 
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change in coaches (each of whom have a different approach as to how 
contracts should be awarded and structured) and change in management, 
with no clear policies or guidelines in respect of how contracts should be 
awarded or structured. Such an environment can result in unfair treatment 
·-· . 
and employees need to be protected. Despite a change in management, 
the legal entity remains the same. Players are therefore entitled to rely on 
the word of-a coach who ha,s implied authority and creates an expectation 
that they _will be given contracts. Furthermore, I have already found that 
despite the _fact the team did not perform well in the World Cup the 
performance of the applicants during the World Cup was .outstanding, and it 
was evident that the coach wanted to keep and develop the talents of the 
tight five after the World Cup. 
The employer also relied on the players' contracts that clearly stated that none of 
the individual players might entertain any expectation that the contract would be 
renewed upon expir:y. This argument did not impress the arbitrator since it is a well 
est.ablished principle that, while the wording of the contract is important, conduct 
subsequent to the conclusion of the contract (as was found to be the case in this 
matter) may give rise to a reasonable expectation. 
[The arbitrator further rejected the employer's argument that the coach had no 
authority to give undertakings to the players, and thus was not in a position to 
make promises or create expectations. On the evidence of the players they only 
dealt with the coach when contracts were negotiated, and the coach was thus held 
to have had implied authority to promise and negotiate contracts.]' 
The CCMA held that the players had shown the non-renewal of their contracts to 
constitute dismissal, and that the employer had failed to show (in terms of section 
192(2) of the LRA) that such dismissals were for a fair reason and in accordance 
with a fair procedure. Compensation in terms of section 194 of the LRA was 
awarded to all three players: Matfield was awarded the amount of ZAR 400 000 
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(the amount of the annual retainer he had been paid in terms of his 2003 
contract, and which amount he ·expected to be paid in 2004 ), while Bezuidenhout 
and Bands were each awarded ZAR 300 000 (the amount of the minimum 
retainers paid in terms of the 2003 annual contracts). 896 
293 Le Roux has suggested that there are two aspects of the CCMA's award 
that may be .worth revisiting. 897 The author argues that it is doubtful that the 
players' expectation of renewal of their contracts was reasonable in the 
circumstances; .in light of th.e hi§hly-publicised in South African rugby at the time, 
the fact that is was also commonly known that the coach's resignation or 
dismissal was imminent at the time, and also that players know very well that 
different coaches prefer different playing styles and that a player who is the first 
choice in one coach's team may very well be a non-starter in another coach's 
team. 898 The author expressed the hope that the Labour Court would provide 
clarity regarding the role of surrounding circumstances in the determination of 
whether a player's expectation of renewal is reasonable (circumstances outside 
the player-employer/coach relationship). It is submitted that this is especially 
· relevant in light of the arbitrator's express recognition in Bands that the 
professional rugby environment (as other professional sports) is an insecure and 
uncertain environment. 
294 Le Roux also expressed doubt as to whether the position of Victor Matfield 
was comparable to that of Bezuidenhout and Bands. While Matfield had had 
successive annual contracts with SA Rugby since 2000 in addition to the 2003 
Rugby World Cup contract, the other two players only had the three month RWC 
896 The CCMA rejected Bands' further claim for ZAR l,5m based on his having, on the strength of the 
reasonable expectation of renewal created by the coach, declined an offer to play for a British club for this 
amount in 2004. It was held that the compensation for unfair dismissal is subject to a statutory maximum, and 
also that the purpose of section 194 of the LRA was to place the employee in the positions/he would have been 
if the dismissal had not taken place (i.e. in which event Bands would not have been entitled to anything more 
than the ZAR 300 000 retainer from SA Rugby (Pty) Ltd). See Le Roux 2006/1-2 International Sports Law 
Journal supra 58-9 
897 Le Roux supra 59 
898 Ibid. 
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899 Ibid. 
900 Ibid. 
contract. It is doubtful that a reasonable expectation in terms of section 186(1)(b) 
would include an expectation of a contract different in nature and substance to 
the existing contract (i.e. the 2003 RWC contract). Le Roux argued that the failure 
by SA Rugby to offer a twelve month contract to Bezuidenhout and Bands did. not 
constitute a dismissal within the meaning of the section. 899 
295 The author pointed out that the reality is that sports governing bodies in 
South Africa will always be prone to claims of the nature of the claim in the Bands 
case, in light of the fact that players' careers are short, that contracts are usually 
fixed term or short term, that South African team sports .have a history of high 
turnover of coaches (each favouring different players), and team composition is 
not only dependent on matters such as the form of players and strategy but also 
on capricious factors such as injuries and transformation. 900 Le Roux argued that 
collecti\le bargaining may play a role in addressing the problems faced by b·oth 
professional athletes and their employers in this regard: 
'Collective bargaining in South African sport .is still very immature, but the sports 
arena may be an area where collective bargaining can be employed to the benefit 
of both the sports governing bodies and the players. On.e of the reasons advanced 
in the SARPA case for players to have security of income (in the form of retainers) 
is that income protection insurance (in the case of injuries) can only be obtained if 
a player has a fixed income (as opposed to being paid on a match-by-match basis 
only). In South Africa a high premium is placed on collective bargaining. If the right 
to rely on section 186(1)(b) of the LRA is excluded in a collective bargaining 
agreement in exchange for proper income protection schemes, perhaps partly 
funded by the employer/governing body, it is difficult to imagine that a court ill not 
enforce it. While such an arrangement will probably force the parties to manage the 
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negotiation of contracts differently,.it will provide more security to all concerned in 
an industry that is inherently insecure.'901 
While it is submitted that there is merit in this suggestion, it may not be 
unproblematic for the simple reason that there may (and are bound .to) be cases 
where, on the circumstances surrounding the non-renewal of a player's fixed term 
contract, a elear and reasonable expectation within the meaning of section 
186(1).(q) ·is found to exist. Denial of the. remedy for unfair dismissal as provided 
for in the section by means of a collective agreement may deprive such player 
from benefits (by means of the compensation payable in terms of the LRA) that 
exceed the benefits from such collectively agreed income protection schemes in 
• circumstances where equity and fairness demand otherwise. 
901 Ibid. 
296 On review of the CCMA's award in the SARPA obo Bands & Others matter, 
the Labour Court (by way of Gerring AJ) 902 held that the CCMA commissioner's 
reasoning and conclusion in respect of Matfield's contract was justified and 
dismissed the review application, and held that it had not been shown that 
Bezuidenhout and Bands had a reasonable expectation that their fixed-term 
contracts would be renewed by SA Rugby on the same or similar terms, and that 
the commissioner's finding to the contrary was not supported on an objective and 
rational basis. 
SARPA (the professional players' association) subsequently appealed the part of 
the Labour Court's judgment which upheld the review application by SA Rugby in 
respect of Bands and Bezuidenhout, and SA Rugby cross-appealed against that 
part of the judgment of the Labour Court which dismissed the review application 
in respect of Matfield. In the Labour Appeal Court's judgment (at the time of 
writing unreported903), Tlaletsi AJA held904 that the central question for 
902 SA Rugby (Pty) Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration & Others (2006) 27 Industrial 
Law Journal 1041 (LC) 
903 Case No. CA 10/2005, delivered 12 May 2008 
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determination was whether there was in fact a dismissal, and if it was found that 
there was no dismissal of the players on the facts that the CCMA lacked 
jurisdiction to hear the dispute in terms of section 191 of the Labour Relations 
Act. The court disagreed with the approach of the Labour Court in the earlier 
review proceedings: 905 
'The question before the court a quo [the Labour Court in the review proceedings] 
- was whether' on the facts of the case a dismissal had taken plai;::e. The question was 
not whether the finding of the commissioner [of the CCMA] that there had been a 
dismissal of the three players was justifiable, rational or reasonable. The issue was 
simply whether objectively ~peaking, the facts which would give the CCMA 
jurisdiction to entertain the dispute existed. If such facts did not exist th~ CCMA 
had no jurisdiction irrespective of its finding to the contrary.' 
In respect of determination of whether there had been a dismissal of the three 
players, the court held that section 186(1)(b) requires not only a reasonable 
expectation of renewal on the part of the employee and a failure to renew a fixed-
term contract or a renewal of such contract on less favourable terms by the 
employer, but also .that such contract should be capable of renewal. 906 The court 
confirmed that the test in terms of the section is an objective one, and that the 
enquiry is whether a reasonable employee would, in the circumstances prevailing 
at the time, have expected the employer to renew the, fixed-term contract on the 
same or similar terms. The court considered the players' evidence in support of 
their contention that such a reasonable expectation existed, namely their 
outstanding performances at the 2003 Rugby World Cup and the remarks made to 
them by the then coach, Straueli, and, in Matfield's case, the meeting in 
November 2003 where the coach had told Matfield that he was one of the senior 
players and that he (Straueli) wanted him as part of his plans for the 2004 
904 Zondo JP and Waglay JA concurring 
905 At par. 41 of the judgment 
906 At par. 43 of the judgment 
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-season. The court held·, however, that this evidence needed to be considered in 
light of other circumstances, specifically the provisions of the existing fixed-term 
contracts. In particular, the court stressed the importance of the.following 
provision (clause 3.2), which was contained in all three of the Rugby World Cup 
contracts (the- short contracts which were to exist only for the purpose_s of the 
tournament and. would run from 1 September 2003 to 30 November 2003): 
'As this is a fixed term.contract, it shall automatically terminate on [30 November 
2003] and the player acknowledges that he has no expectation that this contract 
will be renewed gn the terms herein contained, or on any other terms.'907 
The court held that this provision was ·of 'critical importance', and that it would be 
-expected of the,players to place more credible facts before the court to make their 
expectation reasonable in the face of clause 3.2. 908 The court continued to hold 
that the RWC 2003 contracts were for a specific event that came 'ilnd went, and 
that by its nature such a contract could not be renewed after the event, whether 
on the same or similar terms. Accordingly, it was held that Bezuidenhout and 
Bands could not have justifiably formed a reasonable expectation that their RWC 
2003 contracts would be renewed. The evidence showed that their alleged 
expectation related to being given standard players' contracts for a period of one 
year (for the 2004 season), and the court held that such contracts would differ 
materially from the RWC 2003 contracts as they would be for a different purpose. 
Accordingly, in respect of Bezuidenhout and Bands, the players had failed to show 
a dismissal in terms of section 186(1)(b). 
In respect of Matfield, whose position throughout had been viewed as different 
from the other two players in light of the facts and his prior contracts to play for 
the national team since 2001, the court held that the player's expectation of 
907 The court also referred to a number of exclusion and other provisions contained in clause 9 of this contract 
(e.g. that no representations had been made, that the agreement constituted the entire agreement between 
the parties and that any variation of the terms of the agreement shall be of no force or effect unless reduced to 
writing and signed by the parties). 
908, At par. 46 of the judgment 
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renewal of his standard players' contract was not a reasonable one. The reasons 
included the fact that the contract itself did not inake room for renewal, Matfield's 
concession in evidence that it was not the coach (Straueli) that decided on the 
substance of the contract but negotiations that would take place between the 
players' association SARPA and SA Rugby, and that it should have been clear to 
the players upon the termination of Straueli's employment with SA Rugby in 
December 2003 that they could not be guaranteed a place in the national team 
when a new coach was appointed. The court stated that the CCMA commissioner's 
criticism that the professional rugby environment is insecure, ·uncertain and 
characterized by frequent changes in managers (which the commissioner held 
constituted grounds for protecting players against prejudice) was not entirely 
valid, and that the employ.er (SA Rugby) must be responsive to changing· 
conditions. The court held specifi"cally that it would be absurd to allow ah outgoing 
coach to decide on the players his sutce·ssor- should include in his team. 909 
Finally, the court held that as the players' claims were based mainly on the 
promises made to them by the coach, they should perhaps have pursued other 
contractual remedie·s and not· have relied on the dismissal provisions of section 
186(1)(b); as there was no automatic renewal of contracts, but re-engagement 
on negotiated terms between the employer and players. 
297 Accordingly, the court found that none of the three players had ·managed 
to show that there had been a dismissal in the meaning of section 186(l)(b) of 
the LRA, and that the CCMA had not had jurisdiction to hear the dispute. 
Accordingly, the court dismissed the players' association's appeal against the 
finding of the Labour Court which upheld SA Rugby's review application in respect 
of Bezuidenhout and Bands, and the Labour Appeal Court upheld SA Rugby's 
cross-appeal against the part of the Labour Court's judgment which dismissed the 
review application in respect of Matfield. 
909 At par. 52 of the judgment 
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298 It is·submitted that the importance of this protracted matter in respect of 
the application of section 186(1)(b) of the Labour Relations Act (in the spo_rting 
context in respect of the non-renewal.of fixed-term contracts), lies in the Labour 
Appeal Court's recognition of the insecure and uncertain environment in 
professional.rugby (and other sports): It would be a difficult onus for a player to 
discharge in order to prove a reasonable expectation of renewal of a fixed term 
contr:a<::t which is for a limited duration, specifically, for a number of practical 
reasons. However, ·each case must be considered on its own merits, and 
circumstances may arise where sufficient and cogent evidence in this regard is 
available. However, it is submitted that there is merit in Le Roux's observations as 
discussed earlier, regarding the potential role of the collective bargaining process 
in regulating players' reliance on this form of dismissal and the employers' 
interest in maintaining the necessary flexibility in the face of the uncertainties that 
surround the professional sports labour market. 
Other forms of dismissal in terms of the Labour Relations Act 
B Dismissal for misconduct 
299 'Misconduct' refers to situations where the employee through his or her 
own fault fails or refuses to carry out the duties for which he or she h_as been 
hired, or contravenes a rule relating to the way in which employees are required 
to conduct themselves. 910 Generally, dismissal should only follow if the misconduct 
is so serious that it makes a continued employment relationship intolerable. 
Misconduct which is not sufficiently serious to justify dismissal (e.g. lateness or 
absenteeism) may justify dismissal if the employee does not respond to a series 
910 Jordaan supra Ch 8-27 
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911 Ibid. 
912 Ibid. 
of warnings. 911 For less serious forms of misconduct the employer should follow 
progressive disciplinary sanctions that might range from verbal reprimands to 
I 
final written warnings or suspension without pay. 912 
300 Schedule 8 ofthe Labour Relations Act contains a Code of Good Practice: 
Dismissal, Which provides guidelines in order to determine whether an employee 
is guilty of misconduct and also as to appropriate sanctions. The Code enjoins any 
person considering whether a dismissal for misconduct is unfair to consider -
whether or not the employee contravened a rule or standard regulating 
conduct in the workplace; and 
if a rule or standard was contravened, whether or not -
o the rule was a valid or reasonable rule or standard; 
o the employee was aware, or could reasonably be expected to have 
been aware, of the rule or standard; 
o the rule or standard has been consistently applied by the employer; 
and 
o dismissal was an appropriate sanction for the contravention of the rule 
or standard. 
The LRA does not prescribe a particular procedure to be followed for a disciplinary 
enquiry, but the Code of Good Practice: Dismissal provides certain guidelines in 
this regard. 913 
913 In Item 4 of the Code, which includes the following: 
The employer should normally conduct an investigation to determine whether there are grounds for 
dismissal. The employee should be notified of the allegations forming the basis of the enquiry, s/he should 
be afforded a reasonable opportunity to state a case in response to such allegations (and reasonable 
opportunity to prepare such response), ands/he should be entitled to the assistance of a trade union 
representative or fellow employee. Following a decision, such decision should be communicated to the 
employee, preferably in the form of written notification of such decision; 
If the employee is dismissed, s/he should be given the reason for such dismissal and reminded of any 
rights to refer the matter to a council with jurisdiction or to the CCMA; 
In exceptional circumstances, if the employer cannot be reasonably expected to comply with these 
guidelines, the employer may dispense with pre-dismissal procedures. 
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301 In the professional sporting context, the fairness of any dismissal for 
alleged misconduct by a professional athlete would of course have to be 
determined also in light of the applicable terms of the employment contract. 
Players' contracts will often exhaustively cover forms of conduct that are 
outlawed; as referred to elsewhere, these often include forms of conduct that are 
strictly speaking outside the sphere of on-field performance of the athlete's 
sporting services and relate to the private life of the athlete. Examples of such 
provisions abound in professional sports in most jurisdictions, and range from 
provisions prohibiting 'tapping up'914 to provisions regarding players' participation 
in potentially hazardous recreational activities. 915 Where such provisions apply, 
See Jordaan supra Ch 8-28 
914 An independent commission of inquiry of the FA Premier League imposed substantial fines on Chelsea 
Football Club (£300 000), Chelsea manager Jose Mourinho (£200 000) and Arsenal player Ashley Cole (£100 
000), for their involvement in a 'tapping up' scandal. The commission found that Cole and Mourinho had been 
guilty of attending a clandestine meeting with Chelsea FC at a London restaurant on 27 January 2005, in order 
to conduct negotiations for a transfer by Cole to the club. Cole, who was still under contract with Arsenal, was 
held to have contravened Premier League Rule KS, which governs approaches by contracted players to clubs 
and prohibits players from making such an approach without the permission of their employing club. Chelsea 
were found to be in breach of Rule K3, which contains a similar prohibition on clubs approaching contracted 
players, and Mourinho of breaching Rule Q regarding managers' conduct. The commission declined to also order 
compensation to be paid to Arsenal FC, as had been requested. Two players' agents, who were also alleged to 
have been involved in the transaction, were not sanctioned, as they did not resort under the jurisdiction of the 
League. The League indicated, however, that they would pass on the commission's findings to the Football 
Association, which, in turn, would pass it on to FIFA. 
915 Players' contracts often contain a clause regulating the personal conduct of players in respect of activities 
that may hold the potential for physical injury - for example, clause 8.5 of the Australian Cricket Board's 
standard Match/Tour Contract 2001: 
'(a) During the Term, the Player will not, without the prior consent of the [Australian Cricket Board]: 
(i) engage in any dangerous or hazardous activity; 
(ii) put his own or other players' safety at risk; nor 
(iii) engage in any activity that in the reasonable opinion of the ACB may cause the Player injury or 
otherwise affect the Player's ability to perform his obligations under this Contract. 
(b) The Player acknowledges that activities that fall within the scope of paragraph (a) include, without 
limitation, the following: 
(i) flying in an aeroplane, helicopter or other airborne machine or device unless it is being operated by a 
major domestic or international airline or any of its subsidiaries ... ; 
(ii) participating in so-called "extreme sports"; 
(iii) any form of rugby, rugby league, gridiron, soccer or Australian Rules football ... ; and 
(iv) indoor or outdoor rock climbing, hang gliding, parachuting or bungy jumping.' 
Wise & Meyer International Sports Law and Business Kluwer Law International 1998 Vol.1 at 702 provide an 
extract from clause 8 of the World League of American Football standard players' contract: 
'Without priorwritten consent of League, Player will not engage in any activity other than football which may 
involve a significant risk of personal injury. Player represents that he has special, exceptional and unique 
knowledge, skill, ability and experience as a football player, the loss of which cannot be estimated with any 
certainty and cannot be fairly or adequately compensated by money damages.' 
See also Prinsloo 'Enkele Opmerkinge oar Spelerskontrakte in Professionele Spansport' ['Some observations on 
players' contracts in professional team sports'] 2000 (1) Journal of South African Law 229 at 232. 
Clause 9.1.6 of the South African rugby standard player's contract (Provincial) 2003 provided as follows: 
'During the Player's period of employment, the Player must not engage in any other sports or pastimes, 
including but not limited to absailing (sic), polo, steeple chasing, parachuting, ice-hockey, wrestling, boxing, 
martial arts, hang-gliding, paragliding and speed or durations tests or racing (other than on foot or in a yacht).' 
For more on the regulation of players' 'extracurricular conduct' by way of contract, see Griffith-Jones, D & Barr-
Smith, A (eds.) Law and the Business of Sport Butterworths, London, Edinburgh & Dublin 1997 at 176 et seq. 
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the athlete's conduct may of course constitute a direct breach of contract, which 
would entitle the employer to terminate the agreement for cause. 916 
C Dismissal for incapacity (ill health. or injury, or poor work 
performance) 
(i). Incapacity due to ill health or injury 
302 An employer who wishes to terminate an employee's services on the basis 
of ill health or injury should do so with circumspection, as it should be borne in 
mind that such dismissal would normally be a so-called 'no-fault dismissal' (which 
is not due to the fault of the employee a~ in the case of e.g. miscon_du~t). 
Accordingly, tt:ie employer is required to investigate the extent of the injury or ill 
health, arid also to consider alternatives short of dismissal in cases where the 
employee is likely to be absent for a time that is unreasonably long in the 
circumstances. Relevant factors in such consideration of alternatives are the 
nature of the job, the period of absence, the-seriousness of the injury or illness 
and the possibility of securing a temporary replacement for the employee. Where 
the incapacity is of a permanent nature, the employer should ascertain the 
possibility of securing alternative employment for the employee, or adapting the 
The players' contract often regulates players' conduct in respect of issues such as communication with the 
media, and sometimes such contracts even regulate where the player should live. E.g. clause 11(a) of the 
English FA Premier League and Football League standard players' contract, whereby the player agrees 'not to 
live anywhere the club deems unsuitable for the performance of his duties'. Lewis & Taylor (Sport: Law and 
Practice 2003, at 811 El.19 note 5) mention the example of a residence clause that was considered in the 
judgment of Macari v Celtic Football and Athletic Co Ltd [1999] IRLR 787 - football manager Lou Macari had 
agreed to comply with an obligation to reside within a 45-mile radius of George Square, Glasgow. His failure to 
do so was one of the reasons for his dismissal, which the Scottish Court of Session held to be lawful. 
Sometimes such measures are taken to the extreme: The 2nd King Commission Interim Report, following the 
cricket match fixing scandal in 2000, suggested a wide range of measures to combat corruption - these 
included suggestions for random lie detector testing of players, room and luggage searches, a right for the 
United Cricket Board of SA to monitor players' phone calls and e-mail communications, that only mobile phones 
provided to players by the UCBSA should be allowed and even that the possession of an unauthorised mobile 
phone should be a punishable offence (Judge E.L. King 2nd Interim Report: Commission of Inquiry into Cricket 
Match Fixing and Related Matters, Cape Town, December 2000). · 
916 See, for example, the Disciplinary Code and Procedure (Annexure VI of the 2008 Standard Players' Contract 
between players and provincial rugby unions) as reproduced in par 285 in the text above 
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duties or w.or~ circumstances of the employee in order to accommodate their 
disability. 917 · 
The employee should be afforded an opportunity to state· a case in response 
during such investigation and also to be assisted by a trade union representative 
or a fellow employee. 918 
The degree of incapacity is relevant to the fairness of a dismissal, as well as the 
cause of the incapacity. E.g. in the case of alcoholism or drug abuse, counseling 
or r~tiabflitation may be appropriate steps for an employer to consider. 919 
. . . . ,. .. ... 
The Code furthermore also provides guidelines in cases of dismissal arising from ill 
health or injury. 920 
.. 
' 
(ii) Incapacity due to poor work performance 
303 It should be noted that poor work performance may also be due to factors 
beyond the control of the employee (e.g. lack of skill or training), which might 
constitute d·ismissaLfor such incapacity as a 'no-fault dismissal'. Accordingly, 
dismissal for poor work performance will generally be fair if it can be shown by the 
employer that it took reasonable steps to address the employee's under-
performance; but without success. 921 
917 Code of Good Practice: Dismissal Item 10(1); Jordaan supra Ch 8-30 
918 Code of Good Practice: Dismissal Item 10(2) 
919 Code of Good Practice: Dismissal Item 10(3) 
92° Code of Good Practice: Dismissal Item 11: 
'Any person determining whether a dismissal arising from ill health or injury is unfair should consider -
(a) whether or not the employee is capable of performing the work; and 
(b) if the employee is not capable -
(i) the extent to which the employee is able to perform the work; 
(ii) the extent to which the employee's work circumstances might be adapted to 
accommodate disability, or, where this is not possible, the extent to which the 
employee's duties might be adapted; and 
(iii) the availability of any suitable alternative work.' 
The Code also provides that the duty on the employer to accommodate the employee is more onerous where 
the ill health or injury is work-related. See Jordaan supra Ch 8-30 
921 Jordaan supra Ch 8-28 
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Apart from guidelines·for the dismissal of employees who were placed on 
probation upon appointment, 922 the Code of Good Practice: Dismissal provides the 
following guidelines.in cases of dismissal for poor work performance: 
'Any person considering whether a dismissal for poor work performance is unfair 
should consider -
(a) vyhethe:r or not th~ employee failed to meet a performance standard; and 
(b) if the employee did not meet a required performance standard whether or 
not -
(i) the employee was aware, or could reasonably be expected to have 
been aware, of the required performance standard; 
(ii) the employee was given a fair opportunity to meet the required 
performance standard; ·and 
(iii) dismissal was an appropriate sanction for not meeting the required 
performance standard. '923 
304 In the context of the employment of athletes in professiona·1 sport, these 
guidelines must of course be read in the light of any applicable performance 
clauses contained in such athlete's employment contract. By way of example, the 
2008 Standard Players' Contract between players and the provincial rugby unions 
contains an annexure relating to a performance review procedure, which provides 
as follows: 
922 Code of Good Practice: Dismissal Item 8 
923 Code of Good Practice: Dismissal Item 9 
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/ 
PERFORMANCE REVIEW PROCEDURE 
1. Purpose 
The purpose of this procedure is to guide the Province when it has to deal with a 
poor performing player. 
The underlying approach is that the Province should take all reasonable steps to 
address under-performance before terminating a Player's contract for poor 
performance. 
2. Identification of performance standards and criteria 
At the beginning of the Player's.contract the Province will, in consultation with the 
Player, identify the performance standards that the Player is required to meet, and 
the criteria for determining whether the Player has met such standards. 
3. Continuous review of performance · 
3.1 The Province will monitor the Player's performance and provide him with 
feedback on a continuous basis. If the Player's performance is not meeting the 
required standard, the Province will meet with the Player to identify -
3.1.1 the area I areas in which the Player is under-performing; 
3.1.2 the possible causes thereof; 
3.1.3 measures to address the under-performance, including reasonable 
assistance from the Province; 
3.1.4 the timetable in which the Player must meet the required standard, which 
shall be reasonable in the circumstances. 
3.2 Should the Player not meet the required standard within such timetable the 
Province will either -
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3.2.1 grant the Player a furth.er period of time in which to meet the required 
standard; or 
3.2.2 convene a performance hearing. 
4 Performance hearing·. 
4.1 The Province may convene a performance hearing on at least 
72 hours written notice to the Player. · 
4.2 The Province will conduct the hearing in the presence of the Player and his 
representative. The player's representative may include a SARPA official or 
office-bearer, the player's registered agent or manager, or a fellow player. 
4.3 During the hearing the Province will advise the Player why it is considering 
terminating the Player's contract. 
4.4 The Player and I or his representative will have the opportunity to show 
cause why the Province should not terminate the contract: 
4.5 After considering the Player's representations, the Province will make its 
decision and give brief reasons for the decision. In giving its decisions, the 
Province will respond briefly to the representations made by the Player 
and/or his representative. 
305 As regards the matter of loss of form, it is submitted that poor 
performance for this reason, which is usually of a temporary nature, is to be 
expected in the normal course of events, and that there may be room for implying 
a tacit term in such contract to the effect that such temporary poor performance 
due to loss of form might constitute a justifiable reason for non-selection but not 
for a fair dismissal (depending, of course, on the circumstances and specifically 
the duration of such poor form). 
The athlete's loss of form will usually not be attributable to ill health. While injury 
is usually specifically addressed in the express terms of the sports employment 
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contr.act and also by means of·insurance cover (e.g. income replacement 
schemes), the loss of form relates to a situation where the player's level of 
performance is recurrently inhibited by any of a range of factors (including, often, 
a temporary loss of confidence). Sporting form, which is an ethereal concept at 
the best of times, may however also be. attributable to the athlete's level of fitness 
or other factors (.e.g. quality of training). Accordingly, while it is difficult to classify 
the reason for the loss of form, and such" reason must be determined on the facts 
of any given case, such loss will usually equate to a straightforward failure or 
·inability on the part of the athlete to render his or her services to the required 
performance standard. 
Therefore, most ·cases of loss of form fall to be examined in terms. of what may 
· am'ount to temporary breach of.c,ontract by the' player. However, where there are 
medical reasons for the loss of form, it·may resort under incapacity: Also, where 
the loss of form derives from a failure by" the athlete to comply with fitness levels 
(either.expressly determined·in the contract of employment or implied with 
reference to accepted minimum standards required in the light of the nature of 
the physical activity on the field of play), such loss could relate to misconduct on 
the part of the player employee. 
· 306 It is clear that a dismissal based on loss of form, the extreme remedy for 
the sports employer, may have to be carefully considered in order to ensure that 
justification for such ·dismissal is in accordance with the relevant reason for 
dismissal. However, it would seem that few athletes are dismissed from 
employment solely on the basis of a loss of form, which by its nature is 
temporary. The usual, and relatively uncontroversial, remedy for the sports 
employer is found in the widespread practice in professional sport of short, fixed-
term employment contracts. Where the athlete becomes a liability for the team it 
is safer (and relatively less expensive) to simply let the contract run its course 
and not renew it. While the issue of an athlete's dismissal from employment due 
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to loss of form is therefore a relatively straightforward exercise, in light of the 
specific labour law provisions regarding dismissal mentioned·above, such athlete's 
non-selection on the same grounds (which falls short of dismissal) may be more 
problematic. The practice of selection as applied in professional· sport is virtually 
unknown in employment in other sectors. Thus, a context-specific and context-
sensitive approach is required in evaluating the rights and interests of the 
respective parties. The following should be noted: 
924 Act 55 of 1998 
The non-selection of an athlete· who remains under ·contract does not, per 
se, constitute a 'dismissal' in terms of the Labour Relations Act; 
Accordingly, the provisions of Schedule 8 to the LRA relating to dismissal 
for incapacity (Item 8 of the schedule) or poor performance (Item 9 of the 
schedule) do not apply directly to the non-selection decision;·· · ~ · 
The practice of selection could relate to or constitute demotion or· 
promotion in terms of the LRA (and relate to and affect the provision of 
benefits .to the player), and non-selection could conceivably therefore also 
form the subject of. an unfair labour practice claim under section 
186(2)(a); 
The selection decision, if shown to be based on discrimination against the 
athlete in the meaning of section 6 of the Employment Equity Act,924 would 
be open to scrutiny in terms of the prohibition of unfair discrimination 
contained in Chapter II of the Act as relating to an 'employment policy or 
practice'; 
Due to the nature of professional sport (specifically the fundamental 
cornerstone of the industry and its labour market, namely the promotion 
and maintenance of competition), the practice of merit-based selection will 
in all cases constitute either an express or implied term of the player's 
contract of employment; 
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The issue of a player's performance may be expressly regulated in the 
contract by means of a performance clause, in which case the performance 
stali.dards and criteria set may be relevant not only to a decision to dismiss 
the player but also to the issue of non-selection; 
The selector or selection panel would normally form part of the employing 
union or governing body's management structure, with their functions and 
powers being subject to the relevant organisation's constitution; and 
While ·non-selection may in many cases have no direct financial 
consequences for a player (who would still receive his or her salary 
regardless of participation in matches), in many instances such non-
selection will affect the player directly (e.g. through loss of match fees and 
win ·bonuses) as-well as indirectly (in the 'secondary market'. of 
sponsorship and other forms of commercial exploitation of the player's 
celebrity or sporting reputation and drawing power) - again, this raises the 
possibility of an unfair labour practice claim in terms of section 186(2) of 
the LRA· relating to the provision of benefits. 
307 While the above remarks regarding the possible abuse or general potential 
for unfair treatment inherent in the right of selection hold true, it is important to 
note that the practice of selection is a key element and characteristic of 
(professional) team sports. And, despite the central role of labour legislation, 
South African courts have consistently emphasized the continued significance of 
the common law contract of employment, to the extent that 'the legal relationship 
between the parties must be gathered primarily from a construction of the 
contract which they concluded'. 925 Even though our courts have also recognized 
the unique nature and peculiar characteristics of the employment of players in 
925 SA Broadcasting Corporation v McKenzie (1999) 20 Industrial .Law Journal 585 (LAC) at 591E 
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professional team sports,926 it is important to note that the natural and 
fundamental importance of the selection process in sport constitutes a material 
term, either express or implied, of the contract of employment in this context. 
Clearly, any person entering employment in professional team sport would be 
deemed to be awa_re of the fact that the very nature of competition requires, in 
the normal course of events, that the strongest team should be picked to 
participate on the field of play at any given time. This necessitates a selection 
process,-whereby the relative merits and demerits of different participants are 
evaluated and, along with· other factors, taken into account in determining the 
strongest squad to take the field on match day. While the selection decision is 
often (or may often be perceived to be) subjective, participants are justified in 
demanding that the selection decision must at least be based on rational grounds 
and not completely arbitrary .• 
It can thus be argued that any professional team player by implication submits to 
this system of selection, and that in·cor-pqration of such a system also forms an 
important term, implied if not express, of the employment contract. 
The role of selectio.n, as well as the possible remedies for aggrieved players, if 
any, must be evaluated in this light, with due regard for the fact that it is 
questionable whether the athlete has a 'right to work' which might translate to a 
right to be selected to play in any given case. 927 Also, it should be noted that the 
employer has the right to set its own standards, and the courts are generally 
reluctant interfere with such standards unless grossly unfair or unreasonable. 
In this light, however, it worth considering the following in respect of non-
selection in the professional rugby context. It has been observed that the 
incentive provided to players by the current match fee system 928 is problematic in 
respect of the collective bargaining process, and '[s]hould SA Rugby decide to 
"punish" a player for enforcing his legal rights, the player can merely be dropped 
926 E.g. compare McCarthy v Sundowns Football Club (2003) 24 Industrial Law Journal 197 (LC) - discussed in 
par 401 below 
927 See the discussion in section above 
928 See the discussion below in the section on collective bargaining in professional sports 
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from the team and thus suffer a substantial financial loss. 929 In this regard, non-
selection could relate to or constitute ·demotion in terms of the LRA (and relate to 
and affect the provision of benefits to the player), and non-selection could 
conceivably therefore form the subject of an unfair labour practice claim under 
section 186(2)(a). 
D Dismissal for operational ·requirements 
308 This form of dismissal is.less relevant in the professional sports 
employment context, although cases· of redundancy of player employees due to 
the operational requirements of the employer may present themselves in practice. 
An interesting case study in this regard recently presented in South African 
domestic professional cricket (while a similar scenario presented in 2002 in 
football, when the South African Football Association bought out two clubs, Ria 
Stars and Free State Stars, in order to reduce the number of .clubs in the Premier 
League from 18 to 16). In the following discussion this example from domestic 
cricket will be examined merely with a view to illustrating the potential role of, 
specifically, the provisions of the Labour Relations Act which deal with dismissal of 
employees for operational requirements. 930 
309 The General Council of the United Cricket Board of South Africa (the 'UCB') 
voted in September 2003 to drastically cut the then existing 11 professional 
teams, which made up the domestic first class and limited overs competitions, to 
929 Smailes, S 'Sports Law and Labour Law in the Age of (Rugby) Professionalism: Collective Power, Collective 
Strength' (2007) 28 Industrial Law Journal 57 at 80 
930 In respect of the effect on the employment relations between the employer and its employee(s) of a transfer 
of the business of the employer, see sections 197 and 197A of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995; Sharrock 
supra at 399-402. 
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six franchises. 931 This decision was implemented in the 2004/5 season. The 
reasons given for the decision were both economic and sporting in nature: the 
substantial losses incurred by professional cricket competitions, due to the fact 
that revenue generated by gate money and sponsorship proved to be insufficient 
to cover the costs of such competitions; and also, it was believed that the 
competitive value of the competitions needed to be enhanced as the existing 
system created too large a step up between provincial and international 
professional cri.cket. 932 
This decision was accompanied by the formation of Cricket SA (Pty) Ltd, a 
company formed to function as the commercial arm of the UCB (similar to SA 
Rugby (Pty) Ltd, the commercial arm of the South African Rugby Union). Under 
the new system, domestic cricket in the SuperSport and Standard Bank sponsored 
- competitions would be played by six teams from six professional franchises. 933 · 
The provincial affiliates (or partnerships between such affiliates) were entitled to 
tender for such franchises, on the basis of criteria set by the -board of Cricket SA 
(Pty) Ltd and ratified by the UCB. 934 While this new systeni has limited the 
number of teams in professional competitions, the decision was accompanied by a 
restructuring of amateur cricket, to increase the number of teams competing at 
amateur level from 11 to 16. The rationale for this is said to be the continued 
development of the game in order to provide an improved feeder system for 
players from the amateur to the professional levels. 
The tendering process for franchises was marked by~ measure of controversy, 
which included legal action by the Griquas union following the awarding of the 
central region franchise to Free State. 
931 It is interesting to note that this development seems to run counter to developments elsewhere - compare 
the Pakistan Cricket Board's development of a new domestic cricket system in the 2001-2002 season, whereby 
more players were provided with an opportunity to compete at the higher levels of the game in domestic 
competitions. 
932 As explained by the then Vice-President of the UCB, Robbie Kurz - see 'Kurz praises new vision for SA 
cricket', The Daily News, 8 September 2003, at 14. 
933 The new franchises commenced competition with the introduction of the new format of Standard Bank-
sponsored Pro20 cricket, in April 2004. 
934 The deadline for tenders for franchises was set as 23 January 2004, and the announcement of franchises 
awarded was made on 31 January 2004. The franchises are as follows: Western Province/Boland; Dolphins 
(KwaZulu-Natal); Eastern Cape (Border and Eastern Province); Eagles (Free State); Highveld Lions (Gauteng 
and North West); and Titans (Northens and Easterns). 
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The UCB decision led to a drastic reduction in the number of cricketers who are 
able to pursue their chosen occupation by playing professional cricket in South 
Africa. The franchises established under the new system do not operate on the 
basis of the previous system of provincial teams - in certain geographical areas 
and regions the franchise team is selected from a combined base of candidates, 
with.the number of contracts available for players per franchise set at 18 
(including one international player). In the Western Cape, for instance, the 
previous Western Province and Boland players are now forced to compete for 
. . . 
positions in a single franchise team (the Cape Cobras). As a result, in this region 
alone, the pool of candidates for employment as contracted players has increased 
significantly, while the number of available contracts has bee_n halved. 
To the labour lawyer, this development immediately raises questions regarding 
the retrenchment of employees; and one is faced with the question whether the 
UCB decision equated to a dismissal of employees due to operational 
requirements as referred to in the Labour Relations Act. If so, one must ask 
whether this decision and its implementation was pursued in accordance with the 
Act's requirements for such dismissals. 935 A related question is whether, or to 
what extent, the restructuring decision has impacted on the supply and demand 
for services in the new franchise teams and, consequently, on the bargaining 
power of players and their terms and conditions of employment. 
An evaluation of the con~equences of the UCB decision 
310 As observed earlier, the professional cricketers affected by the UCB's 
decision are to be viewed as employees for th~ purpose of the applicable labour 
legislation. They were employees of the provincial cricket unions (affiliates of the 
UCB) and, where such players were also contracted by the UCB to represent the 
country in the national team, employees of the UCB for the purposes of such 
935 See, generally, section 189 of the LRA relating to consultation, the payment of severance pay and the 
selection of workers to be retrenched, discussed below. 
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representation. The following was stated specifically in respect of the employment 
of professional cricketers, in the case of Cronje v United Cricket Board of South 
Africa: 936 
'[The UCB] contracts players to play international cricket. The relationship with the 
contracted players is a direct employer-_employee relationship and is governed by 
the terms of their contracts of employment. National players are also members of 
clu_bs and_ play provincial cricket for the affiliates ... Players who are no_t selected for 
international cricket, but who play regular provincial cricket are contracted by the 
affiliates. The players' contracts bind them to the UCB and ICC codes of conduct. 
However, even players who are not contracted to an affiliate or to the UCB are 
bound by the code.of conduct as participants.' 
Accordingly, the provisions of the Labour Relations Act (the 'LRA') apply to such 
players and· their employers. 
Section 188 of the LRA provides that a dismissal that is not 'automatically 
unfair'937 is unfair if the employer fails to prove that the-reason for dismissal is a 
fair reason (inter alia) based on the employer's operational requirements. 938 
Section 189 lists the employer's duties in the event of a dismissal for operational 
or economic reasons, which include a duty to consult with employees and/or their 
representatives, a duty to disclose relevant information in such consultation, that 
matters such as the criteria for selection must be determined through such 
consultation (or alternatively must be fair and objective), consultation on 
alternatives to dismissal as well as the payment of severance pay to dismissed 
employees. 
311 In order to determine whether the UCB's decision equated to a dismissal of 
players for operational reasons, one must first of all determine whether it in fact 
936 2001 (4) SA 1361 (T) at 1367 
937 In terms of section 187 of the Act 
938 Section 188(1)(a)(ii) 
365 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
constitutes dismissal for the purposes of the Act. 'Dismissal' is defined by the 
LRA939 as· including the termination of a contract of employment by an employer, 
with or without notice; or a case where an employee reasonably expected the 
employer to renew a fixed term contract of employment on the same or similar 
terms but the employer offered to renew it on less favourable terms, or did not 
renew 1t at all. 940 
' The cricketers most directly affectea by the UCB decision 941 were all appointed in 
terms.~of fixed-term.contracts, the standard practice in professional sports. The 
main reaso.n for the limited au ration of such contracts is that one of the major 
criteria in the decision to contract players is that of form - is the player fit and in 
form,· and .therefore expectea to make a positive contribution to the team's 
performance in the specificseason? The general rule as applied in South African 
labour law is that the failure to renew a fixed-term contract wou.ld only constitute 
a 'dismissal' in the event that the employee had a reasonable expectation that 
such contract would. in fact be renewed - the employee must prove that he had a 
basis for reasonably expecting renewal (see section 186 (1) (b)·of the LRA 
above)~ 942' For those players midway through existing contracts, the termination of 
such contract in pursuit of th.e UCB decision could con.stitute a dismissal. But also, 
while cricket unions are free to contract with whomever they wish and are also 
free to base this decision on factors such as a player's form, the reduction of the 
- . 
number o~_potential employment opportunities943 through a restructuring of the 
league would arguably constitute a downsizing exercise in its ordinary meaning.944 
While the players concerned would not necessarily be able to prove a reasonable 
expectation of renewal, bearing in mind the vagaries of selection for employment 
as contracted players, the very denial of the opportunity to be selected for 
939 Section 186 
940 Section 186 (1) (a) and (b) 
941 Existing contracted players under the previous system 
942 Also Grogan Workplace Law 4th Edition Juta & Co 1999 at 103 
943 Especially in such a limited and restrictive field of employment as professional cricket - see the discussion 
below 
944 Compare the following statement on the restructuring decision by Ray Mali, UCBSA president: 
'We needed to make a tough business decision to ensure the survival of the game we love and to ensure that 
we can develop that game and ensure excellence.' 
(As quoted in "Major Changes to SA Domestic Cricket Competitions', The Mercury, 1 September 2003) 
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continued employment as a result of such restructuring might be viewed as 
tantamount to such a dismissal due to a business restructuring in the meaning of 
section 189.945 
312 It is submitted that here one should not lose sight of the role of fairness 
and equity in application of the test to determine whether such players harboured 
a reasonable expectation of renewal. In the recent case of SARPA obo Bands & 
Others/SA Rugby (Pty) Ltd946 (which was discussed earlier in this chapter947), the 
CCMA was asked to review. a situation where national rugby players' fixed term 
contracts of employment had not been renewed. The players brought claims of 
unfair dismissal in terms of section 186 (1) (b) of the LRA, alleging that the 
employer had failed to renew their fixed term contracts in circumstances where a 
reasonable expectation of-renewal existea. The Commission (by way of 
Commissioner Pather) remarked as follows: 
'In my view principles of fairness and equity should apply equally to professional 
rugby players and fa_ctory workers alike. In both environments employees a're still 
susceptible to unfair treatment by employers ... Employees do not have to be 
destitute or impoverished to be tr~ated fairly. What professional rugby players are 
paid must be seen in perspective to their short employment lifespan and the high 
risk of injury ... I am of the view that this is a statutory claim in terms of the 
[Labour Relations Act], which is based on fairness and equity, and not a contractual 
claim. The respondent cannot rely on the terms of the contract alone. In the 
interests of fairness and equity, the surrounding circumstances of the case have to 
be considered and the respondent must justify the dismissal.' 
945 This issue raises the question of the meaning of the term 'reasonable expectation' in the context of 
professional sport, and whether the specific nature of employment and selection for employment as 
professional players would necessitate a different interpretation of this concept (see the discussion elsewhere in 
this chapter) 
946 [2005] 2 Butterworths Arbitration Law Reports 209 (CCMA) 
947 See par 290 et seq above 
367 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Even-though the CCMA's award in this matter was eventually overturned by the 
Labour Appeal Court, 948 it is submitted that there is merit in these observations 
regarding the role of fairness. Accordingly, it might be necessary to consider the 
surrounding circumstances and not simply the nature and form of the relevant 
player's contract. A decision to limit the number of available contracts in a league 
might very well fall foul of the pr.ovisions of section 186 (1) (b) and constitute 
unfair dismissal of players, when .viewed in the light of considerations of fairness 
and equity (bearing in mind of course the Labour Appeal Court's observations in 
the appeal in the SARPA obo Band & Others v SA Rugby (Pty) Ltd matter, 949 
regarding the uncertainty and insecurity which characterises the professional 
sports Jabour market and the onus of proof on players to prove a dismissal 
through ·pr.oaf of a. reasonable expectation of renewal of a fixed-term contract). 
So, if the UCB's decision and subsequent action can be viewed as a dismissal of 
players due to operational requirements, did the UCB and its provincial affiliates 
comply with the provisions of section. 189? In other words, can the UCB's decision 
be marked as a fair dismissal of play.ers on the grounds of its operational 
requirements? 
The retrenchment exercise and fairness 
313 The above discussion has mentioned some of the main requirements of 
section 189 of the Labour Relations Act that an employer must comply with in a 
downsizing or retrenchment exercise. Of these, the central requirement is that 
such a move must be done in consultation with affected employees or their 
representatives, with a view to negotiating the terms and form of such 
downsizing. While this remains a business decision, which falls squarely within the 
948 See the discussion in par 290 et seq above 
949 Ibid. 
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managerial prerogative, the Labour Relations -Act aims to protect the. interests of 
·affected employees in order to ·ensure fairness. 
The Act's provisions relate to the procedure to be followed by an employer in 
implementing an existing decision to retrench. However, it appears that the 
·Labour Court favours a view that the 'consultation'. process involved means· 
something more than mere consultation, and rather that the terms and form of 
.such retrenchments should be negotiated between the parties. This process has 
been described· as 'an exhaustive joint problem-solving or consens.us-seeking 
process.between the employer and the consulted parties'. 950 Accordingly, an 
employer would not be able to escape its obligations under section 189 simply 
because the retrenchment.decision has already bee·n made on the grounds of 
pressing economic or other justifiable need. This emphasis on the·fairne_ss of the 
employer's conduct flows from the fact that retrenchments are-classified as 'no 
fault' dismissals, which are not due to any fault, incapacity or: misconduct on the 
part of the employee. . .. 
'· 
This implies that the requirement of fairness is inherent io both·the pr.ocedure 
followed as well as the substantive reason for the decision to retrench: Du Toit et 
a/951 state that the chief source of clarification of what would constitute a 'fair 
reason' for dismissal for operational requirements remains the voluminous 
jurisprudence formulated by the labour courts in this regard. By way of summary, 
the authors observe the following regarding the proper role of the courts: 
'Between the extremes of "second-guessing" the employer's decisions and adopting 
a "hands-off" attitud~, it is submitted, the fundamental responsibility of the court is 
to ensure that the provisions of the [LRA] are complied with. Section 192(2) 
requires the employer to prove that any dismissal is fair. "Fair" in this context 
means that a reason for dismissal based on the employer's operational 
950 National ·union of Metalworkers of SA & Others v Comark Holdings (Pty) Ltd [1997] 5 BLLR 589 (LC) 
951 Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law: A Comprehensive Guide LexisNexis 2003, at 406 
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.... requirements (as defined in section 213) must be present. This places an onus on 
,the employer to present at least prima facie evidence of such a reason.'952 
As to what would constitute such a reason, the Code of Good Practice: Dismissal 
_based.on Operational Requir_ef"!lents953 prov.ides the following guidelines to the 
interpretation of the definition contained in section 213 of the LRA: 
'As a general rule, economic reasons are those that relate to the financial 
' 
management of the enterprise. Technological.reasons refer to the i_~troduction of 
new technology that affects work relationships either by making existing jobs 
- -
redundant or by requiring employees to adapt to the new technology or a 
'<i ".":· .. :'.··~ €:'") .. _. ... • ~ 
consequential restructuring of the workplace. Structural reasons relate to the 
-redundancy of posts-consequent to a restructuring of the employer's enterprise.'954 
As Du Toit et al have observed, the LRA seems to restrict the meaning of 'similar 
means' to grounas akin to economic, technological and structural restructuring of 
. ~ .. ' - . 
the workplace - e.g. a male employee cannot be dismissed on operational 
grounds in order to promote gender diversity in the workforce. 955 
·- ,. ~ 
314 One must ask whether the reasons provided for the UCB's decision comply 
with these requirements. The financial losses experienced through poor 
attendance of cricket matchE;!s would, at first glance, appear to qualify as just such 
an economic reason related to the financial administration of the enterprise of the 
UCB and its affiliates. The sporting element in the justification of the decision 
(namely to enhance the competitive quality of the competitions in order to bring 
the quality of domestic competitions in line with that of international cricket) 
952 Ibid at 408 
953 GN 1517 Government Gazette No 20254 (16 July 1999), Item 1 
954 The expansive definition of 'operational requirements' has permitted the courts to include under operational 
requirements a refusal to accept changed conditions of employment consequent upon the need to reorganise 
work and to become even more competitive and more profitable - Mazista Tiles (Pty) Ltd v NUM & Others 
(2005) 3 BLLR 219 (LAC) 
955 Ibid at 405 
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. might not qualify as a fair reason. It will be assumed that the first of these 
reasons would indeed satisfy the requirements of the Act and the Labour Court 
jurisprudence. 
As regards this second reason provided for the decision, one should look more 
closely at the meaning attributed to the term 'operational requirements' by the 
Legislature and its application in other industries. The Labour Relations 
Amendment Act of 2002956 has inserted section 189A in the LRA, which introduced 
a right to strike in disputes about the fairness of the reason for dismissals based 
on operational requirements, and a right for the employer to lock out in such 
disputes. This section applies to employers who employ more than 50 employees, 
when such employer contemplates dismissing (inter alia) at least 10 employees (if 
the employer ~mploys up to 200 employees). 957 Apart from the procedural 
requirements set in this section, section 18_9A(l) now contains the following: 
'In any dispute referred to the Labour Court in terms of section 191(5)(b)(ii) that 
concerns the dismiss~! of the number of employees specified in [section l89A(l)], 
the Labour Court must find that the employee was dismissed for a fair reason if-
(a) the dismissal was to give effect to a requirement based on the employer's 
economic, technological, structural or similar needs; 
(b) the dismissal was operationally justifiable on rational grounds; 
(c) there was a proper consideration of alternatives; and 
(d) selection criteria were fair and objective.' 
This provision (especially the part- contained under (b)) was apparently introduced 
to address the perceived ineffectiveness of the Labour Court in protecting 
employees against dismissal for operational requirements by scrutinizing the 
employer's rationale for such action. 958 However, it is questionable whether this 
956 Act 12 of 2002 
957 Section 189A(l) 
958 Du Tait et al at 425 
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provision will make a noticeable difference, as it largely constitutes-a codification · 
ofthe existing law in this regard. 959 
The crux of the test seems to be that such dismissals should be operationally 
justifiable on rational grounds relating to for instance the employer's technological 
'or similar' needs. Would the- stated reason of enhancing the competitive element 
of domestic cricket in favour of the national team's competitive strength on the 
international stage satisfy this test? In effect the UCB has stated that, in order for 
the national team to be more competitive .in international competitions with teams 
from other countries, the standard of players graduating to the national team 
must be enhanced. And the restructuring exercise is aimed at bringing this about 
by ensuring a more competitive 'strength vs. strength' first class cricket league, 
where the 'dead wood' is removed and there remain only berths for the best 
players. This reminds one of arguments raised by employers in other industries, 
relating to globalisation and the ability to compete effectively and successfully 
with international or foreign businesses. 960 
315 Growing globalisation has led to decreased job security in many sectors. 
Employers have responded to this phenomenon in a number of ways, for example 
by the outsourcing of non-core aspects of their businesses; by increasing the use 
of casual labour in .order to reduce the costs of social benefits such as pension and 
medical benefits; investments towards capital intensive and technologically 
advanced methods of production to reduce the cost of labour; and the 
acceleration of mergers and acquisitions with a resultant increase in 
959 Ibid. SATAWU v Old Mutual Life Assurance Co SA Ltd (2005) 4 BLLR 378 (LC) held that the section confirms 
the principle of proportionality or the rationality basis test that contemplates a degree of deference to 
managerial prerogative. It held the enquiry is directed at an investigation of the proportionality or rationality of 
the process by which the commercial objectives are to be achieved. Thus there should be a rational connection 
between the employer's scheme and its commercial objective, and through the consideration of alternatives an 
attempt should be made to find the alternative which least harms the rights of the employees in order to be fair 
to them. The alternative eventually applied need not be the best means, or the least drastic alternative. Rather 
it should fall within the range of reasonable options available in the circumstances. However, the Labour Appeal 
Court in CWIU & Others v Algorax (Pty) Ltd (2003) 24 ILJ 1917 (LAC) suggested the following test for 
substantive unfairness: Not only should the court guard against merely accepting the say so of the employer in 
regard to the need to retrench, but retrenchment must be a 'measure of last resort' - in other words, it places 
more emphasis on scrutinizing the alternatives to dismissal. 
96° Compare also Frys Metals (Pty) Ltd v NUMSA & Others (2003) 24 ILJ 133 (LAC) 
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retrenchments. 961 But it appears that the effects of measures aimed at addressing 
globalisation in other industries is not similar to the position of the UCB in this 
case study - what one is dealing with is not the operational need to compete with 
foreign businesses through reduced production costs, but rather the need to 
improve the quality of the product delivered by the employer. The nature and 
characteristics of international competitive cricket is such that it is felt that the 
local product must be enhanced.in order to facilitate a smooth transition of 
players, who can perform satisfactorily, to the highest level. Can such a rationale 
be viewed as being akin to technological restructuring in other industries? 
One must not lose sight of the nature of professional sport as an entertainment 
industry. The players in professional team sports are,. due to the nature of 
professional sport and the important role-of'personal ·attributes and characteristics 
of such players, sometimes more akin to assets of the team management th9n 
employees. 962 It ·might be argued that"the effects of the UCB decision more closely 
resembles a pruning exercise by a business:undertal<ing that decides to.cut dead 
wood from its stock or other investment portfolio. Does the shrinking of the 
league constitute an attempt to eliminate less- successful players with a view to 
retain a core of the 'best of the best'? If so, this decision and its implementation 
raise interesting questions regarding the role of selection criteria for dismissal in 
terms of section 189 of the LRA. In fact, one might even be faced with a situation 
where the traditional 'no fault' nature of dismissal for economic reasons becomes 
questionable in this context: Are we then not rather dealing with straightforward 
dismissal for incapacity or failure to satisfy performance standards in the 
performance of the job? 
961 See the report of the Commission (:m Globalisation, Unemployment and Decent Work, NEDLAC Annual 
Summit 2001, available at http://www.nedlac.org.za/summit/2001/comm2.htm. 
962 A view that is strengthened by the phenomenon of the mobility of players between teams - players are often 
bought and sold, apparently in a similar fashion to goods 
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The procedural requirements of section 189 
316 There remain the-procedural requirements of section 189. Did the UCB 
and/or its affiliates consult with players or their representatives? Did the players 
affected receive severance pay? These questions are difficult to answer on the 
available information regarding the implementation of the restructuring process. 
According to reports dated as early as August 2002, the South African Cricketers 
Association (SACA) was meeting with the UCB in order to discuss the restructuring 
of domestic competitions in order to ensure a 'strength vs. strength' format. 963 
SACA is a registered trade union, representing South African professional 
·cricketers. The association, which was formed in June 2002 by Cape Town lawyer 
·Tony Irish (former legal representative of a number of professional cricketers), 
was modeled on the Australian cricketer,s; association. 964 According to one such 
early report, it was recognized that the proposed restructuring could lead to a 
reduction in the number of professional .cricketers (from the approximate number 
of lSO·in. 2002), but it was observed that the upside would be better benefits for 
the remaining players. 965 
317 · An interesting question is also raised by the LRA's requirement that one of 
the issues to be consulted upon is that of the selection criteria for employees to 
be dismissed in terms of the retrenchment exercise. The UCB decision was 
apparently not accompanied by prescriptions to the then existing provincial team 
managers or the new franchises regarding the selection of players to be 
contracted. Accordingly, one must assume that this process would have 
proceeded in the traditional way - franchises will contract the best available 
players, on the basis of factors such as form, experience, past performances, 
fitness, stature and other sporting factors, as well as the level of remuneration 
963 Colin Brydon 'Cricketers' Eyes on the Piggy Bank', Sunday Times, 25 August 2002 
964 More is said about SACA and its activities elsewhere in this chapter 
965 Brydon supra 
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claimed. Case law on dismissal for operational requirements has accepted that 
selection criteria may be based on the need to retain special skills, especially 
where these are necessary for the competitive and efficient operation of the · 
enterprise and on past performance as a measure of establishing whether 
employees have the special skills that need to be retained. 966 
The potential Constitutional implications 
318 Apart from the implications of the UCB decision in terms of the LRA and 
other labour statutes, it is also necessary to consider.the impact of the decision in 
light of-the provisions of Chapter II of the Constitution (the Bill of Rights). Section 
22 of the Bill of Rights provides that every citizen has the right to freely choose 
his or her trade, occupation or profession freely, subject to the proviso that the 
practice of a trade, occupation or profession may be regulated by law. 967 
The courts have recognised the fact that participation as.players in professional 
sport is a rather rigidly regulated exercise. In the major professional sports, 
football, rugby and cricket, players are forced to participate under the auspices 
and in accordance with the rules of the relevant national (and international) 
governing bodies. 968 These persons are not entitled to participate in these sports 
on the professional level if not affiliated to such governing bodies as the UCB, the 
National Soccer League and the SA Rugby Union. We therefore see an inherent 
(although undoubtedly justifiable) restriction of the right afforded in section 22, 
which is automatic and serves to limit the player's options in deciding in what 
manner he wishes to pursue the chosen trade. 
966 See NUM & Others v Anglo American Research Laboratories (Pty) Ltd (2005) 2 BLR 148 (LC) - on the facts 
the court did not accept that the selected employee could have acquired the skills possessed by his fellow 
retained employees in a short period of time; but in a later case (CEPPAWU v Republican Press (Pty) Ltd (2006) 
6 BLLR 537 (LC)) the Labour Court found that the criterion 'retention of special skills' introduces a subjective 
variable into the selection procedure. 
967 More detailed discussion of the section 22 right can be found elsewhere in this chapter 
968 Compare the remarks of Traverso J in Coetzee v Comitis 2001 (1) SA 1254 (CPD), and Waglay J in McCarthy 
v Sundowns Football Club & Others [2003] 2 BLLR 193 (LC) (both cases concerning professional soccer). 
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319 The UCB decision under discussion has now added a further restriction of 
the freedom of professional cricketers to pursue their chosen occupation within 
South Africa. For those players qualified to compete in domestic competition at 
the professional level, the restructuring of these competitions has significantly 
limited the choice of participation in first class cricket as a career. If one accepts 
the approximate figure of 180 professional cricketers in 2002, the restructuring 
.. exercise meant that 72 professional cricketers have effectively been denied an 
opportunity to participate professionally in South Africa (or potentially 108 players 
if one takes into account that each of the new franchises may contract one 
·international player as part of their complement of 18 contracted players). These 
players have apparently now been left out in the cold, with no other options for 
participation at professional level within South Africa's borders. 
Such a view may cast some doubt on the reasonableness of the UCB decision. 
While these athletes' constitutional rights in terms of section 22 may be regulated 
by law or otherwise, in a reasonable manner, the effect of the decision appears to 
negate this right as far as a large proportion of these players are concerned. An 
added element is the fact that the restructuring of domestic competitions also 
impacts on such players' prospects for employment in the representative national 
team. Players not participating in domestic competitions are virtually guaranteed 
not to be considered for selection to the Proteas (the national team). 
320 Finally, in light of what has been said above regarding the termination of 
fixed-term contracts, it remains to include a brief note on retrenchment prior to 
the expiry of a fixed-term contract. In Buthelezi v Municipal Demarcation Board969 
the Labour Appeal Court held that a dismissal of a fixed-term contract employee 
based on operational requirements would be unfair even where the employer 
might have good reason to retrench and where it follows a fair retrenchment 
969 (2004) 25 IU 2317 (LAC) 
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procedure. Fixed-term contract employees may not be dismissed before the 
expiry of their contract unless it is a case of a material breach of the contract by 
such employee (or where the contract expressly allows for early t_ermination). The 
court reaffirmed thi.s common law princ~ple and justified the rule by pointing out 
that this is simply because the employer is free not to enter into a fixed-term 
contract but to conclude a contract for an indefinite period if he thinks that there 
is a risk that he might have to dispense with the employee's services b~fore the 
expiry of the term. If the employer chooses-to enter into a fixed-term contract, he 
takes the risk that he might have a _need to dismiss the employee mid-term, but is 
prepared to take that risk. If he has elected to take such a risk, he cannot be 
heard to complain when the risk materializes. The employee also assumes the risk 
that during the term ·of the contract he could be offered a more lucrative job 
elsewhere, while· he has.an obl·igation to complete the term .of the contract. Both 
parties make a choice and there is no unfairness in the exercise ofthat choice. 
The consequence of this decision is that em·ployers will have to expressly include 
in fixed-term contracts a right to prematurely terminate the contract for 
operational requirements (although it should be noted that this case has been 
criticized). 
321 As was mentioned earlier, the above examination of the restructuring of 
the domestic professional cricket league is meant purely as an illustration of the 
possible impact of labour legislation provisions regarding dismissal of employees 
for operational requirements. The UCB's restructuring exercise did not lead to 
significant legal challenges and, by all accounts, the current restructured 
competition is functioning well. It appears that professional cricketers who may 
have been negatively affected have, mostly, been able to successfully explore 
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employrner:it elsewhere (especially in the· UK, following the effects of the Kolpak 
judgrnentJ. 970 
_· . ·; 
II . ·.Termination by the employee 
322 In re:s·pect:of termination· of the employment .contract by the (player) employee, 
the reader isTeferred to:the discussion in the section that follows regarding the common 
law remedies for breach of the employment contract (and, specifically, the important 
issue of the av,ailability of,the:employer's remedy·of a claim for an order for specific 
performance-of the contract) . .It should furthermore be noted that the following may be 
relevant in cases of termination by the employee: 
The· C:.abour R~lations Act971 makes provision for cases of constructive 
dismissal in ce'rtain instances where the employee terminates the contract, 
. ' ' 
·which coristn.ictfve dismissal may be challenged on the basis of the Act's 
provisions regarding unfair dismissal. Such cases would be where the 
employee terminates his contract (with or without notice) because the 
em~l~yer has. made continued employment intolerable for him972 or the 
employer, after a transfer of the business in terms of section 197 or 197A 
of the Act, has provided the employee with conditions or circumstances at 
work that are substantially less favourable to the employee than those 
provided by the old employer. 973 The test to determine whether 
employment was made intolerable by the employer is whether the 
970 Deutcher Handbal/bund eV v Maras Kolpak C-438/00, 8 May 2003 (see the discussion elsewhere in this 
chapter) 
971 Act 66 of 1995, as amended (see the discussion in the text above) 
972 Section 186(e) of the Act 
973 Section 186(f) of the Act 
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employer's overall conduct, judged reasonably and sensibly, ·was such that 
the employee could not have been expected to put up with it; 974 and · 
The concept of 'sporting just cause' may play a role in assessment of the 
player employee's right to terminate the contract of employment. In 
football, Article 21(1)(a) of the FIFA Regulations for the Status and 
Transfer of Players provides for the application of sanctions and payment 
·of compensation in cases of a unilateral breach of contract without just 
cause or 'sporting just cause'. An indication of the meaning 6f this term is 
found in the regulations, which provide that a player is entitled to 
terminate his· contract if he can show at the end of a season that he was 
fielded in less than 10% of the official matches played by his -dub. 975 
Rule 36 of the National Soccer League Rules976 deals with sporting just 
cause and provides as follows: 
'36.1 Within three weeks of the end of any season a player may apply to 
the [PSL'S] Dispute Resolution Chamber to be released from his 
contract of employment with a club for sporting just cause if the 
player participated in less than 10% of the official matches of his 
club in that season; 
36.2 Sporting just cause will be established on a case-by-case basis by 
the Dispute Resolution Chamber in the interests of fairness and 
equity having regard to all relevant factors including: 
36.2.1 injury; 
36.2.2 suspension; 
36.2.3 the player's field position; 
36.2.4 the player's age, and 
974 See Sharrock supra at 427 
975 See the discussion in Le Roux, R 'Under Starters Orders: Law, Labour Law and Sport' (2002) 23 Industrial 
Law Journal 1195 at 1203. The concept of 'sporting just cause' is also included in the regulations of the South 
African National Soccer League - see McCarthy v Sundowns Football Club supra at 1950 of the judgment, and 
the text that follows. 
976 As amended 17 June 2008 
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36.2.5 the number of matches in which the player played for the 
club in the previous season. 
36.3 Any dispute over sporting just cause will be considered by the 
Dispute Resolution Chamber. 
36.4 If the Dispute Resolution Chamber holds that a player is entitled to 
be released from his contract for sporting just cause it will 
simultaneously determine whether a transfer fee or compensation 
is payable in termsof these rules and, if so to which clubs and in 
what amount.' 
The reader is referred to discussion of this concept elsewhere, but it is 
suggested here that cases which may constitute sporting just cause for 
termination on the part of a player employee may, conceivably, also relate 
to termination by the employee which might constitute a constructive 
dismissal in terms of section 186 of the Labour Relations Act. 
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§8 Common law remedies for breach of contract in the professional sports 
context 
323 Under South African law a party to a· contract which has been. breached by 
another party has three main remedies to his or her disposal, namely a claim for an 
order for specific performance (in forma specifica), cancellation of the contract, or a claim 
for damages for breach. The clain:i for damages can generally be brought along with 
cancellation or an order for specific_ performance, but the _order for specific performance 
and a claim of cancellation can of course not be brought together as they are mutually 
exclusive in respect of their effect on the continuation of the obligations under the 
contract. 
- - ~ • '4 
324 In South African law, unlike the position in e:g. English law, the"claim for specific 
performance ·is the normal or natural remedy for- the innocent party in case of breach of 
contract and, accordingly, the innocent' party is viewed to be entitled to such relief in 
case of breach of contract (although· an order for specific performance is always within 
the discretion of the court =- see the discussion below). Cancellation of the contract, on 
the other hand, is viewed to be an extraordinary remedy (as it seeks to bring the 
contract and its obligations to an end, and is thus contrary to the parties' original 
intention in contracting and the courts' adherence to the principle of sanctity of contract), 
, . 
and is available only where the breach is deemed to be sufficiently serious to justify 
cancellation or, otherwise, ifthe contract between the parties contains a cancellation 
clause (or lex commissoria). 
The discussion that follows will briefly examine these three distinct remedies in the South 
African law of contract. 
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I The order for.specific performance 
325 As mentioned in the discussion above, in terms of the South African law of 
contract (and unlike the position in English law), the order for specific performance of a 
contract in the event of breach is viewed as the normal or natural remedy for the 
aggrieved party. 977 Accordingly, the aggrieved party is entitled to claim specific 
performance-of the other party's obligations in terms of the contract (which may include 
an order to perform a specified act in pursuance of a contractual obligation - an order ad 
factum praestandum - or an order to pay money~ an order ad pecuniam solvendam), 
subject only to the court's discretion to refuse an award of specific performance. This 
judicial discretion has been the subject of much debate and a long line of cases in which 
the content of the discretion has been developed in order to bring certainty in respect of 
the extent to wliich the aggrieved· party's 'right' to an order for specific performance is to 
be de.termin~d' in light of such discretion. 
326 While the courts had over the years developed a number of general principles in 
respect of the exercising of such judicial discretion (e.g. that specific performance would 
not be ordered where it would be impossible for the defendant to comply with the order, 
and that there are many cases in which j~stice between the parties can be fully and 
conveniently. done by an award of damages978), the (then) Appellate Division in the case 
of Haynes v Kingwilliamstown Municipality979 observed the fol lowing: 
'The discretion which a court enjoys, although it must be exercised judicially, is not 
confined to specific types of cases, nor is it circumscribed by rigid rules. Each case must be 
judged in the light of its own circumstances.' 
977 Farmers' Co-Op Society (Reg) v Berry 1912 AD 343; Christie, RH The Law of Contract in South Africa 5th ed 
Lexisnexis Butterworths 2006 at 523 
978 Farmers' Co-Op Society (Reg) v Berry supra 
979 1951 (2) SA 371 (A) at 378 
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However, the court continued to formulate a number of classes of cases where sp·ecific 
performance would normally not be granted, including impossibility of performance980 on 
the part of the defendant, undue hardship to the defendant or to third parties981 , cases of 
imprecise obligations and in contracts for personal services. 982 
327 It appears that the courts in subsequent judgments seemed to apply these 
'classes' of cases as referred to in Haynes in a rather rigid manner, and that the warning 
against the application of 'rigid rules' was largely unheeded. This prompted the (then) 
Appellate Division, in Benson v SA Mutual Life Assurance Society983 to observe the· 
following: 
'[I]t seems clear, b.oth logically and as a matter of principle, that any curtailment of the 
Court's discr~tion inevitably entails an ero~ion of the plaintiff's right to performar)ce and 
that there can be no rule, whether it be flexible or inflexible, as to the way in which the_ 
. . 
discretion is to be exercised, which does not affect the plaintiff's right in some way or 
another ... This does not mean that the discretion is in all respects completely unfettered. It 
remains, after all, a judicial discretion and from its very nature arises the requirement that 
it is not to be exercised capriciously, nor upon a wrong principle ... [T]he basic principle 
thus is that the order which the Court makes should not produce an unjust result which will 
be the case, e.g., if, in the particular circumstances, the order will operate unduly harshly 
on the defendant. Another principle is that the remedy of specific performance should 
always be granted or withheld in accordance with legal and public policy ... Furthermore, 
the Court will not decree specific performance where performance has become 
impossible. t9B4 
980 To be distinguished from cases where supervening impossibility of performance after conclusion of the 
contract serves to distinguish the obligations (and a failure by the debtor to perform does not constitute a 
breach of the contract) 
981 This last was the overriding consideration in Haynes's case, which involved a claim for an order of specific 
performance in order to compel a local authority to supply water to the plaintiff, during a time of severe 
drought 
982 In respect of contracts for personal services, however, see the discussion below 
983 1986 (1) SA 776 (A) 
984 See also South Cape Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Engineering Management Services (Pty) Ltd 1977 (3) SA 534 
(A) 
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328- ·Accordingly, South African law acknowledges an order for specific performance as 
a natural remedy which the aggrieved party in the case of breach is entitled to, in terms 
of its election (and not that of the defendant to e.g. pay damages rather than perform its 
obligations985), subject only to the judicial exercise of a discretion by the court to refuse 
the order where such an award would not be in line with legal and public policy. 
In the sports context, the importance of the availability of an order for specific 
performance is of course paramount in the context of players' employment contracts986 
and the wide-spread practice of 'contract-jumping', which necessitates a brief review of 
South African courts' treatment of the order for specific performance in the context of 
contracts for personal services. 
329 Garainer & Welch987 have examined the issue of English contract law's treatment 
of contract-jumping by professional footballers. The authors refer to Caiger & O'Leary's 
earlier discussion988 of the 'Anelka doctrine' and the argument that a player should have 
the right to terminate his contract providing he is prepared to pay compensation to his 
club by reference to the normal contractual principles for calculating damages (in which 
case a club would be obliged to release the player's registration so that he can join and 
play for the club of his choice). Gardiner & Welch observe that the practical reality of 
clubs searching for star players often lead to clubs making business decisions that would 
not be viewed as rational decisions in other areas of business: 
'[I]t is this essentially commercial factor that suggests that, even were the transfer system 
abolished tomorrow, the buying and selling of players under contract with agents acting as 
the middle-men would continue. The issue then becomes one that is resolved by 
985 The courts have on occasion, through the exercise of such discretion, refused to award specific performance 
in cases where the an order for damages would be less expensive than an order obliging the defendant to make 
a counter-performance where the defendant no longer needed the plaintiff's performance - see SA Harness 
Works v SA Publishers Ltd 1915 CPD 43; Unibank Savings and Loans Ltd v ABSA Bank Ltd 2000 (4) SA 191 
(W). . 
986 And other contracts for services, e.g. between clubs and coaching staff - see discussion of Santos 
Professional Football Club (Pty) Ltd v Igesund & Another 2003 (5) SA 73 (C) below 
987 Gardiner, S & Welch, R 'The contractual dynamics of team stability versus player mobility: Who rules "The 
beautiful game?"' Entertainment and Sports Law Journal Vol. 5 No. 1 (August 2007) 
988 Caiger, A & O'.Leary, J 'The end of the affair; the Anelka doctrine - The problem of contract stability in 
English professional football', in Caiger, A and Gardiner, S (eds) Professional Sport in the EU: Regulation and 
Re-regulation T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague (2000) 
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commercial considerations that replace notions of legally enforceable contracts. In short, is 
a potential new club prepared to pay whatever sum of damages is likely to be awarded by 
a court to secure a player that his existing club is not prepared to release?'989 
The basis of these remarks regarding the position in English football is of course the 
treatment by the English law of contract of breach and, more specifically, the view that 
courts will not order performance of contracts for personal services and the club or other 
sports employer is limited to a claim for damages. Another commentator has also noted 
that this inability to claim specific performance leads, in the sporting context, to .'an 
informal regime that generally works without legal interference', and which (one might 
even argue) leads to market forces an~ practices being the ultimate arbiter of the 
lawfulness of players' conduct in breaching their contracts: 
'The whole picture is that of obligations that may be difficult to deliver, without any fault on 
behalf of the performer and without any prospect of enforcement by the employer. '990 
330 It appears that the position may be different in South African law. South African 
courts have traditionally refused an order for specific performance in circumstances 
which involved employment contracts and, specifically, contracts for personal services. 991 
Apart from the fact that such contracts often involve imprecise obligations, the courts 
have reasoned that where a contract calls for the performance of personal services of a 
continuing nature and because of the personal relationship involved, there would be a 
constant danger of disputes arising over whether the contract was being properly 
performed, and the courts are not equipped to provide the constant supervision which 
989 Gardiner & Welch op cit. par 12 
990 Greenfield, S 'The ties that bind: Charting contemporary sporting contractual relations', in Greenfield, S & 
Osborn, G (eds) Law and Sport in Contemporary Society Frank Cass Publishers, Portland, OR (2000) 149 
991 Ingle Colonial Broom Co Ltd v Hocking 1914 CPD 495; Schierhout v Minister of Justice 1926 AD 99; 
Bramdaw v Union Government 1931 NPD 57; Roberts Construction Co Ltd v Verhoef 1952 (2) SA 300 (W); 
Myers v Abramson 1952 (3) SA 121 (C); Khubeka v Imextra (Pty) Ltd 1975 (4) SA 484 (W); Troskie & Another 
v van der Walt 1994 (3) SA 545 (0) · 
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would be necessary to prevent such disputes arising or to adjudicate on them as they · 
arose. 992 In the early case of Schierhout v Minister of Justice, 993 the (then) Appellate 
·Division, with reference to the position regarding the breach of contracts for personal 
services in English law, explained the unavailabil·ity of an order for specific performance 
on the basis of 'the inadvisability of compelling one person to employ another whom he 
does not trust in a position which imports a close relationship; and the absence of 
mutuality, for no Court could by its order compel ·a servant to perform his work faithfully 
and diligently'. It should, however, be noted that this does not constitute any hard-and-
fast rule; in line·with the courts' views regarding the judicial discretion to order specific 
performance, any rule which rigidly denies specific performance in all cases of contracts 
for personal services would unduly fetter.the aggrieved party's entitlement to the order, 
subject only to the-court's discretion. This is true also oJ employment contracts, 994 an·d it 
has been held that the reasons for courts' refusal to order specific performance in the 
earlier.cases995 were based on practical considerations and not a rule of law: 
. 'As a general rule a party to a contract which .has been wrongfully rescinded by the other 
party can hold .the otl:ier·party.to the contract if he so elects: There is ... no reason why this 
general rule should not be applicable to contracts of employment.'996 
331 In the case of Troskie & Another v van der Walt, 997 a Full Bench of the Free State 
Provincial Division was faced with a matter involving alleged breach of contract by an 
amateur998 rugby player, who had left his existing club to join another club. The applicant 
club claimed an order compelling the respondent to play for the applicant club during the 
1991 season, as well as an order prohibiting the respondent from playing for any other 
992 Christie The Law of Contract in South Africa supra 528 
993 1926 AD 99, at 107 
994 Myers v Abramson 1952 (3) SA 121 (C) at 123E-H 
995 See the cases referred to in par 326 above (and especially the judgment of the (then) Appellate Division in 
Schierhout v Minister of Justice 1926 AD 99) 
996 National Union of Textile Workers v Stag Packings (Pty) Ltd 1982 (4) SA 151 (TPD) at 156H 
997 1994 (3) SA 545 (0) 
998 It should be noted that this matter arose at the time when rugby union was still an amateur sport (although 
it came out in the evidence that there was a 'pay for play' arrangement in place with the respondent player) 
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club during that season. The court, after acknowledging an applicant's entitlement to an 
order for specific performance, focused ori the highly personal nature of the services 
which were to be rendered in terms of the contract for playing services. The court 
emphasized that, in the exercise of the court's jurisdiction, each such case; must be 
considered on its merits. In considering the merits, the court observed that the rendering 
of the player's services are dependent on such player's personal enthusiasm, willingness 
and endurance~ and that the services required a significant element·of skill and ability of 
a personal nature, which are dependent on the player's personality and his relationship 
with the club. 999 The court accordingly upheld the court a quo's refusal to order specific 
performance against the player. 
A second aspect of the Troskie judgment which deserves attention relates to the second 
·basis of the claim, .namely for an order (an interdict) prohibiting the player to play for 
any other club. The court examined the-question of whether su:ch·an order.should be 
given where there was no express negative covenant included in the contract (as was the 
position on the facts), but the applicant claimed that such a covenant against playing for 
any other club during the term of the agreement should be implied as a tacit term. The 
court was not willing to decide the issue, but in the course of its reasoning in rejecting 
the appeal against the court a quo's refusal to order specific performance of the player's. 
positive obligations as well as an interdict to enforce such an implied negative obligation, 
the court observed the following: 
That a court would be much less inclined to enforce such an implied (tacit) 
negative covenant by means of specific performance, as opposed to an 
express negative covenant; and 
That the following view reflects the preferred way forward for South African 
courts in considering applications for an interdict to enforce negative 
covenants in cases of this nature: 'The problem of the deserting employee 
would be better handled by asking simply whether he is in breach of his 
999 At 552H-J of the judgment (from the Afrikaans) 
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contract and whether an interdict to forbid that breach would transgress 
·the principles preventing an order of specific performance of the contract 
of service. '1000 
The courts have in the past been willing to grant such an interdict where the contract 
contained an.express covenant whereby the employee undertook not to be employed by 
any employer or undertaking other than that of the employer during the term of the 
contract; and where it was held that damages would not be an adequate remedy for the 
employer. 1001 
332 The first case in South Africa where a court ordered specific performance of a 
contract for personal services against an employee was a 'sports case'. In the matter of 
Santos Professional Football Club (Pty) Ltd v Igesund1002 the Cape Provincial Division was 
faced with a claim by the applicant football club to enforce its employment contract with 
the respondent football coach. Igesund, who is one of the top football coaches in the 
country (and who had formerly coached the national team), had entered into a two-year 
contract to coach Santos's team. Half-way through the contract, he approached the club 
and informed them that he intended leaving to coach another Cape Town-based club, 
Ajax Cape Town FC (of which Ajax Amsterdam is a 51 % shareholder). The contract with 
Santos contained no provision for a notice period, and Igesund gave two weeks notice of 
his intention to leave the club (although he offered to assist for a reasonable period until 
Santos had employed a new coach). The reasons cited by lgesund for his decision to 
leave were personal concerns and family obligations (although these were not considered 
to be significant), as well as financial considerations. He was offered a three-year 
contract with sizeable signing-on fee by Ajax and would be paid a monthly salary of more 
than double the salary earned at Santos. Santos approached the court for an order that 
1000 Wright J in Troskie, quoting Christie supra 2"d ed (at 5568 of the judgment) 
1001 See Roberts Construction Co Ltd v Verhoef 1952 (2) SA 300 (W) 
1002 2003 (5) SA 73 (C) 
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Igesund continue to serve as head coach at the club for the remainder of his employment 
contract:1003 
333 The court a quo,1°04 by way bf Desai J, rejected the claim for specific performance. 
The court held that the performance of the service rendered by Igesund was dependent 
upon his personal ability, efficiency and skill, and that a coach performing his functions 
under a court order would do so with diminished enthusiasm and commitment, and, that 
the court was unsure how a dispute about the coach's performance of his duties would be 
resolved under such circumstances. The court further referred to certain policy 
considerations (which it was held resonated strongly in the constitutionally enshrined 
rights to freedom of movement, 1005 freedom to choose a profession 1006 and the right to 
dignity1007), which included a disapproval of.forced labour, the fact that damages were a 
sufficient .remedy for the employer, and .a reluctance to interfere with an employee's right 
freely to exercise his skills or profession. The court referred to the previous view-as 
expressed in the case law that the reasons militating against an award for specific 
performance of a contract of.employment were so compelling thatthey were generally 
regarded as a rule of law, and that specific performance would never be granted in such 
cases. The court continued to hold that, even though there was no longer such an 
inflexible rule of law, the 'compelling considerations why such an order should not be 
granted remain weighty.'1008 The court continued to hold that, in the judicial exercise of 
its discretion to order or refuse the order for specific performance, it was restrained in 
the circumstances of the case from granting the order by a number of practical 
considerations. These practical considerations were the fact that the highly personal 
nature of the services would make it virtually impossible to gauge Igesund's 
performance, that such an order might compromise Igesund's dignity, and that the 
1003 Santos also sought an order against second respondent, Ajax, restraining it from taking any action designed 
to induce Igesund to breach his contract with Santos. This claim was rejected on the evidence, as both the 
court a quo and the Full Bench on appeal held that there was no evidence of inducement to breach or of 
interference with another's contractual undertaking by Ajax - see the discussion in par 347 below. 
1004 Santos Professional Football Club (Pty) Ltd v Igesund & Another 2002 (5) SA 697 (C) 
1005 Section 21 of the Bill of Rights 
1006 Section 22 of the Bill of Rights - see discussion elsewhere in this chapter 
1007 SeCtion 10 of the Bill of Rights 
1008 Santos a quo at 701C 
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existing discord between the parties might be exacerbated to such an extent that it 
would be impossible.to restore a working relationship between both Igesund and the club 
and Igesund and the team. 1009 -
334 The Full Bench, on appeal, rejected the reasoning of the court a quo and ordered 
specific performance against Igesund. The court, by way of Foxcroft J, based its decision 
on a number of factors relating to the contract between Igesund and the club as well as 
the na.ture ~f the emP_loyment ~elationship between the parties. Firstly, the court referred 
to the fa_ct t~at the ~mployment c~ntra_ct between Santos and Igesund specifically 
provided that, in the event of a breach by either of the parties, the aggrieved party 
. . . 
would be entitled to cancel the contract or to claim specific performance of the other 
~ . . 
party's obliga~i~ns in terms of_ the agreement. 101° Furthermore, the court stressed the 
.. 
importance of the_ fact that (as it stated) t~is was not an ordinary con~ract of 
employment. 1011 The court referred tc:> the signing-on fee which was paid to Igesund and 
to his job description. The court referred t~ the fact that the employment contract 
contained a claus~ which specificallyyrovided that the club may not interfere in any way 
whatsoever in the coaching,,selection or substitutions of the team, and that Igesund 
would have full control and responsibility in this regard. 1012 The court continued, in 
examining the earlier case law in respect of the discretion to order specific performance 
in contracts for personal services, distinguished between cases of wrongfully dismissed 
servants and cases of employees unlawfully resiling from a contract. 1013 The court, by 
way of summary, remarked as follows regarding the nature of the employment 
relationship between the parties: 
; . 
'[Igesund] is certainly no ordinary servant, but a contracting party, contracting on equal 
terms with [Santos], and being able to command a high sum of money in doing so. He is 
also given carte blanche in the exercise of his duties. The present matter is also not one 
1009 Santos a quo at 701 
1010 In clauses 9.1 and 9.2 of the contract - see Santos (appeal) at 76 
1011 Santos (appeal) at 760 
1012 In clause 5.3 of the agreement - Santos (appeal) at 78A-C 
1013 Santos (appeal) at 78J 
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where the Court is asked to order specific performance against an employer. The Court was 
asked to declare that a contract was binding and to allow [Santos] to proceed to enforce 
[its] contract against an unwilling employee who wished to earn more money in a new 
position ... I would point out immediately that the present case is not concerned with 
compelling one person to employ another against his will either as a confidential servant or 
anything else. On the contrary, this is an application to compel a contracting party to hold 
to his contract. '1014 
The court agreed with Desai J's view in the court a quo that Igesund's principal reason 
for leaving Santos was a commercial one - the coach had simply been made a better 
offer. 1015 The court stated that it is the injured plaintiff's right to elect whether to hold a 
defendant to his contract and claim performance by him of precisely what he has bound 
himself to do, or to claim damages for the breach. The defendant has no right to 
prescribe how the plaintiff will make this election which is provided by law (i.e. to insist 
that the plaintiff should rather claim damages for the breach). 1016 
The court continued to reject the court a quo's view regarding the personal nature of the 
services to be rendered as constituting a reason to refuse specific performance and also 
distinguished the judgment in Troskie 1017 on the facts,· and held further that ordering 
Igesund to return to work at Santos could not be seen as compelling someone to do 
something against their will. The court further rejected the arguments based on the 
difficulty of supervision of the court's order, and concluded as follows: 
'On the present facts, there does not seem to be any inequity in obliging [Igesund] to 
adhere to his contract. The only party who will be prejudiced if he does not perform 
properly is [Santos]. [Santos] has chosen to take that risk by bringing the application 
which it brought, seeking to hold [Igesund] to his contract. If [Igesund] refuses to return 
despite a court order, or refuses to carry out his work to the satisfaction of [Santos], 
1014 Ibid. at 79D-I 
1015 Ibid. at 77G 
1016 Ibid. at 81F-I 
1017 See the discussion supra 
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[Santos] has·various remedies available. The most obvious would be to stop paying him his 
· salary .. or. to bring an application for cancellation of the contract.'1018 
The court furthermore made short shri~ of the court a quo's argument that an order 
compelling Igesur:id to wor~ for Santos·f9r a further nine months would compromise his 
dignity, and qbserved that '[i]t must be remembered that we are dealing with a contract 
which °[Igesund] entered into freely and voluntarily and in terms of which he agreed to an 
order for spe_ci.fi_c performance being mad.e'. 1~19 Finally, the court reiterated the . 
importance of sanctity of contract (or pacta.sunt servanda) in South African law and 
referred to the fact that courts should exercise 'perceptive restraint' in striking down 
contracts freely made, 1020 and held that the court a quo had erred in not sufficiently 
taking into account the primacy of the plaintiff's remedy of an order for specific 
performance and the election involved. 
335 Naude1021 has observed that the Full Bench on appeal in Santos v Igesund failed 
to deal specifically with the court a quo's argument that one of the compelling reasons 
not to enforce specific performance against an employee is the disapproval of forced. 
labour, with reference to the prohibition of forced labour in section 13 of the Bill of 
Rights. 1022 The author is of the view that there may be merit in this claim, and observes 
that section 13 might justify a presumption against specific performance of an 
employment contract and that section 13 and 'the policy behind s 22 1023 of protecting 
personal freedom shouid ... make courts very wary of granting specific performance 
against an employee'. 1024 
It is, however, debatable to what extent, if any, these last two constitutional provisions 
have a role to play in cases on similar facts to Santos v Igesund (and, specifically, cases 
1018 Santos (appeal) at 85H-I 
1019 Ibid. at 86E 
1020 With reference to Brisley v Drotsky 2002 ( 4) SA 1 (SCA) at 35 
1021 Naude, T 'Specific performance against an employee - Santos Professional Football Club (Pty) Ltd v 
lgesund' (2003) 120 SA Law Journal 269 
1022 Ibid. at 280 
1023 Section 22 of the Bill of Rights, which guarantees the freedom to choose one's occupation, trade or 
profession - see the discussion elsewhere in this chapter 
1024 Naude op cit. 281 
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of contract-jumping by professional athletes). Le Roux 1025 has remarked that the 
Transvaal Provincial Division, in the case of Golden Lions Rugby Union v A J Venter, 1026 
appeared to reject an argument that a right of first refusal against a professional rugby 
player had the effect of compelling such player to accept unemployment or to accept 
employment with somebody he did not wish to be employed by and is as such contrary 
to public policy and to sections 13 and 22 of the Bill of Rights. 1027 Le Roux refers 1028 to 
the case of Knox D'Arcy Ltd & Another v Shaw & Another1029 (a restraint of trade case), 
where it was held that 'if an individual freely undertakes to surrender ·a particular right, 
that decision is not a violation of the right but a consequence of the covenanter's 
freedom', 1°30 and the author states that it is doubtful whether ttie interests and policy 
which underlie the section 13 and 22 rights ever had any relevance" or a'ppli-cation to the 
facts in Santos. 
Le Roux remarks the following in respect of the application of these constitutional 
considerations to the facts of the case (and which, it is submitted, is of wider relevance 
to the·issue of contract-jumping by professional athletes): 
'It is difficult to see how a contract of relatively short duration, sucli as·the·one entered 
into by Igesund, could undermine his rights in terms of section 22. [It has been 
remarked] 1031 that section 22 operated to ensure that the choice of trade, profession or 
occupation is open to all ... There is nothing to suggest that this choice of profession would 
have been compromised if [Igesund] were required to honour his contract with Santos ... 
[I] find it hard to comprehend how the enforcement of a contract that a party was 
originally happy to conclude and happy to honour until a better offer came along can 
1025 Le Roux 'How Divine is my Contract? Reflecting on the Enforceability of Player or Athlete Contracts in Sport' 
(2003) 15 SA Mercantile LJ 116 
1026 Case 2007 /2001, i3 February 2000 (unreported). This case involved an unsuccessful claim by the Golden 
Lions union to enforce a right of first refusal in its contract with its player, A J Venter, to prohibit him from 
moving to rival team the Natal Sharks, based in Durban. See the discussion in the text below 
1027 Le Roux op cit. 123; Naude op cit. 277 
1028 At 123 
1029 1996 (2) SA 651 (W) at 660A-B of the judgment 
1030 It appears that a similar sentiment was expressed by Ngcobo J in the Constitutional Court judgment of 
Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) in respect of the meaning and content of the principles of freedom 
and sanctity of contract. See, however, for criticism regarding the waiver of constitutional rights, Woolman, S 
'Category mistakes and the waiver of constitutional rights: A response to Deeksha Bhana on Barkhuizen' (2008) 
125 South African Law Journal 10 
1031 With reference to the cases of JR1013 Investments CC & Others v Minister of Safety and Security & Others 
[1997] BCLR 925 (E) and Van Rensburg v South African Post Office Ltd [1998] 10 BCLR 1307 (E) 
393 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
am6uot to forced labour. I suggest that forced labour involves much more hardship than 
simply losing out on a good deal. '1032 . 
It is submitted, in respect of the role of section 22 in this context, that a court's award of 
an order for spE;!cific performance against a player, through the due exercise of its judicial 
discretion, should be distinguished from the scenario of the operation of the very rigid 
and arbitrary rules of. the National Soccer League which were held to be unconstitutional 
and in unlawful restraint of trade in the case of Coetzee v Comitis. 1033 
336 ~he trerip in respect of Judicial willingness to award an order for specific 
performance as established in the Santos Full Bench appeal was subsequently followed, 
in the sports context, in the Cape High Court judgment in Roberts & Another v Martin. 1034 
This case involxed a sponsorship agreement whereby the respondent had agreed to 
sponsor the applicant, a promising young tennis player. When the player was injured, the 
respondent repudiated the contract and refused to make further payments. The court 
ordered specific; performance against the sponsor. 1035 
337 The Santos Full Bench judgment was subsequently followed by the Witwatersrand 
Local Division in the more recent case of Nationwide Airlines (Pty) Ltd v Roediger & 
Another. 103.6 This case, which was not a sports case, involved a claim for an order for 
specific performance by an airline against one if its pilots, who wished to terminate a 
contract with the airline in light of a better financial offer to fly for another airline. The 
court examined the existing case law in the development of the judicial discretion to 
grant or refuse specific performance (and specifically in respect of contracts for personal 
services), and reiterated that it is a misconception to say without qualification that 
1032 Le Roux op cit. 127-8; see also Cloete et al Introduction to Sports Law in South Africa LexisNexis 
Butterworths (2005) at 28-29 
1033 2001 (1) SA 1254 (C), discussed elsewhere in this chapter 
1034 2005 (4) SA 163 (C) 
1035 For further discussion of the case, see Cloete et al Introduction to Sports Law in South Africa LexisNexis 
Butterworths (2005) at 29 
1036 2008 (1) SA 293 (W) 
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specific performance of an employment agreement will never be permitted. The court 
stressed that there are numerous situations where specific performance may be ordered, 
where various factors may play a role in coming to such decision. These factors are the 
following: 1037 
The particular relationship between the employer and the employee; 
The nature of the employment contract; 
The nature of the service or work which is to-be performed in terms of the 
contract; 
The prejudice or hardship to be suffered by the innocent party should 
specific performance not be ordered, compared to the prejudice that will be 
suffered by the employee, should it be granted. · ... J 
The court reiterated that 'the general rule should still be that where a ·party wrongfUlly · 
breaches a contract it should entitle the innocent party to enforce the contract, and that 
should no less be so even in employment contracts.'1038 The court continued to refer to-
the Santos Full Bench judgment and held that the facts in Roediger's case were akin to 
the facts in the Santos case; and held as follows: 
'It is probably true to say that the first respondent's position [as a professional airline pilot] 
vis a vis the applicant is somewhat unique. It is not the normal master and servant 
contract of employment that we are dealing with here. In this sense the position of the first 
respondent in respect of his relationship with the applicant is very much the same as was 
the case with the respondent in the Santos matter. '1039 
The court considered the fact that the respondent employee had freely and voluntarily 
entered into the contract, as well as the potential harm that the applicant airline may 
suffer if the order were refused (e.g. the significant cost of cancellation of flights due to a 
1037 Ibid. at 297H-I 
1038 Ibid. at 297J 
1039 Ibid. at 298F-H 
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lack of trained and experienced pilots on the relevant routes), and ordered that the 
respondent should continue to serve as captain of the applicant's Boeing 767 aircra~ 
subject to certain relevant civil aviation regulations. 
338 It appears therefore. that .the current state of South African law is that the sports 
employer may·in certain circumstances be able to successfully claim an order for specific 
performance'against a player employee who attempts to desert to pursue greener grass 
elsewhere. The question has not_ been examined specifically in respect of the position 
regarding players' contracts~ although the above considerations from the Santos and 
Roediger cases, it is submitted, could open the practice of contract-jumping to such a 
course of action. 
339 A recent matter promised judicial consideration of the question, although this did 
not come to pass. Prominent Super 14 Blue Bulls franchise and Springbok rugby lock 
forward, P.J. 'Bakkies' Botha, was embroiled in a high profile case before the Labour 
Court early in 2008, in an attempt to escape from his five-year Bulls contract in order to 
take up more lucrative employment with French club Toulon. Botha's application to the 
Johannesburg Labour Court came amidst reports that the player h.ad signed a lucrative 
contract with French club Toulon, that he was reportedly required to report for duty at 
the club on 1 April 2008, and that warnings had been issued that he would be sued for 
breach of contract. In what was reported as a 144-page set of affidavits, Botha claimed 
that the relationship between himself and the Bulls had broken down irretrievably over 
the past year. Botha's application reportedly cited seven reasons why his contract with 
the Blue Bulls Company should be declared null and void, and the player claimed an 
order to force the respondent to provide him with a clearance certificate to take up 
employment at Toulon. Amongst the reasons that were reportedly cited for Botha's 
application to have the contract declared null and void were the following: 
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An allegation that the contract had not been finalised due to. an 
outstanding agreement to discuss the player's image rights (even though 
such an agreement would reportedly be contrary to the Special Players 
Agreement (a collective agreement in force between the parties as 
negotiated by the SA Rugby Players Association (SARPA)); 
An allegation that the contract was concluded under wrongful influence due 
to the fact that the player agent who negotiated the contract on Botha's 
- behalf was not a registered agent with SA Rugby; and 
Allegations by Botha that he had never been granted leave by the 
respondent in terms of the contract. According to reports Botha was owed 
125 days leave by the respondent and, despite being given ten day.s to 
comply with the player's leave requirements or, alternatively, to 
compensate him for such leave,.the respondent had failed to respond. 
Botha reportedly argued that this constituted breach of contract on the 
part of the company .which entitled him to cancel the contract. 
Botha abandoned a number of his claims during the course of the application, and 
ultimately persisted only in seeking the following relief: : 
A declaratory order in terms of section 158(1)(a)(iv) of the Labour 
Relations Act, 1995, to the effect that the contract entered into between 
Botha and the Blue Bulls on 18 September 2006 (a five year contract) be 
declared void ab initio; alternatively 
An order declaring that Botha is a free agent and is entitled to cancel the 
contract entered into with the Blue Bulls on 18 September 2006 on written 
notice; and 
That the respondents be ordered to furnish Botha with a clearance which 
conforms with the requirements for the issuance thereof in accordance 
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with Appendix 1 of Regulation 4 of the International Rugby Board 
Regulations. 
The Johannesburg. Labour Court (by way of Nel AJ) rejected Botha's claims, inter alia on 
the basis that a 2007 collective agreement was in force between the parties and that the 
Labour Court lacked jurisdiction to pronounce on a dispute regarding the interpretation of 
such agreement (in terms of section 24 of the Labour Relations Act). 1040 
This matter may have provided the ideal opportunity to consider the issue of the extent 
to which a club can hold a player to his contract in such circumstances. At the time of 
writing it is unknown whether Botha might persist in any future action in respect of the 
abandoned claims, although it was reported that the employment offer from Toulon was 
subsequently withdrawn. 
340 Finally, it remains to briefly examine the availability of an alternative remedy in 
the case of a player contract breach, namely what is known in English law as the 
'negative injunction', i.e. a request for a court order during the term of the contract to 
prohibit the player from taking up employment elsewhere. English law in this regard has 
developed over the years since Lumley v Wagner104i to distinguish between enforcement 
by means of an injunction of an express negative covenant in the contract as opposed to 
an implied covenant to that effect, where such injunction will generally only be granted in 
the former case. This approach was incorporated into South African law in earlier 
" 
cases, 1042 but it has been suggested that there is no place in South African law for this 
approach. While the court in Troskie v van der Walt1043 failed to go this far, and held that 
a court would be more reluctant to enforce a purely implied negative covenant by means 
of an order for specific performance (i.e. granting an interdict to prohibit the party in 
breach from transgressing the negative obligation), this view has been criticized on the 
1040 Botha v Blue Bulls Co (Pty) Ltd & Another Case No JR1965/2005 (judgment of 27 June 2008, unreported) 
1041 1852 (1) de G., M. & G. 604 
1042 Roberts Construction Co Ltd v Verhoef 1952 (2) SA 300 (W); Tension Envelope Corporation (SA) (Pty) Ltd v 
Zeller & Another 1970 (2) SA 333 (W) 
rn43 1994 (3) SA 545 (0) - discussed supra 
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ba~is that South African law recognizes no difference in efficacy between tacit and 
express terms in a contract: 
And: 
'The problem of the deserting employee would be better handled by asking simply whether 
he is in breach of his contract and whether an interdict to forbid that breach would 
transgress the principles preventing an order for specific performance of the contract of 
service. ' 1044 
'A plaintiff who asks for an interdict to prohibit [breach of an express or implied prohibition 
in the contract] is in reality asking for specific performance in the negative form of non-
performance of the forbidden or inconsistent act to ensure performance of the contract. His 
entitlement t9 an interdict, subject only to the court's discretion, is therefore as 
unquestionable as in the case of a plaintiff who seeks specific performance in the positive 
form.'104s 
341 It appears, therefore, that players who breach employment contracts with their 
employers may in principle be subject to either an order for specific performance of the 
positive obligations in terms of the agreement, or, alternatively, to an interdict 
restraining them from taking up employment elsewhere during the currency of the 
I 
agreement. Such claims must be considered on the merits of every given case, and will 
generally be refused where one or more of the factors that would militate against an 
order for specific performance are present (e.g. undue hardship for the respondent player 
or third parties, impossibility ·of performance, where the potential harm that would arise 
from the granting of the order outweighs the potential harm that would arise for the 
1044 Christie The Law of Contract in South Africa supra at 534 
1045 Ibid. at 532 
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employer from the refusal of such an order, etc.). 1046 As mentioned above, it is doubtful 
whether a constitutional challenge to an order of specific performance as promoting 
'forced labour' or constituting an unjustifiable limitation of the player's right to freedom 
of trade, occupation or profession would be likely to succeed (depending on the 
circumstances of the case, including the length of.the applicable contract of service and 
factors such as the consideration paid and the relative degrees of harm which the 
granting/refusal of the order would occasion for the respective parties). 
II Cancellation of the contract 
342 As has been observed above, cancellation of a contract on the basis of breach (as 
opposed to a claim for specific performance) is viewed in South African law as an 
extraordinary remedy (as it envisages termination of the obligations undertaken by the 
parties and thus runs counter to their intention at the time of contracting). Accordingly, 
the 'innocent' party in the event of breach is normally only entitled to cancel the contract 
if such breach is material, i.e. of a sufficiently serious nature to justify cancellation. In 
the case of delay in performance (or mora) by the other party (either as debtor or 
creditor in respect of such performance), the injured party may only cancel the contract 
if time is of the essence in respect of such performance (which will usually be the case in 
respect of sports contracts which function on fixed schedules). 1047 Where time is not of 
the essence, cancellation for breach will only be justified once the injured party has 
notified the party in breach of such breach and has provided such party with an 
opportunity to remedy the breach, failing which the injured party would acquire a right to 
cancel the contract. 
1046 See the preceding discussion regarding the availability of the order for specific performance in contracts for 
personal services and the content/meaning of the courts' judicial discretion to refuse such an order 
1047 See Cloete et al Introduction to Sports Law in South Africa (2005) at 30 
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343 The other forms of breach of contract also require that such breach must be of a 
sufficiently serious nature in order to justify cancellation. In the event of positive 
ma I performance, the injured party would only be entitled to cancel the contract if the 
performance is so defective that one cannot reasonably expect of the prejudiced party to 
accept the defective performance and be satisfied with a reduction of the counter-
performance or damages. 104.3 In the event of repudiation .of the obligations, the injured 
party will normally only be entitled to cancel the contract if the repudiating party· gives a 
clear indication that s/he will no longer fulfill any of the obligations in terms of the 
contract (partial repudiation will only justify cancellation if it results in substantial 
rejection of the obligations in terms of the contract). 1049 
344 Alternatively, if the. contract makes:proVision for cancellation in the evenLof ,. ~.· . ... ;·· 
breach (by means of a cancellation clause .or lex commissoria), the injured party will be 
permitted to immediately (or upon.. the terms such dause) cancel the contract even·on 
the basis of an insignificant breach. For more detailed discussion of the remedies for 
breach of contract and, specifically, cancellation, the reader is referred to specialized 
texts in this regard. ~oso 
III The contractual claim for damages for breach of contract 
345 In terms of the South African common law of contract, the injured party in the 
event of breach of contract will have a claim for damages, irrespective of whether the 
contract is maintained (enforced) or cancelled as a result of such breach. The measure of 
damages for breach of contract is that of the injured party's positive interesse (i.e. to 
104a Ibid. 
1049 Ibid. 
1050 See Christie, R H The Law of Contract in South Africa 5th ed LexisNexis Butterworths, Durban (2006) at 538 
et seq.; Kerr, A J The Principles of the Law of Contract 5th ed LexisNexis, Durban (2002) at 703 et seq. See also 
Spheris v Flamingo Sweet (Pty) Ltd & Another [2008] 1 All SA 304 (W) at 309-311 in respect of the 
consequences of cancellation, and in respect of cancellation based on delay in performance (or mora) see Net v 
Cloete 1972 (2) SA 150 (A); Alfred McAlpine & Son (Pty) Ltd v Transvaal Provincial Administration 1977 (4) SA 
310 (T). . 
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place the injured party in the economic position they would have been if the contract had 
been fulfilled (i.e. ifthere had been no breach). The injured party is entitled to claim its 
patrimonial loss, and damages cannot be awarded for emotional factors such as pain and 
suffering or humiliation. 1051 The injured party would have to show that there was a causal 
connection between the breach and the loss and also that such loss was not too remote. 
Generally, the defaulting party will only be liable for losses that were reasonably 
foreseeable at the time of contracting, and the injured party can claim general damages 
(for losses which arise· naturally from the breach) as well as· special damages (if such 
losses may be reasonably supposed to have been within the contemplation of the parties 
as likely to arise from the breach). 1052 Beneficial side-effects to the breach are taken into 
consideration. The injured party is also-expected to take reasonable steps to mitigate its 
loss.1053. 
There is some authority· in the case law for an award of the injured party's negative 
interesse 1~54 (i.e. damages to place the.party in the position they would have been if the 
contract not been concluded), or''restitutionary damages'. 1055 
346 In ·order to avoid the often problematic exercise of proving one's damages in the 
event of breach of contract, the parties to a contract will often include penalty clauses 
(which provide that a party who commits breach will be liable to pay or forfeit an amount 
of money to the other party). Penalty clauses are regulated by the Conventional Penalties 
Act, 1962, 1°56 which provides that such clauses are valid but that a court may reduce the 
amount of the penalty if it is out of proportion to the prejudice suffered as a result of the 
1051 See Jackie v Meyer 1945 AD 354; Administrator, Natal v Edouard 1990 (3) SA 581 (A); Tweedie & Another 
v Park Travel Agency (Pty) Ltd t/a Park Tours 1998 (4) SA 802 (W) 
1052 See, generally, Victoria Falls & Transvaal Power Co Ltd v Consolidated Langlaagte Mines Ltd 1915 AD 1; AA 
Alloy Foundry (Pty) Ltd v Titaco Projects (Pty) Ltd 2000 (1) SA 639 (SCA); Transnet Ltd t/a National Ports 
Authority v Owner of MV Snow Crystal 2008 ( 4) SA 111 (SCA) 
1053 See, for example, Soar t/a Rebuilds for Africa v JC Motors (Pty) Ltd 1992 (4) SA 27 (A) 
1054 This is the normal measure of damages for claims in delict (or tort) - see the discussion elsewhere in this 
chapter 
1055 See Probert v Baker 1983 (3) SA 229 (D); Svorinic & Others v Biggs 1985 (2) SA 573 (W); Mainline 
Carriers (Pty) Ltd v JAAD Investments CC & Another 1998 (2) SA 468 (C); Tweedie & Another v Park Travel 
Agency (Pty) Ltd t/a Park Tours 1998 (4) SA 802 (W) 
1056 Act 15 of 1962 
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breach. 1057 Such prejudice includes both patrimonial and non-patrimonial loss. The 
amount in terms of a penalty clause may be claimed in the alternative to a claim for 
damages (and not in addition to such damages). 1058 
For more detailed discussion of the remedies for breach of contract and, specifically, 
damages, the reader is referred to specialized texts in this regard. 1059 
IV Unlawful interference with another's contractual relationship 
347 It should be noted that the remedies for breach of contract are not limited solely 
to the contractual remedies which are available. to the other party or parties to the 
contract. Similar to the position in other jurisdictions, a civil. law remedy (in 'tort') is 
available against a person who procures a breach of a contract. 1060 It is accepted in 
South African law that '[a] delictual remedy is available·to a party to a contract who 
complains that a third party has intentionally and without lawful justification induced 
another party to the contract to commit a breach thereof.'1061 The courts generally 
require the defendant's actions or conduct in interfering with the contractual rights of the 
plaintiff to be intentional (therefore with the clear intention to interfere with the parties' 
contractual rights and cause the plaintiff damage) in order to found liability under this 
delictual action. 1062 Just some examples of specific forms of conduct that may found 
liability under this delict are the intentional inducement, enticement or instigation of a 
contracting party to breach the agreement, bribing an employee of a competitor to sell 
trade secrets, or enticing employees of a competitor to leave its service. In the case of 
1057 Section 3 of the Act. See Plumbago Financial Services (Pty) i...td t/a Toshiba Rentals v Janap Joseph t/a 
Project Finance 2008 (3) SA 47 (C); Gounder v Top Spec Investments (Pty) Ltd 2008 (5) SA 151 (SCA) 
1058 See Cloete et al Introduction to Sports Law in South Africa supra at 31 
1059 See Christie The Law of Contract in South Africa (2006) supra at 542 et seq.; Kerr The Principles of the Law 
of Contract (2002) supra at 737 et seq. 
106° For discussion of the similar remedy in English law, see Lewis & Taylor Sport: Law and Practice Cavendish 
Publishing 2003 at 832-833 (par El.75 et seq.). See also the treatment of such a claim based on procuring a 
breach of contract in the judgment in the well-known boxing case of Warren v Mendy [1989] 1 WLR 853 
1061 Atlas Organic Fertilizers (Pty) Ltd v Pikkewyn Ghwano (Pty) Ltd 1981 (2) SA 173 (T) at 202. See also Dun 
and Bradstreet (Pty) Ltd v SA Merchants Combined Credit Bureau (Cape) (Pty) Ltd 1968 (1) SA 209 (C)). 
1062 Union Government v Ocean Accident and Guarantee Corporation Ltd 1956 (1) SA 577 (A) 
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Santos Professional Football Club (Pty) Ltd v Igesund, 1063 Santos FC instituted a claim of 
unlawful inducement to breach a contract of service against Ajax Cape Town FC, alter 
Ajax had offered Santos coach Gordon Igesund (vyho was one year into a two-year 
contract with Santos) a lucrative contract as Ajax manager. Igesund repudiated his 
contract with Santos. The cou·rt dismissed the daim based on unlawful interference with 
a contractual relationship, on the basis that Ajax's mere offer to Igesund was insufficient 
to found liability for the club in. the absence of proof of active unlawful inducement to 
breach the contract. 1064 
1063 2003 (5) SA 73 (C). For more detailed discussion of Igesund's case, see par 325 et seq (on termination qf 
the contract by the employee and the order for specific performance) above 
1064 See Cloete et al Introduction to Sports Law in South Africa LexisNexis Butterworths 2005 at 114 
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§9 Players' agents 
348 The relationship between professional athletes and their agents and the other 
contracting party (e.g . .team owners) is governed by the law of principal and agent. If the 
agent acts within the scope of the mandate provided by the principal (the athlete), the 
athlete will be bound to any contract entered into by such agent on the athlete's behalf. 
This is also true of an employment contract. 1065 
349 Apart from the legal regulation imposed by the normal rules derived from the 
common law of agency, 1066 the activities of players' agents are regulated to a limited 
extent in South African professional sport. Little will be said here regarding the specific 
regulations and codes of conduct that may be applicable, and the reader is referred to 
the various governing bodies for more comprehensive information in this regard. 
350 In football, the SAFA issued regulations in 1999 (in force from 1 November 1999) 
governing agents who undertake transfers of players between clubs within South 
Africa. 1067 An agent must be in possession of a license from SAFA for all domestic 
transfers or a license from FIFA for international transfers. Players and clubs are not 
permitted to employ an unlicensed agent (except where such agent is a close relative of 
a player or a registered attorney in the Republic). 1068 Where an applicant for a license is a 
foreign national, s/he must have been resident in South Africa for a period of five years, 
and only natural persons may apply for a license. 1069 If, following an interview process, 
there are no objections to a license being granted, the applicant is required to furnish a 
bank guarantee to cover possible claims for damages by players or clubs in respect of the 
1065 Jordaan in Basson & Loubser Sport and the Law in South Africa supra at Ch 8-16 
1066 See, generally. Kerr, A J The Law of Agency 4th ed LexisNexis Butterworths, Durban (2006) 
1067 Promulgated on 8 October 1999 in compliance with Chapters I, III, IV and V of the FIFA Regulations 
Governing Players' Agents and Art. 17, par. 2 of the Regulations governing the Application of the FIFA Statutes. 
1068 SAFA Player Agent Regulations Articles 1.2 and 1.3 
1069 SAFA Player Agent Regulations Article 2 
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conduct of such persons which may be in contravention of SAFA's regulations. 1070 Article 
12 of the SAFA Player Agent Regulations provides for the following rights of a registered 
player agent: 
(a) To contact any player who is not or is no longer under contract with a 
club (cf Art. 12 and 13 of the FIFA Regulations Governing the Status 
and Transfer of Players); 
.. · ~ (b). To represent any player or club requesting him to negotiate and/or 
conclude a contract on his/their behalf; 
(c) To manage the affairs of any player who requests him to do so; and 
(d) To manage the affairs of any club which requests him to do so. 
Article 14 deals with the duties of licensed players' agents, and provides that such agents 
are obligated: 
(a) To comply with the statutes and regulations of SAFA, CAF and FIFA at all 
times; 
(b) To ensure that every transaction to which he/she is a party conforms with 
the abovementioned statutes and regulations; 
(c) Never to approach a player who is under contract with a club so as to 
persuade him to break his contract or not to adhere to the rights and 
duties contained in the contract; and 
(d) . To represent the interests of only one party in the same transfer. 
In terms of Article 15 the sanctions against licensed players' agents for contravention of 
their duties include a reprimand, censure or caution; a fine; suspension of the license or 
withdrawal of the license. Article .17 provides that, in the event that a player uses the 
1070 SAFA Player Agent Regulations Article 9. According to the version of the Player Agent Regulations as 
available on the web site of SAFA at the time of writing (April 2009) the amount of such bank guarantee is ZAR 
300 000. 
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services of an unlicensed player agent, SAFA may .take this into account in considering 
the player's position in any subsequent contractual dispute, or may sanction the player 
by means of a reprimand, censure' or caution; a fine not exceeding ZAR 100 000; or a 
disciplinary suspension not exceeding 12 months. 
In terms of Article 18 a club wishing to procure the services of a player shall only 
negotiate directly with the player or with a SAFA-licensed agent acting on behalf of the 
player. Any club which pays another club compensation for a player's training or 
development shall be ·obliged to transfer the. amount directly to the club in question a_nd 
shall be strictly prohibited from transferring any or all of the amount, even as 
remuneration, to a player's agent. Contravention of these provisions is liable to sanction 
by SAFA, which may include-· 
(a) a reprimand, censure or caution; 
(b) suspension of all or part of its management bodies; 
(c) a fine of up to ZARlOO 000; 
(d) interdiction to carry"·out national and/or international transfers; or 
(e) a ban on all national and/or international footballing activity. 
Disputes between players and their agents may be referred to the PSL's Dispute 
Resolution Chamber. At the time of writing, the SAFA web site lists only 5 individuals as 
agents currently accredited by SAFA. 1071 At the time of writing, the professional 
footballers' union, SAFPU, are reported as having warned their members against 
concluding contracts with a certain FIFA-accredited agent, on the basis of alleged greed 
(and contravention of the FIFA Regulations regarding monthly payments by.players) and 
other issues. 1072 
1071 As on 9 April 2009 
1072 See the report by Nkareng Matshe 'Players' union slams greedy agent Makaab', 21 January 2009 (available 
online at http://www.iol.co.za - last accessed 9 February 2009) The agent in question has denied the 
allegations (see the article by Mcelwa Nchabeleng 'I'm not ripping players off: Makaab', The Sowetan, 21 
January 2009 
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351 In professional cricket, the Memorandum of Understanding currently in force 1073 
between players' union SACA and Cricket SA provides for the establishment of a Cricket 
SA Player Agent Accreditation Programme, to clarify the role played by players' agents 
and to avoid conflict.in respect of commercial and financial aspects of the game. 
352 In rugby union, SARU's Player Agent Code of Conduct is applicable to agents, and 
breaches are subject to the disciplinary provisions of SARU's Regulations pertaining to 
Illegal and Foul Play and Misconduct. SARU also implements a Player Agent Accreditation 
Scheme, which is subject to SARU's Player Agent Regulations, and the Union is to 
maintain and publish a register of accredited agents. Any agent who intends to 
represent, advise, counsel or assist players in contract negotiations with any international 
rugby club; national union or rugby body, or any agent who requires the consent of a 
rugby body for the use of a player's image rights pursuant to the Standard Players 
Contract, must apply for accreditation with SARU. Provincial unions are prohibited from 
negotiating with a non-accredited agent. According to the Regulations, an agent is 
required to have a written Standard Player Agent Agreement with the players/he 
represents. An agent's fees are to be negotiated between such agent and the player, and 
neither SARU, ·sARPA nor SAREO prescribe the fees payable for an agent's services. 
1073 In force until 2010 
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§10 Professional athletes' employment and the role of the restraint of trade 
doctrine 
353 . The essence of the restraint of trade doctrine under En'glish law was described by 
Lord MacNaghten in Nordenfelt v Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition Co1074 as 
follows: 
'The public have an interest in every person~s carrying on his trade freely: so has the 
individual. All interference.with individual liberty of action in trading, and all restraints of 
trade of themselves, if there is nothing more, are contrary to public policy ... ' [Emphasis 
provided] 
Public policy leans againstt~e use of restraint of t_rade c;,lauses or covenants for the 
purpose of the limitation of competitiori per se._In South African law it has been observed 
that, in determining whether a restriction on a party's frE;!edom to trade or to practice a 
profession is enforceable, a court will have regar-d to two majn considerations. The first is 
that the public interest requires that parties should comply vyith their contr-actual 
obligations even where these are unreasonable or unfair (the principle of sanctity of 
contract, or pacta sunt servanda). The second consideration is that all persons should, in 
the interests of society, be permitted as far as possible to engage in commerce or the 
professions or, expressed differently, that it is detrimental to society if an unreasonable 
fetter is placed on the person's freedom of trade or to pursue a profession. It will be 
contrary to the public interest to enforce an unreasonable restriction on a person's 
freedom to trade. 1075 
1074 [1894] AC 535 
1075 Sunshine Records (Pty) Ltd v Frohling & Others 1990 (4) SA 782 (A); see also Magna Alloys & Research 
(SA)(Pty) (Ltd) v Ellis 1984 (4) SA 874 (A), the locus classicus in respect of South African law relating to 
restraints of trade (while this judgment was rendered prior to the 1996 Constitution, subsequent case law has 
confirmed that Magna Alloys remains good law - see the discussion below) 
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354 Some interest w,orthy of protection (and which is protected by such restraint in a 
reasonable manner) is usually required· in order to mark such restraint as being in line 
with public policy. 1076 Similarly, in South African law, the following has been observed: 
'A contract is against public policy if it restricts a party's freedom of economic activity in a 
mi;jnner or to i;in extent that is unreasonable judged against the broad interests of the 
community and the interests of the-~ontractjng p~rties.' 1077 
It has also been observed (elsewhere) that th~ !;>a sis for the restraint of trade doctrine is 
'that as a matter of public policy a person should not be restricted in his or her ability to 
earn a living by an obligation that goes beyond what i~ necessary to achieve some 
legitimate and desirable aim.'1078 This 'protectable interest' on the part of the restraining 
party has ·cor:isistently been identified as a requirement in the test for the reasonableness 
of a contract in restraint of trade, e.g. in the well.-known majority judgment of Nienaber 
JA in the Appellate Division judgment of Basson v Chilwan. 1079 In the sporting context, it 
has been observed in respect of such protectable interest that 'the principle which has 
emerged is that the bodies responsible for the management of each sport can 
legitimately have regard to the orderly management of the sport.'1080 
355 The test in English law to determine the justification for a restraint (namely 
whether it is reasonable and justified in the interests of the parties) is also incorporated 
in the South African test of whether the restraint is contrary to public policy: 
Reasonableness and justification depends on whether the restraint pursues a legitimate 
1076 See Kamerling, A & Osman, C Restrictive Covenants under Common and Competition Law 4th ed Sweet & 
Maxwell, London 2004 at 2 (with reference to the English case of Herbert Morris Ltd v Saxe/by [1916] 1 AC 
688) 
1077 From 'Contract' in Joubert et al The Law of South Africa 2nd edition Vol. 5 par 168. See also the landmark 
judgment of the (then) Appellate Division in Magna Alloys and Research (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Ellis 1984 (4) SA 874 
(A); J Lauw and Co (Pty) Ltd v Richter 1987 (2) SA 237 (N) at 2438-D. 
1078 In English law - see Lewis & Taylor Sport: Law and Practice Butterworths LexisNexis 2003 at 173. Apart 
from the fact that the location of the burden of proof differs in restraint cases between South African and 
English law (in English law restraints are prima facie void unless justified, and accordingly the burden of proof 
re justification is on the party who wants to enforce the restraint), much of the English common law regarding 
restraints are as relevant here. 
1079 1993 (3) SA 742 (A) at 767E-I 
108° Kamerling, A & Osman, C Restrictive Covenants under Common and Competition Law 4th ed Sweet & 
Maxwell, London 2004 at 267; Eastham v Newcastle United FC [1964] Ch. 413; Greig & Others v Insole [1978] 
All E.R. 449 
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· aim that is worthy of protection and does so in a reasonable and proportionate manner 
(i.e. in order to be proportionate the restraint must not only be necessary to protect the 
restraining party's interest, it must also go no further than is reasonably necessary for 
that purpose. 1081 
356 According to South African law, the onus of proof in restraint cases is on the party 
alleging that a restraint is contrary to public policy (the opposite position to that followed 
in English law). 1082 Recent case law appears to have left open the question whether, in 
light of the impact of section 22 of the Constitution (the freedom to choose one's trade, 
occupation or profession 1083), the onus to prove the constitutionality of a restraint 
provision may need be ·shifted to the party seeking to enforce such a restrictive· 
provisioh. 1084 
The content of this onus (i.e. what the party-who tries to escape the strictures of a 
restraint needs to prove) was summarized as follows in the case of Canon Office 
Automation v Booth: 1085 
'The restraint of trade clause in the contract constitutes a limitation on first respondent's 
fundamental right to freedom of trade, occupation and profession ... [I]t seems to me that 
applicant needs to do more than to invoke the provisions of the contract and prove the 
breach. In addition, and in terms of section 36 of the Constitution, it has to show that the 
restraint is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom ... Insofar as a restraint is a limitation of the right to freedom 
of trade, occupation and profession, entrenched in section 22 of the Constitution, the 
common law as developed by the Courts complies with the requirements laid down in 
section ~6(1) [the limitation clause] ... as tci the limitation of such a right. The common law 
in regard to restraints of trade is of general application and such restraints are only 
1081 See the English case of Essa Petroleum v Harper's Garage [1968] AC 269, HL, and Basson v Chilwan supra 
1082 See Magna Alloys & Research (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Ellis 1984 (4) SA 874 (A) 
1083 Discussed below 
1084 Fidelity Guards Holdings (Pty) Ltd t/a Fidelity Guards v Pearmain [1997] 4 All SA 650 (SE); Canon KZN (Pty) 
Ltd t/a Canon Office Automation v Booth 2005 (3) SA 205 (D); Reddy v Siemens [2006] SCA 164 (SA); M Tait 
'Who should bear the onus in restraint of trade disputes' 2004 25 Obiter 488. See, however, Neethling, J 'The 
Constitutional impact on the burden of proof in restraint of trade covenants: A need for exercising restraint' 
2008 (1) South African Mercantile Law Journal 89 _ 
1085 Canon KZN (Pty) Ltd t/a Canon Office Automation v Booth 2005 (3) SA 205 (D), at 209E-J 
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enforceable if they are not in conflict with public policy. A restraint would be adverse to 
public policy if its enfo_rcement would be contrary to the public interest. It would most likely 
be contrary to the public interest if it is unreasonable. It would be unreasonable if and to 
the extent that it does not seek to protect a legitimate interest of the one party; or if it 
does purport to protect an interest, such interest is eclipsed by the interest of the other 
party not to be so restrained.' [Emphasis provided] 
The Supreme Court of Appeal, in Reddy v Siemens Telecommunications (Pty) Ltd,1°86 
while declining to express a view on whether the position of the onus of proof in restraint 
cases sho.uld shift to the covenantee in light of the section 22-right, 1087 has confirmed 
that the common law test as set down in earlier cases 1088 to balance or reconcile the 
concurring interest of.the different parties to a restraint gives effect to the precepts of 
the limitations clause in the Bill of Rights. 
357 Importantly, it should be noted that one of the factors that the courts take into 
account in determining the reasonableness of a contractual restraint of trade is that of 
the equality.(or inequality) of bargaining strength of the parties to such contract. 1089 
More will be sai.d below on the relevance of this in the context of the employment milieu 
of professional athletes. 
358 As has been observed, the restraint doctrine may affect the enforceability of 
contracts restricting competition in the field of sport; where an employment contract 
restricts the rights of a professional athlete to play for another club or union, or imposes 
certain regulations for the transfer of players from one club to another, such restriction 
1085 2007 (2) SA 486 (SCA) 
1087 See the discussion above. It is unclear what the stance of the-Supreme Court of Appeal will be in respect of 
the issue of the incidence of the onus in future restraint cases - see Digicore Fleet Management (Pty) Ltd v · 
Steyn & Another (722/2007) [2008] ZASCA 105 (22 September 2008), where the court did not examine the 
issue of the onus and observed, simply, that 'it is now trite that provisions in restraint of trade are enforceable 
unless shown by the person wishing to escape an undertaking to be unreasonable and hence contrary to public 
policy'. 
1088 Magna Alloys supra; Basson v Chi/wan supra 
1089 See Basson v Chi/wan supra at 768C-D; Christie, R H The Law of Contract in South Africa 5th ed. LexisNexis 
Butterworths 2006 at 368-9 
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or regulations may be considered an unenforceable restraint of trade. 1090 In addition, 
such restrictions may in the circumstances also constitute unjustified infringement of 
such athlete's constitutional right to freedom of trade, occupation or profession as 
~ . ., . . 
contained in section 22 of the Bill of Rights. 1091 Also, it should be noted that such 
restrictions may also fall foul of one or more of the restrictive acts which are prohibited 
by sections 4( 1) and 8 of the South African Competition Act 89 of 1998. 1092 
359 It. is, however, important to note that elsewhere restraints of trade do not function 
. 
solely in the context of restrictive provisions contained in contracts (e.g. an employment 
contract or a contract for the sale of a business, two of the traditional forms most 
encountered in practice). In the sporting context, the following has been observed: 
'Although in the normal course the restraint of trade doctrine is applied to render specific 
contractual clauses unenforceable, the doctrine does have wider applicability. Even where 
~. . ... . ~ 
there is no contractual relationship, a specific rule of a body with power to affect the ability 
. . . . . . 
of a person to trade can ·be declared incompatible with-the doctrine ... [T]he 06/igation, or 
.. . . - . 
the restraint, [does not] have to arise out of a sports governing body's rut-es. It may arise 
out of a particular decision of the sports governing body to apply in an unjustifiably 
restrictive way rules that in themselves are valid. 11093 [Emphasis provided] 
In English law the courts have on a number of occasions evaluated the actions and rules 
of sports governing bodies in the light of the restraint of trade doctrine, e.g. as regards 
football transfer and retention rules, 1094 the granting of trainers' licenses in horse 
racing, 1095 the rules of eligibility for participation in cricket Test matches and county 
1090 Loubser in Basson & Loubser Sport and the Law in South Africa Butterworths 2000 (loose-leaf) Ch 8-35; 
Highlands Park Football Club v Viljoen 1978 (3) SA 191 (W); Coetzee v Comitis 2001 (1) SA 1254 (C) 
1091 See the discussion in par 370 et seq below 
1092 See the discussion in par 457 et seq below 
1093 Lewis & Taylor op cit. at 179 
1094 E.g. Eastham v Newcastle United Football Club & the FA [1964] Ch 413 
1095 Nagle v Feilden [ 1966] 2 QB 633 
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cricket, 1096 doping rules, 1097 decisions on the allocation of racing dates to racecourses, 1098 
entry criteria for a·football club to gain promotion to a league, 1099 etc. The prevalence of 
restraint of trade challenges in the sporting world (which has been characterised as 'a 
field for the growth of the law of restraint of trade as applied to association) has been 
ascribed to the fact that sports governing bodies cannot usually rely upon the statutory 
provisions which protect employers' associations and trade unions to exempt them from 
the consequences of the restraint doctrine. 1100 
Compare.also the judgme.nt of the Federal Court of Australia in Hughes v Western 
Australian C~ickeCA~soCiation (Inc), 1101 where.ft.was held by Toohey J that a resolution of 
the respondent association to amend its rules (specifically to make provision for the 
. . 
automatic disqualification of players who participated in the rebel tour to South Africa in 
. · ..· -
1985 from participation in matches recognised by the domestic cricket board and the 
regional association) was in unreasonable restraint of trade as against such players. The 
court came to this conclusion even after finding that the relevant resolution did not 
constitute a contract giving rise to legally enforceable rights and obligations. 1102 With 
reference to earlier judgments regarding (professional) athletes in England and 
elsewhere1103 the court held that it is 'not necessary for an applicant to show that rules 
which he seeks to impugn constitute a contract between him and the association in 
question', and that 'where the rules of an association place an unjustifiable restraint on 
the income earning activities of a person, a court is not precluded from granting 
appropriate relief merely because that person is not a member of the association.' 
1096 Greig v Insole [1978] 1 WLR 302, discussed supra 
1097 Gasser v Stinson, 1988 (see Lewis & Taylor at 180) 
1098 R v Jockey Club, ex parte RAM Racecourses [1993] 2 All ER 225, DC 
1099 Stevenage Borough Football Club v Football League Ltd, 1996 (see Lewis & Taylor at 183) 
110° Kamerling, A & Osman, C Restrictive Covenants under Common and Competition Law 4th ed Sweet & 
Maxwell, London 2004 at 267 
1101 ( 1986) 69 ALR 660 
1102 It should be noted that this finding was made in determination of whether the relevant provisions of the 
Trade Practices Act 1974, upon which a part of the applicant's claim (that of a restrictive trade practice in terms · 
of section 45 of the Act) was founded, applied to the resolution in question. 
1103 Eastham v Newcastle United Football Club Ltd [1964] Ch 413 at 441-2; Buckley v Tutty (1971) 125 CLR 
353 at 375; Greig v Insole [1978] 1 WLR 302 at 345; Foschini v VFL and South Melbourne Club Ltd (unreported 
judgment of Supreme Court of Victoria delivered 15 April 1983); Nagle v Feilden [1966] 2 QB 633 at 644, 650. 
414 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
360 Gardiner et al have observed the following in respect of the relatively favourable 
application of the restraint of trade doctrine in English law and the scope of the doetrine 
for providing relief to those prejudiced by the exercise of often substantial powers by 
those governing sport: 1104 
'The restraint of trade route has clearly been the most fruitful for those seeking to call 
sports governing bodies to account ... The doctrine itself is highly accessible; its invocation 
is not limited to those who are parties to the challenged agreement, and it can be utilised 
by a stranger to an agreement who is unreasonably restrained by its operation. The source 
of the restraint is not seen as being of particular significance; it is the effect that brings the 
doctrine into play. This has the effect that the doctrine is not hindered by the procedural 
pitfalls found particularly in the context of judicial review.' 
The only South African judgment where the restraint of trade doctrine has been applied 
in respect of the rules of a sports governing body, was that of Traverso J in the Cape 
High Court in Coetzee v Comitis 1105 (where the court held 1106 that the rules relating to 
transfers of players as enforced by the relevant professional governing body constituted 
an unconstitutional and invalid restraint of trade against players). The court examined 
the transfer system applicable in that case and held that '[t]he situation which arises 
when a player's contract comes to an end and he is by virtue of a compensation dispute 
prevented from joining a new club is akin to a restraint of trade provision in a normal 
commercial employment contract.'1107 The court employed the method of referring to the 
incorporation of the applicable regulations in the player's employment contract, and held 
that '[i]f ... the regulations ... are contrary to public policy, it is self-evident that the 
[player's contract], which incorporates the ... regulations, is contrary to public policy and 
that, accordingly, the "restraint of trade" should not be enforced.'1108 
1104 Gardiner et al Sports Law 3rd ed Cavendish Publishing 2006 at 216 
1105 2001 (1) SA 1254. See par 400 below for discussion of the Comitis case in the context of player transfers in 
South African football. 
1106 At par 41 of the judgment 
1107 At par 29 of the ju-dgment 
1108 At par 32 of the judgment 
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361 It is submitted-that South African courts would, in any future litigation when 
confronted by conduct by a sports governing body that is alleged to be in restraint of 
trade, be justified to follow the lead of English and other courts in recent years and to 
consider the circumstances of the governing body and of the plaintiff; specifically the 
·. 
peculiar position of this type of association in respect of its governance role of a sporting 
code and its imposed authority over participants: 
'[I]n an appropriate _case where a body enjoys a monopoly position such that it can prevent 
a person from earning his living by not admitting him or from conducting a legitimate 
business, in restraint of trade, it will be amenable to a declaratory judgment in an action 
begun by writ, if it has acted in an arbitrary and capricious way in refusing to permit the 
a ppl ica nt's activities. '1109 
·. 
The author has referred elsewhere to the characteristics, and consequences, of the 
monopolistic nature of sports governance in terms of the 'European model' which we 
encounter in the major South African professfonal sports such as cricket and rugby. 1110 In 
recent years, the very reason for being of the organisations that govern these codes has 
been the establishment of a monopoly of control over the professional arm of the sport 
and exploitation of its commercial spin-offs, and to fulfill a regulatory function of 
maintaining monopolies of control also at national level. 1111 They are monopoly 
regulators with inherent market dominance. 1112 This monopoly function, when considered 
1109 Stuart-Smith U in R v Jockey Club, ex parte RAM Racecourses [1993] 2 All ER 225, DC at 243f 
1110 Louw, AM 'An Anomaly Tolerated by the Law: Examining the Nature and Legal Significance of International 
Sports Governing Bodies' (2007) 1 South African Public Law 211-255 
1111 As has been stated in respect of the establishment of FIFA: 
'The main idea behind [the meeting in 1904 of the founding members of the organisation] was to create a body 
with legitimacy to arbitrate over conflicts among national football associations and later to assure the presence 
of one national association per country and the development of football across all member nations. This 
legitimacy came with time, when an ever-growing number of affiliations pleaded their affiliation to FIFA, and 
with the monopolistic characteristic that the body impressed at all levels of football governance: Only one 
association per country would be officially recognised as sovereign responsible for the control and the 
development of the sport within its boundaries.' 
Ducrey, P; Ferreira, C; Huerta, G & Marston, K 'UEFA and Football Governance: A New Model' International 
Sports Law Journal 2004/1-2 at 81 
1112 See Ken Foster 'Can Sport be Regulated by Europe? An Analysis of Alternative Models', in Caiger & Gardiner 
Professional Sport in the EU at 59. 
In respect of the economic characteristics of professional team sports, it has been noted that the most valued 
product of a sports league is the world or national championship contest, which only a monopoly can supply. 
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together with .certain other characteristics.of these organisations~ must certainly subject 
their exercise of regulatory powersto scrutiny in the public interest. For sake of 
convenience, mention will only be made here of a few of these other characteristics of 
such organisations: 
(i) The degree of autonomy that (international) sports governing bodies possess 
in determining the regulatory regime within which the specific sport functions 
""" to an extent international sports·governing bodies may be seen as 
possessing a qualified 'uritouchable' status in respect ·of the legal regulation of 
their activities and decisions at international level; 1113 
(ii) The dispute resolution procedures and codes that are prescribed by' these 
organisations, sometimes to a large extent ousting 1114 the powers of national 
courts to intervene in disputes between its members and athletes or 
attempting to postpone recourse to such courts; 1115 
.... 
See Neale, W .C. (19.64) 'The Peculiar Economics of Professional Sport' Quarterly Journal of Economics 78, 1: 1-
14, as discussed in Paul Downward and Alistair Dawson The Economics of Professional Team Sports Routledge, 
London & New York 2000 at 21. 
1113 Compare the position in the European Union: At the March 1996 intergovernmental conference for the 
framing of the new Treaty of Amsterdam, the European Commission declined to accept calls that there should 
be legally binding provisions in the Treaty applicable to sport. Instead, a non-binding declaration was attached 
to the Treaty in these terms: 
'The conference emphasises the social significance of sport, in particular its role in forging identity and bringing 
people together. The conference therefore calls on the bodies of the European Union to listen to sports 
associations when important questions affecting sport are at issue. In this connection, special consideration 
should be given to the particular characteristics of amateur sport.' 
See Beloff et al at 108. 
1114 Sports governing bodies may of course not validly seek to oust the jurisdiction of courts (which would 
generally be held to be against the public interest), except by means of a valid agreement to arbitrate a 
dispute. An arbitration clause, however, can also not oust the jurisdiction of a South African court, which retains 
a discretion as to whether it should itself determine the dispute or whether to stay the proceedings - see 
Minister of Law and Order and Others v Hurley and Another 1986 (3) SA 568 (A). This has not stopped 
international sports governing bodies from attempting such exclusions in the past - see the discussion in Lewis 
& Taylor at 119 (A3.52). 
For an example from South African football, see the contractual clause pertaining to the Dispute Resolution 
Chamber of the National Soccer League, as discussed in Monei and Manning Rangers Football Club, National 
Soccer League Arbitration (DRC 075) (2006) 27 Industrial Law Journal 242 (ARB). 
1115 In the context of South African labour law, the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration. 
(CCMA) has on more than one occasion bowed to the 'supremacy' of players' contracts in respect of dispute 
resolution provisions, usually on the basis of the specialised nature of sport as an activity and the need for 
specialised knowledge on the part of arbitrators - compare Augustine and Ajax Football Club (2002) 23 Ill 405 
(CCMA); Treswill Overmeyer and Jona Cosmos Football Club WE 39134; Vaisili Sofiadellis & Others and 
Amazulu Football Club KN51728. 
Arbitrators have also on occasion apparently applied 'sports-specific' principles to such disputes - compare the 
reference to 'sporting justice' in the Monei and Manning Rangers matter supra, which concept was unfortunately 
not explained further (although it was probably derived from the concept of 'sporting just cause' as contained in 
article 21(1)(a) of FIFA'S Regulations for the Status and Transfer of Players - the concept of 'sporting just 
cause' is also included in the regulations of the South African National Soccer League; see McCarthy v 
Sundowns Football Club [2003] 2 BLLR 193 (LC) at 195D of the judgment). 
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(iii) · - The non-governmental nature in the composition and operations of such 
bodies, although they tend to display 'quasi-public' functions and powers; and 
(iv) The 'extra-national' nature of their-activities, in the sense that these 
organisations are something outside the structures recognised in public 
internation_al law (neither sovereign states nor international organisations 
. made up of ·sovereign states) - these bodies do not represent states, but 
rather inte_rests within_ states that organise collectively in order to pursue. a 
: common 'purpose (namely the regulation of the specific sport, by means of 
measures that are non-governmental in origin and form). 
It is submitted that the monopolistic governance function of sports governing bodies 
serves as a special feature which.should subject the conduct of a domestic governing 
body to more stringent scrutiny under the restraint of trade doctrine. One could argue 
that, for example, a professional cricketer is in the position of an applicant for entry to 
officially sanctioned international competition organized under the auspices of a body 
such as'the ICC or. a domestic board; that no such player has an enforceable right to 
work (in the sense of a right to eligibility and selection for international competition); and 
finally that in light of this there exists no legal relationship between such player and the 
ICC or domestic board upon which to challenge a rule or regulatory conduct aimed at 
excluding such player in the. event of participation in a 'rebel' league (such as the Indian 
Cricket League). 1116 It is submitted, however, that in light of the governance function and 
nature of the sports governing body concerned one should avoid such a simplistic view of 
the issue. 
1116 Even though there would normally of course be an employment nexus, where a player is contracted to the 
domestic board for participation in the national team for international competition, our law does not recognize a 
right to work (and specifically not a right to selection) on the part of such player. 
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362 In the English case of Stevenage Borough FC Ltd v The Football League Ltd1117 the 
applicant football club finished top of their league (the GM Vauxhall Conference), which 
entitled them to promotion to the 3rd Division of the Football League. The League's. rules 
stipulated that such promotion would be dependent on .the club satisfying certain ground 
capacity and safety requirements. Stev~:nage FC failed to meet the league's deadline in 
!'.,-
this regard, but would have done so by the start of the next season. The League· refused 
Stevenage entry into the competition on this basis. Stevenage challenged the. League's 
decision to refuse them entry on the basis that such decision constituted an unreasonable 
restraint of trade. 1118 
Carnwath J rejected the argument that the League was under no obligation to justify the 
restraint in question as there was no legal relationship between the club and the League 
;.1 
' upon which a challenge could be based, and. that, in effect, the club on 'these facts was.in . · 
the position of an applicant to the competition organized by the League., with no 
enforceable right to entry. The court.held that a broader approach could be justified on· • 
the following basis (as discussed by Gardiner et al): 1119 . 
'[T]he Football League could be seeri·to be operating as a part of the complicated system of 
control operating for the organization of professional football, in the interests of 
participants and the general public. The fact of the Football League's operation in the public 
interest was seen as a reasonable basis upon which to extend the ambit of the restraint of 
trade doctrine.' 
Even though the court failed to find that the League's conduct constituted an 
unreasonable restraint on the facts (inter alia based on the fact that Stevenage FC should 
have objected to the relevant rules at the beginning of the season, and that the delay in 
challenging the League's conduct was potentially prejudicial to the rights of third parties), 
1117 Chancery Division, unreported, 1996 (see the case report as published in the International Sports Law 
Review, 3 August 2006 at.p 128-147 (©Sweet & Maxwell Ltd)) 
1118 For more comprehensive discussion of the facts and judgment of the Stevenage case, see Gardiner et al 
Sports Law 3rd ed. Cavendish Publishing, London (2006) at 215-6 
1119 Ibid. 
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it is submitted that the court's reasoning regarding the application of the restraint 
doctrine in light.of the· nature of the organization and function of the sports governing 
body is in. line with both common sense and equity. Furthermore, even a view of a sports 
governing body as a 'custodian of the public interest'1120 in respect of the administration 
of the sport in question will not justify conduct by such body which is aimed primarily at 
the prevention of competition for its owl sake. 112 ~ When considering this custodian 
function of sports governing bodies, the following should be noted: 
·'The :main aims of sports governing bodies ·are to draw up rules for the sport, to promote it, 
to widen its popularity and to represent the sport and those involved in it. Governing 
bodies will, in part, achieve this through.good governance and by ensuring that the 
principles of democracy, fairness, solidari~y ,and transparency are respected. Governing 
bodies acknowledge that they hold the power to govern their sport as trustees. The power 
to govern is fundamentally vested in their members and exercised by them directly or 
indirectly through a system of representation. Governing bodies shall provide a clear 
statement of their role and the functions they perform to support their members and other 
groups with a legitimate interest in their acti~ities.'1122 
363 It can validly be argued that the basis for the authority of governing bodies 
derives, ultimately and fundamentally, from the interests of their members, including 
(professional) participants. When one encounters a situation of player restrictions such as 
that experienced at the time of writing in respect of the Indian Cricket League, it is 
debatable to what an extent an organisation such as the ICC's or domestic cricket 
boards' response to 'rebel' players is aimed at merely restricting competition (in respect 
of the breakaway league) or is aimed primarily at protecting a worthy interest, e.g. the 
1120 See Greig & Others v Insole supra and the judgment of Wilberforce J in Eastham v Newcastle United 
Football Association, Ltd supra 
1121 Greig v Insole supra at 496d-e 
1122 From the 'Statement of Good Governance Principles for Sports Governing Bodies' - Draft statement 
prepared by the Governance in Sport Committee for discussion at a conference on the same subject in Brussels, 
26-27 February 2001, at 2 
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maintenance of the elite status of (officially sanctioned) international competitions or the 
revenues generated by international competitions for purposes of trickle-down funding of 
domestic competitions and the development of the game. 1123 The reasonableness of the 
restraint, in light of the interest which ·is sought to be protected, remains paramount. 1124 . 
364 It may be necessary here to briefly just mention an additional reason for South 
African courts to consider extending the application of the restraint doctrine outside the 
contractual context. While it might be argued that such extension is strictly speaking 
unnecessary in light of the potential application of the section 22 right (e.g. to restrictive 
regulatory conduct by a sports governing body), it is submitted that the internal 
limitations.inherent in the section 22 right may serve to exclude access to such right in 
circumstances where the extended restraint doctrine would provide grounds for relief. 
Section 22 applies only to South African citizens, 1125 and it may therefore happen that a 
non-South African domestic cricket franchise player (e.g. the Nashua Dolphins' star Sri 
Lankan player, Sanath Jayasuriya) could be the subject of a Cricket SA/franchise ban or 
other regulatory restriction based on participation in a competition such as the ICL and 
yet be denied recourse to a section 22-based challenge. Application of the extended 
restraint doctrine would not be excluded in such cases. It should, however, also be noted 
that the very eligibility of non-South African players to compete in the domestic 
competitions (and at national level) in South Africa is currently under a significant threat 
from government (which threat, ironically, might also be open to challenge in terms of 
the extended restraint doctrine). 1126 
· 
1123 Compare the arguments raised at the time by the TCCB in Greig v Insole supra. The 'protectable interest(s)' 
of sports governing bodies in the current context will be examined more closely below. 
1124 Eastham v Newcastle United FC supra; Greig v Insole supra; Buckley v Tutty [1971] 125 C.L.R. 353; 
Adamson v Wife [1979] 27 A.L.R. 475; Barnard v Australia Soccer Federation [1988] A.LR. 81 
1125 Currie & de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook Juta (2005) point out that even though it has been held that 
in terms of section 38 of the Bill of Rights ('Enforcement of rights'), for an applicant to show sufficient interest 
in the outcome of constitutional litigation the enquiry is objective (it is sufficient to show that a right in the Bill 
·of Rights has been violated by a law or conduct and it is not necessary to show that the rights of the applicant 
has been violated), section 22 could not be used to challenge laws that prohibit the employment of non-citizens 
- at 490 note 38. 
1126 At the time of writing, a stand-off between major federations and the South African government appears to 
be on the cards, following controversial draft regulations in terms of the National Sport and Recreation 
Amendment Act, which are apparently currently under consideration. These regulations are expected to be 
gazetted for public comment following submissions by sporting federations (for further discussion of these draft 
regulations, see the discussion in par 114 et seq above). The draft regulations on the Control of Foreign Sports 
Persons shall apply to all instances where a foreign sports person is recruited and contracted by a person, a 
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§11 Relevant Constitutional guarantees of the fundamental rights of 
professional athletes 1127 
I The right.to fair labour practices 
365 ·. Section 23 of the Constitution guarantees the right to fair labour practices. 1128 
While there has been debate on whether the use of the wording of section 23(1) has 
sports body or any other body in South Africa to participate in a sports team in any sport inside the 
geographical boundaries of the country (a 'foreign sports person' is defined in the definitions section of the draft 
regulations as as any person recruited in terms of section 6(3) of the National Sport and Recreation Act, 1998, 
110 of 1998 (as amended). Draft Regulation 5 provides for stringent requirements in the recruitment of foreign 
sports persons: A national federation must, in terms of section 6(3) of the Act, before recruiting a foreign sports 
person to participate in sport in South Africa, satisfy itself that 'there are no other persons in the Republic 
suitable to participate frr such sport'. If there is such other person in the country, such a person 'must be given 
preference above (sic) a foreign sports person'. A national federation must advise the Minister of Sport of the 
full names and country of origin of a recruited foreign sports person and of the purpose and reason for 
recruiting such person, and must confirm that there is 'no other person in the Republic suitable to participate in 
such a sport.' This last requirement (at least in respect of the wording of the draft regulations which were 
circulated to federations) appears to be rather nonsensical; criteria to determine a person's suitability to 
participate in a sport would surely need to be much more clearly and definitively circumscribed. A failure to 
comply with these requirements would entitle the Minister to withdraw the recognition of a national federation 
by notifying it that it will not be recognised by Sport and Recreation SA with immediate effect, or to withdraw 
funding allocated to the national federation. The (in the opinion of this observer) rather bizarre nature of these 
draft regulations is further illustrated by the requirements contained in draft Regulation 8, which a foreign 
sports person must comply with before s/he may be considered by a national federation to participate in a 
sports team in any sport in South Africa. These requirements include, inter afia, that a foreign sports person 
must have officially played for his or her country 'in at least 65% of competitive "A" team matches at senior 
level for which he or she was available for selection, during a period of at least two years preceding the date of 
his or her recruitment' to participate in South Africa. Amongst other requirements for a foreign coach or 
manager, s/he must 'have coached or managed a national team for a period of at least five years' and may also 
be required to write 'an admission examination as determined from time to time by the relevant national 
federation', whatever this may entail. The wording of this draft regulation does not appear to be qualified, and 
it is difficult to divine the rationale behind a requirement that even a potential applicant for a coaching or 
manager's position in a Premier Soccer League club, a rugby Super 14 franchise or provincial team would 
apparently be required to have coached or managed a national team. A failure by a foreign sports person to 
comply with these requirements would entitle the Minister to disapprove of his or her participation in a sport in 
South Africa and 'to make recommendations to the Minister of Home Affairs to declare such a foreign sports 
person as an illegal immigrant.' It is expected that the effect of such a regulation could be very significant in a 
number of sporting codes. A number of Premier Soccer League clubs, for example, employ players from 
elsewhere in Africa, and other sports employers (such a number of domestic rugby and cricket franchises) 
would also be affected in terms of their foreign players. 
1127 It should be noted that other relevant constitutional guarantees, which are not expressly mentioned in this 
section, are applicable to the relationship between employees and employers (and trade unions, where 
applicable). The guarantees, which include the Constitutional right to equality (section 9), the right to privacy 
(section 14), rights to freedom of assembly (section 17) and freedom of expression (section 16), are discussed 
or referred to where relevant elsewhere in this chapter. 
1128 Sections 23 (1) - (3) provide as follows: 
'(I) Everyone has the right to fair labour practices. 
(2) Every worker has the right-
( a) to form and join a trade union; 
(b) to participate in the activities and programmes of a trade union; and 
( c) to strike. 
(3) Every employer has the right-
(a) to form and join an employers' organisation; and 
(b) to participate in the activities and programmes of an employers' organisation. 
(4) Every trade union and every employers' organisation has the right-
(a) to determine its own administration, programmes and activities; 
(b) to organise; and 
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broadened the scope of application of this right beyond the traditional · 
employer/employee relationship 1129 , the right has been recognized as applying to 
employees who are excluded from the definition of an employee as contained in the 
Labour Relations Act, 1995. 1130 
It has been observed that, in the context of the traditional purpose of rights guaranteed 
in Bills of Rights (namely to regulate legislation and public power), it is strange to find 
such a constitutionalisation of an entitlement to fair conduct which regulates the conduct 
of employers, and that sue~ a right is unique to the South African Bill of Rights. 1131 For 
present purposes the exact content and interpretation of this right will not be considered, . 
and the reader is referred to expert discourses on the topic available elsewhere. 1132 It is 
important simply to note that section 23 introduces Constitutional gua_rantees that are ~ 
applicable to the employment of professional athletes and extends.beyond tl:ie individual: 
employment-relationship to include collective bargaining, strike ~ction, 113_3 and·. -
.. 
organizational rights and freedoms of players' associations which are recognized trade 
unions (as well as employers' organisations1134). 
II Freedom of Association· 
366 Section 18 of the South African Constitution 1135 provides that '[e]veryone has the 
right to freedom of association'. The word 'association' has been defined as a group of 
people joined together for some purpose, and 'freedom of association' includes 'freedom 
(c) to form and join a federation.' 
1129 See Currie, I & de Waal, J Bill of Rights Handbook 5th Ed. Juta Law 2006 at 499 
1130 See the (at the time of writing unreported) judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal in Murray v The 
Minister of Defence (Case number 383/2006; handed down on 31 March 2008), where the SCA held that the 
constitutional guarantee of fair labour practices applied to an employee of the South African National Defence 
Force (whose employees are expressly excluded from the ambit of the Labour Relations Act, 1995) in the 
context of a claim of constructive dismissal. 
1131 Currie, I & de Waal, J Bill of Rights Handbook supra 502 (and the authority referred to there) 
1132 Cf. Currie, I & de Waal, J Bill of Rights Handbook supra Chapter 23 (at 498 et seq.) 
1133 While section 23(2) contains a right to strike, the reference to the employer's right of lock-out (which was 
contained in the Interim Constitution (Act 200 of 1993) was not incorporated in the final Constitution. The 
Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 provides a statutory right to lock-out for employers. 
1134 E.g. the SA Rugby Employers' organisation (or SAREO), which is the collective bargaining unit of the 14 
provincial rugby unions · 
1135 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
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to establish, belong to and maintain an association'. 1136 As has been observed, 
association relates to a means of expression, and freedom of association is intrinsic to a 
democratic society and 'obviously is of singular importance for .a deeply divided 
heterogenous country like South Africa'. 1137 The right of freedom of association enjoys 
protection as a ·distinguishable and independent right rather than one derived from any 
other fundamental freedom. It has been ·charaderized as a correlative right, which 
'buttresses .. : the promise of a variety of other rights'. 1138 The right also includes the 
freedom of dissociation. 1139 As has been observed: 
'The right involves not only a positive aspect, but also a negative one. Therefore by virtue 
of this right no-one should be compelled to establish an association, or to belong to an 
association ... [A]s far as the general principle is concerned, it is unconstitutional to force a 
pers.o.n to subscribe to_ a belief against his or her will, and it is also wrong to artificially 
i_nflate the strength of certain ideas and beliefs by compelling persons to support them.'1140 
It has been observed that.this right is recognized internationally as protecting 'a general 
capacity for citizens to jo_in ... in associations in order to attain various ends'. 1141 
Associations are yoluntary groupings formed to achieve a common goal. The South 
African formulation of the right does not limit the objectives to which the freedom to 
associate is attached; 1142 and it appears to be accepted that the objectives or goals of the 
association and its nature do not effect the hurdle regarding justification of a limitation of 
the right - the 'importance' of the goals of the association should therefore not affect the 
1136 Devenish, G The South African Constitution LexisNexis Butterworths 2005 at 109-110 
1137 Ibid. Haysom in Cheadle, MH; Davis, DM & Haysom, NRL South African Constitutional Law: The Bill of 
Rights 2nd edition LexisNexis Butterworths 2005 (at Ch 13c3) observes that the right to freedom of association 
is deeply implicated in other fundamental rights that also serve to protect this freedom - for example the 
freedom of expression (section 16 of the Constitution) and political rights (section 19), which are concerned 
with 'protecting those fundamental aspects of associational freedom relating to the articulation of opinions and 
viewpoints, both within and outside the political realm'. 
1138 Stuart Woolman, writing on 'Association' in Currie, I & de Waal, J The Bill of Rights Handbook 5th ed Juta 
2005 at 420 
1139 Devenish op cit. at 110-111; Du Plessis & Corder Understanding South Africa's Transitional Bill of Rights 
(1994) at 160 
1140 Devenish op cit. 111; Law Society of the Transvaal v Tloubatla [1999] 4 All SA 59 (T) 
1141 Sieghart, as quoted by Haysom in Cheadle et al at Ch 13-4 
1142 Haysom in Cheadle et al at Ch 13-4; Ch 13-6 
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level of scrutiny. Plainly_put, it appears that an alleged infringement or limitation of the 
right to freedom of association would not be more easily justified merely because the 
context relates to sporting activity. 
It is accepted that there is nothing in the nature of the right of freedom of association or 
the duties imposed by it that prevents its horizontal application (therefore not only in the 
relations between individuals and the state but also between individuals inter se). 1143 The 
effect of horizontal application is .most likely to find legal effect in the development of our 
common law of contract. 1144 While courts elsewhere have condoned a voluntary waiver, 
by means of contract, of an individual's freedom of association, 1145 it appears to be 
accepted that voluntary waivers of fundamental rights would not find favour in the South 
African context. 1146 
367 The right to freedom of association does not apply only to individual natural 
persons, but may also be invoked by associations. As has been mentioned elsewhere in 
this chapter, the court in Cronje v United Cricket Board of South Africa 1147 held that the 
governing body for the game of cricket in South Africa is a voluntary association which is 
private in nature, and derives its powers and authority not from statute but from 
contract. The court accordingly found that the UCBSA had been entitled to pass a 
resolution (to ban an individual from the game for life) as a means of exercising its right 
of non-association against the applicant, as guaranteed in section 18 (and, in fact, the 
court held that the organisation had not only been entitled but also 'correct' in doing 
so). 1148 There had been no contract of membership in place between the applicant and 
the respondent sports body. 
1143 Haysom at Ch 13-8 and the authority quoted there 
1144 Ibid. For more on recent developments regarding what has on occasion been referred to as the 
'constitutional colonization of contract law', see discussion elsewhere in this chapter (specifically, the 
introduction to the section on sport and employment). 
1145 See Haysom at Ch 13-9 
1146 Ibid. See also, specifically, the arguments by Stuart Woolman ('Category mistakes and the waiver of 
constitutional rights: A response to Deeksha Bhana on Barkhuizen' (2008) 125 South African Law Journal 10), 
who appears to argue that one cannot validly waive a constitutional right. 
1147 2001 ( 4) SA 1361 (T) 
1148 Aspects of the Cronje judgment, specifically relating to the 'private' nature of the organisation, are subject 
to criticism - see the discussion elsewhere in this chapter (specifically the section on judicial review of the 
decisions of sports governing bodies) 
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368 The Indian Cricket League, and the response by organizations such as the ICC and 
domestic cricket governing-bodies· (e.g. also Cricket South Africa), as referred to 
elsewhere in this chapter, raises definite questions regarding professional cricketers' 
rights to freedom of association, in two main ways. First, it appears that the banning of 
, 
rebel players from participating in officially sanctioned international cricket infringes the 
rights of such players to freely associate at the highest level of officially sanctioned 
competitions within their chosen profession. Also, the inh~rently coercive (and punitive) 
nature of the player bans would appear to infringe the right of such players to associate 
1 
with the promoters, organisers and other players who choose to participate in a private 
league or competition such as the ICL, which is positioned outside the officially 
sanctioned competitions. Second, it appears that the 'official' cricket bodies' bans of such 
players also infringe their freedom not to associate with ~uch bodies and the official 
competitions organised under their auspices. 
369 It is submitted that a case can be made for a finding that these bodies' conduct 
under discussio~ constitutes an unjustified infringement of the right to freedom of 
association of the affected player:s. It is submitted that such infringement is unjustified in 
light of the fact that the player bans do not have a rational connection with the protection 
by the cricketing associations of a legitimate interest in the regulation of the sport and 
also are not proportional to any such interest. With reference to one instance of a player 
ban referred to elsewhere in this chapter, namely the case of Andrew Hall, it is hard to 
find any possible legitimate basis for the conduct of Cricket South Africa in refusing the 
player permission not only to participate in the South African domestic competition but 
also in the English country cricket championship in 2008. While maintenance of the 
interests of stakeholders in the SA domestic league might justifiably require exclusion of 
players perceived to be 'rebels', it is less easy to find any rational basis for the restriction 
of such player's freedom to associate with another, officially sanctioned, league. The 
draconian nature of such restriction appears to militate against a finding of such conduct 
being reasonable in light of the interests sought (or ostensibly sought) to be protected by 
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the domestic governing body. Thi!:) is especially poignant in light of the effect of such· 
regulatory conduct in effectively sterilizing the player's potential to earn a living in any 
professional form of the game. 
Accordingly, it is submitted that Cricket South Africa's banning of players from eligibility 
for future selection to the national team is unconstitutional an_d accordingly liable to be 
struck down as an infringement of the rights conveyed in terms of section 18, and 
invalid. 
III Freedom of Trade, Occupation and Profession 
370 Section 22 of the South African Constitution provides"'irs-follows: 
'Every citizen has the right to choose their trade, occupation or profession freely. The 
practice of a trade, occupation or profession may be regulated by law. '1149 
- . 
The right contained in section 22 mirrors the concept of freedom to trade which is found 
in South African common law, although this right is of a more limited ambit than its 
earlier counterpart in the interim Constitution of 1993. 1150 This concept of freedom of 
trade has usually been expressed as a public policy consideration which must be taken 
into account when deliberating on claims to enforce restraints of trade or to prevent 
unlawful competition. 1151 One dimension of this concept is that a free and competitive 
market requires that 'personal skills and expertise can be freely bartered'; 1152 a 
1149 The section 22 right is only available to South African citizens (compare the wording of the section, and the 
Constitutional Court's finding in Certification of the Amended Text of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996 (2nd Certification decision) 1997 (2) SA 97 (CC) that the right of occupational choice could not be 
considered a universally accepted human right - see Currie, I & de Waal, J The Bill of Rights Handbook 5th ed 
Juta & Co 2005 at 489) 
1150 Section 26(1) of the Interim Constitution (Act 200 of 1993) provided that '[e]very person shall have the 
right freely to engage in economic activity and to pursue a livelihood anywhere in the national territory'. See 
Currie, I & de Waal, J The Bill of Rights Handbook 5th ed Juta & Co 2005 at 484 et seq. 
1151 See Lagrange in Cheadle, MH; Davis, DM & Haysom, NRL South African Constitutional Law: The Bill of 
Rights 2nd edition LexisNexis Butterworths 2005 at Ch 17-1 note 2 
1152 Atlas Organic Fertilizers v Pikkewyn Ghwano & Others 1981 (2) SA 173 (T) at 192F-193E, as quoted in 
Cheadle et al at Ch 17-1 note 2 
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complementary dimension is that persons are entitled to trade without wrongful 
interference from others. 1153 1154 
The proviso in section 22 allows limitation o(the freedom to practice a trade by 'law'. It 
is in this proviso that constitutional testing of alleged infringements of the right to freely 
choose a trade will usually.find its substance -: namely an evaluation of the legitimacy of 
any restriction of the right in question. 
371 It is. important to note that South African courts have not yet been faced with a 
case where the regulatory powers of a sports governing body·in respect of eligibility for 
participation in (a form of) the sport were at issue as constituting alleged infringement of 
the section.22 right.~we must therefore find guidance as to the courts' probable course of 
action in evaluating such restrictions in the existing case law. 
In this regard, the Constitutional Court1155 has held that an emphasis on freedom of 
participation :in the e_conomy did not implicitly include the right of unqualified persons to 
practice in professions requiring such qualifications nor did it entitle 'persons to ignore 
legislation aimed at regulating the manner in which particular activities are to be 
conducted, provided always that such regulations are not arbitrary .'1156 1157 
Regarding restriction of the right contained in section 22, Traverso J declared as follows 
in the case of Coetzee v Comitis: 1158 
'I accept that any profession must be regulated to a certain extent - these regulations can 
be internal or imposed by statute. Whatever the case may be, a profession can only be 
regulated in a manner which is reasonable and in a manner which does not violate the 
constitutional rights of individuals.' [Emphasis provided] 
1153 E.g see Patz v Green & Co. 1907 TS 427 at 436-7; Matthews v Young 1922 AD 492; see also the discussion 
of the common law action for unlawful competition in par 491 et seq below 
1154 Cheadle et al at Ch 17-1 note 2 
1155 In S v Lawrence; S v Negal; S v Solberg 1997 (10) BCLR 1348 (CC) 
1156 Ibid, at par. 33 of the judgment 
1157 Cheadle et al at Ch 17-4 
1158 Coetzee v Comitis and Others 2001 (1) SA 1254 (C), at par. 27 of the judgment 
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It is clear that ariy alleged infringement of a person's choice to engage in economic 
activity in terms of section 22, which would constitute a limitation of such right, would 
have to satisfy the proportionality test under section 36 of the Bill of Rights. Any 
restriction falling short of such a limitation (in terms of the proviso to the right, namely a 
restriction regulating the manner of participation in such economic activity) must satisfy 
the 'rationality test', which, at least, demands that such restriction must not be arbitrary 
and that there must be a rational basis for the restriction. Where the restriction on the 
mannE;?r of participation also affects the choice to participate, the limitation test must be 
satisfied. 1159 Such an analysis raises the importance of the policy issues underlying a 
regulatory measure, and specifically also the purpose of such measure. 1160 
Any conduct or actions of a sports governing body which constitute a limitation of 
individual players' (and even retired players') freedom of choice in terms of section 22 
must be justified ·as a reasonable limitation in light of public policy and the provisions of 
section 36 of the-8ill of Rights1161 or, otherwise, would constitute an illegitimate . . . , 
if1Fringement of such right ... 
372 When evaluating ·the justification for restrictive measures, rules or conduct in 
respect of eligibility for participation in a sport by its governing body, it is submitted that 
a fruitful analogy may be drawn with the approach to legislative regulation of vocational 
activity under the German Constitution of 1949 (which in article 12(1) contains a 
provision that is strikingly similar to section 221162). While such regulation is in terms of 
the conduct of private bodies and not in terms of legislation (deriving from state action), 
the analogy is apt in light of the nature and effects of such conduct (see the discussion 
1159 See Cheadle et al at Ch 17-4 
116° Cheadle et al at Ch 17-5 
1161 Section 36, the limitations clause, provides as follows: 
'1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general application to the extent that 
the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality 
and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including: 
a) the nature of the right; 
b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
c) the nature and extent of the limitation; 
d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and 
e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. 
2) Except as provided in subsection (1) or in any other provision of the Constitution, no law may limit any right 
entrenched in the Bill of Rights.' 
1162 See Cheadle et al at Ch 17-1 note 2 
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above relating to the extremely exclusionary nature of the system of governance and of 
eligiQility for participation in the sport). As has been observed, the fact that one is 
· dealing with the application of the section 22 right in the relations between private 
individuals or private actors (as oppos·ed to the individual vs. the state) has not stopped 
the courts from direct application of the right to private entities. 1163 And an added 
element to consider is-the power wielded by the perpetrator of an alleged infringement of 
the right:· · -~ 
'Irf principle, the ability tci argue th-e applicability of the right would seem to depend more 
.on the market p0wer wielded by the actor whose conduct is impugned rather than the 
statws of thf!t actor: the more the.power wielded enables that actor to control access to an 
. •... - . 
entice market, the '.11ore vulnera~le that power will be to constitutional attack. This 
approach might well guide the courts when deciding the appropriateness of applying the 
right horizontally.'1164 [Emphasis provided] 
The approach regarding the regulation of vocational activity under the German 
Constitution has been summarised as follows: 
'The general principles governing the regulation of vocational activity may be summarised 
as follows: The practice of an occupation may be restricted by reasonable regulations 
predicated on considerations of the common good. The freedom to choose an occupation, 
however, may be restricted only for the sake of compelling public interest; that is, if after 
careful consideration the legislature determines that a common interest must be protected, 
then it may impose restrictions to protect that interest - but only to the extent that the 
protection cannot be accomplished by a lesser restriction on freedom of choice. In the 
event that an encroachment of freedom of occupational choice is unavoidable, lawmakers 
must always employ the regulative means least restrictive to the basic right.'1165 
1163 SeeCheadleetalatCh 17-19toCh 17-20 
1164 Ibid. 
1165 Kommers The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany 1997 at 287-8, as quoted in 
Cheadle et al at Ch 17-10 (note 38) 
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: -t ... 
It is submitted that the 'public interest' referred to should be applied, mutatis mutandis, 
in the context of sport to refer to the 'public interest' in free participation in such activity; 
possibly more so where such participation is in the professional form of the· sport. and by 
professional athletes, and constitutes the pinnacle of elit~ or international competition in 
the code (which is also the top·.tier ~of the entertainment product provided to the masses 
of fans). A related element to such public interest in this regard is the interest of the · 
public (as supporters of teams and athletes within the relevant sporting code) in having 
access to the-performances ·Of such players at the highest !evel of competition. 1166 This 
approach aims to limit the regulatory infringement of the individual's freedom of choice 
through scrutiny'of both the pu-rpose"of the iimitation as well as the proportionality of the 
means chosen to effect such limitatiort. In this sense it is in .line w-ith the section-36 test 
under the South African Bill of Rights ... 
. ;. .. . ~ 
In assessing both the rationality and proportionality of the private regulatory conduct of a 
sports governing body, it is important to note that such regulation (and the rules of the 
. . . 
sport) is not in and of itself an illegitimate restriction on participation and individuals' 
rights. It is commonly accepted, due to the nature, history, traditions and characteristics 
of sports that a well-developed normative rules structure is of key importance to the very 
activity engaged in. 1167 
373 In the context of a section 22-review it is also important to note that the presence 
of economic freedom does not mean thatthere can be no legitimate constraints on the 
exercise of economic activity - t~e section 22 right permits persons to be active in the 
economic domain with all its. inherent constraints. 1168 Such constraints and the bases for 
their existence must satisfy the thresholds for constitutional review. As has been 
observed: 
1166 See also Greig v Insole supra 503b-c 
1167 See, generally, the discussion in Louw, A M 'An Anomaly Tolerated by the Law: Examining the Nature and 
Legal Significance of International Sports Governing Bodies' (2007) 1 South African Public Law 211. 
1168 See Devenish op cit. at 139 
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'There are a host of constraints imposed by the kind of society that the constitution has 
brought into being, premised as it is on social democratic principles.'1169 
However, the exercise of constitutional testing of the rules and conduct under discussion 
here should take account of the reality that the rules of a sport, as laid down by an 
international body and applied and enforced at domestic level by a nominally private 
association such as a governing body.; are not necessarily premised on these same 
principles. Their legitimacy in their domestic application must be determined with 
reference to the applicable constitutional values. 
Furthermore, reference should be had to the relevant competition law provisions that are 
prescribed by relevant legislation (e.g. the Competition Act 89 of 1998). 1170 
1169 Ibid. 
1170 See discussion of the application of the South African Competition Act, 89 of 1998, and the restrictive 
practices prescribed in terms of its provisions, in par 457 et seq below 
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§12 Collective bargaining in South African professional sport 
I Introduction 
374 As in other industries, collective bargaining has assumed a central role in the 
determination of terms and conditions of employment of professional athletes. 1171 This 
phenomenon has been accompanied by the increased unionization of players in many 
sports, both at international and domestic levels. The development of professional sport 
in different jurisdictions globally has always been characterized by a strong sense of 
collectivism among employers - due to the peculiar economics of professional team 
sports, 1172 team owners have traditionally been active in enforcing mechanisms and 
systems aimed at preserving competitive balance within sports leagues. 1173 This same 
balance had however largely been lacking in respect of collective action by the players in 
pursuit of equity and the enforcement of their employment rights. The emergence of 
'players' associations', 1174 and the development of such associations into fully fledged 
1171 It should be noted that the term 'collective bargaining' in the professional sporting context does not relate 
solely to the traditional notion of bargaining between employer(s) and employees in the employment context 
(which will be the topic under discussion in this chapter). Sports leagues the world over have also been active 
in concluding collective agreements with outside agencies for other purposes. For example, the English Premier 
League in football saw collective agreements concluded between the Premier League clubs as a collective with 
sports broadcasters (e.g. the BskyB and BBC agreement, which the Restrictive Practices Court ruled in 1999 did 
not constitute an anti-competitive arrangement and was in fact in the best interests of the development of the 
game of football and the interests of smaller clubs in the League). See also the interesting paper by Falconieri, 
Palomino & Sakovics 'Collective vs. Individual Sale of TV Rights in League Sports', August 2002, available online 
at http://www.econ.ed.ac.uk/papers/Collective vs Individual Sale of TV Rights in League Sports.pdf; and 
the article by Findlay, Holohan & Oughton 'A Game of Two Halves? The Business of Football', available on the 
web site of the Football Governance Research Centre, Birkbeck, University of London (available on line at 
http://www. football-research .org/gof2h/Gof2 H-cha p6. htm). 
On the collective (or 'central') selling of broadcasting rights within sports leagues, generally, see Lewis & Taylor 
Sport: Law and Practice Butterworths LexisNexis 2003 par B2.249 (at 403) et seq; Gardiner et al Sports Law 
2nd Ed Cavendish Publishing Ltd 2001 at 424 et seq. 
1172 See the discussion elsewhere in this chapter 
1173 Ibid. One of the main features of the economics of professional team sports that is relevant here is the 
monopsonist position of teams (employers) as the sole 'buyers' of the product of player labour in the input 
market of athlete employment - see, generally, Braham Dabscheck 'Industrial Relations in Australasian 
Professional Team Sports' The Otemon Journal of Australian Studies Vol. 30 (2004) 3-22. Dabscheck quotes 
Lord Wilberforce's description of the erstwhile retain and transfer system in English football (Eastham v 
Newcastle United Football Club [1964] Ch 413, at 438), an example of a collective mechanism devised by 
monopsonist clubs within a league in order to determine employment rules and the manner in which they will 
negotiate with individual players: 
'[The retain and transfer system is] an employer's system, set up in an industry where the employer has 
succeeded in establishing a monolithic front all over the world, and where it is clear that for the purposes of 
negotiation the employers are more strongly organised than the employees. No doubt the employers all over 
the world consider the system a good system.' 
1174 Modern world sport has seen the emergence of both domestic players' associations and international 
associations (e.g. FICA, the Federation of International Cricketers' Associations (established 1998), and FIFPro, 
the worldwide representative organisation for all professional football players, established in 1965). 
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trade unions, has marked an important step forward for professional athl·etes in 
strengthening their bargaining power in an industry that has, by definition, been 
characterized by generally strong employers and employers' organizations.and a wide 
gap between the respective powers of the parties to employment-related negotiation at 
the bargaining table. 1175 
375 A major factor in the disparity of bargaining power in professional sport is the 
frequent use of standard players' contracts, which are contracts of adhesion and have, 
traditiona·11y; left little room for negotiation and were offered-on a 'take it or leave it' 
basis to the majority of professional athletes or potential professional athletes. This, 
coupled with the generally. strict eligibility-criteria and relatively .small number of 
opportunities for entry into professional sports league, has contributed to professional 
sports.bein-g characterized as displaying a highly regulated labour market. This system 
was of course eminently open to exploitation by the employing parties to this 
relationship, and the equitableness of the professional player's contract was generally 
viewed with derision. 1176 
A common- misconception exists regarding the bargaining power of professional athletes 
in respect of their employment. In light of frequent reports of athletes earning millions in 
the major professional sports, many believe that these stars.are overpaid and should not 
be afforded the protections afforded 'ordinary' working people. 1177 It is, however, trite 
that most professional athletes are not in so fortunate a position - they ply their trade in 
For discussion of major developments in the emergence of players' associations in different professional 
sporting codes in Australia in recent times, see Braham Dabscheck 'Australian Professional Team Sports in a 
State of Flux'.The Otemon Journal of Australian Studies vol. 29 [2003] 3-19; Braham Dabscheck 'Industrial 
Relations in Australasian Professional Team Sports' The Otemon Journal of Australian Studies vol. 30 [2004] 3-
22. 
1175 This characteristic of the significant disparity in bargaining power between employers and players is 
symptomatic of the classical doctrine of labour law: 
'The main object of labour law has always been, and we venture to say will always be, to be a countervailing 
force to counteract the inequality of bargaining power which is inherent and must be inherent in the 
employment relationship.' 
Davies, P & Freedland, M Kahn-Freund's Labour and the Law 3ed Stevens & Sons, London 1983 at 18. 
1176 Robert Murphy, baseball commentator and member of the National Baseball Hall of Fame, once declared: 
'The validity of the baseball contract makes me laugh. A baseball owner can do as he wants with a player on 10 
day-notice.' 
1177 I have referred elsewhere to the vast salaries of a few star athletes in international professional sport -
compare Alex Smith (Utah quarterback in the NFL), who in July 2005 signed a 6-year contract with the San 
Francisco 49ers worth $49.25 million, with the potential to increase with incentives to $57 million; and David 
Beckham, who was reported in 2005 as earning around $32 million a year from his salary at Real Madrid and 
endorsement deals (source: BBC News, 3 May 2005, available online at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4510115.stm). 
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the minor leagues of professional sport where they often earn what amounts to a 
minimum wage, while also being confronted by a relatively short career with an uncertain 
duration and the potential of sporadic interruptions due to injury, non-selection, etc. 1178 
376 A prime example of the typically draconian limitations on the employment rights 
of professional athletes that arose from their negligible individual bargaining power is the 
erstwhile reserve clause system that was enforced in Major League Baseball in the USA. 
This system in essence provided team owners with a perpetual option to renew a player's 
contract and established supreme control over such player's employment prospects. 
Players bound by a reserve clause would, upon expiry of their contract, be forced to 
either negotiate·to re-sign with the team or request a release. Teams realized that 
freedom of movement would cause a·rise in salaries, and were generally reluctant.to 
consent to such releases. Players who preferred not to re-sign were therefore forced to 
hold out by refusing to play,: and receiving no pay. The reserve clause.system· .. 
undoubtedly ended many a player's career prematurely and caused much misery. 1179 The 
system was eventually abolished, which stemmed from (unsuccessful but 
groundbreaking) legal action by St. Louis Cardinals outfielder Curt Flood. Flood, who 
during the 1969 season had coincidentally heard that he had been traded to the 
Philadelphia Phillies (he was not informed by the team management but heard a report in 
a radio broadcast while driving in his car), eventually ruined his career by taking on the 
establishment in Major League Baseball. 1180 
1178 Compare again the remarks of Waglay J in McCarthy v Sundowns Football Club [2003] 2 BLLR 193 (LC) 
regarding the peculiarity of professional sport (football, in casu) employment - see the discussion elsewhere in 
this chapter 
1179 Compare the similarities between the reserve clause system in baseball and the transfer and registration 
system in South African professional football, which was declared to be an invalid, unconstitutional and 
unreasonable restraint of trade in Coetzee v Comitis and Others 2001 (1) SA 1254 (as discussed elsewhere in 
this chapter). 
118° Flood was unsuccessful in having the reserve clause scrapped through his legal action (Flood v Kuhn 407 US 
258, where the Supreme Court ruled to follow the decision in the landmark 1922 case of Federal Baseball Club 
v National League 259 U.S. 200, which exempted major league baseball from federal anti-trust legislation), but 
the system was eventually abolished in an arbitration award in 1975 (the Andy Messersmith/ Dave McNally 
matter), which established the right of free agency for players. It was subsequently realised that reserve 
clauses are a subject to be negotiated in terms of collective bargaining (e.g. while free agency was to be 
allowed in baseball, a collective bargaining agreement limited recourse thereto to players only after 6 years 
under contract). 
Flood is of course also associated with the 'Curt Flood Act' of 1998 (which amended the Clayton Act 15 U.S.C. 
section 12 et seq), which has subjected the employment of professional baseball players in the major leagues 
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377 . In. addition to the 'straitjacket' of often one-sided contracts, a major factor in 
evaluating the relative bargaining power of the parties to this relationship is found in the 
economic nature of sports leagues, and specifically the strength of employers based on 
their monopolistic position within the market. 1181 As has been observed elsewhere, the 
. traditionaUy weak bargaining position of professional athletes on issues affecting their 
employment1182 can also be traced to the role and functions of (international) sports 
governing .bodies in the governance of the different professional sporting codes. 1183 In 
essence, the employment context of players in professional team sports involves a highly 
regulated contractual nexus, where players are bound by means of contracts of adhesion 
to their employers, and by means of a 'chain of subjugation'1184 to (international) 
governing bodies in the particular sporting code. These bodies, which are strictly 
speaking positioned somewhere outside the athlete's employment relationship, in fact 
form part of what can be called the 'composite employer' in professional team sports. On 
to anti-trust scrutiny, and has thus limited baseball's traditional non-statutory anti-trust exemption in terms of 
the Federal Baseball judgment supra. 
1181 Compare the foljowing description of professional sports leagues in the USA: 
'Sports leagues are not merely joint ventures; they are cartels that exist to allocate and control the production 
and distribution markets and to eliminate within the cartel competition over producers (players) and consumers 
(fans). Clubs compete today but largely in areas forced on them through legal and political sanctions ... 
[C]lubs acting collectively through a league still can maximise income and profits, so long as they proceed in 
accordance with the law. Today, as a cartel, a sports league allocates territorial markets and attempts to 
eliminate within the league competition for the sport consumer's dollar. At the same time, while spreading itself 
across an expansive geographical complex, it becomes a natural monopoly and effectively discourages the 
establishment of rival leagues. As a league enters prime markets and establishes viable properties, it gains 
substantial advantages, while the opportunities for new leagues to form and to succeed are diminished.' 
Berry, R; Gould, W & Staudohar, P Labor Relations in Professional Sport Auburn House Publishing Co., Dover, 
Massachusetts 1986 at 5-6. 
1182 It should be noted that these issues affecting the employment of professional athletes have a very wide 
reach, often significantly more so than is the case with 'ordinary' employees in other industries. As discussed 
elsewhere, the employment contracts of professional athletes (and other parties such as coaches) often 
regulate issues such as where the player should live, what the player should eat (e.g. clauses regarding fitness 
standards), what extra-curricular activities the athlete may or may not participate in (e.g. standard clauses re 
conduct that holds the potential for physical injury), what the athlete should wear (clothing advertising 
regulations), what the athlete should say (clauses re communication with the media), etc. 
1183 See Louw, A M 'An Anomaly Tolerated by the Law: Examining the Nature and Legal Significance of 
International Sports Governing Bodies' (2007) 1 South African Public Law 211. As an example of the role and 
powers of an international sports governing body, compare the dispute between the South African Rugby 
Players' Association (SARPA) and the SA Rugby Union (SARU) regarding a proposed benefit match between the 
Springboks and the Barbarians, which had been planned for 3 December 2005 at Twickenham and was to 
generate funding for SARPA and SARU. This match was subsequently abandoned, even though a collective 
agreement had been reached between SARPA and SARU, when the International Rugby Board refused to give 
its approval for the game and also refused to provide reasons for this decision. SARPA declared a dispute 
against SARLI on the basis of the latter's apparent refusal to obtain the IRB's consent for the match or, 
alternatively, to request written reasons for the refusal. See the report entitled 'Players union declare dispute 
with SARU', 4 August 2005, available online at http://www.european-rugby.com/News/story 45192.shtml [last 
accessed 27 February 2006]. 
1184 Discussed in Louw, A M 'Employment Based on a Fiction: Evaluating the Legitimacy of Traditional Notions of 
Contract in their Application to an Atypical Employment Relationship' Obiter Vol. 2 (2007) 187 
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th·e edifice of contract 1185 a number of controversial and far-reaching practices have 
developed· within this industry, which always have the potential to impact on the rights 
and freedoms of professional athletes. 
378 . While the mechanism of collective bargaining has therefore increasingly assumed 
a role of countering the potential abuses inherent in such a strictly regulated and singular 
employment nexus, a more contentious but natural extension of the unionization of 
players and the emergence of systematised collective bargaining in professional sport has 
been the accompanying threat and occasional use of industrial action as an element of 
such bargaining. The strike and the lock-out have arrived on the scene in professional 
sport, and recourse thereto has on -rather frequent occasions caused havoc in especially 
North American professional sports leagues. 
II Collective Bargaining: The South African Model 
379 One of the cornerstones df the law relating to employment is found in the 
mechanism of collective bargaining, whereby workers organize collectively in order to 
exercise a bargaining power in negotiations with employers that would otherwise be 
absent from the individual employment relationship. 1186 In fact, modern labour law is 
1185 Namely an amalgamation of the employment contract as well as the contract of membership of governing 
bodies (in terms of the traditionally accepted notion of such bodies as voluntary associations - see the 
discussion elsewhere in this chapter). 
1186 As it has been expressed: 
'The phenomenon of strikes and lock-outs comprises one of the crucial problems of contemporary industrial 
relations. The concept of concerted activity concerns issues that lie at the heart of the ideological conflict of 
labour relations, related to the core of the legal regulation of industrial conflict. Strikes and lock-outs are basic 
to the distribution of power between capital and labour, as well part of the problem of autonomy of groups and 
their relationship to the State.' 
Ruth Ben-Israel 'Introduction to Strikes and Lock"outs: A Comparative Perspective', in Blanpain, R (ed) 'Strikes 
and Lock-outs in Industrialized Market Economies' Bulletin of Comparative Labour Relations 29 - 1994 Kluwer 
Law, at 1. 
Malcolm Wallis succinctly described the need for collective bargaining when discussing some shortfalls of a 
purely contractual analysis of employment: 
'The law of contract does not provide an adequate vehicle for ensuring fairness in dismissal. Certain matters 
that we regard as basic to all employment such as annual leave and sick leave and limitations on hours of work 
in the in'terests ofthe health of workers, and the establishment of a basic floor of fair employment conditions, 
are simply not achievable by an individualised process of forming employment contracts ... To suggest that the 
common law alone should govern labour relations is manifestly an untenable proposition.' 
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founded on the premise that the relationship between an employer and an individual 
employee is an unequal relationship .:of power. The main object of labour law is to provide 
the mechanism to counteract this inequality, although the law cannot do so on its own: 
'Law is ill-suited for the delicate task of regulating the dynamic interaction between 
employers and employees in detail. Economic efficiency and political democracy alike 
require a significant degree of local autonomy and devolution of decision-making within a 
framework of public policy. In this context, i! ha!? come to be widely accepted that the 
natural counterbalance to employer power resides in the power of workers acting 
.o:, 
collectively ... In other words, the function of labour law is not only to extend certain basic 
-
protections to employees (for example, by prohibiting excessive hours of work) but, more 
fundamentally, to create a framework for collective bargaining between organised labour 
and employers.'1187 
A significant component of the terms and' conditions of employment of workers, where 
unions are active, derives as a product of such collective action. In fact, a collective 
bargaining agreement concluded in terms of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 (or the 'LRA') 
may depart from the provisions of the most basic protection provided to employees 
under the Basic Conditions of Employment Act (or 'BCEA), 1188 and will supersede an 
individual employment contract in existence or that comes into existence between parties 
who are bound by such collective agreement. 1189 
380 The Labour Relations Act does not provide for obligatory collective bargaining. 
Instead of obligating employers and trade unions to bargain collectively, the legislature 
Wallis, M 'The LRA and the Common Law' Law, Democracy and Development 2005 (2) Vol. 9 181 at 181-2. See 
also Spiros Simitis 'The Rediscovery of the Individual in Labour Law', in Rogowski, R & Wilthagen, T (eds.) 
Reflexive Labour Law Kluwer Law 1994 at 185. 
· 
1187 Du Toit, D 'Labour and the Bill of Rights' The Bill of Rights Compendium LexisNexis Butterworths (1996) par 
4Bl0 
1188 Act 75 of 1997 
1189 See section 199 of the Labour Relations Act. Of course, the terms of such collective agreement must be 
more favourable to the employees than the basic protections found under the Basic Conditions of Employment 
Act (or BCEA). This status of collective agreements vis a vis the BCEA gives expression to important principles 
of South African labour law, which include 'the primacy of collective bargaining and dispute resolution by 
consensus' (see the Labour Court judgment in University of the Western Cape Academic Staff Union v 
University of the Western Cape Case. No. CBOl/2001). 
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chose to facilitate rnllective bargaining in a number of ways, by encouraging the process 
rather than imposing an enforceable duty to bargain on any of the parties. 1190 In the 
event of a dispute about a refusal to bargain, a party may only proceed to industrial 
action after an advisory award has been obtained from the CCMA or a bargaining 
council, 1191 but there is no penalty if a party refuses to bargain. 
- . 
381 · In order to facilitate collective bargaining and to give effect to the fundamental 
right to fair labour practices as contained in section 23 of the Constitution, 1192 the LRA 
provides for a number of organizational rights that trade unions may obtain vis a vis the 
employer or an employers' organization. These include the following: 
A right of trade union access to the workplace; 1193 
A right to demand deduction of trade union subscriptions or levies by 
means of stop-order facilities; 1194 
The right to appoint trade union representatives; 1195 
Leave for office bearers for union activities; 1196 and 
Rights to disclosure of information relevant to coll.ective bargaining by the . 
employer. 1197 
Of course, fundamental to collective bargaining is the provision in section 4(1) of the 
LRA, which states that every employee has the right to participate in forming a trade 
union or federation of trade unions, and to join a trade union subject to its constitution. 
1190 See, generally, Cheadle, H 'Collective Bargaining and the LRA' Law Democracy and Development 2005 (2) 
Vol. 9 147 at 148 - 153 
1191 Section 64(2) of the Labour Relations Act . 
1192 Act 108 of 1996. Section 23(5) provides that [e)very trade union, employers' organisation and employer 
has the right to engage in collective bargaining.' This right may only be limited in terms of national legislation 
(the LRA), where such limitation complies with the limitation clause contained in section 36(1) of the Bill of 
Rights. 
1193 See section 12 of the LRA 
1194 See section 13 of the LRA 
1195 See section 14 of the LRA 
1196 See section 15 of the LRA 
1197 See section 16 of the LRA 
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It has been·held that dismissing an employee for participating in trade union activities is 
an example of automatically unfair dismissal. 1198 
382. Section 213 defines a trade union as 'an association of employees whose principal 
purpose is to regulate relations between employees and employers, including any 
employers' organisation', and the main role of unions is to engage in collective bargaining 
witt:i.:members' employers and~to represent such members in grievance and disciplinary 
matters. The above organizational rights are only available·to a trade union registered 
under the LRA. The application for registration is a simple procedure. 1199 While unions are 
not obliged to register under the Act (e.g. in order to embark on protected strike action), 
registration is a prerequisite for the availability of the organizational rights provided by 
Chapter 111. 1200 Only a registered trade union can enter into collective agreements; if 
unregistered; any collective agreement entered into by such union will fall outside the 
scope of the LRA. When an employee expressly or impliedly consents to a collective 
agreement; it is deemed at common law that the terms and conditions of such 
agreement are incorporated by reference in the individual employee's· employment 
contract .. 
383 Section 213 of of the LRA defines a collective agreement as a written agreement 
concerning terms and conditions of employment or any other matter of mutual interest 
concluded by one or more registered trade unions and one or more employers (or 
registered employers' organization(s)). Section 23 gives statutory force to all collective 
agreements, irrespective of the individual's consent. Where employees are subject to a 
collective agreement, its terms are treated as implied terms of their contracts of 
employment. Such a collective agreement also binds any employee who becomes a 
1198 Kroukamp v SA Air/ink (Pty) Ltd (2005) 26 ILJ 2153 (LAC). For the consequences of an automatically unfair 
dismissal, see the discussion earlier in this section on sport and employment 
1199 See section 95 of the LRA 
1200 It is also a prerequisite for the conclusion of collective agreements as defined under the LRA, for a union to 
obtain separate legal personality distinct from its members, for a union to apply for the establishment of a 
bargaining council or a statutory council, to apply for the establishment of a workplace forum, to authorise a 
picket by its members, and to represent members at CCMA proceedings~ see, generally, Basson et al Essential 
Labour Law 4th Edition Labour Law Publications 2005 at 240 et seq. 
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member of the union after conclusion of the agreement, and will continue to bind them 
whether or not they remain members of the union. 1201 A trade union has .a duty to avoid 
violations of its members' constitutional rights, and unlawful or unfairly discriminatory 
terms in a collective agreement are unenforceable. The courts have held that a union has 
a duty of fair representation,towards its members, which requires the union to obtain a 
mandate from the majority of its members before concluding a collective agreement, and 
that uni.on negotiators should employ the test of whether the agreement is in the interest 
of its members. Where a union acts in breach of this duty to negotiate within the 
mandate and authority of its members, aggrieved members can resign from the union or 
seek an interdict from the Labour Court in terms of secion 158(1) of the LRA to prevent 
the union from signing an agreement which is against the interests of the members. 
The right to form and join trade unions is significantly bolstered by the fundamental 
right, contained in section 18 of the Bill of Rights, of freedom of association. 1202 
;, 
384 An important. weapon in the arsenal of employees who bargain collectively with 
employers, is the right to resort to industrial action and, more specifically, to strike. 
Section 23(2)(c) of the Constitution and section 64 of the LRA provide that every worker 
has the right to strike. 
It is important to distinguish between rights disputes and interest disputes. A 
rights dispute arises where an existing right is breached or an existing advantage is 
sought, and the dispute can be resolved by application and interpretation of existing 
norms (e.g. an unfair dismissal dispute, which can be resolved by the CCMA or Labour 
Court, or a dispute arising out of a breach of a collective agreement which can be 
resolved through interpretation of the terms of the agreement). 
An interest dispute arises where a party seeks a new benefit or standard to which 
such party has no legal entitlement (e.g. a wage increase or improved working 
conditions). 
1201 See Smailes, S 'Sports and Labour Law in the Age of (Rugby) Professionalism: Collective Power, Collective 
Strength' (2007) 28 Industrial Law Journal 57 at 62-3 
1202 Which right is examined more closely elsewhere in this chapter 
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As the Labour Relations Act reserves determination of rights disputes to the CCMA 
through arbitration or the Labour Court by adjudication, the Act prohibits industrial action 
over rights disputes. 1203 Interest disputes must be resolved through collective bargaining 
and, if unsuccessful, .through industrial action. In respect of determining the distinction 
between rights and interest-,disputes the reader is referred to expert texts. Industrial 
action (e.g. a strike) over a rights dispute would generally be unprotected, and the 
consequences of engaging in an unprotected strike are serious (e.g. an employer may 
fairly dismiss such striking workers). 1204 Even though disputes over the organizational 
rights of unions are designated as rights dispute~, section 65(2)(a) of the Act expressly 
permits employees to strike and employers to lock-out in order to enforce their demands 
in respect of the implementation of organizational rights (in the event of a representative 
. . .. . .. . 
union). Generally, though,.a strike over a rights dispute would be unprotected. 
385 A strik~ is defined in section 213 of.the LRA as 'the partial or complete refusal to 
work, or the retardation or obstruction of work, by persons who are or have been 
employed by the sal'!l~ employer or by different employers, for the purpose of remedying 
a grievance or ,resolvi~g a. d_isp~te in respect of any matter of mutual interest between 
employer and employee, and every reference to work in this definition includes overtime 
work, whether it is voluntary or compulsory'. The procedural requirements for a 
protected strike in terms of the Act are set out in section 64, and will not be discussed 
here. It is, however, important to briefly highlight the following substantive points 
regarding a protected strike (as per the above definition) which may be relevant in the 
event of strike action in the professional sports context: 
The dispute must concern workplace issues, i.e. terms and conditions of 
employment or other issues which impact on the employment relationship; 
The dispute must be between an employer and employees (or a union); and 
1203 Section 65(1) provides that employees may not strike if the issue in dispute is one that may be referred to 
arbitration or adjudication. Examples of such rights disputes are an unfair dismissal dispute and an unfair 
labour practice dispute. 
1204 Section 68(5), subject to compliance with Item 6 of the Code.of Good Practice: Dismissal (a Schedule to the 
Act) 
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The Act allows for secondary or 'sympathy' strikes (section 66). 
386 Further discussion of collective labour law and industrial action, generally, is 
beyond the scope of this chapter, and the reader is referred to specialized texts in this 
regard. 
III Industrial action in professio·nal sport 
387 On 22 May 1999;··New Zealand's Otago Highlanders faced the Western Province 
Stormers at Newlands in Cape Town to· determine a place in the semi-final of the (then) 
Super 121205 tournament. The Stormers were beaten convincingly, with a final score-line 
of 33-18, ensuring an all-New Zealand semi-final between the Highlanders and the 
Canterbury Crusaders. While the result of the ·match on 22 May was unspectacular -
neither the first nor lasttiine a South African side would fail to make the semi-finals of 
the Super 12 (or the subsequent Super 14 tournament) or lose to a New Zealand team -
the date will live on to be remembered by many as a day of infamy and controversy in 
SA rugby history. The match was preceded by a threatened players' strike by the 
Stormers squad, with demands for a doubling of the match fee and an increased win 
bonus against threats of refusing to play. For about an hour, while the prospects for the 
match proceeding were hanging in the balance, South African rugby fans were for the 
first time confronted by the very visible spectre of strike action and labour unrest in 
professional sport. This was not well received by the public. 
388 The words 'sport' and 'strike' immediately conjure up visions of American 
professional sport in the major leagues. Indicative of the closer similarities between 
sports leagues and teams in the US major leagues with businesses with the prime 
1205 A.s it was then called. From 2006 the tournament has been revamped as the 'Super 14', and including two 
extra teams (one each from South Africa and Australia). 
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objective of.maximizing profits, as found in other, more archaic industries, the traditional 
weapons of employers and employees in the collective bargaining context have also been 
quite prevalent. Sports such .as baseball and hockey have in recent times qeen 
characterized by long and costly strike actions by players and lock-outs by team owners. 
Major League ·baseball saw a players' strike that lasted for 232 days from August 1994 to 
April 1995, and which has been called the ·longest and most costly strike in sports 
history. 1206 More recently, the·National 'Hockey League (NHL) saw a lockout of players, 
which commenced on 16 September 2004, and was initiated in support of owners' 
demands for a· restructuring of the·pay scale for players in light of claims that the 
existing system was threatening the economic survival of the League. 1207 On 16 February 
2005 NHL commissioner, Gary Bettman, made history .by canceling the NHL season and 
playoffs, the first North American sports league to lose a year to a labour dispute. A 
collective agreement was eventually reached to ensure hockey in the 2005/6 season. 1208 
It appears that frequent (and sometimes imaginative) industrial action is an entrenched 
and inherent part of the American professional sports landscape. 1209 
389 The feature of industrial action (and especially players' strikes) in professional 
sport is not confined to the USA. In the latter part of 1997, the Australian Cricketers' 
Association (ACA) threatened strike action in one-day international matches in order to 
gain recognition from the Australian Cricket Board and to negotiate a collective 
agreement with the ACB. Recognition was granted, and a collective deal was concluded in 
September 1998. This use of industrial action in cricket was nothing new, as it built on a 
history that saw the first players' strike in England in 1859 (when Surrey players 
informed the Oval authorities that they would not play without a pay increase), and even 
1206 See Paul Weiler Leveling the Playing Field Harvard ·university Press, 2000 at 112 
1207 See the discussion by Paul Hendrick in the North Carolina Bar Association's newsletter Sport and 
Entertainment Vol. 5 No. 1 January 2005. The NHL had also experienced a lockout in the 1994-5 season, which 
lasted 103 days, wiped out 468 games and cost roughly US$5 million for a typical team in the league. 
1208 See the report entitled 'Back on the ice', 22 July 2005, available online at 
http://www.cbc.ca/sports/indepth/cba 
1209 For example, since 1972, negotiations between Major League Baseball players and team owners have led to 
eight work stoppages. This is in line with the perception of a 'litigation frenzy' in American professional sport -
see Weiler Leveling the Playing Field Harvard University Press 2000 at 1. 
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the use of 'scab labour' in the form of replacement players during a strike in a match 
against a.touring Australian side in 1878.1210 • . 
The threat of industrial strike action has also on occasion been utilised successfully in 
English football. For example, the Professional Footballers' Association (PFA) used this 
threat in 2001 during a dispute over the union's share of a broadcasting deal with the 
governing bodies. 1211 The PFA, which was only .offered what amounted to-1.5% of the TV 
monies in 2001 (significantly less than what the union had been receiving since the mid-
1950s), visited 92 Premier League and Football League clubs to discuss the situation with 
members. When put to a memb~r vote, 99% of the members who voted were in favour 
of strike action - this enabled the PFA to negotiate a deal worth £17.5 million per year 
for a prospective 10 years, dependent on future. TV deals. 1212 
In English rugby union· in 2000, players went on strike from international ·representation 
alter they rejected a proposal from the Rugby Football Union (RFU) regarding. 
remunerati'on. The players claimed increased match fees and objected to' the ·RFU 
retaining intellectual property rights regarding the use of players' likenesses.· The strike 
action was called off when the matter was settled. 1213 
More recently, a number of Zimbabwean cricketers went on strike. in response to the 
Zimbabwe Cricket Union's failure to pay match fees for tours to India and New Zealand 
and apparent widespread dissatisfaction among players over the way the sport is run by 
administrators. 
1210 See the discussion of these events by Simon Rae It's Not Cricket Faber & Faber 2001 at 71, 76-77. 
1211 A similar dispute brewed between the South African Football Players' Union (SAFPU) and the Premier Soccer 
League in 2006. Amid allegations that the PSL had failed to involve players or obtain their consent in respect of 
the use of players' image rights when negotiating a (rumoured) ZAR500 million broadcasting rights deal with 
the South African Broadcasting Corporation in 2001, SAFPU claimed 10% of the proceeds of this deal from the 
PSL (from a report in Business Day, reproduced (dated 25 January 2006) on the web site of the SA Rugby 
Players' Association at htto://www.sarpa.net - last visited 23 February 2006). The outcome of this dispute is 
un"known to the author at the time of writing. 
The threatened strike action of the Australian Cricketers' Association in 1997 resulted in a collective agreement 
with the Australian Cricket Board in September 1998 that also dealt extensively with the issue of revenue-
sharing. Under this agreement, players received 20% of the ACB's cricket revenues up to AUS$60 million, and 
25% of any income over this amount (see Braham Dabsceck 'Industrial Relations in Australasian Professional 
Team Sports' The Otemon Journal of Australian Studies vol. 30 [2004] 3 at 17). 
A collective agreement between the New Zealand Rugby Players' Association and the New Zealand Rugby 
Union, in place from 1 January 2006 to 31 December 2008, reportedly contained a revenue-sharing scheme 
whereby 32.4% of all player-generated revenues (including all New Zealand Rugby Union broadcasting 
revenue, sponsorship and match-day revenue) was allocated to an annual player payment pool to be used for 
player payments and initiatives. 
1212 See Geoff Walters The Professional Footballers' Association: A Case Study of Trade Union Growth Football 
Governance Research Centre, Birkbeck, University of London 2004 at 11-12. See also Lewis & Taylor op cit. par 
El.92 (at 838). 
1213 See Lewis & Taylor op cit. at par EL 94 (at 839) 
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390 The-major South. African sports have to date not seen actual strike action or 
employer lock-outs, although threats of such action have been made on occasion. In 
professional football, the players' union SAFPU has frequently complained about unfair 
treatment of players by clubs in the Premier League· and the National First Division 
competition. In November 2007 SAFPU threatened a strike unless player demands 
regarding a ·minimum wage, medical aid and player representation on the PSL Board 
were met. This followed unhappiness -regarding. an announcement that had been made 
about an ·amount of ZAR 70 million that had been set aside to·pay bonuses to a small 
number of administrators for their .procurement of a lucrative ZAR 500 million PSL 
sponsorship from major bank ABSA as well as the lucrative ZAR 1.4 billion PSL 
broadcasting rights deal with .SuperSport. 1214 The, union was very upset at the fact that 
this money was apparently to be used to enrich a few administrators (which caused 
public outcry at the time, following earlier reports that 5 high.:.ranking PSL officials and 3 
club owners were to each·pocket ZAR 30 million in commission from the PSL. 
broadcasting rights deal), and that player would see none of the financial benefits 
involved. further unhappiness related to discrepancies in salaries paid to players by 
different clubs (SAFPU alleged in August 2007 that only 6 of the 16 PSL clubs were 
paying decent salaries; that, depending on a player's club, PSL players could be earning 
anything between ZAR 2 000 and ZAR 80 000 per month; and that things were even 
worse in the First Division, where some players were earning a pauper's wage of less 
. than ZAR 1 000 per month). More recently, SAFPU has also taken clubs to task about 
alleged deceptive practices with players' contracts, and the alleged exploitation of 
illiterate and ignorant young players. 
1214 See discussion elsewhere in this chapter regarding the dispute between public broadcaster SABC and the 
PSL which followed on this broadcasting rights deal with pay-TV content aggregator SuperSport 
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391 In professional rugby, the SA Rugby Players' Association (SARPA) is the registered 
players' trade union, 1215 which periodically negotiates the collective agreement between 
SARPA and the SA Rugy Union and SA Rugby (Pty) Ltd (in respect of minimum conditions 
of employment of the national team players), and a substantive collective agreement 
between SARPA and the collective referred to as the provincial unions (SAREO, or the SA 
Rugby Employers' Organisation) re~arding provincial player contracts. The first collective 
agreement with SARU (then SARF.U) and SA Rugby (Pty) Ltd was concluded on 1 
November 2004 following a dispute regarding player representation on the SARU 
executive committee and the board of SA Rugby (Pty) Ltd, which was eventually resolved 
by the CCMA in July 2004 (it was determined that SA Rugby (Pty) Ltd agreed to alter its 
articles of association to incorporate one player representative to serve as director on the 
board of directors of the company for the duration of the collective agreement with_ 
SARPA).1216 
SARPA have, in terms of the collective agr:-eements in place, negotiated two types of-
standard player contracts, namely the standard contract between national players and SA 
Rugby (Pty) Ltd in respect of playing for the Springboks, and the standard contracts 
between provincial players and the provincial union. SARPA plays a more active role in 
negotiation of the national contracts than is the case with provincial contracts (largely 
due to capacity constraints in servicing approximately 470 professional players around 
the country). 1217 G~ins made by SARPA through collective bargaining relate mainly to 
remuneration (in terms of the national collective agreement, national players are graded 
in terms of an evaluation made by the national coach in consultation with the national 
team manager, the CEO of SA Rugby (Pty) Ltd and the management committee; in 
respect of professional provincial players, the provincial unions are themselves graded as 
category 'A', 'B' or 'C' provinces, and the substantive collective agreement makes 
provision for minimum levels of remuneration for players in respect of each of these 
categories of provinces), medical aid benefits, an income replacement insurance scheme, 
1215 For more on the activities of SARPA, see the article by Smailes, S 'Sports Law and Labour Law in the Age of 
(Rugby) Professionalism: Collective Power, Collective Strength' (2007) 28 Industrial Law Journal 57 
1216 See Smailes supra at 64-66 
1217 Smailes 74 
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and a SARPA retirement fund. 1218 It has been observed that the inequality of bargaining 
power between players -and employers in rugby is evident in negotiation of the player 
contracts (both provincial and national); there is little room for negotiation by SARPA 
beyond conditions of service, minimum standards for players, budget and player 
categories. 1219 The contracts offer players a match fee, a win bonus and an annual 
retainer (and the only difference between contracts is the amount of the annual retainer, 
. . 
which is payable monthly in 12 equal instalments). 1220 It was reported in May 2008 that 
. . 
the SA Rugby Union is considering abolishing the use of one-year standard players' 
contracts in order to retain the services of players in the national team, in favour of 
simply contracting players upon remuneration on a match-by-match basis. The outcome 
of such proposal is unknown to the author at the time of writing. It has been observed, 
however, that the incentive provided to players by the current match fee system is 
problematic in respect o(the collective bargaining process, and '[s]hould SA Rugby 
decide to "punish" a player for enforcin.g his legal rights, the player can merely be 
dropped from the team and thus suffer a substantial financial loss. 1221 
A major concern regarding collective bargaining in professional rugby is that fact that it 
appears tha·t SARPA has signed away its members' right to strike. Smailes, 1222 in her 
discussion of the 2004 collective agreement between SARPA and SA Rugby, has observed 
the following: 
'In clause 7.2 of the collective agreement, which sets out further undertakings by SARPA to 
SA Rugby, SARPA undertakes not to participate in or encourage industrial action. This 
indicates that SARPA has signed away its right to strike in direct contradiction to its own 
constitution. Further evidence of this contradiction can be seen in clause 17, the "peace 
obligation" clause, which mirrors SARPA's undertaking not to enter into or encourage any 
1218 Professional rugby players are the only employees in South Africa who can retire from age 32 with no 
penalties. Players are allowed to make contributions to the SARPA fund until the age of 40, after which they 
must retire from the fund - see Smailes supra 71 
1219 Smailes 75 
1220 Ibid. 
1221 Smailes supra 80. It should be noted, however, that such a practice may be open to challenge as 
constituting demotion in terms of the Labour Relations Act (and relate to and affect the provision of benefits to 
the player), and non-selection could conceivably therefore form the subject of an unfair labour practice claim 
under section 186(2)(a). See the discussion elsewhere in this chapter. 
1222 Smailes, S 'Sports Law and Labour Law in the Age of (Rugby) Professionalism: Collective Power, Collective 
Strength' (2007) 28 Industrial Law Journal 57 at 67-68 
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industrial a1=tion and holds that all dispute_s_ must go to private arbitration. Clause 17 also 
makes provisions for instances where players do participate in industrial. action. In these 
instances SARPA has undertaken immedic;itely to intervene and attempt to stop all such 
participation ... A possible reason !or sue~.~ dramatic move by SARPA might be because it 
is a young trade union and the trust relationship with SA Rugby has not been sufficiently 
tested as yet. The most probable answer, however, lies in the uniqueness of sport. 
I * :. [SARPA's CEO has stated] that, "in the era of professional sport and in line with 
international trends new structures like final binding arbitration is (sic) more appropriate 
than power play'. SARPA-states that strike.s and lock-outs have in the past been damaging 
to professional sports worldwide:This is, however, debatable. With the inherent inequality 
that exists in such a relationship, to relinquish one'.s most important weapon is not 
ne_cessarily_the best move.'_ 
Clause 21 of the 2.008 collective agreement b_etween SARPA and SARE0:223 in respect of 
. ~ ~ -
the contracts of provincial play~r:s similarly p~ovides for final and binding arbitr~tion ~f 
disputes: 
'Any dispute between the parties to this agreement arising out of the interpretation, 
application or.implementation o_f this agreement, or any dispute between a Province and a 
player arising out of the employment of the player by the province, including the 
termination of such employment, shall be referred to and determined by final and binding 
arbitration.' 
392 In professional cricket, the SA Cricketers' Association (SACA) appears to have 
been extremely successful in its activities undertaken on behalf of members. At the time 
of writing a Memorandum of Understanding (collective agreement) is in place between 
SACA, Cricket South Africa (Pty) Ltd and the domestic professional franchises, 1224 which 
deals with issues such as, the contracting of players by Cricket SA in the national team, 
1223 Of 5 June 2008 (copy on file with the author) 
1224 The current MOU is in place for a three year-period from 1 May 2007 until 30 April 2010 
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minimum numbers of players to be contracted to the six domestic franchises (as well as 
standard 'Play for Pay' contracts to·be used by all franchises for non-contracted players 
dra~ed in per ·match as a- contingency), revenue share for players in terms of a player 
payment pool, regulations relating to provincial and club cricket, players and playing 
overseas (in terms of Ko/pak), 1225 race-based transformation policy, ICC event 
arrangements, match. scheduling in terms of. guidelines provided by FICA, and player 
agent accreditation. 
An area of particular success in professional cricket relates to a commercial rights 
arrangement currently in place between Cricket South Africa, the six domestic franchises 
and SACA. This arrangement regulates commercial rights relating to the use of player 
attributes (image rights) and player.appearances (in terms of contractual obligations with 
the official sponsors of the CSA and the franchises), by means of two players' trusts that 
have been established to act as vehicles for the·granting of rights to the CSA and the 
distribution of revenue from such commercial rights to players. 1226 
393 No more will be said here regarding the players' unions in the three major 
professional sports and, aside from references elsewhere in this chapter, the reader is 
referred to their respective web sites for more information on their functions ·and 
activities. 1227 
IV Collective Bargaining and the Peculiarities of the Professional Sports 
Context 
394 It is useful at this stage to identify, very briefly, some of the peculiarities of the 
processes and rules of collective bargaining under South African labour law as applied to 
1225 Deutcher Handballbund eV v Maras Kolpak C-438/00, 8 May 2003 - see the discussion elsewhere in this 
chapter 
1226 For more on this arrangement, see the discussion in the section on athletes' image rights elsewhere in this 
chapter 
1227 South African Football Players' Union (SAFPU) - http://www.cosatu.orq.za/affiliates/affisafpu.htm (affiliated 
to the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU)); South African Cricketers' Association (SACA) -
http://www.saca.org.za; South African Rugby Players Association (SARPA) - http://www.sarpa.net 
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the specific context of professional sport. Undoubtedly, the application of normal 
principles and provisions of legislation such as the Labour Relations Act (or 'LRA') 1228 as 
well as the common law gives rise to a number of issues that are of special interest to 
the student of the employment of professional athletes. The following are examples: 
The specific application of the right of freedom of association in the context 
of professional sport, with a particular focus on players' unions as atypical 
manifestations of the concept of the 'closed shop'; 1229 
The issue of organizational rights of trade unions as provided for in 
Chapter III of the LRA, specifically rights relating to access to the 
workplace and disclosure of information by the employer; 
The meaning and content of 'issues of mutual interest'12'30 between 
employers and employees in this context; 
Identification of the various parties involved in collective bargaining and 
industrial action in professional sport, and some interesting questions 
regarding the accommodation of disputes between such ·parties under the 
'traditional' law relating to collective bargaining in terms of the Labour 
Relations Act; 1231 
1228 Act 66 of 1995, as amended 
1229 The term 'closed shop' is used here in a different meaning than that usually associated with a trade union 
where membership is compulsory and refusal to join would serve to deny the particular employee access to 
employment. It has been contended elsewhere that the very nature of employment in professional sport, due to 
the specific characteristics of the limitations on rights of access to this occupation, functions as a 'closed shop', 
in the sense that all potential candidates for employment as players in professional sport are in fact forced to 
conclude employment contracts in line with the system of rules and regulations existing in the particular 
sporting code. One is faced with a situation where players are forced to enter employment in a specified 
manner and on specified terms. It is debatable whether this situation in turn forces players to join players' 
unions as a necessary step to counter the inherent potential abuses of power by employers and governing 
bodies in the employment relationship. Walters The Professional Footballers' Association: A Case Study of Trade 
Union Growth Football Governance Research Centre, Birkbeck, University of London 2004 (at 10) observes that 
the Professional Footballers' Association (PFA) in England has a union density of 100%, which indicates that 
membership of the union appears to be the social norm amongst professional footballers. The author states 
that the PFA does not operate a closed shop, but represents a 'closed union'. This is different from a closed 
shop in that membership is only available to a concentrated group of workers; the union can regulate its intake. 
1230 In the meaning of section l(c)(i) of the Labour Relations Act - for example the identification of issues of 
mutual interest that are strictly removed from the direct employment relationship although relating to elements 
such as the remuneration of players (e.g. revenue-sharing in the selling of broadcasting rights within leagues or 
by individual clubs or teams, an issue that has often prompted (threatened) strike action by players' unions in 
other jurisdictions). 
1231 Mention has been made elsewhere in this chapter to the apparently frequent disputes regarding revenue-
sharing within sports leagues in respect of the sale of broadcasting rights. Gardiner et al (op cit. at 533) discuss 
an example from England: The Professional Footballers' Association (PFA) balloted its members employed by 
clubs in the Football League on strike action in 1996, following the League's decision to terminate a 30 year 
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The parties' respective rights ·and duties in respect of strikes and lock-
outs; 1232 
Dispute resolution in the context of collective bargaining; 1233 and 
Peculiar aspects of (the economics of) professional sports leagues as they 
feature in respect of the relations between employer(s) and union, 1234 as 
well as in shaping the contents of collective agreements between players' 
unions.and employer bodies. 1235 
Specifically, the issue of the role of the common law in legislatively regulated collective 
bargaining also comes to the fore :- here it is-interesting to note the peculiar nature of 
the employment o.f professional athletes in team sports as 'free agents'1236 within the 
agreement under which the PFA received 10% of the income from television rights (which money is used by the 
PFA for the welfare of its members). The dispute was ultimately resolved by agreement. 
The authors ask the interesting question whether any proposed strike would have run foul of the legal controls 
aimed at 'traditional' trade unions, namely the statutory immunity against the tort of inducing breach of 
contracts of employment by the members of such trade union, afforded to lawful strikes in terms of section 219 
of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 (compare similar provisions in chapter IV of 
the Labour.Relations Act 66 of 1995; Afrox Ltd v SA Chemical Workers Union & Others (2).(1997) 18 Industrial 
Law Journal 406 (LC); Fidelity Guard Holdings (Pty) Ltd v PTWU & Others [1997] BLLR 1125 (LAC)). The reason 
for this is that the dispute might properly have been determined to be between the PFA and the Football 
League, and not between employees and their employer as required by law for such protection. 
1232 See Chapter IV of the LRA 
1233 See chapter VII of the LRA 
1234 Interestingly, it appears that trade unions of professional athletes have a significant interest in promoting 
and maintaining the success of the sports league, which is arguably more prevalent in this industry than in 
others and undoubtedly colours the nature of relations between such unions and employers. Walters (op cit. at 
10), for example, refers to the Professional Footballers' Association in England, of which the industrial relations 
arm has a dual focus - on the needs of individual players as well as on protecting the industry, which as a 
consequence directly benefits members. 
1235 For example the imposition of a salary cap to teams or franchises at provincial level - compare the 
collective agreement between the New Zealand Rugby Players' Association and the New Zealand Rugby Union, 
which came into force on 1 January 2006 (report entitled 'NZ rugby players deal reached', 1 November 2005, 
available online at http:/ltvnz.co.nz/view/paqe/413551/623651 [last accessed on 27 February 2006]). 
An interesting (and unique) feature of the players' union in professional sport relates to the financing of such 
organisations' activities: Apart from special sources of income for players' associations such as specially 
negotiated benefit matches, the role of revenue-sharing in respect of broadcasting income in most cases means 
that such unions' income from members' subscription fees often constitute only a fraction of the unions' income 
(e.g. see Walters op cit. 18 in respect of the English PFA). 
1236 It is important to note here that the discussion in the text does not refer to the practice of free agency as 
known in professional sports in the USA, whereby athletes are in certain circumstances (and in the absence of 
reserve clauses or other mechanisms that serve to limit mobility in employment) entitled to sign with another 
team at their whim, either in terms of certain restrictions or unrestricted. 
I refer here to the position of athletes, even in team sports, as largely independent actors within the collective 
bargaining context. In the American professional sports market, players' unions follow an atypical model of 
bargaining agents, quite distinct from their trade union counterparts in other industries. They function as 
exclusive bargaining agents for the employees they represent in respect of terms and conditions of 
employment, and collective bargaining takes place in an environment of standard players' contracts. However,· 
these unions consciously promote competition by allowing individual athletes to independently negotiate certain 
terms of their employment, most notably remuneration and the duration of contracts. The player therefore, 
within a collective labour arrangement, enjoys a high degree of autonomy. See Wise & Meyer International 
Sports Law and Business Kluwer Law International 1997 Vol. 1 at 90 et seq. 
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collective bargaining scenario. While the LRA (e.g. in section 23(1)) provides a 
framework for the application of collective agreements concluded in terms of the Act, and 
to a large extent excludes the ordinary rules of the common law as they would otherwise 
have applied to such a contract, the mixed nature of collective bargaining in professional 
sport demands that the common law should retain its role in respect of regulating certain 
important aspects of the process. This is especially relevant in the context of the greater 
role for the common law rules regarding employment contracts in professional sport (as 
opposed to 'ordinary' employment contexts), in light of the prevalence of fixed-term 
contracts of employment. In this context, the process of collective bargaining retains a 
significantly individualistic element in respect of certain issues and in certain cases, which 
characteristic serves as another example of the distinction between the employment of 
players in professional sp.ort from the 'normal' employment scenario as found in· other 
industries. 1237 The main reason for this distinction is found in the entertainment nature of 
the professional sports industry. 1238 
Another example of this is found in Swedish ice hockey. The first collective labour agreement concluded 
between the Salaried Employees' Union (representing 250 professional ice hockey players) and the Employers' 
Alliance (representing clubs) in October 1999, specifically provided that employers and players were to reach 
individual agreement on salaries and other remuneration. All players' salaries are individual and differentiated, 
with young players often receiving less than the top salaries commanded by top players. See the report 
available on line at http://www.eiro.eurofound.eu.int/2000/02/feature/se0002126f. html. 
In South African professional sport, as also elsewhere, this is also a feature of collective bargaining where 'star 
players' are involved. 
An added feature, which connects with this, is the nature of the employment of professional players as 
facilitating the exploitation of commercial opportunities (sponsorships, the licensing of image rights, etc) by 
individual players. Often such rights may come into conflict with the rights of employers and others as 
regulated by collective bargaining, in which event more individualised bargaining is required. 
1237 Wise & Meyer Vol. 1 op cit (at 90) declare that (in the American professional sports context) sports unions 
are 'not necessarily consistent with the overall policy considerations behind unions - that employees are better 
off being represented as a group [rather] than by negotiating terms and conditions of employment on an 
individual basis'. The authors state that sports unions have dealt with this tension by reaching an 
accommodation between the interests of the group and of the individual: 
[O]verall working guidelines are negotiated by the union, including standard players contracts, minimum 
salaries, overall salary maximums (in some cases), benefits and restrictions on movement. However, broad 
latitude is reserved for players in the areas of compensation and duration of contract.' (Wise & Meyer Vol. 1 at 
90-91. 
Another unique feature of collective bargaining in this context is that sports leagues are not typical of most 
multi-employer bargaining units. They have widely-varied constituencies in respect of the size and economic 
position of teams or franchises (Wise & Meyer 91), as well as having to grapple with peculiar issues such as the 
maintenance of competitive balance within leagues. 
1238 Paul Staudohar observed (in the American context) that there are similarities between the labour force of 
the (wider) entertainment industry and that of its sports component: 
'Management is highly dependent on the work force - live entertainment cannot go on without it. In general, 
workers are well educated and know how to use their economic power to greatest advantage. Both are subject 
to the "star system", in which exceptionally talented people dominate the worker hierarchy. Whether actors, 
rock musicians, or athletic superstars, these elite persons command vastly disproportionate influence on their 
professions and substantial incomes from outside sources. Although exceptionally talented performers will 
always be able to derive exceptional incomes, one of the important reasons that unions have arisen in sports 
and other segments of the entertainment industry is the need to further the economic interests of workers 
farther down in the hierarchy - marginal players, equipment operators and stagehands - whose talents are 
more easily replaced.' 
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While this postulate is in line with a view of the role of the common law as being 
supplementary to other sources of law in the employment context such as collective 
agreements and legislation; 1239 it is submitted that the professional sports employment 
context necessitates recognition of a more prominent role for the common law rules of 
contract than is the norm elsewhere. 
This is also in ·line with the ~upreme role of contract as the often-cited basis for the 
incorporation of the;rules and regulatory conduct of (international) sports governing 
bodies as a significant source of.the terms and conditions of employment contained in 
the indiyidual pl:ayer's contra~t: : 
395 In evaluating the p.eculiarities of collective bar~aining in th'e professional sports 
context, it is -necessary to briefly consider the characteristics that distinguish this industry 
. ' 
from others. Mention has been made elsewhere of the peculiar economics of professional 
team sports, which relate to a range of issues that include the economics of the output 
market of the entertainment product of sports, as well as the specific rules and practices 
that have developed in regulating the input market of labour. It is this last that is most 
relevant to the discussion at han9, which focuses on the employment c:if players in 
professional team sports. 
Berry et al declared as follows, in their evaluation of labour relations in American 
professional sports: 
'The sports industries are not typical. Their product is ephemeral, seen in a moment, 
perhaps remembered, but generally not used by the hand or physically consumed. The 
product is entertainment, but of a special variety. A victor is declared, and a loser 
identified, but these are in many respects illusions, since all participants may well be 
winners where it counts: in the pocketbook.'1240 
Staudohar, P The Sports Industry and Collective Bargaining 2"d Ed ILR Press, Cornell University, New York 1989 
at 7. 
1239 Rather than an 'either/or' approach to such other sources of the terms and conditions of employment - see 
the discussion by Wallis op cit at 186. 
1240 Berry, R; Gould, W & Staudohar, P Labor Relations in Professional Sport Auburn House Publishing Co., 
Dover, Massachusetts 1986 at 2 
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Numerous factors influence the creation and operation of sports leagues. 1241 These 
include the bases leading to their cr:eation, the nature of a sport, its potential appeal to 
spectators, the number of teams per league, the number of players per team, the 
marketability of the sport to a national versus a regional following, the number of games 
in a season, and the adaptability of the game to media such as television.1242 Sports 
leagues are individual entities that should not be regarded as having identical interests or 
necessarily common problems - 'while commonalities exist, they are not as pervasive as 
are the differences'. 1243 
Berry et al describe the five main interests that comprise the infrastructure of the 
professional sports league, and their alignment on both sides of the divide between 
employers and employees. On the one hand one finds the league1244 and the clubs. On 
the other, one finds players, unions and agents/attorneys acting on·behalf of individual 
players. 1245 
396 In evaluating the peculiarities of collective bargaining in the professional sports 
context, one should also take note, more pragmatically, of trends in the development of 
bargaining in respect of the issues involved. When one considers the history of collective 
bargaining in sport in the USA, Europe, the UK and elsewhere, it appears that the 
following general trends have emerged: 
1241 While the professional 'sports league' has a specific meaning in the Ame.rican context, which is largely 
unique to the North American model of sport, it is contended that the remarks reproduced here are pertinent to 
an analysis of the professional sports industry in South Africa. While the major SA professional sports have in 
recent years also seen the introduction of business entities similar to the American model of franchises within 
professional leagues, it is submitted that much of what is said about professional sport in the USA are equally 
applicable mutatis mutandis to the SA industry, the different sports codes and the league and competition 
structures that function at the higher (professional) levels within such codes. 
1242 Berry et al op cit. 3 
1243 Ibid. 
1244 While the league functions as a business entity in the American model of professional sport, it is contended 
that the competition or league as managed by the relevant governing body and/or corporate body in South 
African sport is the equivalent - compare the Super 14 rugby tournament, the Premier Soccer League in 
football and the domestic franchise cricket league as administered by Cricket SA (Pty) Ltd. 
1245 Berry et al at 4 
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·-.The _early instances of player organization and bargaining involved 
acquiring recognition and enforcing bargaining: due to the traditional 
nature of employment in professional r:;port and the significant imbalance 
between strong owners and leagues vis a vis individual players, team 
owners initially simply refused to bargain with players over issues of 
importance. 1246 
"Fhe early instances of collective bargaining with recognized players~ unions 
largely resembled the traditional role of unions in other industries in 
respect of the issues for bargaining - namely pensions, benefits and job 
security. 1247 
During the 1970s and 1980s bargaining revolved mostly around player 
. freedom of movement and free. agency; 1248 
In the 1990s bargaining focused on disputes over salary caps, taxes and. 
other devices aimed at controlling the increases in salaries resulting from 
free agency. 1249 
_ ·-It appears that, at present, a significant focus of collective bargaining in 
professional sport is the sharing of revenue (from sources such as the 
lucrative sale of television rights) between players and their employers. 
Compare calls for greater player participation in the governance (and 
share-holding) of the new cricket Twenty20 tournaments. 
Interestingly, it appears that the professional sports industry has generally experienced a 
trend towards the progressive recognition of the role of players as constituting more than 
a mere element of the cost of production, but rather as contributing significantly to the 
value of the product rendered. This has led to at least nominal recognition of players as 
1246 E.g. Wise & Meyer (Vol. 1 op cit. 91) refer to the example of the National Football League Players' 
Association in the NFL in the USA - while this union was formed in 1956 and recognised in 1958, it did not 
conclude its first collective bargaining agreement until 1968. 
1247 Wise & Meyer op cit. 91 
1248 Ibid. 
1249 Ibid. 
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-stakeholders in the industry, although the interests of such players are still often affected 
negatively by the conduct of employers. 
397 By way of illustration of the elements and factors that affect the bargaining power 
of professional-athletes, compare the position of the labo_ur market in English professional 
football in recent times. Walters 1250 argues that the insider-outsider theory of 
employment and unemployment, which focuses on the individual worker's ability to 
influence wage negotiation and determination (rather than·determinationthrough 
employer influence) as a result of the worker being viewed as profitable, is applicable to 
the English professional football labour market in the 1990s. The aLitho·r argues that the 
three main reasons for this increased labour power are the introduction pf the Premier 
League in 1992, the advent of pay to view television sold.on the basis of live football 
coverage, and the resultant in.crease in industry revenue. 
Three factors illustrate the extent of this labour power: The first was the substantial 
increase in player wages (a 700% growth rate in_ the Premier League), which significantly 
exceeded the national average. The second was a rise in employment numbers as teams 
contracted larger playing squads in the pursuit of increased competitiveness on the field 
of play. The third factor was the increase in long-term contracts for individual players as 
a result of the Bosman judgment in 1995.1251 
Three more factors contributed to the increased individual bargaining power of players, 
especially in respect of player appropriation of the increased revenues that entered the 
industry during this time: The first is the scarcity value of players. Football players 
possess a particular level of talent that other individuals do not and cannot obtain, not 
even through training. The supply of labour is relatively inelastic and there is a limit on 
the normal_ substitutions of other inputs for labour. 1252 The second .factor is the role of 
players' agents. Because the football union does not, as in other industries, bargain 
1250 Geoff Walters The Professional Footballers' Association: A Case Study of Trade Union Growth Football 
Governance Research Centre, Birkbeck, University of London 2004 at 18-22 -
1251 Walters states that clubs became aware of the danger of losing players for nothing at the end of their 
contract (as clubs could no longer restrict the movement of players), therefore offering longer-term contracts 
(Walters 19). 
1252 Walters 20 
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collectively for member salaries and .the duration of contracts, wage negotiation takes 
place at the individual player level. This was a key factor in the development of the agent 
as mediator:1253 Thirdly, the trend towards longer-term contracts following Bosman also 
contributed to a shift in bargaining power from employer to player. 1254 
Clearly, some of these trends are as relevant elsewhere, specifically also in the major 
South African professional sports. Here this is especially true in respect of rugby, which 
only saw the emergence of professionalism in the late 1990s but where such 
development coincided with new and very lucrative competitions (e.g. the Super 14 
competition in rugby). 
398 What is most interesting in respect of these developments is the following: While 
the professional sports industry has been rather unique in comparison to other industries 
in that the emergence of collective bargaining has had much more substantial impact in 
strengthening the bargaining power of the individual 'worker', it is submitted that the 
actual value of collective bargaining has been largely illusory. The very fundamental (and 
peculiar) characteristic of the important role of individual bargaining (in respect of e.g. 
remuneration and the duration of contracts) has meant that those who have gained from 
these developments are mostly the fortunate few, the star players at the very pinnacle of 
their game. For the majority of professional players, even within a system of strong 
collective bargaining, the gains have been and promise to continue to be limited. 
And in this we find irony. While one would assume that collective bargaining would find a 
special niche in professional sport, as a mechanism to ensure significant bargaining 
power for players (because of the inelastic nature of the supply of players as well as their 
fundamental role and value in the 'production' of the entertainment product of the 
industry), these very peculiarities regarding the nature of the product and the 
entertainment value of individual players have caused the end value of collective 
bargaining to be reduced. While one would assume that collective bargaining would be 
1253 Walters 20 
1254 Walters 21. The author points out, however, that these developments towards increased bargaining power 
for individual players has changed due to the financial crisis that affected the Premier League in the late 1990s 
- individual bargaining power now only tends to be appropriate for the minority of 'star' players at the highest 
level (Walters 22). · 
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much more prevalent and also that players would usually prevail in disputes through the 
threat of industrial actiori, it appears that collective action has limited value for these and 
other reasons. 1255 This appears to be borne out by the observations referred to above 
regarding the role of strike action in South African rugby in light of the collective 
agreements currently in place. 
1255 These other reasons include the following: 
The role and powers of (international) sports governing bodies as constituting external sources of 
the terms and conditions of employment. While these bodies are usually not the targets of 
collective action by players, as being strictly removed from the employment relationship between 
a player and a club or team, their actions and decisions significantly affect the employment 
contract as well as the collective bargaining process. 
In respect of industrial action as an element of collective bargaining, it should be noted that 
professional athletes differ significantly from 'strikers' in other industries. While frequent strike 
action has led to much dissatisfaction amongst fans ands supporters in American sports, it 
appears that there is generally significant public interest in the actions of players. For example, if 
a national cricket team undertakes strike action against an ICC Member Board in respect of 
contractual issues affecting private sponsorships of individual players, the fans of that team would 
generally be quite vocal in respect of such strike action affecting the team's participation in 
events. It is submitted that the public's role in this respect generally discourages resort to 
industrial action, due to the wider social value and significance of sport. As has been observed, 
sports clubs have 'two souls', the 'top-level money-spinning business activity and a long standing 
recreational activity deeply rooted in almost every social and geographic context' - see Domenico 
Di Pietro 'The Dual Nature of Football Clubs and the Need for Special Legislation' International 
Sports Law Journal 2003/2 at 24. Similarly, players in professional team sports are also faced with 
the duality of representing the public or the fans in their activities, also when engaging in 
industrial action. 
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§13 Player transfer rules, freedom of movement and player restrictions 
.· 
399 The first South African case to deal with player transfer rules (in football) was the 
1978 judgment of the Witwatersrand Local Division of the High Court in Highlands Park 
Football Club v Vi/joen. 1256 The applicant football club, whose first team was one of the 
leading teams in the country and had won the (then) National Football League's 
competition a number of times, brought an application to enforce a restraint of trade 
clause contained in its contract with the respondent player. The applicant's only assets 
consisted in contractual rights which bound its players to play football for the applicant, 
which rights were commonly regarded as capable of being ceded or sold between clubs. 
It was common practice for clubs to sell and purchase the obligations of players to play 
for a certain club. If either ~he .Player or the club was dissatisfied with the contractual 
arrangements, the player was pla.ced on a 'open to transfer' list, and offers would then be 
invited from other clubs to tran~fer the player to such clubs subject to negotiation of a 
suitable transfer fee. 1257 
Following the player's signing with another club at the end of the 1977 season, the 
applicant club bought an application for an interdict restraining the player from playing 
for any other club, in terms of the restraint ~f trade clause in the player's contract which 
read as follows: 
'The player agrees, undertakes and binds himself that on the expiry of the agreement and 
unless and until he is formally transferred by the Club to another club, he will not for a 
period of three years after the date of such expiry play professional football in the Republic 
of South Africa, save with the prior written permission of the club.' 
The Court held that the restraint of trade was not enforceable, on the basis of the 
following principle: 
1256 1978 (3) SA 191 (W) 
1257 Loubser in Basson & Loubser Sport and the Law in South Africa supra Ch 8-38 
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'[T]he employer of a sports professional is not entitled, by virtue of a restraint. clause in th.e 
employment contract with the player, to prevent the player from playing for a competing 
club or union after termination of the employment contract. This is because the employer 
does not retain a proprietary interest, akin to the i.nterest in a trade secret or client list, in 
the services of a player after termination of the player's contract. Contract clauses 
purporting to restrict a player from freely offering his services in the employment market 
after termination of an employment contract are therefore regarded as unreasonable, 
contrary to public interest and unenforceable.'1258 
The court held that that an employer may not prevent a player employee from using his 
skills in his profession after termination of the employment ·contract, even where such 
skills were. at least partly acquired by the training, teaching and know-how which the 
employer had invested in the player during his contract of employment. The employer's 
initial financial outlay in acquiring the services of the player as well as subsequent 
training was held not to constitute t~e kind of proprietary interest which could be 
legitimately protected by a restraint of trade clause. 1259 
400 In 2001 South Africa saw its own 'Bosman' case in respect of judicial testing of 
the transfer rules which were applicable in professional football (or 'soccer', as the game 
is most commonly referred to), in the judgment of the Cape Provincial Division of the 
High Court in Coetzee v Comitis and Others. 1260 In this matter, the court was confronted 
with an application by a professional soccer player to declare the National Soccer League 
L 
(NSL)'s constitution, rules and regulations relating to the transfer of professional soccer 
players whose contracts had terminated, to be contrary to public policy and unlawful 
and/or inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution 1261 and therefore invalid. 1262 In 
evaluating the lawfulness of the rules and regulations concerned, Traverso J recognised 
1258 As summarised by Loubser in Sasson & Loubser Sport and the Law in South Africa supra Ch 8-39 
12s9 Ibid. 
1260 2001 (1) SA 1254 (C) 
1261 Especially section 10 (right to dignity) and section 22 (right to freely choose and pursue an occupation). 
1262 The facts appear from the judgment at 1256F-1259C 
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the 'chain of subjugation'1263 under which professional athletes contract with their 
employers and the hierarchy of links in this chain, which is applicable to professional 
soccer players in South Africa: 
'It is common cause between the parties that professional football in South Africa is 
regulated and controlled by the NSL. Any club or footballer wishing to play professional 
football must be registered with the NSL. If a player is not registered he cannot play for 
any club that is affiliated to the NSL. The NSL is an association which has as its primary 
• % • .. - • 
purpose the cont.rol and management of profess!onal football in South Africa. All 
professional football clubs in South Africa are affiliated to the NSL, which in turn is affiliated 
to [the South African Football Association]. SAFA is in turn affiliated to [the Confederation 
,.. ~ .. •"" ·-
of Afri_can Football Associations] and FIFA, the wo.rld body of professional football. The 
hierarchy is_ therefore: NSL; SAFA; CA~; FIFA.'1264 
The court continued to set out th.e then-applicable regulations of the NSL that were 
relevant .to the dispute, including the following: 
'13.1 ·-Every player designated as a professional shall have a written contract with the 
club employing him. 
14.1 Only a player who is currently registered by the League shall be permitted to 
participate in official matches of the League.'126s 
1263 Louw, AM 'Employment Based on a Fiction: Evaluating the Legitimacy of Traditional Notions of Contract in 
their Application to an Atypical Employment Relationship' Obiter Vol. 2 (2007) 187 
1264 At 1257C of the judgment. The judge continued to describe the position of clubs in this hierarchy as follows 
(at 1265J-1266B): 
'The individual clubs are all compelled to be members of the NSL. The NSL, in terms of clause 2 of its 
constitution, is a body corporate, capable of suing and being sued in its own name. The NSL is the only 
professional soccer body recognised by SAFA. All members of the NSL are subject and bound to the NSL 
constitution and its rules and regulations, as well as the rules and regulations relating to various league and 
club competitions. The NSL is the body which represents all the affiliated clubs and all the affiliated clubs are 
represented on the board of governors of the NSL. Each club therefore has direct representation on the board 
of governors, and the NSL is therefore the representative body of all the clubs.' 
See also the remarks by Waglay J in McCarthy v Sundowns Football Club [2003] 2 BLLR 193 (LC) at 194B of 
the judgment. 
1265 At 1259F of the judgment 
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Traverso J, in coming to the conclusion that the relevant provisions of the NSL's 
constitution and rules and regulations enforced by it amounted to an unreasonable 
restraint of trade 1266 which was against public policy and therefore unlawful and 
· . inconsistent with the Constitution, made the following remarks which are germane to the 
issue under discussion: 
. . 
'[The effects ·of the regulations of the NSL] are: All professional players must belong to a 
club which is affiliated to the NSL. All members of the NSL are bound -by_ its constitution, 
rules and regulations. Every player who receives remuneration in excess of travel and hotel 
expenses shall be regarded as a professional player. The result is that every player who 
earns an income (however meager) from soccer will be regarded as a professional soccer 
player, and is obliged to enter into a written agreemen.t with the ~iu·b h~at employs him .'1267 
'It is no answer to say ... that "there is no obligation on a any footballer to play professional 
football". This contention is frivolous and shows a scurrilous disregard for a per-soh's (and 
in particular the applicant's) right to choose his profession freely. Of course, I accept that 
any profession must be regulated to a certain extent - these regulations can be internal or 
imposed by statute. Whatever the case may be, a profession can only be regulated in a 
manner which does not violate the constitutional rights of individuals ... If we should find 
that the regulations violate one or more of the applicant's or other football players' 
fundamental rights, then it follows as a matter of logic that the only choice with which a 
professional football player is faced is to enter into a contract which violates these rights, 
thereby offending public policy, or not to play football at all. This is no choice.'1268 
'[A] player, in terms of the NSL rules, is helpless. He can give no input in respect of the 
transfer fee, and, if all else fails, he is at the mercy of an arbitrator who determines the 
compensation payable according to a formula for which there is no rational basis. The 
1266 The judge remarked that the applicable rules were 'akin to' a restraint of trade which one might find in an 
ordinary commercial contract (although the case did not strictly speaking involve an action based on the 
restraint of trade doctrine - see the discussion elsewhere in this chapter) 
1267 At 12676-C. See also the remarks by Waglay Jin McCarthy v Sundowns Football Club [2003] 2 BLLR 193 
(LC) at 194F-G of the judgment. · 
1268 At 1269H-1279A 
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player would then be treated just like an Qbject. His figures will be fed into the formula and 
an amount will pop up! Not v~ry different from the manner in which the book value of a 
motor vehicle is determined! ... In my view, this procedure strips the player of his human 
dignity as enshrined in the Constitution.'1269 
'[T]he applicant, or any person who wants to play professional soccer, is subject to the 
rules and regulations which I have set out above. In my view, these rules are akin to 
treating players as goods and chattels who are at the mercy of their employer once their 
contract has expired. In my view, these rules violate the most basic values underlying our 
·Constitution. If entering into a contract which incorporates these rules is the only option 
open to a person who wants to pursue a career of professional football, it can hardly be 
~said·that he agreed to these terms out of his own free will. '1270 
401 In McCarthy v Sundowns Football Club & Others1271 the Labour Court was 
confronted with a challenge to an option for the renewal of a professional footballer's 
contract. The applicant, a 25-year-old professional football player, had entered into a 
standard fixed-term National Soccer League (NSL) contract with Sundowns Football Club, 
to play for them for two years from 26 September 2000 to 30 September 2002. A 
provision in the contract provided that Sundowns had an irrevocable option to renew the 
contract on expiry for a further two years. From April 2002 the applicant and Sundowns 
attempted to negotiate the terms on which he would remain at Sundowns. However, 
these negotiations failed and the applicant's contract came to an end by effluxion of time 
on 30 September 2002. In urgent proceedings before the Labour Court the applicant 
contended that he was a free agent and entitled to enter into a contract with another 
1269 At 1271C. The learned judge examined the functioning of the NSL transfer fee system at 1268-1269 of the 
judgement. In coming to conclusion quoted in the text, the court referred (at 1270J-1271B) to the judgment of 
Wilberforce J in the English case of Eastham v Newcastle United Football Club supra, where the following was 
said: 
'The transfer system has been stigmatised by the plaintiff's counsel as a relic from the Middle Ages, involving 
the buying and selling of human beings as chattels; and, indeed, to anyone not hardened to acceptance of the 
practice it would seem inhuman, and incongruous to the spirit of a national sport.' · 
1270 At 1273C-D (emphasis provided) 
1271 (2003) 24 Industrial Law Journal 197 (LC) 
464 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
football club. He complained that Sundowns had, however, refused to provide him with a 
clearance certificate, without which he could not register as a player for any football 'Club. 
The applicant sought a declarator that his contract had in fact terminated and that he 
was a free agent and also requested that the court order Sundowns to issue him with a 
clearance certificate. 
The court (by way of Waglay J) explained the transfer regime in terms of the then 
applicable NSL rules, as follows: 1272 
'If a player wants to leave a club, even after his contract has expired and join another club, 
he must obtain a clearance from the club he is leaving as his new club will not be able to 
register him with the NSL and he will not be able to play unless and until his club is able to 
lodge a clearance certificate with the NSL. The requirement of the clearance certificate prior 
to registration is found in the NSL regulations which require that the only players eligible to 
play will be players who are properly registered with the NSL, who will register the player 
on submission of the relevant documents including a clearance certificate or club transfer 
certificate as defined in the rules. If a player is under contract with a club, a clearance 
certificate will not be provided as players must remain with and play for their clubs while 
the contract subsists. Players are signed on fixed-term contracts, and this is a requirement 
of the NSL, and may not leave their clubs and join other clubs while they are in contract 
save in special circumstances. What these special circumstances are, are not relevant for 
present purposes. 
Regulation 17.14 of the current NSL Regulations provide: 
"A contracted player who has 'reached the age of 23 and whose contract has 
expired, is entitled to a clearance certificate without a transfer fee or compensation 
being payable." 
The reference to a transfer fee is a reference to the fact that a player who is in contract can 
only be transferred to another club by agreement between the clubs, including if that is 
part of the agreement, the payment of a transfer fee. The issue of compensation is only 
1272 At p 200E - 201C of the judgment 
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relevant in relation·to players who are under the age of 23 where in terms of the FIFA and 
NSL Regulations training and compensation fees may be payable to clubs who contributed 
to the training of a player prior to the age of 23. Players who have reached the age of 23 
and whose contracts are terminated are free agents in terms of the ,NSL Regulations .. In 
o~her words, they are free to conclude contracts with new clubs and to further their 
occupation as professional footballers with new clubs, free of any restraint by clubs that 
they had been contracted to. The term 'free agent' is defined in the NSL Regulations to 
mean: 
"A player who is registered with the national soccer league and whose contract has 
expired and who has reached 23 years of age or a player whose contract has been 
~ · te~~iriate"tl by m'utual agreeme.nt or for just cause or sporting ]ust cause as 
co.ntemplated in regulation 20." · 
. . . 
The court had to consider whether the matter was urgent, and in the process remarked 
on the nature of employment in professional sport (football): 1273 
'The employment contract of professional footballers differs substantially from the contracts 
... 
which one finds with other employees. In particular, a professional footballer cannot resign 
during the period of his contract of employment and take up employment with another club 
without agreement of his old club. If a professional footballer leaves a club after the period 
of his contract of employment, he cannot simply begin playing for another club unless and 
until he is provided with a clearance certificate by the club that he leaves as the NSL would 
not register the player without a clearance certificate. A professional footballer is required 
to sign a standard NSL players contract and also a registration form requiring him to bind 
himself, like his club, to the NSL constitution and regulations. The NSL contract clearly is 
intended to be for a predetermined fixed-term period. It is in fact a fixed-term contract and 
therefore has to specifically set out the period for which that agreement will subsist ... 
When the footballing rules and regulations are read in their entirety, it is clear that the 
1273 At p 201E- 202A of the judgment 
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predetermined fixed-term contracts of employment would terminate unless new · 
agreements have been entered into, signed and· the play.er is registered afresh.!. 
The court continued to hold that it was willing to hear the matter as an urgent one in 
. ' 
light of the fact that the player had secured another club who was willing to sign him 
(and on the basis of certain peculiarities of the employment of professional football 
players, which, it is submitted, has wider verity also in other professional sports 
contexts): 1274 
'This court must ... be mindful of the fact that, unlike any other employees, professional 
footballers only have a relatively short period within which to practice their profession, a 
. : . ~ -· ..,. 
profession which is inherently risky as they may suffer injwies which may ruin their 
careers; they are subjected to the vagar.ies of selection not faced by other employees; they 
are required to earn sufficient to sustain themselves and their families in a relatively short 
period and cannot simply, like any other employee, decid.e to move from one employer to 
. . . 
another. Here we have a class of employee~ who face restri<:tions in carrying out the trade 
which restrictions can have an effect on their earnings that cannot be calculated with any 
degree of certainty. The fact that Sundowns continues to pay the applicant his salary is not 
what this court in the present matter considers to be adequate .because as a professional 
footballer what the applicant should be allowed to do is to play and for this reason I am 
prepared to entertain this matter as being an urgent one.' 
The court then turned to the principal issue, i.e. whether or not a contract had been 
concluded between the parties (as alleged by the club). In light of the fact that the NSL 
would not register a player unless there was a written contract between the player and 
the club, the court held that insofar as Sundowns had alleged that there was an oral 
agreement between it and the applicant, such oral agreement did not give it the right 
1274 At p 204A-D of the judgment 
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even to field the applicant as part of its team in a match. Accordingly, as the apP,licant 
was over the age of 23, he was considered a free agent in terms of the NSL's rules. 1275 
The court continued to find that the option clause in the contract did no more than to 
give the club the right to negotiate a·contract with the applicant. This irrevocable option 
meant nothing more than.the right to negotiate and, if possible,- conclude an 
agreement. 1276 
Accordingly, the court issued a declaratory order that there was no binding contract as 
envisaged by the NSL between the applicant and the club, an order that the applicant 
was a- free agent and therefore free to join the professional club of his choice, as well as 
an order compelling the club to issue to the applicant a clearance certificate for purposes 
of applicant·being registered with the NSL. 
402 Rule 37 of the National Soccer League Rules1277 deals with free agency and Rule 
37 .1 provides as follows: 
'37.1 A player may apply to the [PSL's] Dispute Resolution Chamber to be declared a 
free agent with.in thirty (30) days of.any of the following occurring: 
37.1.1 his club has repudiated his contract of employment; 
37.1.2 his club has unfairly dismissed him; 
37.1.3 his club has ceased to exist as a club falling under the jurisdiction of the 
[National Soccer League]; 
37 .1.4 his club has been placed under final liquidation by Order of the 
Court; 
37.1.5 his club refuses or fails to issue a clearance certificate to which 
the player is entitled; or 
37.1.6 it is in the interest of fairness and equity.' 
1275 The court expressly remarked that it did not make any comment on whether or not the oral agreement, if 
indeed concluded, created any rights and obligations between Sundowns FC and the applicant. It was satisfied 
with iits finding that there was in fact no contract between Sundowns and the applicant which was binding. 
insofar as the applicant playing for Sundowns as a professional soccer player or footballer was concerned. 
1276 At p 204 
1277 As amended 17 June 2008 
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403 In the matter of Golden Lions Rugby Union v A J Venter1278 the Johannesburg High 
Court had to deal with a unilateral option of renewal clause (which amounted to a right of 
first refusal) in a rugby player's contract with a provincial Union. The player's contract 
provided that the Union could renew his fixed-term contract upon expiry provided that 
they offered no less favourable terms than those offered by another union. Following a 
lucrative offer for. the player's services by the Natal Rugby tJnion for the 2000 season, 
which the player accepted, the Golden Lions offered the player the same financial terms 
and claimed that he was obliged to play for them. The player challenged the renewal 
clause as constituting a restraint of trade clause which was unreasonable, as-the Union 
had no interest to protect, and which offended public policy as well as sections 13 and 22 
of the ·Bill of Rights. 1279 Th-e court found in favour of the player on the basis that the 
matching offer which was required in terms of the clause did not refer to financial terms 
only, but to general terms. The Golden Lions were unable to offer the same conditions in 
respect of living, tra·ining and coaching staff (e-.g. it was held that the coastal-Natal Union 
- -
could provide the player'with training on the beach and swimming in the sea) and, 
accordingly, the player was not obliged to except the Lions offer and was free to join the 
Natal Union. 1280 
404 In respect of limitations on the freedom of movement of professional athletes and 
player restrictions in respect of eligibility for participation e.g. at national representative 
level, events in two of South Africa's major professional sports, namely rugby and 
cricket, recently made headlines and serve to highlight the inherent conflicts in the 
relationship between those governing these codes, the professional athletes and the 
1278 Johannesburg High Court Case 2007 /2000, unreported (the author has not been successful in sourcing a 
copy of this judgment - discussion in the text is sourced from Cloete et al Introduction to Sports Law in SA 
(2006) at 161-2) 
1279 The right not to be subjected to forced labour and the freedom to choose one's occupation, trade or 
profession - see th'e discussion elsewhere in this chapter regarding the restraint of trade doctrine in South 
African law and the availability of the order for specific performance againstthe (player) employee. 
1280 See Cloete et al 162 and discussion of the Venter case in Le Roux 'How Divine is my Contract? Reflecting on 
the Enforceability of Player or Athlete Contracts in Sport' (2003) 15 SA Mercantile Law Journal 116 
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supporting public (the consumers of the sports entertainment industry). In July 2007 the 
President's Council of the South African Rugby Union (SARU) announced a controversial 
resolution in the run-up to the national team's preparations for the IRB Rugby World Cup 
2007 in France. SARU announced that it had been decided that players under contract 
with overseas clubs would, following the World Cup, no longer be eligible for selection to 
the national side. The decision was followed by reports of a number of key and 
experienced. current Springbok players who would be hit by the resolution and would 
potentially be lost to South African rugby. These events followed earlier reports regarding 
the substantial amounts of money offered to local players by overseas clubs, and the 
apparent inability of local provincial unions and Super 14 franchises to compete for the 
services of such players in light of the economic realities of rich European clubs and the 
strong euro and pound sterling. A prominent rugby Super 14 Blue Bulls franchise.and 
Springbok lock forward, P.J. 'Bakkies' Botha, was recently embroiled in a high profile 
case before the L.abour Court, attempting to escape from his five-year Bulls contract in 
order to take up more lucrative employment with French club Toulon. 1281 
In August 2007 it was reported that a very lucrative new break-away cricket league in 
India (the Indian Cricket League, or ICL) was drawing interest from a number of current 
and former South·African national players, who were considering signing to play in this 
league at the risk of being excluded from future eligibility to represent South Africa in 
international competition. 
405 From the sports lawyer's perspective, these developments have underlined the 
issue of sports governing bodies' powers to regulate the freedom of movement and 
employment of domestic professional players who are drawn by lucrative offers to seek 
out the greener grass abroad. Reminiscent of similar developments elsewhere in the 
recent past - namely Kerry Packer's attempts to take over control of international cricket 
with his 'World Series Cricket' in the 1970s, and Rupert Murdoch's similar attempts in 
respect of Australian Rugby League in the 1990s - it has also highlighted more 
1281 See the discussion in par 339 above 
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fundamental questions regarding the governance of international sport - specifically, the 
ability of international and domestic sports governing bodies to maintain their monopoly 
powers of control and inherent market dominance of sports codes and competitive 
leagues, which charaderistics are so central to the functioning of the European model of 
sport which applies to .all the major South African professional codes. The discussion that 
follows will briefly consider the relevance of developments in cricket, specifically in 
respect of the freedom of South African players to pursue employment in overseas · 
leagues and competitions: 
Case study - The Indian Cricket League (or 'ICL ') and South African players· 
406 Following the·'Packer Cir:cus' ·in international cricket in the 1970s, ·breakaway 
cricket leagues appear to be a boom industr:y the world over in recent times, although 
attempts to establish such alternatives to the structure of officially sanctioned 
competitions resorting under the domestic cricket boards that are members of the 
International Cricket Council-have not all been successful. 1282 
In early April 2007 it was first reported that India's largest listed media company, sports 
broadcaster Zee Telefilms Group, had announced the launch of a rival tournament to the 
Indian domestic cricket tournaments operated under the auspices of the Board of Control 
for Cricket in India (or 'BCCI'). This broadcaster-driven initiative, the Indian Cricket 
League (or 'ICL'), eerify mirrors developments in the Packer saga; according to reports 
Zee's establishment of the ICL arose from the broadcaster's failure to secure the rights to 
broadcast Indian cricket in a series of failed bids, ultimately being outbid for the BCCI's 
broadcasting rights until 2011 by Nimbus. 
1282 Compare the Pro Cricket League, which was started with eight teams in the USA in July 2004 and failed to 
survive its first year. More recently, billionaire Sir Allan Stanford formed the Stanford 20/20 competition in the 
west Indies in 2006. 
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407 The new Indian Cricket League was established to operate a Twenty20 
tournament between (initially) six city-based teams or clubs on a home-and-away basis, 
playing over a period ·of about three weeks· for an ultimate winners' purse of US$1 
million. Each team would consist of two Indian players registered with the BCCI, four 
foreign players and eight budding players sourced through talent scouts. It was planned 
that the ICL would develop over a three"" year period to a 50-over a side (or One Day 
International format)_ tournament, which would be better suited to develop talented 
young players for the_ rigours ohnterhational cricket,"while the number of teams 
competing· would increase .from six to sixteen. From the outset, the organisers of the ICL 
appeared to rather pointedly. stress the developmental aspirations of the new league. 
One of the main justifications for.the·ICL's establishment has been that the poor level of 
funding and infrastructure of India's regional cricket teams - reportedly due to the BCCl's 
failure to properly manage the game outside its national team structure - has been a 
contributing factor to the Indian national team's poor performances over the last few 
seasons, as well as its lack of depth on the bench. Suggestions for development of young 
players within the ICL included that each team would have a mentor, media manager, 
psychologist and physiotherapist, and also that residential academies with state-of-the-
art facilities would be set up all over India, 
An early step in planning for the new league involved a letter from Zee Group chairman, 
.Subhash Chandra, to the president of the BCCI, Sharad Pawar, officially seeking 
permission to start the ICL. Chandra was quoted in the media at the time as being 
confident of BCCI approval: 
'[The proposed ICL] is not in conflict with the BCCI, but is complimentary to it. We have 
sent a proposal to the BCCI and I don't think they will reject it. I even don't want to 
assume that BCCI will reject it. '1283 
1283 From a report available on the official web site of the ICL at http://www.indiancricketleaque.in [last visited 
28 January 2008] 
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Events in the months following would serve to·dash this early optimism about the 
response to the ICL by the powers that b_e in Indian and world cricket. Throughout the 
first season of the ICL it was reported that a number of top-class international cricketers 
from across the spectrum of test-playing nations, both current and retired players, had 
signed up for the very lucrative series. It was reported that, apart from well-known 
names such as Pakistan's Inzamam Ul-Haq, former West Indies star batsman Brian Lara, 
New Zealand's Craig McMillan; Chris Cairns and Nathan Astle (to name just a few), a 
number of ex-South African stars such as Andrew Hall, Lance Klusener, Nicky Boje, Dale 
Benkenstein and Mornantau Hayward (and current player Johan van.der Wath), had all 
signed up to earn the big money on offer in the ICL. It was reported that these players 
were contracted to earn in the region of R2.5 million each for a few weeks' work. The 
attraction of this financial incentive is probably.best illustrated in Nicky Boje's case -
following Boje's widely reported reluctance to tour.India in the years following the cricket 
match-fixing scandal in 2000, allegedly for fear of possible prosecution by the Indian 
anti-corruption officials and police, it appears that the ICL paycheque was too good to 
pass up. 
408 The inaugural ICL competition was held in November and December 2007. For 
present purposes, what is truly interesting is the response to the ICL by cricketing 
authorities, both the sport's .international governing body the ICC as well as individual 
domestic cricket boards. The BCCI in India condemned the ICL from the outset, and 
made it clear in media statements that players who signed up to play would jeopardise 
their international careers and prospects for selection to represent India in officially 
sanctioned matches. Other domestic boards followed suit. New Zealand cricket (or the 
'NZC'), which has probably been hardest hit by the exodus of players to the ICL, appears 
to have heeded a call by the ICC to domestic boards not to recognise 'rebel' players 
participating in. the ICL for national selection. It has been reported that countries like 
New Zealand and Pakistan are affected most, as their players are generally not as well 
paid as those of countries like England and Australia (e.g. it was reported that regular 
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England internationals could earn·as much as £400 000 in a season, while a New Zealand · 
player might earn 10% of that, and can reap as much in one month of ICL participation). 
While one possible solution for the NZC's dilemma would be raising the pay of their 
contracted players, the board was reported as having responded by threatening to 
exclude players who joined the ICL (such as Sharie Bond). 
While it appears that some domestic boards have recognised, in their response to their 
players leaving to ]oin the ICL, the potential dangers of being found to act in restraint of 
trade if such players were to be banned from future international competition, some 
boards (spedfically the NZC and the English Cricket Board) have reportedly decided to 
avoid an outright (and official) ban on players in favour of an ostensibly more low-key 
approach: These boards have reportedly decided to follow the route of placing rebel 
players in unwritten disfavour, by 'encouraging' national selectors to select other players 
for international competition in future. This last has however, in this author's view 
correctly, been criticised as not necessarily avoiding the potential of restraint of trade-
based challenge. More .will be said on this later. 
409 The ICC was reported in August 2007 as having issued a statement through its 
chief executive officer, Malcolm Speed, to the effect that the ICC would not recognise the 
ICL until such time as the BCCI has officially recognised the league. 1284 In January 2009 
the ICC Board agreed to new regulations regarding domestic cricket in the territory of 
member boards and so-called 'approved/disapproved' events. According to these 
regulations, which followed recommendations from a working party (made up of the 
former president of Cricket South Africa; the chairman of the Board of the England & 
Wales Cricket Board, the President and Vice-President of the Board of Control for Cricket 
in India, and the ICC's Head of Legal Affairs), a host member board can determine if a 
match or tournament within its territory is approved or disapproved, and no member 
1284 From an article posted on www.cricinfo.com, 28 August 2007 (available online at http://content-
www.cricinfo.com/icl/content/story/308716.html - last accessed 6 February 2008). In another article of 22 
August 2007, an ICC spokesperson was quoted as having stated that 'the ICC Executive Board has taken a 
policy decision that the BCCI was the only competent authority to deal with the issue. It is up to the BCCI to 
decide whether to recognise the ICL or not' - http://content-www.cricinfo.com/icl/content/story/307880.html 
(last accessed 6 February 2008). 
474 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
boards, members' players, coaches or officials may participate in disapproved cricket 
(and no foreign player may take part in domestic cricket within the territory of a member 
unless such player obtains a no objection certificate from his home board). These 
regulations will be implemented from 1 June 2009. The regulations are controversial, as 
it has placed the power to sanction the ICL in the hands of the BCCI, which, of course, 
may have a rather significant conflict of interest through its commercial interests in the 
Indian Premier League tournament (and the fact that the BCCl's Vice-President, La lit 
Modi, is also the IPL Cqmmissioner); 
410 While it appears from reports in the media that Cricket South Africa (the 'CSA') 
followed a similar hard line regarding barring of future participation for rebel players-. 
accord.ing to reports during 2007 and 2008 the board had banned all six of:the SA 
players who had signed up with the ICL - the South African situation saw·an even more· 
interesting (or, frankly, bizarre). development. In December 2007 it was reported that 
Cricket South Africa had withdrawn former national player Daryll .Cullinan's media 
accreditation as television commentator for local pay-TV broadcaster Supersport during 
the West Indies tour to SA, as a result of his involvement in the I!;:l as·coacb of the 
'Kolkata Tigers' team. At the time of writing it appears that the matter regarding 
termination of Cullinan's contract has not yet been settled by way of legal action or 
otherwise. 
411 The impact of the 'rebel' ICL has, not unexpectedly, also been felt by a number of 
South African professional cricketers under contract abroad elsewhere. In April 2008 the 
Professional Cricketers' Association (PCA) in the UK was awaiting an appeal against the 
refusal by the England & Wales Cricket Board (ECB) to register three South African ICL 
players to play county cricket. The PCA was reported as threatening a High Court action 
in the event of its appeal being denied. The three ex-SA national team players, Justin 
Kemp (contracted with Kent county), Andrew Hall and Johan van der Wath (both 
contracted with Northamptonshire), had been refused registration by the ECB in terms of 
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Regulation 2.l(b) (Regulations Governing the Qualification and Registration of Cricketers) 
as a result of their participation in the unsanctioned ICL during 2007 (which is not 
recognized by the ECB as official first class cricket). 1285 The refusal to register these 
players (even though they had already been contracted as Kolpak players) was as a 
result of Cricket South Africa's refusal to issue the required No Objections Certificates1286 
to the players as a result of their ICL affiliation. Hall had reportedly also been refused 
permission by CSA to play for the Lions franchise in the 2008 domestic Pro20 
competition. Following reports that other ex-international cricketers 1287 had also been 
refused entry to county cricket on the same grounds, the ICL was during late 2008 
reportedly in the process of instructing their legal representatives for purposes of legal 
action against the ECB. 1288 The appeal (heard on 30 April 2008) of the three South 
African players against the ECB ruling (which Hall's barrister characterised as an 
'unlawful, unreasonable, capricious and discriminatory' ban) was successful 1289 , although 
at the time of writing it appears that Cricket South Africa had not relented in respect of 
Hall's domestic ban. 
412 The Indian Cricket League was the subject of legal action in the High Court of 
Delhi during August 2007, when the ICL filed a petition against the BCCI requesting an 
order that BCCI be restrained from interfering in the ICL's signing of players as well as 
alleged conduct by the BCCI in 'out-hiring' cricket stadiums in India that are owned and 
managed by state governments, in an attempt to prevent the ICL from staging events. 
The Delhi High Court granted an interim order in favour of ICL on 27 August 2007. No 
further information regarding these developments was available to the author at the time 
of writing. The implications of player bans by Cricket South Africa are considered in more 
1285 See the short article entitled 'PCA to appeal to High Court if appeal against player bans fails' World Sports 
Law Report, May 2008 Cecile Park Publishing Ltd 
1286 A certificate of clearance by the players' domestic cricket board, required for entry into the English country 
cricket scene by the rules of the ECB 
1287 Namely the West Indies' Wavell Hind and New Zealand's Hamish Marshall 
1288From a report in Rapport , 23 March 2008 
1289 From a report entitled 'Trio successful in county appeals', 30 April 2008, available online at 
http:l/news.bbc.co.uk (last accessed 7 May 2008) 
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detail elsewhere in this.c1"1apter. The reader is further referred to discussion of the 
potential application of the Competition Act 89 of 1998 in par 457 et seq below. · 
: 
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PART III Liability for sports (and sports-related) injuries 
Chapter 1 Criminal law 
§1 Introduction 
413 The founder of the modern Olympic Games, Baron Pierre de Coubertin, was once 
quoted as stating that sport is 'a volunteer cult of intensive muscular effort, supported by 
a desire of progress, and being able to go as far as risk permits.'1290 
Sport often involves contact between participants and/or the use of potentially dangerous 
equipment, and the vigour and competitive nature with which it is practiced holds the 
potential for significant injury to participants, officials, spectators or others. In those 
instances where participants go beyond what 'risk permits', the law seeks to provide 
liability for sports-related injuries under criminal law or the private law (liability in tort, or 
the law of delict under South African law).The discussion in the section that follows will 
firstly focus on criminal liability for injuries related to sport, and then on civil liability 
under the law of delict. 
§2 Criminal liability for sports injuries 
414 The role of the criminal law is limited in the context of sports injuries. As Loubser 
has observed, the criminal law 'applies to acts of violence on the sports-field in the same 
manner as it applies to other forms of violence, thereby serving to protect participants in 
sport from unlawful harm, to uphold the values of society, and to punish perpetrators in 
1290 As quoted by Alexandru-Virgil Voicu 'Civil liability arising from breaches of sports regulations' (Romania), in 
2005/1-2 International Sports Law Journal 22 
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a way which will deter them and others from following a similar course of conduct in the 
future. '1291 
-
An act of violence on the sports field may constitute the common law offence of assault. 
The requirements for conduct to constitute assault are the unlawful and intentional (i) 
application of force to the person of another, or (ii) inspiring of a belief in another person 
that force is immediately to be applied to him or her. 1292 
. . . 
415 In combat and contact sports the use of force is generally considered lawful, to 
the extent that conduct that would otherwise (in other activities) be considered unlawful 
are legitimized through occurring in the sporting context. The law tolerates the use of 
physical force in sport on the. basis of consen.suaJ participation. Such consent of course 
. . . 
presuppos~s that the_ attacker should hav~ acted within the rules of the sport; a 
participant who performs a forceful or violent act .. ( e.g. a late or dangerous tackle in 
football or rugby) in contravention of the r.uJes with the intent to injure or with knowledge 
of the likelihood of injury would be committing assault. 1293 Accordingly, conduct that 
would otherwise constitute assault is deemed to be lawful if full and informed consent is 
present within the context of a lawful sport and .where the injury occurs within the 
normal course of such sport. 1294 As to the role of the rules of a sport and its relation to 
the consensual assumption of risk in this regard, the following has been observed: 
'Sports activities are susceptible to a series of risks, which are previously known to the 
participants and which they must all accept ... Only when all mandatory rules have been 
respected by participants, sportsmen, coaches, referees, spectators and organizers alike, 
can liabiiity [for injuries resulting from the playing of the sport] be removed. This means 
that offenders who have failed to comply with the rules and have committed an act which 
resulted in the personal injury of another party, cannot successfully invoke consent [as a 
defence to such liability]. .. Similar to legal rules, the rules of play in a particular sport serve 
1291 Loubser "Sports Injuries - Liability" in Basson & Loubser Sport and the Law in South Africa Butterworths 
2000 (loose-leaf) Ch 5-3 
1292 Ibid. 
1293 Loubser supra Ch 5-3 
1294 Loubser supra Ch 5-4 
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the need of protecting the subjective rights of the participants and perhaps more 
importantly of ensuring that the activities in question will not go against social norms and 
principles ... The.rules of play in a particular sport can ... be regarded as an official 
declaration of [the members of a community's] consent. Rules that have been established 
in this way are at the same time a declaration of the authorities of a sporting community 
concerning the conditions to which the community's members have consented and a 
guarantee providing legal certainty that all the rights of the participants in the sports 
activities will be ensured. Conversely, through their consent, all parties involved are also 
obliged to c~mply with the rules of plav.'1295 
416 There is no" definitive definition of a lawful sport, and not all contact sports are 
-
lawful. While sports such as boxing and wrestling are lawful sports within the ambit of 
- -
applicable legislation (regulated ·in South Africa in terms of the South African Boxing Act, 
2001 1296 ) and the participants are immune from civil or triminal legal ~rction 'even in 
cases of serious injury, certain forms of boxing (e.g. prize-fighting or. b;are-:khuckle bouts) 
are considered unlawful. 1297 Even where a fight is deemed to be a lawful boxing match, 
liability may follow where an injury occurs outside the normal course of the contest and 
outside the rules (e.g. as a result of a foul such as head-butting which leads to serious 
injury, which would constitute an assault). 1298 Other combat sports such as martial arts 
may be more dangerous thari boxing, but they are generally practiced and legally 
tolerated in many countries. As Loubser points out, if such combat sports are properly 
and openly organized and regulated, and as long as the dominant object is competition 
and not the inflicting of injury, and provided the sporting conduct does not involve a 
breach of the peace, the courts are likely to regard the sport as lawful (and injuries 
occurring in the course of such a sport and within its rules will be justifiable on the basis 
1295 Alexandru-Virgil Voicu supra at 22-3 
1296 Act 11 of 2001, which replaced the earlier Boxing and Wrestling Control Act, Act 39 of 1954 
1297 Austin v Morrall (1905) 22 SC 67; S v Couper (1894) 1 Off Rep 186; Clarke v Bruning 1905 TS 295; 
Loubser supra Ch 5-4 to 5-5 
1298 Loubser supra Ch 5-5 
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of the consent of the participants). 1299 ·It should also be noted that the Minister of Sport is 
expressly empowered to make regulations regarding any form of combat sport or 'to 
minimize the chances of injury in any sport o·r recreational activity other than boxing, 
kickboxing, karate, wrestling, taekwando, judo and any other form of combat sport'. 1300 
417 The main defences or grounds of justification in the context of lawful sporting 
contests are consent and self-defence. Consent by a participant in a contact sport who 
knowingly accepts the violence and possible resulting injury that such participation may 
involve, justifies an i'njury that would otherwise be unlawful. Consent is a unilateral legal 
act which may be given expressly (e.g. by means of a written or oral declaration) or by 
implication (participation with the knowledge of the risks of injury). Participants will 
generally not be··held to have consented to force which goes beyond that which is 
normally expected in the sport (even if such force is a regular occurrence in the sport 
involved}, and the defence of cohsent to injury or assumption of risk will only be upheld 
when the act complained of falls within the ambit of the assumed risk. 1301 The exact 
extent of such assumed risk may depend on the nature of the sport involved, e.g. robust 
tackling in a rugby match 1302 or the risk of being hit by the other player's racket in a 
game of squash. 1303 
Consent which is contrary to public policy (or contra bonos mores) is invalid and would 
not serve to justify otherwise unlawful conduct. Participants in sporting activities must 
themselves consent to the risk of injury, but a parent or guardian of a minor child may 
give consent on behalf of the child. 1304 
418 Self-defence (or the defence of private defence) would justify the use of 
reasonable force by a participant in a sporting event to repel an attack or a threatened 
1299 Loubser supra Ch 5-6 
1300 Paragraphs (jA) and (jB) of section 14 of the National Sport and Recreation Amendment Act, 18 of 2007 
1301 Loubser supra Ch 5-6 to 5-7 
1302 Mandelbaum v Bekker 1927 CPD 375 
1303 Boshoff v Boshoff 1987 (2) SA 694 (0) - see Loubser supra Ch 5-7 
1304 Ibid. Ch 5-7 
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attack by another"participant which constitutes unlawful violenceY05 Such defence is also 
available to a fellow ·participant who has acted in defence of a fellow participant who was 
the victim of an attack. The force used by the defender must be reasonable and 
necessary in the circumstances. The requirements to be satisfied before a plea of private 
defence would be upheld are as follows: 1306 
The attack must bave be~n unlawful (i .. e. unlawfully caused or threatened 
J 
. to cause injury); · . 
The attack must be direded against legally recognize·d interest such as 
bodily integrity; 
- The attack must have commenced or be threatening:-- the.defence will not 
justify the use of force in:anticipation (except where an attack is· 
imminently threatened) or in retaliation once the attack has ceased; 
As the defence justifies the warding off of unlawfully caused harm, 
irregardless of fault on the part of the attacker), private defence may 
justify the use of reasonable force against an attacker who is not at fault 
(e.g. a deranged person on the field of play); 
The defence must be directed against the attacker, and private defence 
does not justify harm caused to a person other than the attacker; and 
The means of defence must be reasonable and necessary to ward off the 
attack (i.e. the defence will not succeed where the threat could have been 
avoided in some harmless or less harmful way). 
As Loubser points out, the question of proportionality between defence and attack is 
often the most difficult facet of the inquiry into private defence. An objective test is used 
to determine the proportionality of the harm threatened and the means used to avoid it, 
although the courts have in a number of cases followed what amounts to a qualified 
objective test (i.e. by taking into account what the person who acted in private defence 
1305 Ibid. 
1306 Ntsomi v Minister of Law and Order 1990 (1) SA 512 (C) at 526-7, as discussed by Loubser supra Ch 5-8 
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could reasonably have known or how he could reasonably be expected to react in the 
heat of the moment, instead of taking into account all the facts ofthe situation as known 
after the event). 1307 
419 · Finally, it should be noted that it has been observed that the role of the criminal 
law in respect of,Sports-related violence is a limited one. Loubser has pointed out that, 
for a variety of reasons, injuries caused by violence on the sports field will usually be 
viewed as most appropriately addressed by means of disciplinary procedures in terms of 
the laws of the' game and rules of the relevant governing body. Also, for practical reasons 
it might be difficult to establish criminal liability (e.g. to establish intent to cause harm on 
the part.of a par:ticipaot in a situation where s/he could have been attempting to play 
within the rules). Also, it appears that criminal prosecution in such cases might be 
inappropriate, as a player who causes injury on the field of play arguably poses little 
threat to society. 1308 
§3 Regulation of safety at stadia and venues 
420 Criminal liability for injuries related to sports events is of course not limited to 
injuries to participants inflicted by other participants and in the course of play. Spectators 
may also be injured in the course of play or in respect of the situation surrounding an 
event, in circumstances which may lead to criminal or civil liability. 1309 A prime example 
is that of stadium disasters, such as the tragic death of 95 spectators at the FA Cup 
semi-final match between Liverpool FC and Nottingham Forest FC in the Hillsborough 
1307 Loubser supra Ch 5-9 
1308 Loubser supra Ch 5-10 
1309 For examples of such claims by spectators against event organisers in other jurisdictions, see Evans v 
Waitemata District Pony Club [1972] NZLR 773 (New Zealand); Wooldridge v Sumner [1963] 2 QB 43 
(England); Hall v Brook/ands Auto-Racing Club [1933] 1 KB 205 (England); Wilkes v Cheltenham Home Guard 
Motor Cycle and Light Car Club [1971] 3 All ER 369 (CA) (England); Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire 
[1992] 1 AC 310 (England); Payne and Payne v Maple Leaf(1949) 1DLR369 (Canada). See, generally, 
discussion of these and other cases in Loubser supra Ch 5-32 to 5-36. 
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disaster on 1.5 April 1989. 1310 Regulation of safety at stadiums and events has assumed 
particular importance, including the imposition of criminal liability in respect of certain . 
conduct related to e.g. poor crowd control or the endangerment of spectators or 
members of the public on the part of event organizers or officials. 
421 South Africa's worst stadium disaster to date occurred on 11 April 2001, when two 
of the top local soccer teams, Kaizer·Chiefs and Orlando Pirates, played a local 'Soweto 
derby' at the Ellis Park (now Coca Cola Park) ·stadium in Johannesburg. According to 
reports, the stadium was already filled to its 60 000 capacity when a further 30 000 fans 
attempted to enter, and in the resultant stampede 43 fans were tragically crushed to 
death and more than 100 fans were injured. This was not the first disaster of this kind 
involving a match between these tw.o teams; in 1991 a match played in Orkney in 
Gauteng saw a stampede in which 41 fans were killed, and in another match between the 
two teams at the Ellis Park Stadium (in October 1998) members of the SA Police Services 
were forced to use rubber bullets against unruly and violent fans who were allegedly 
damaging property. 
A commission of inquiry chaired by the then Judge President of the Transvaal Provincial 
Division of the High Court, Justice Bernard Ngoepe, was instituted to examine the causes 
of the 2001 disaster. 1311 The Commission's Final Report of 130 pages (released 26 
September 2002) identified a number of causes for the tragedy, including gross 
underestimation of possible crowd attendance by the organizers, failure to sufficiently co-
ordinate the roles of the four private security companies whose staff were on duty at the 
event, a lack of equipment (such as closed circuit television cameras) to monitor crowd 
behaviour, as well as the fact that the use of teargas by security personnel had been a 
major cause of the crowd stampede. Amongst the recommendations contained in the 
report was the proposed introduction of special legislation to regulate the game of soccer 
in the interests of spectators' safety (e.g. to identify those responsible for the safety of 
1310 As to the highly-publicised litigation which arose from this disaster, see Alcock v Chief Constable of South 
Yorkshire [1992] 1 AC 310 (England) and Hicks v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [1992] 2 All ER 65 
1311 The Commission was instituted and conducted in terms of the provisions of the Commissions Act No. 8 of 
1947 and the Regulations published in terms of the Act; Terms of Reference published in Government Gazette 
No. 22246, 20 April 2001, Regulation Gazette No. 7053 
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spectators at events, to outline criteria,for the certification of stadiums, to identify an 
authority charged with inspecting stadiums, to make it compulsory for stadiums to have 
certain minimum security enforcement facilities, and to regulate the employment of 
security personnel at events). 
422 The issue of stadium safety again came to the fore recently in respect of South 
Africa's preparations for the 2010 FIFA World Cup South Africa™, following the spectator 
crushJN.hich_ killed 19 and injured 132 persons at a match in 'Cote d'Ivoire in late March 
2009. This has highlighted the need for the 2010 Local Organising Committee to intensify 
efforts to raise awareness amongst the South African football-supporting public that all 
tickets for the 2010 event must be purchased in advance, and thatfans will be restricted 
from approaching venues without tickets . 
. -
423 The Safety at Sports and Recreational Events Bill, 2005 (the 'SASRE Bill') was first 
tabled in Parliament in March 2005. Despite enquiries, the author is at the time of writing 
unaware of the status of this Bill in the legislative process (aside from the fact that the 
Bill has definitely not yet been passed into law). A revised version of the Bill was 
available on the internet in early 2009,-although it is unclear whether such 2009 version 
has been published for comment at the time of writing. A comprehensive discussion of · 
this ambitious and far-reaching piece of proposed legislation (the 2005 version of which 
ran to 95 pages), which was drafted by Patrick Ronan, the author of the safety and 
security section of South Africa's Bid Book for the 2010 FIFA World Cup, is beyond the 
scope of this chapter. It should be mentioned, however, that the Bill has been subjected 
to criticism, for example that it provides a minefield for sponsors regarding the liabilities 
and obligations which are proposed to be created, that possibly only larger sports 
federations would be able to comply with costly safety and event planning exercises in 
terms of its proposed provisions, and regarding its expected impact on small sports 
bodies and federations. The apparently watered-down nature of the 2009 version of the 
Bill may be attributable to such criticism. 
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The discussion that follows will provide a brief overview of the proposed scope of the 
2005 version of the Bill (in light of uncertainty regarding the current status of the 2009 
version, which is available on the internet at the time of writing, this section will in 
passing refer to apparent changes as incorporated in this latest version). 
424 The Preamble of the Bill describes its main aims as being th.e following: 
To provide for the .safety and security-of all persons who attend sports or 
recreational events held at stadia and other venues ·in the Republic; 
To provide for the risk categorization and the designation of sports and 
recreational events as well as the issuing of general safety and design 
certificates for existing and planned stadia and venues; 
To provide for the issuing of special safety certificates and prohibition 
notices;- .-
To provide for the powers and functions of a National Events 
Inspectorate; 1312 
To provide for safety and security planning and measures for sports and 
recreational events held at stadia and other venues; 
To provide for events ticketing and accreditation requirements; 
To provide for spectator access and vehicular control at stadia and other 
venues; 
To provide for alcohol, tobacco, environmental, corporate hospitality and 
vendor control at stadia and other venues; 
To provide for proper accredited training of stadium and venue personnel; 
To provide for proper stadium and venue safety and security 
communication policies, structures and procedures; 
To provide for the role of volunteers at stadia and other venues; 
To provide for measures to counter-act ambush marketing; 1313 
1312 It appears that the provisions regarding a National Events Inspectorate have been excluded in the 2009 
version of the Bill 
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Tb provide for spectator exclusion orders; 
To provide for the securing of public liability insurance at stadiums and 
other venues; and 
To provide for appeals and offences in respect of such matters . 
. - . 
. . . 
Section 17 of ttie Bill proposes the establishment of a National Event Inspectorate, to 
resort under the government department of Sport and Recreation South Africa, the 
primary function of which shall be to enhance the provision of safety and security, to the 
. . 
general public, within the precincts of stadia and venues in the Republic and to effectively 
enforce the provisions of the Bill. It appears that the provisions regarding a National 
Events Inspec:::to.rate have been excluded from the 2009 version of the Bill, and that 
related functions are to be performed by the National Commissioner of the South African 
Police Services: · 
In respect of event safety planning, section 19(5) of the Bill specifically provides for the 
preparation of a comprehensive disaster management contingency and operational plan 
for an event, prepared by the relevant Disaster Management Centre as contemplated in 
the Disaster Management Act, 2002, 1314 including protocols for mass spectator stress, 
mass spectator evacuation, power and water outages, sewerage spills and biological 
agent and chemical contamination and bomb threats. 
425 The proposed ambit and effect of the SASRE Bill is wide. While the 2005 version of 
the Bill did not expressly exclude any events from the application of the Bill, the 2009 
version (in section 2) excludes gatherings as defined in the Regulation of Gatherings Act, 
1313 It appears that the provisions regarding ambush marketing have been excluded in the 2009 version of the 
Bill. For more on ambush marketing protection in South Africa, see the discussion in par 562 et seq below. 
Measures aimed at countering ambush marketing in respect of, specifically, the 2010 FIFA World Cup South 
Africa event (and contained in the legislation specifically passed for this event - as discussed below and 
elsewhere in this chapter) have been controversial and have generated criticism from certain quarters, in light 
of the sometimes perceived as draconian requirements set by FIFA for the event and the rather harsh 
limitations in respect of the economic freedom of commercial enterprises (e.g. also regarding the use of such 
enterprises' own intellectual property such as trade marks). 
1314 Act 57 of 2002 
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1993 (Act No. 205 of 1993) and any form of water sport. The wide ambit of the Bill is 
evidenced by th.e provisions of section 45, which deals with offences and penalties: 1315 
'45. Offences and penalties 
(1) Any person who contravenes any provision of this Act is guilty of an offence and, 
on conviction, liable to a fine or to imp.risonment not exceeding 10 years or both 
such fine and such imprisonment; 
(2) The following acts and behaviour, in particular, shall constitute an offence in te.rms 
of this Act: 
-. 
(i) the entering.onto or into, by a person, of a restricted, secured or 
barric.aded~area Lnside a stadium or venue or its precinct, including .. 
amongst others, a field of play, a stage, a [venue operations center.], 13.16 
. , ' 
media area, dressing rooms.and event official area, without prior written 
permission of the relevant authorized official of the controlling body! .event 
organizer and stadium or venue owner; 
(ii) the touting of event tickets as contemplated in section 27 of the [Bill]; 1317 
1315 Although it should be noted that the relevant section on offences and penalties as contained in section 30 of 
the 2009 version of the Bill has been significantly amended (and appears to be less extensive). 
1316 A venue operations center is defined in the Bill as 'a temporary or permanent facility, located inside a 
stadium or a venue, which houses an on-site operational control center from where the entire safety and 
security operation at a stadium or a venue and its precincts, for the purposes of an event'. 
1317 Section 27 of the Bill contains rather far-reaching provisions in respect of event ticketing, which includes 
the following: 
Wh.ere applicable, event tickets shall be made available to the public via a timeous, accessible 
and efficient event ticketing distribution system, which system shall be controlled; 
Where applicable, there must be pre-sales of event tickets; 
Where applicable, and in respect of a sporting event, the provision for a proper rival sports 
fan spectator separation policy as far as the sales of event tickets are concerned; 
The total number of tickets made available to spectators for an event in terms of the Bill must 
not exceed the safe spectator capacity of a stadium or venue hosting an event, or any of its 
designated spectator viewing areas, as determined in terms of the Bill; 
Where applicable, no event tickets shall be sold on the day of the event; 
Where applicable, no event tickets shall be sold at a stadium or venue on the day of an event 
provided that where such sales of event tickets are conducted on the day of an event, such 
sales must be conducted at least 1 kilometre from a stadium or venue; 
Where applicable, a no spectator standing rule shall be applied to a spectator viewing area 
inside a stadium or venue on the day of an event; 
A reserved seating only policy shall be implemented at a stadium or venue for any high or 
medium risk event, provided that in the event that a stadium or venue is comprised, in whole 
or in part, of man-made embankment seating areas this policy shall not apply; and 
Any form of touting shall be prohibited in terms of the Bill. 
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(iii) the intentional breach of an event ticket condition, the intentional breach of 
written and visible conditions-of entry into a stadium or venue and the 
possession of a prohibited or restricted item within a stadium as 
contemplated in [the Bill]; 
(iv) the intentional contravention of the provisions of section 39 of the [Bill]; 1318 
. ~ . ' 
(v) a contravention of the terms and conditions of an exclusion notice as 
contemplated in section 40 (3)(o) of the [Bil1]; 1319 
- ·-·(vii) a non-complia~~e with the provisions of section 42 of the [Bill]; 1320 
·(viii) a failu"re to·co'mply with a lawful request cir directive of any person 
authorized in terms of this [Bill] to ensure compliance with the provisions of 
this [Bill]; 
. (ix) the un-authorize_d throwing, kicking, knocking or hitting by a person, of any 
. object within a stadium or venue or its precinct; 
(x) the un-authorized _destruction or damage to any movable or immovable 
property inside a stadium or venue or its precinct; 
(xi) delinquent and/or anti-social behaviour by a person inside a stadium or 
venue or its precinct, including amongst others, racist, vulgar, 
inflammatory, intimidatory or obscene behaviour.' 
426 It should be noted that speciaf: legislation has been passed to deal with the 2010 
FIFA World" Cup South Africa, which legislation also serves to regulate certain aspects 
related to stadiums and venues for the FIFA event. The 2010 FIFA World Cup South 
Africa Special Measures Act No. 12 of 2006, for example, deals with issues such as the 
declaration by the Minister (by way of publication in the Government Gazette) of stadia 
and venues which have been identified and selected to host one or more matches, 1321 a 
prohibition on the prevention by any person of the playing of a national anthem or the 
1318 Section 39 deals with ambush marketing - see the discussion in par 562 et seq below 
1319 Regarding the provisions of the Bill which relate to spectator exclusion notices, see the discussion on 
spectator violence and hooliganism in par 428 et seq below 
1320 Section 42 of the Bill deals with mandatory public liability insurance for event organisers, stadium and 
venue owners 
1321 Section 2 of the Act 
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flying of a national flag of any country represented by a team at any match or otherwise 
officially connected with the event, 1322· access control measures and the possession of 
accreditation cards for access to designated areas for matches, 1323 traffic-free zones 1324 
and provisions regarding search and seizure of persons and vehicles. 1325 In terms of 
section 9(3) of the Act, any regulation issued by the Minister of Sport and Recreation 
under the Act 1326 may declare a contravention thereof or failure to comply therewith to 
be an offence and that a person convicted of such an offence may be sentenced to a fine 
or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding 12 months or: to both a fine and such 
imprisonment. 
427 The South African government has also announced that special courts will be in 
place during the World Cup event (as well as during the 2009 FIFA Confederations Cup) 
in order to deal with offences relating to the event. According to reports, the police 
services are expecting in the region of 350 000 foreign visitors (and more than 28 000 
journalists) to the 2010 event, and offences committed by visitors will be speedily 
resolved by such special courts before their departure from ttie country. 
Along with these speCial courts, special units of the police services are also in the process 
of being set up to do duty as part of the collective security structure (or 'JOINTS') during 
the 2010 event. It has been reported that ZAR 645 million has been budgeted for the 
recruitment of 55 000 additional police officials, while ZAR 665 million has been budgeted 
for additional police equipment. Specific focus areas of the security response include the 
following: 
Preparations for possible terrorist attacks: While South Africa is not 
currently threatened by terrorism, it is expected that some countries 
participating in the event may draw interest from terrorists (such fears 
have been heightened by recent events at the time of writing, specifically 
1322 Section 3 of the Act 
1323 Sections 5 and 6 of the Act 
1324 Section 7 of the Act 
1325 Section 8 of the Act 
1326 In terms of section 9(2) of the Act 
491 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
the terrorist attack on the Sri Lankan cricket team which took place in 
Lahore on 3 March ·2009, and prompted the ICC to move the 2009 ICC 
Champions Trophy tournament, which had been scheduled to be played in 
Pakistan, to South Africa for September 2009); 
Certain sectors have been identified as potential flashpoints for unrest 
during or around· the dates of the event (including organized labour and 
the transport industry); and 
Hooliganism: Members of foreign police services .will co-operate with the 
local police services and are expected to be of special value if deployed at 
matches involving their countries' teams. The National Intelligence service 
and delegates from foreign security services would assist rn identifying 
undesirable persons and potential trouble-makers. 
The reader is further referred to specialist texts on risk management in sport. 1327 
§4 Hooliganism and other. forms of spectator violence 
428 South African sport has, fortunately, not been blighted by the problems 
experienced elsewhere in respect of wide-spread and organized spectator violence. 
Crowd hooliganism (in football, specifically) has been experienced as a problem of 
significant proportions in other jurisdictions. 1328 In the UK, specific legislation 1329 has 
been passed to provide for measures such as e.g. spectator banning orders. 1330 In the 
European Union, it appears that only a limited number of binding measures have been 
1327 See Cloete et al Introduction to Sports Law in South Africa LexisNexis Butterworths 2005 Chapter 8 ('Risk 
Management in Sport') 
1328 For discussion of recent developments in this regard, see Sport and the Law Journal Vol. 15 Issue 3 (2007) 
p 44 et seq. 
1329 E.g. the Football Spectators Act (1989), the Football Offences Act (1991), the Football (Offences and 
Disorder) Act (1999), and the Football (Disorder) Act (2000). 
1330 See the discussion by Blackshaw, I 'The "English Disease" - tackling football hooliganism in England' 
2005/1-2 International Sports Law Journal 90 
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taken at EU level in the fight against football hooliganism, and that in certain areas of 
action only 'soft law' exists in the form of resolutions and recommendations of the 
·European Parliament and the Council. 1331 
While hooliganism has not been experienced to any significant extent in South Africa and, 
as such, has not necessitated ttie introduction of specific statutory measures, legal 
measures exist in the form of the more general provisions of the criminal law (common 
law crimes such as assault and malicious damage to property) as well as more specific 
provisions containe_Gl in the Safety at Sports and Recreational Events Bill, 2005 (the 
'SASRE BiW). 1332 
429 Section 40 of the SASRE Bill (the status of which in the legislative-process is at 
the time of writing unknown to the author) provides for spectator exclusion notices. 1333 
This section provides that, in circumstances where information is brought to or comes to 
the attention of a safety and security role-player (as defined in the Bill~ and in-eluding 
amongst others a controlling body, an event organizer, a stadium or venue owner, a 
venue operations center commander or any other person having a substantial, material 
or real interest in the safety and security of an event to be hosted at a stadium or 
venue), regarding the undesirability of any person as far as such person's attendance at 
an event is concerned, then the spectator exclusion notice procedures in the Bill shall be 
put into operation. 1334 In the event that these circumstances arise, then any of the safety 
and security role-players shall within 30 days of such information having come to their 
attention, apply, in writing to the National Safety and Security Officer, for a spectator 
exclusion notice to be issued in respect of any such undesirable person (which the 
National Safety and Security Officer must issue within 30 days, ifs/he decides to issues 
1331 See the discussion by Mojet, H 'The European Union and football hooliganism' 2005/1-2 International Sports 
Law Journal 69 
1332 See also the brief discussion in par 427 above regarding special security arrangements for the 2010 FIFA 
World Cup event. It should be noted that a revised version of the Bill was available on the internet in early 
2009, although it is unclear whether such 2009 version has been published for comment at the time of writing. 
As the status of this 2009 version is unknown to the author, it will not be discussed here. 
1333 As contained in section 22 of the 2009 version of the SASRE Bill 
1334 Section 40(1) of the Bill 
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such an .order). 1335 The terms and conditions which the National Safety and Security 
Officer may include in a spectator exclusion notice issued against a person deemed to be 
undesirable, include the prohibition on the entry of sucha person into any stadium or 
within its precinct, in the Republic, in perpetuity or for such lesser period as the National 
Safety and Security Officer may deem fit. 1336 A person upon whom a spectator exclusion 
notice has been served can appeal against the decision to issue such a notice against him 
or her, to the National Safety and Security Officer. 1337 Section 41 of the Bill makes 
provision for.court reviews and appeals against spectator exclusion notices. 
Any person. found to contravene the terms and conditions of such a spectator exclusion 
notice shall be guilty of an offence in terms of section 45 of the Bill, and, on conviction, 
shall be liable to a fine or to imprisonment not exceeding 10 years or both .such fine and 
such imprisonment. 
As mentioned above, it is unknown at the time of writing whether the above provisions of 
the Bill .will eventually pass into law (in light also of the fact that a significantly revised 
2009 version of the Bi.II is apparently in circulation at the time of writing). 
§5 Corruption and match-fixing 
430 Mention has been made elsewhere of the match-fixing and corruption scandal 
which rocked international, and especially South African, cricket in 2000. The scandal 
erupted after news of match-fixing and collusion with book-makers by the then South 
African national team captain, the late Hansie Cronje, came to light. No more will be said 
here about these events, 1338 apart from noting that corruption in sport promises to 
1335 Section 40(2) 
1336 Section 40(3)( o) 
1337 Section 40(3)(p) 
1338 For further reading on the 2000 match fixing scandal in cricket, see Deon Gouws '- and nothing but the 
truth?' Zebra Press, Cape Town 2000; Andre Oosthuizen & Gavin Tinkler The Banjo Players: Cricket's Match 
Fixing Scandal Riverside Publications, Hout Bay 2001; Gardiner et al Sports Law 2nd Edition 2001 at 365 et seq; 
Sir Paul Condon Report on Corruption in International Cricket (Report of the ICC's Anti Corruption Unit, April 
2001), available online as htto://www.icc-cricket.com/corruption/condon report.html; Judge Edwin L King Final 
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remain a problem which will face officials and administrators in a number of sporting 
disciplines (as evidenced also by the 'Operation Dribble' police investigation into 
corruption in Premier League Soccer, which uncovered wide-spread corruption and 
match-fixing in football and led to the arrest of a large number of premier league football 
referees and some team officials). 1339 The problem is of course not unique to South 
Africa, and many countries and sporting disciplines have been tainted by sports · 
corruption (which is more often than not closely connected to sports gambling activities). 
Compare the match-fixing scandal in the German football league in 2005 (which saw the 
League, the DFB, claiming damages against·referee Robert Hoyzer, who was convicted of 
deliberately manipulating matches), and the recent establishment of an Integrity Unit by 
world tennis authorities following a spate of allegations regarding possible match-fixing 
and offers of bribes to top players to lose matches. 1340 
431 The South African 1e-gislature enacted ·1egislation _which has the potential to have a 
significant impact on the fight against corruption in sport in future. The Prevention and 
Combating of Corrupt Activities Act1341 was enacted mainly in order to provide for the 
strengthening of measures to prevent and combat corruption, and to provide for a 
statutory offence of corruption and offences relating to corrupt activities. This legislation 
was a reaction to the perceived wide-spread corruption in South African government and 
civil society, and was accordingly not enacted solely with sport in mind. The Act has a 
very wide area of application, which deals inter alia with corrupt activities relating to 
public officials, agents, members of the legislative authority, judicial officers and 
members of the prosecuting authority. 1342 Part 4 of the Act contains specificprovisions in 
Report: Commission of Inquiry into Cricket Match Fixing and Related Matters 2001, available online at 
http://www.info.qov.za/otherdocs/2001/kinqfinal.pdf; Qayyum, Justice M.M. Report of Judicial Commission, 
Pakistan Cricket Board, Lahore 1998; Central Bureau of Investigation Report on Cricket Match Fixing. 
1339 See Cloete et al Introduction to Sports Law in South Africa (2005) supra at 11 
134° For more on recent developments in corruption in international sport, see the Sports Law Foreign Update 
('Criminal Law') in Sport and the Law Journal Vol. 15 Issue 3 (2007) p 35 et seq. For more information on the 
specific measures taken by the International Cricket Council following the earlier match fixing scandal in cricket, 
see Gardiner, S & Naidoo, U 'On the front foot against corruption' Sport and the Law Journal Issue 2 Vol. 15 
(2007) 16-27 
1341 Act 12 of 2004 
1342 Part 2 of the Act 
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respect of corrupt activities relating to sporting events1343 and to gambling games or 
games of chance. 1344 
432 Section 15 of the Act is far-reaching, and provides as follows: 
'Offences in respect of corrupt activities relating to sporting events 
15. Any person who, directly or indirectly-
(a) accepts or agrees or offers to accept any gratification from any other 
person, whether for the benefit of himself or herself or for the benefit of 
that other person or of another person; or 
(b) gives or agrees or offers to give to any other person any gratification, 
whether for the benefit of that other person or for the benefit of another 
person-
(i) in return for-
(aa) engaging in any act which constitutes a threat to or 
undermines the integrity of any sporting event, including, in 
any way, influencing the run of play or the outcome of a 
sporting event; or 
(bb) not reporting the act contemplated in this section to the 
managing director, chief executive officer or to any other 
1343 Section 15 
1344 Section 16 of the Act provides as follows: '' 
'Offences in respect of corrupt activities relating to gambling games or games of 
chance 
16. Any person who, directly or indirectly -
(a) accepts or agrees or offers to accept any gratification from any other person, whether for the benefit of 
himself or herself or for the benefit of that other person or of another person; or 
(b) gives or agrees or offers to give to any other person any gratification, whether for the benefit of that other 
person or for the benefit of another person -
(i) in return for engaging in any conduct which constitutes a threat to or undermines the 
integrity of any gambling game or a game of chance including, in any way, influencing the 
outcome of a gambling game or game of chance; or 
(ii) as a reward for acting as contemplated in subparagraph (i): or 
(c) carries into effect any scheme which constitutes a threat to or undermines the integrity of any gambling 
game or a game of chance, including, in any way, influencing the outcome of a gambling game or a game of 
chance, 
is guilty of the offence of corrupt activities relating to gambling games or games of chance.' 
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person holding a similar post in the sporting body or 
regulatory authority concerned or at his or her nearest 
police station; or 
(ii) as a reward for acting as contemplated in subparagraph (i): or 
(c) carries into effect any scheme which constitutes a threat to or undermines 
the integrity of any sporting event, including, in any way, influencing the 
run of play or the outcome of a sporting event, 
is guilty of the offence of corrupt activities relating to sporting events.' 
'Sporting events' are defined in the Act as 'any event or contest in any sport between 
individuals or teams or in which an. animal competes, and which is usually attended by 
the public and is governed by rules which include the constitution,_ rules or code of 
conduct of any sporting body which stages any sporting event or of any regulatory body 
under whose constitution, rules or code of conduct the sporting event is conducted. '1345 
As has been observed, this definition is very wide, and would include all organized sport, 
including sports such as horse racing, show jumping, polo-crosse, pigeon racing and dog 
contests. 1346 The term 'gratification' is also given a wide meaning in the Act. 1347 
1345 Section 1 (xxv) of the Act 
1346 See Cloete et al supra at 11 
1347 In terms of section l(ix) ('Definitions'), 'gratification' is defined as including: 
'(a) money, whether in cash or otherwise; 
(b) any donation, gift, loan, fee, reward, valuable security, property or interest in property of any description, 
whether movable or immovable, or any other similar advantage; 
(c) the avoidance of a loss, liability, penalty, forfeiture, punishment or other disadvantage; 
(d) any office, status, honour, employment, contract of employment or services, any agreement to give 
employment or render services in any capacity, and residential or holiday accommodation; 
(e) any payment. release, discharge or liquidation of any loan, obligation or other liability, whether in whole or 
in part; 
(f) any forbearance to demand any money or money's worth or valuable thing; 
(g) any other service or favour or advantage of any description, including protection from any penalty or 
disability incurred or apprehended or from any action or proceedings of a disciplinary, civil or criminal nature, 
whether or not already instituted, and includes the exercise or the forbearance' from the exercise of any right or 
any official power or duty; 
(h) any right or privilege; 
(i) any real or pretended aid, vote, consent, influence or abstention from voting; or 
(j) any valuable consideration or benefit of any kind, including any discount, commission, rebate, bonus, 
deduction or percentage.' · 
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433 While the Act does not define the meaning of 'corrupt activities'., the general 
offence of corruption is explained as encompassing the following as contained in section 
3 of the Act: 
'General offence of corruption 
3. Any person who, directly or indirectly -
(a) ·· ·accepts o~ agrees or offers to accept any gratification from any other 
person, whether for the benefit of himself or herself or for the benefit of 
another person; or 
(b) gives or agrees or offers to give to any other person any gratification, 
whether for the benefit of that other person or for the benefit of another 
.. person, 
in order to act personally or by influencing another person so to act, in a manner -
.. 
(i) that amounts to the-
(aa) illegal, dishonest, unauthorized, incomplete or biased, or 
(bb) misuse or selling of information· or material acquired in the 
course of the exercise, carrying out or performance of any powers, 
duties or functions arising out of a constitutional, statutory, 
contractual or any other legal obligation; 
(ii) that amounts to -
(aa) the abuse of a position of authority; 
(bb) a breach of trust; or 
(cc) the violation of a legal duty or a set of rules; 
(iii) designed to achieve an unjustified result; or 
(iv) that amounts to any other unauthorised or improper inducement to do 
or not to do anything, 
is guilty of the offence of corruption.' 
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434 It is important to note that the Act contains specific provisions regarding its 
interpretation, which relate to the instances where it is alleged that a person knew of 
corrupt activities or is deemed to have known of such activities (i.e. the imputation of 
knowledge to a person). Section 2 provides as follows in this regard: 
_ '2. (1) For purposes of this Act a person is regarded as having knowledge of a fact if -
(a) that person has actual knowledge of the fact; or 
(b) the _court is satisfied that -
. :. .; . 
(i) the person believes that there is a reasonable possibility of the 
existence of that fact; and 
(ii) the person has failed to obtain information to confirm the existence 
of that fact, 
and "knowing" shall.be construed accordingly. 
(2) For the purposes of this Act a person ought reasonably to have known or suspected a 
· fact if the conclusions that he or she ought to have reached are those which would have 
been reached by a reasonably diligent and vigilant person having both -
(a) the general knowledge, skill, training and experience that may reasonably 
be expected of a person in his or her position; and . 
(b) the general knowledge, skill, training and experience that he or she in fact 
has.' 
It is clear that such imputation of knowledge of conduct or of an act that constitutes a 
threat to or undermines the integrity of a sporting event, for purposes of the requirement 
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of reporting such act to the officials of a sports body in terms of section 15 of the Act, 
might significantly affect a wide range of persons involved in such sporting event (i.e. 
fellow players or athletes, officials, stadium or venue staff, etc who become aware of or 
would be deemed to have been aware of illicit. contact or communication between e.g. a 
player and a book-maker or other persons) . 
. . 
Furthermore, it is interesting to speculate as to what types of information may be 
relevant to the undermining of the integrity of an event (e.g. whether the communication 
by a coach, captain or player in a team of an 'injury list' or of a team strategy to a book-
maker .or punter would constitute prohibited activity). In light of th.e wide ambit of the 
provisions of. the Act, would the communication of such information to a journalist for 
co_nsideration constitute a 'corrupt activity' for purposes of section 15? While the Act does 
- • • !. • ' ....... - - • 
not provide clarity _on the point, the_ ~ommunication of information of a newsworthy 
nature o_r _in the public interest would surely not contravene these provisi_ons (although 
the person providing such inforrr:i9tion may of course be subject to civil sanctions, e.g. for 
breach of a confidentiality clause i.n an employment contract or for contravention of the 
employee's duty of good faith towards the employer and the employer's business 
undertaking). 
435 Section 21 provides that an attempt, conspiracy or inducement of another to 
commit any of the p~ohibited acts as contained in the Act constitutes an offence, liable to 
the same punishment as laid down (in section 26(1) of the Act) 1348 for the commission of 
the offence which such person attempted, conspired or induced another to commit. 
Section 25 of the Act deals with defences, arid provides as follows: 
'Defences 
25. Whenever an accused person is charged with an offence under Part ... 4 ... or section ... 
21 (in so far as it relates to the aforementioned offences), it is not a valid defence for that 
accused person to ·contend that he or she -
1348 See the text below 
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(a) did_ not have the power, right or opportunity to perform or not to perform 
the act in .relation to which the gratification was given, accepted or offered; 
(b) accepted or agreed or offered to accept, or gave or agreed or offered to 
give the gratification without intending to perform or not to perform the act 
in relation to which the gratification was given, accepted or offered; or 
(c) failed to perform or not to perform the act in relation to which the 
gratification was given, accepted or offered.' 
During the King Commission enquiry into the cricket match fixing scandal in 2000, South 
African national team batsman Herschelle Gibbs was implicated in an episode of match-
fixing involving an agreement between the national team captain and a book-maker. 
Gibbs testified that he had agreed prior to a match (at the instigation of captain Cronje, 
in return for a promised payment by the book-maker) to bat in such a way as to lose his 
wicket early and thus achieve a low score, but that he subsequently changed his mind 
and went on to score a half century. Clearly such conduct would not constitute a defence 
in terms of section 25 of the Act; the initial agreement would be sufficient to found 
criminal liability in terms of the Act. 
436 The Act makes provision in section 26 for very substantial penalties in the case 
of conviction for an offence in terms of section 15 (which is contained in Part 4 of the 
Act): 
'Penalties 
26. (1) Any person who is convicted of an offence referred to in -
(a) Part ... 4 ... is liable -
(i) in the case of a sentence to be imposed by a High Court, to a fine 
or to imprisonment up to a period of imprisonment for life; 
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·(i.i) in.the.case of a sentence to be imposed by a regional court, to a 
fine or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding 18 years; or 
(iii) in the.case of a sentence to be imposed by a magistrate's court, to 
a fine or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding five years; 
(2) ... 
(3) In addition to any fine a court may impose in terms of subsection (1) or (2), 
the court may impose a fine equal to five times the value of the gratification 
involved in the offence:' 
' -.;.,,.~ -
437 In terms of the civil consequences of a·n agreement to commit a corrupt activity, it 
should be noted that the South African· common law of contract provides that a contract 
induced by the bribery of an agent of·a contracting party is voidable at the instance of 
the innocent party (the principal). Bribery, along with misrepresentation at contracting, 
duress and the ~exercising of ari undue influence by a party to a contract lead· to · 
improperly obtained consensus, ·and the innocent party is entitled to claim rescission of 
the contract (restitutio in integrum) and delictual damages (or damages in tort, where 
the requirements for such liability are present and cah be proved).°1349 The contract of 
bribery (between the briber and the agent) is not enforceable at the instance of the 
briber, as the contract is contra bonos mores (against pu~lic policy), and the maxim ex 
turpi causa non oritur actio applies. 1350 
1349 See Extel Industrial (Pty) Ltd v Crown Mills (Pty) Ltd 1999 (2) SA 719 (A) 
1350 I.e. from an unlawful cause no action arises - see, generally, Christie, RH The Law of Contract in South 
Africa 5th ed LexisNexis Butterworths Durban 2006 (Chapter 10) 
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Chapter 2 Delictual liability (liability in tort) for sports injuries 
§1 Introduction 
438 At this point the reader should note that, while the following section will focus on 
liability in tort (or delict) for injuries suffered by players, athletes, pa.rticipants, 
spectators, officials and other persons during the course of play, 1351 the South African law 
of delict also provides grounds for other remedies related to patrimonial loss caused 
through the unlawful and culpable infringement of recognized subjective rights. In South 
African ,private law, th.e.law of delict is, apart from contract,_~~e primary source of 
obligations (i.~. in the case of delict, the obligation on the. part of a wrongdoe.r to 
. . . - " . . 
compensate the plaintiff for such unlawful infringement of.his or her subjective rights} . 
. ~ . . . . .. 
Under the umbrella of the more general delictual action, the actio legis.Aquiliae, 1352 
. . . ·. 
liability in delict can be found.in a number of specific instances of_wrongful conduct _which 
cause patrimonial loss. Examples of these, which may all occur in the c;:ontext of sport 
. . 
and of its organization and commercialization, are the delict of unlawful competition 
(including passing off) 1353 and interference with another's contractual relationship. 1354 For 
. . 
1351 I.e. for wrongful and culpable conduct which causes injury or harm to the bodily or physical integrity of 
persons 
1352 See the discussion in the text below 
1353 See, generally, van Heerden, HJO & Neethling, J Unlawful Competition Butterworths (1995); Cloete et al 
Introduction to Sports Law in South Africa LexisNexis Butterworths (2005) 114-115. See also the discussion 
elsewhere in this chapter 
1354 It is accepted in South African law that '[a] delictual remedy is available to a party to a contract who 
complains that a third party has intentionally and without lawful justification induced another party to the 
contract to commit a breach thereof' (Atlas Organic Fertilizers (Pty) Ltd v Pikkewyn Ghwano (Pty) Ltd 1981 (2) 
SA 173 (T) at 202. See also Dun and Bradstreet (Pty) Ltd v SA Merchants Combined Credit Bureau (Cape) (Pty) 
Ltd 1968 (1) SA 209 (C)). The courts generally require the defendant's actions or conduct in interfering with the 
contractual rights of the plaintiff to be intentional (therefore with the clear intention to interfere with the · 
parties' contractual rights and cause the plaintiff damage) in order to found liability under this delictual action 
(Union Government v Ocean Accident and Guarantee Corporation Ltd 1956 (1) SA 577 (A)). Just some 
examples of specific forms of conduct that may found liability under this delict are the intentional inducement, 
enticement or instigation of a contracting party to breach the agreement, bribing an employee of a competitor 
to sell trade secrets, or enticing employees of a competitor to leave its service. In the case of Santos 
Professional Football Club (Pty) Ltd v Igesund 2003 (5) SA 73 (C), Santos FC instituted a claim of unlawful 
inducement to breach a contract of service against Ajax Cape Town FC, after Ajax had offered Santos coach 
Gordon Igesund (who was one year into a two-year contract with Santos) a lucrative contract as Ajax manager. 
Igesund repudiated his contract with Santos. The court dismissed the claim based on unlawful interference with 
a contractual relationship, on the basis that Ajax's mere offer to Igesund was insufficient to found liability for 
the club in the absence of proof of active unlawful inducement to breach the contract - see Cloete et al supra 
114. 
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more information on these and other possible causes of action in delict, the reader is 
referred to specialist works on the subject. 1355 
439 As was observed in the above discussion of the role of the criminal law on the 
sports field, it is a reality and (often in the highly competitive environment of modern 
professional sport) an increasingly predictable certainty that participants in sports 
activities will get hurt. As was pointed out, liability for injury caused by an opponent or 
participant may follow where such participant's conduct went outside the rules of the 
game. In fact, one of the functions and objectives of sporting rules is to counter the 
natural consequence of the competitive spirit being taken too far, and to protect those 
who t;.9ke·part in sport from injury. Much has changed in the centuries since the 'hazy' 
rules of the 'wrestling, boxing and all-in fighting known as pankration' of the ancient 
Olympic Games: 
'One clear infringement was whacking an opponent once the contest was over, a tactic that 
brought a stern rebuke for Apollonius of Egypt. Deliberately breaking your opponent's 
fingers may also have been made illegal, since only Leontiscus of Messana is known to 
have won the Olympic title this way.'1356 
As rules in sport have developed, so have the law's treatment of transgressions by 
partidpants that cause injury to others. The law of torts in common law systems has 
been characterised as 'the best way to deter violent conduct among athletes and provide 
them with an adequate remedy for their injuries ... Tort law imposes financial liability on 
the athlete ... and this will hit him where it hurts the most - his pocket.'1357 This 
sentiment is especially true in the modern context of professional sport: In English 
1355 Boberg, P QR The Law of Delict: Vol. 1 Aquilian Liability (1984); Burchell, J M Principles of Delict (1993); 
Neethling, J; Potgieter, JM & Visser, P J Law of Delict (2006) 
1356 From Tim Harris's humorous exposition on the subject of rules in sport ('Nice guys finish seventh') in Sport: 
Almost Everything You Ever Wanted to Know Yellow Jersey Press, London 2007 at 198 
1357 Jahn, G 'Civil liability: An alternative to violence in sporting events' (1988) 15 Ohio Northern University Law 
Review 243 at 253 (as quoted by Anderson, J 'Spear-tackles and sporting conspiracies: Recent developments in 
tort liability for foul play' 2006/1-2 International Sports Law Journal 41 
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Premier League football, Manchester United trainee Ben Collett was recently awarded a 
record settlement of £4.3 million following a challenge by Gary Smith of Middlesbrough in 
a match in 2003 which broke Collett's leg in two places (both Middlesbrough and Smith 
had admitted liability fo(the injury). While some commentators have expressed surprise 
at the award in light of the uncertainty involved in determining the future career 
prospects of a player in Collett's position, it has been observed that the award has set a 
precedent which might affect clubs' in·surance premiums. 1358 Other jurisdictions also 
appear to show willingness in respect of awarding compensation in a wide range of 
matters (including, even, a case of psychological trauma to a race horse1359). 
440 Anderson 1360 observes that the law of tort is armed with two weapons in dealing 
with liability for sports ir:ijuries, n-amely a-ssault and battery (trespass to the person) and 
negligence, which were distinguished as follows by Lord Denning in Letang v-Cooper: 1361 
· 'If [the defendant] does not inflict injury intentionally, but only unintentionally, the plaintiff 
has no cause of'action today in trespass. His only cause of action is in negligence, and then 
only on proof. of want of reasonable care. If the plaintiff cannot prove want of reasonable 
care, he may have no cause of action at all.' 
As Anderson points out, a plaintiff injured during the course of a contact sport will rarely 
sue in assault and battery, because of the difficult onus of proving on a balance of 
probabilities that the injury was inflicted intentionally and deliberately. Courts would have 
to take into account factors such as the spontaneous and robust environment of contact 
1358 See the article by Leroux, M entitled 'Man United trainee Ben Collett awarded record £4.5 million over 
injury', Times Online, 12 August 2008 (available online at 
http:f(www.timesonline.eo.uk/tol/soort/football/premier league/manchester united/article4504210.ece [last 
accessed 21 August 2008]) 
1359 See the decision of the Court of Appeal of Orleans of 2 April 2007, JCP-La Semaine Juridique of 21/5/2008 
(as referred to in the Sport and the Law Journal Foreign Survey Vol. 16 Issue 2 at 64) 
1360 Anderson, J 'Spear-tackles and sporting conspiracies: Recent developments in tort liability for foul play' 
2006/1-2 International Sports Law Journal 41 
1361 (1965) 1 QB 232 at 239-240 
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sport, that players act and react in the heat of the moment and that players must be 
assumed to· have acted consensually in a sporting contest. 1362 
The resultant importance of the tort of negligence in. this context - and specifically the 
applicable standard of 'reasonable care' - highlights the importance of determining 
whether the conduct which caused the injury in question was performed within the rules 
of the game. As was observed in the context of injury to a spectator by a participant in a 
horse riding event: 
'[P]rovided the competition or game is being performed within the rules and the 
requirements of the sport and by a person of adequate skill and competence, the spectator 
does not expect his safety to be regarded by the participant. If the conduct is deliberately 
intended to injure someone whose presence is known or is reckless and in disregard to all 
safety of others so that it is a departure from the standard that might be reasonably be 
expected in anyone pursuing the competition or game, then the performer might well be 
liable for any injury his act caused.'1363 
§2 The Sout_h African .system of delict 
441 South African law does not follow the system of torts as found in common law 
jurisdictions, and liability for injuries caused in the context of sport are based in the law 
of delict. The law of delict forms part of the law of obligations, within the private law, 
which recognizes and protects individual interests and is aimed at harmonizing conflicts 
between the interests of different individuals. 1364 It functions as follows: 
'The law of delict recognizes and protects certain individual interests against unlawful 
infringement and provides for compensation or damages in the event of such infringement. 
1362 Anderson 2006/1-2 International Sports Law Journal supra 41 
1363 Wooldridge v Sumner [1962] 2 All ER 978 at 983; Anderson supra 41-2 
1364 Loubser ('Sports Injuries - Liability') in Basson & Loubser Sport and the Law in South Africa Butterworths 
(loose-leaf) 2000 at Ch 5-10 
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The person responsible for the unlawful infringement is liable to compensate for the 
damage caused by the infringement; and the person who suffered harm or damage has the 
corresponding right to claim compensation. Delictual liability therefore implies an 
obligation, which ~ncompasses both a right ~nd a correlative liability or duty.'1365 
A delict occurs when the act of one person unlawfully and culpably causes damage to 
another, and the elements of a delict and requirements for liability are the following: 
An act or conduct; 
Causation; 
Damage; 
Unlawfulness; and 
Fault. 
As Loubser observes, the law of delict is based on the general principles that developed 
around these five elements of delictual liability, and this generalizing approach gives the 
system flexibility and enables the law of delict to deal with a variety of situations and to 
afford protection to a whole spectrum of individual interests, including the risk of injury. in 
sport. 1366 The law of delict is thus less limited in its scope, and avoids the common law 
system of torts' numerus clausus of specific and separate torts (such as assault and 
battery and negligence as referred to above). 
The law of delict is, broadly, divided into two main categories, namely delicts which 
involve patrimonial damage (damnum inuria datum) and those involving injury to 
personality rights (iniuria). Claims under the first of these categories (for patrimonial loss 
caused intentionally or negligently) resort under the actio legis Aquiliae (which derives 
from the Roman law Lex Aquilia, an Act of 287 BC). Claims under the second category 
1365 Ibid. See also, for more detailed discussion of delictual liability for sports injuries, Cloete et al Introduction 
to Sports Law in South Africa LexisNexis Butterworths (2005) at 105-118 
1366 Ibid. . 
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deal with intentional damage to personality rights and resort under the actio 
iniuriarum .1367 
§3 The delictual remedies 
442 The following remedies are available to the injured party in cases where delictual 
liability has been proved: 1368 ... · 
(1) An application for an interdict against the wrongdoer 
This is a preventative measure aimed at obtaining a court order against 
the wrongdoer where there is a threat of an imminent wrongful act. While 
the court has a discretion to grant or refuse to order an interdict (e.g. 
where the wrong can be redressed by another remedy or the interdict 
would cause undue hardship to another person), there are generally three 
requirements which the applicant would need to prove in order to succeed 
in obtaining an interdict: 
o The applicant must have a clear right (e.g. in the case of a threatened 
assault, the right to physical or bodily integrity); 
o There must be an actual or threatened act or omission on the part of 
the wrongdoer which is unlawful (i.e. it poses an impending 
infringement of the applicant's clear right, or poses an impending 
failure to comply with a legal duty); and 
o There must be no other suitable remedy at the disposal of the applicant 
to avert the impending harm. 
1367 Ibid.; Van Heerden, HJ 0 & Neethling, J Unlawful Competition Butterworths 1995 at 54-57 
1368 See Cloete et al Introduction to Sports Law in South Africa 118 
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(2) The Aquilian action (actio /egis Aquiliae) 
This is the general delictual action for damages to remedy patrimonial loss 
suffered as a result of the wrongdoer's unlawful conduct. 
(3) The actio iniuriarum 
This action is used to claim compensation for intentional impairment of the 
physical or psychological integrity of a person. 
( 4) The action for pain and suffering 
Where the impairment of a person's physical or.psychological .integrity 
occurred in a negligent way; damages can be claimed under the action for 
·pain and suffering. 
(5) Damage by animals 
Where damage is caused by a domestic animal, the plaintiff may claim 
compensation from its owner by means of the actio de pauperie. This is a 
form of strict liability which does not require fault on the part of such 
owner. 
509 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
§4 The requirements.for delictual liability 
443 As mentioned above, there are five general requirements for delictual liability to 
arise. These are conduct by the wrongdoer, fault, unlawfulness, causation and loss. 
These·requirements will very briefly be considered below. 
I Conduct 
444 The conduct of a wrongdoer can be both conduct by way of·a physical act 
(such as punching or kicking a person), which is voluntary1369 , or by way of an 
omissJon or failure to act in .certain circumstances. Liability for conduct by way of 
.. omission will arise, for example, where a person has created a potentially 
. · dangero"us situ.ation and fails to take reasonable steps to prevent harm to others 
arising from such situation; where a person fails to exercise proper control over a 
dangerous object; where .legislation requires positive action and a person fails to 
. act; or where a duty of care is established through a particular relationship 
between- parties. ~ 370 Different factual situations may occur in sport which may 
place a duty of care on participants to take positive steps in order to guard 
against inflicting harm against others (e.g. a golfer who may be under a duty to 
.warn other players against potential harm following a misdirected shot). 1371 It is 
accepted that a juristic person (such as a company) may act through its organs 
(directors, officials or servants) and may thus also be held delictually liable for 
such conduct. Also, any person who assists, aids or abets the wrongdoer may be 
held liable in delict. 1372 South African law furthermore recognizes that a person 
may be held liable in delict for the wrongful actions or conduct of another person, 
1369 E.g. where a person acts by means of convulsions during an epileptic fit, such action will be deemed to be 
involuntary and no delictual liability will arise 
137° Cloete et al Introduction to Sports Law in South Africa 107-108 
1371 In Australia, the Queensland Court of Appeal recently held that such a duty did not exist in a situation 
where a golfer had not aimed in the direction of the claimant, and the court took into account the golfer's level 
of skill in finding that he could reasonably expect the ball to go in the direction in which he had aimed (see 
Pollard v Trude [2008] QCA 421). 
1372 McKenzie v van der Merwe 1917 AD 41 
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on the basi.s of vicarious liability. Usually, where a certain relationship exists 
between the parties, the one person may be held vicariously liable for a delict 
committed by such other person. The most common example of this is found in 
the employment relationship. The employer will be held vicariously liable if it can 
be shown that an employment relationship existed, that a delict was committed 
by the employee, and that the employee was acting within the course and scope 
of his or her employment when committing the delict. 1373 
II Unlawfulness 
445 The unlawfulness requirement in delict relates to the general duty, in 
terms of the legal convictions of the community (or bani mores), which rests on 
every person not to infringe the legally recognized subjective rights of others. The 
bani mores test is an objective one, which is based on the criterion of 
reasonableness. 1374 The basic question is whether, according to the legal . 
convictions of the community and in the light of all the circumstances of the case, 
the defendant infringed the interests of the plaintiff in a reasonable or 
unreasonable manner. This entails an ex post facto weighing-up or balancing of 
. the interests which the defendant actually promoted with his act or conduct, and 
the interests which he actually infringed. The court must weigh these interests in 
the light of all the circumstances, including the public interest, in order to 
determine whether the defendant's conduct was reasonable or unreasonable. 1375 
This standard of reasonableness (or the bani mores) must be determined in the 
specific context of any given case; importantly, this means that (in the sporting 
context) the bani mores must be determined in light of the legal convictions 
1373 Loubser supra Ch 5-11 
1374 Universiteit van Pretoria v Tommie Meyer Films (Edms) Bpk 1977 (4) SA 376 (T); Minister van Polisie v 
Ewels 1975 (3) SA 590 (A); Hawker v Life Offices Association of South Africa 1987 (3) SA 777 (C) 
1375 Van Heerden, HJO & Neethling, J Unlawful Competition Butterworths (1995) at 123 
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prevailing in the.community with regard to the sport in question and its rules and 
conventions: 1376 
Because the test for unlawfulness in delict involves such a balancing exercise in 
respect of the rights and interests of the respective parties, various instances 
where the infringement of a person's rights is not deemed to be unlawful have 
.evolved. These ·are-referred' to as 'grounds of justification', and include the 
following (some of which may be more or less relevant in the sporting 
· context).: 137Z. 
o Self-defence 
Whenever there is an .imminent (or commenced but not yet completed) 
, · - .threatrto the lawful interests ofa person (or of a third party), that 
'Operson may lawfully fend of such attack. Fault on the part of the 
· attacker· is not a requirement for the lawfulness of the defence. The 
defensive action must be directed at the attacker, it must be necessary 
to. fend ·off the attack and avoid the threatened harm, and it must be 
· p.roport·ionate to the attack (i,.e. not more sever than what might be 
required to avert the harm). If these requirements for self-defence are 
met, the .defender's conduct will not found delictual liability:· 
.o Emergency 
When a person is placed in a precarious situation as a result of 
circumstances (such as force majeure) where their lawful interests are 
threatened, s/he may lawfully protect their interests even if such 
conduct infringes on the interests of third parties. There must be an 
imminent or commenced threat (even though this does not originate 
1376 Loubser supra Ch 5-11 
1377 See Cloete et al Introduction to Sports Law in South Africa 109-110 
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from an attacker), anEI the infringement of the rights or interests of 
third parties must be proportionate to the interest which is threatened. 
o Consent to injury and assumption of risk 
In South African law, the Roman and Roman-Dutch law maxim volenti 
·:. non fit iniuria encompasses both cases of voluntary consent to the 
intentional causing of specific harm for a lawful purpose (e.g. consent 
to a medical operation) as well as cases of voluntary acceptance of a 
risk of harm that may be negligently caused in the course of a 
dangerous activity (e.g. a contact sport), which last is referred to as 
voluntary assumption of risk. 1378 Such consent or· voluntary assumption 
of risk is a ground of justification for conduct which. would otherwise be 
deemed unlawful; by consenting to the h'arm or assuming the risk the 
subsequent causing of injury is deemed to be re·asonable in light of the 
boni mores, and it cannot be said that a legal duty not to cause harm 
exists where such harm has been voluntarily consented to. 1379 
Consent involves unilateral. conduct, which can be express or tacit (e.g. 
participation in a dangerous or potentially dangerous sport), and no 
agreement or contract between participants is required for such 
consent to be valid. The person who so consents must have legal 
capacity to do so and must do so freely, having understood the nature 
of the risk, reconciled himself therewith and actually agreed to accept 
such risk. 1380 Majority is not a requirement for valid consent, but the 
required legal capacity entails that such person must havethe mental 
ability to appreciate the implications of his actions; to distinguish 
1378 Netherlands Insurance Company of SA Ltd v Van der Vyver 1968 (1) SA 412 (A); Loubser supra Ch 5-36 
1379 Ibid. 
138° Clark v Welsh 1975 (4) SA 469 (W); Cloete et al supra 109 
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between right and wrong and to. act accordingly. 1381 And, as has been 
observed, being aware of the risk in an activity does not mean consent 
to it; real consent-requires full knowledge and appreciation of the 
specific form and nature of the injuries. 1382 Such consent may also at 
any time be revoked. 1383 
A parent or guardian can lawfully consent to a minor child's 
participation in a sport. Such parent or guardian's consent must be 
reasonable and in the interests of the child (where consent is given for 
participation in a· patently dangerous activity that is of no value of 
benefit to the child will be unreasonable and invalid).1384 Such consent 
will also only be valid where, it involves reasonable risks arising from 
normal sporting a·ctivities, and consent which purports to exclude 
delictual liability for injury'arising from assault by a fellow participant 
will be contrary to public policy and invalid. 1385 
The defence of assumption of risk entails that if a person takes part in 
an activity which may reasonably be expected to hold a measure of risk 
to the participants, that person cannot complain if the risk is realized 
and he suffers loss or injury, 138.6 if such risk could reasonably have been 
foreseen by such person. 1387 As has been observed, this means that 
sports participants assume the risk of harm of loss occurring in the run 
of play from acts or omissions which are in accordance with the rules of 
the sport. But it could also mean that participants, within reasonable 
limits, assume the risk of loss or harm resulting in the run of play from 
acts or omissions which are in contravention of the rules of the sport, if 
such conduct could reasonably be expected to occur from time to time 
1381 SvMarx1962 (1) SA 848 (N); Loubser supra Ch S-37 
1382 See J M T Labuschagne & J M Skea 'The liability of a coach for a sport participant's injury' Stellenbosch Law 
Review 1999 (2) 1S8 at 182 
1383 Jooste v National Media Ltd 1994 (2) SA 634 (C); Cloete et al supra 109 
1384 Loubser supra Ch S-38 
1385 S v Collett 1978 (3) SA 206 (RA); Loubser supra Ch S-38 
1386 Boshoff v Boshoff 1987 (20 SA 694 (O); Cloete et al supra 110 
1387 Broom v Administrator, Natal 1966 (3) SA SOS (D) 
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in the particular sport (e.g. a rugby player who is exposed to the 
occasional high tackle or a boxer to a punch below the belt). 1388 
Accordingly, the defence of assumption of risk should also be available 
in such cases. 1389 
In respect of consent to risk by other persons (e.g. spectators), it 
should be noted that tickets for the attendance of sporting events more 
often than not include exemption of liability clauses/ which purport to 
exclude liability for the event organizers in respect of damage to the 
property or person of spectators. The South African law of contract 
requires that contractual terms that are imposed by means of tickets 
(or notices at the event) will, generally, be binding on a contracting 
party (e.g. a spectator) if the other party to the·contract (e.g. the 
· event organizer) took reasonable steps to bring such terms to the 
attention of the first party. The test to determine whether such 
imposed terms are binding is as follows: 
1388 Cloete et al supra 110 
1389 Ibid. 
Was the first party aware that the ticket ·contained writing? 
If so, was the party aware that such writing constituted or 
contained contractual terms? 
Did the other party take reasonably sufficient steps to bring 
such terms to the attention of the first party? 
Generally, if the answer to either of the first two questions is in the 
affirmative, the party will be held bound by such terms on the basis 
of actual consent (i.e. by continuing to contract as s/he did, s/he 
created a reasonable reliance on the part of the other party that 
s/he intended to be bound to such terms, even ifs/he did not read 
them). 
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. If the answer to either of the first two questions is in the negative, 
the first party will be bound if the other party took reasonably 
sufficient steps to bring the existence of contractual terms (e.g. an 
exemption or exclusion of liability clause) to the attention of such 
party. What constitutes reasonable steps depends on the facts of 
any given case. 1390 
In respect of exemption clauses on tickets to sporting events, it 
may be argued that such clauses are reasonably to be expected in 
most standard form contracts nowadays. 1391 Accordingly, event 
organizers may be excused for taking fewer or less onerous steps in 
: • order to bring such clauses to the attention of spectators. 
In respect of exemption clauses more generally, the courts tend to 
interpret them restrictively (or narrowly), and in the case of 
ambiguity such clauses will be interpreted contra proferentem. 1392 It 
is accepted in South African law that a contracting party may not 
validly exclude liability for fraud; such a provision would be against 
· public policy.1393 A party may validly employ an exemption clause in 
·.order to exclude liability for their negligence (or that of their 
employees). 1394 It has not been decided whether it would be against 
public policy for a party to .exempt their liability for negligently 
causing the death of another. 1395 
Finally, it should be n<?ted that section 51 of the Consumer 
Protection Act 2008 (at the time of writing not yet in force) 1396 
prohibits an agreement or terms and conditions of an agreement 
1390 See King's Car Hire v Wakeling 1970 (4) SA 640 (N); Bok Clothing Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd v Lady Land Ltd 
1982 (2) SA 565 (C); Durban's Water Wonderland (Pty) Ltd v Botha 1999 (1) SA 982 (A) 
1391 See Afrox Healthcare Ltd v Strydom 2002 (6) SA 21 (SCA) at 42 
1392 See Durban's Water Wonderland (Pty) Ltd supra at 989 
1393 Wells v SA Alumenite Co 1927 AD 69 
1394 Central SAR v Adlington & Co 1906 TS 964; Essa v Divaris 1947 (1) SA 753 (A); SA Railways & Harbours v 
Lyle Shipping Co Ltd 1958 (3) SA 416 (A) 
1395 The question was left undecided in Johannesburg Country Club v Stott 2004 (5) SA 511 (SCA) - for more 
on this case, see the discussion below 
1396 The Consumer Protection Act, 68 of 2008 was signed into law by the President of the Republic on 24 April 
2009 and published in the Goverment Gazette on 29 April 2009. The Act will come into force on a date 
unknown during the course of 2009/10 
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which purport to limit or exempt a supplier of goods or services 
from liability for any loss directly_ or indirectly attributable to the 
gross negligence of the supplier or any person acting for or 
controlled by the supplier (or which purports to constitute an 
assumption of risk or liability by the consumer for such loss). 1397 
III Fault 
446 It is a requirement for delictual liability that the wrongdoer must have 
acted with fault, i:e. that his or her conduct, apart from being wrongful in terms of 
the boni mores, was also blameworthy. Such person must have the mental 
capacity· to realize.the difference between right and wrong and.to act in 
accordance with such realization, before their conduct will be deemed to be 
blameworthy for the pur:poses of establishing liability. 
Children under the age of 7 ar:e deemed to be unaccountable irrespective of their 
actual mental capacity (or doli incapax). While a rebuttable presumption of 
unaccountability· exists in respect of children between the ages of 7 and 12 (i.e. 
they will be held accountable if it can be proven that they did in fact possess the 
necessary mental capacity to distinguish between right and wrong and to act 
accordingly), persons over the age of 12 are presumed to be accountable unless a 
lack of the required mental capacity can be proven (e.g. also as a result of 
temporary impairment caused by intoxication by alcohol or other drugs) .1398 
If a wrongdoer is accountable, the law of delict requires fault on their part to 
found liability. Such fault can be in any of the recognized forms of intent, where 
such person has directed his will at a certain result while being conscious of the 
wrongfulness of his conduct, or otherwise by negligence. Intent can take the form 
1397 Section Sl(l)(c)(i) read with sec. Sl(l)(c)(ii) 
1398 Cloete et al supra 110-111 
517 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
·of direct intent (or do/us directus), 1399 indirect intent (do/us indirectus) 1400 or 
-intent with regard to foreseeabilities (do/us eventualis). 1401 Negligence is present 
where a person has acted in circumstances where a reasonable person (or bonus 
paterfamilias) would have foreseen that his conduct would cause damage or loss 
to another person and such reasonable person would have taken steps to avoid 
the damage or loss, .and where such person failed to take such steps. 1402 The test 
for negligence requires that both the occurrence of the event and the resultant 
loss or damage must have been reasonably foreseeable. 1403 
In the·context of determining liability for injuries in sport, the courts appear to 
incorporate both the test for unlawfulness and for negligence in an enquiry into 
·.the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct. Reasonableness is determined 
with reference to the rules and conventions of the sport, the standards of care 
and skill that can be expected of a participant in the sport, and the circumstances 
of the incident from which the loss or injury resulted. 1404 The court in Clark & 
Another v Welsh 1405 (a golf case) formulated the approach as follows: 
'The ordinary principles of the law of negligence as it exists in our law are to be 
· applied having due regard to the circumstances of the game in which the plaintiff 
and defendant were ~ngaged, one of those circumstances being the inferences 
which can fairly be drawn by the defendant from the fact that the plaintiff 
participated voluntarily in the game with her.'1406 
1399 Where a person desires to achieve a certain result and directs his conduct towards achieving that result 
1400 Where a person desires to achieve a certain result but knows that, inevitably, another, secondary, 
consequence will follow - such person has indirect intent in respect of such secondary consequence 
1401 This is where a person foresees that a certain consequence may follow from certain conduct, but 
nevertheless persists in such conduct so that the foreseen consequence actually realises. It is often said that 
such person has acted 'recklessly' towards the occurrence of such foreseen consequence, but this form of 
intentional conduct should not be confused with negligent conduct. 
1402 Cloete et al supra 111; Broom v Administrator, Natal supra; Kruger v Coetzee supra; Mukheiber v Raath & 
Another 1999 (3) SA 1065 (SCA); Sea Harvest Corporation (Pty) Ltd & Another v Duncan Dock Cold Storage 
(Pty) Ltd & Another 2000 (1) SA 827 (SCA) 
1403 Cloete et al 111; Bolton v Stone (1951) All ER 1078 (HL) 
1404 Loubser supra Ch 5-13 to Ch 5-14 
1405 1975 (4) SA 469 (W) at 477H (as quoted by Loubser supra Ch 5-14) 
1406 See also the extracts from the judgment of the High Court of Australia in Rootes v Shelton [1968] ALR 33 
as quoted by Loubser supra Ch 5-14 
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Accordingly, the playing culture ofa sport as constituted by its rules, conventions 
or customs, may assist a court in determining the unlawfulness or negligence of 
the defendant participant's conduct. The playing culture will determine what 
conduct players may expect from their fellow participants, which will normally 
include participation within the rules of that sport, as well as the acceptance of 
minor infractions of such rules as part of playing the game. The playing culture 
may assist a court in determining the limits of lawful conduct in the sport and the 
extent to which consent (as a ground of justification of otherwise unlawful 
conduct) may justify certain common infractions of the rules of the sport. 1407 As 
Loubser points out, the surrounding circumstances will of course also play an 
important role in this regard, including factors such as the following: the nature of 
the sport (contact or non-contact), the extent of the risk that the act involved, 
possible precautions that could have reasonably been taken, the nature and 
seriousness of the possible injury, whether the incident occurred in the heat of the 
moment or in a quiet passage of play, deliberate or reckless disregard of the 
possibility of injury, and previous warnings against similar conduct. 1408 
Finally, in respect of the requirement of fault, it must be noted that under the 
South African law of delict the plaintiff's own conduct may also play a role in 
terms of the calculation of damages for which a wrongdoer may be liable. Where 
both the wrongdoer (defendant) and the plaintiff have acted negligently in the 
circumstances, as the plaintiff's damages are to an extent attributable to his or 
her contributory negligence (which contributed to the loss arising) the damages or 
compensation that the plaintiff may recover from the wrongdoer will be adjusted 
in terms of the Apportionment of Damages Act, 1956.1409 A court will determine 
the measure to which each party's negligence had contributed to the loss or 
damage which occurred, and will proportionately reduce the amount of damages 
awarded to the prejudiced party. Contributory negligence does not constitute a 
1407 Loubser supra Ch 5-15 
14oa Ibid. 
1409 Act 34 of 1956 
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defence for the wrongdoer who intentionally caused the harm or loss of the 
plaintiff. 1410 
IV Causation 
447 The requirement of causation entails two separate enquiries; the first 
· relates to factual causation and the second to legal causation. Factual causation 
. involves the question of whether the act or conduct of the defendant has actually 
caused the relevant consequence; in other words, whether the damage or loss 
flowed from the defendant's act or condact. One must ask whether the loss would 
still have followed if the wrongful act had not been committed (i.e. was the 
wrongful act a condition sine qua non for the loss arising?). If the answer is in the 
affirmative, the wrongdoer will not be held delictually liable for such loss. 1411 Legal 
causation involves the question of determining which harmful consequences of a 
defendant's wrongful and culpable conducts/he should be held liable for. South 
African courts have to date followed a flexible approach in this regard: 
'The crucial question is whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between the 
wrongdoer's act and the harmful consequences that the consequences may be 
imputed to him - taking into account "policy considerations" on the grounds of 
"reasonableness, equity (fairness) and justice".'1412 
Accordingly, for delictual liability to follow from a wrongdoer's unlawful and 
culpable conduct, s/he must not only have factually caused the harm or loss of 
the plaintiff but such harm or loss must also not be too far removed or remote 
(legally, on the basis of policy considerations) in order to found liability. 
141° Cloete et al supra 112 
1411 See Cloete et al 117 
1412 Van Heerden & Neethling Unlawful Competition supra at 71, with reference to 5 v Mokgethi 1990 (l) 0 SA 32 
(A); International Shipping Co (Pty) Ltd v Bentley 1990 (1) SA 680 (A) 
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VI Harm, loss or damage 
448 The law of delict concerns itself only with wrongful conduct which causes 
some form of loss; where no loss results no delictual liability will lie against the 
wrongdoer. As to the forms of loss which may found a cause of action in deli ct, 
_the law distinguishes between patrimonial and non-patrimonial. loss. Patrimonial . 
loss involves loss or damage to a plaintiff's financial interests or material 
possessions (i.e. a claim sounding in money, which has a monetary value and can 
.. be calculated as such). Such form-of loss is calculated a·s the plaintiff's negative 
inter.esse (the form ·of patrimonial damages which can be-Claimed in a delictual 
:action), and are calculated by comparing the plaintiff:s patrimonial position 
imm·ediately before the· wrongful act was committed with his or ·her patrimonial 
position after. the commission of the wrongful act; any. reduction: in such 
patrimonial position~ constitutes patrimonial damages. Patrimonial loss may take 
many forms, including loss of maintenance (a claim brought by the dependants of 
a person whose death or injury has led to a loss of maintenance where a duty of 
maintenance exists in law), a claim for medical expenses following from injury, or 
a claim for 'pure' economic loss (i.e. economic loss which does not result from 
damage to property or injury to the person or impairment of the personality of the 
plaintiff) .1413 
Non-patrimonial loss occurs when a person's physical or psychological integrity is 
impaired by the wrongful conduct of the wrongdoer. Such loss may _include 
impairment of the reputation, dignity or honour of a person, for which the law of 
delict provides liability under the action for defamation in terms of the actio 
iniuriarum, 1414 as well as relief for invasions of privacy or infringement of the 
1413 See the discussion in Cloete et al 112-113. On Aquilian liability for pure economic loss, see van Heerden & 
Neethling Unlawful Competition supra at 59-61, and the authorities referred to there 
1414 See the discussion in the text above 
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plaintiff's right of" identity. 1415 These causes of action are beyond the scope of this 
chapter, and the reader is referred to more specialised texts on these issues. 
§5 Related issues 
449 Finally, a note on two specific issues regarding delictual liability in sport, namely 
the special position of coaches, and the use of exemption clauses to exclude liability: 
450 In respect of coaches of athletes and sports teams, it should be noted that a duty 
to exercise. reasor:ia.ble care exists and _that coaches are expected to prevent foreseeable 
•• -- • • t • •• 
risks_ o_f har~ _to ~articipants. Even though there is a dearth of case.I~\'\'. Or) the subject in 
South Afr!ca, th!s duty of care is in line with the general approach of the law of delict. 1416 
This duty to mioimize the risk of injury to all participants includes the following specific 
duties: 
_Supervision; 
Training and instructioo (i.e. providing an athlete with the necessary skills 
to play the sport in a safe and correct way); 
Proper use of facilities and equipment; 
Providing prompt and proper medical care; 
Knowledge of participants (i.e. thorough knowledge of participants' existing 
injuries or weaknesses); 
Matching and equating participants (or the duty not to 'mismatch' 
participants of unequal size, weight, skill, experience, etc); and 
1415 See Cloete et al 115-116 
1416 Compare e.g. Minister van Polisie v Ewe/s 1975 (3) SA 590 (A) 
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Warning ·of latent dangers (i.e. making risks that are unknown to 
participants and inherent to the activity known). 1417 
It should also be noted that, apart from the possible duty of care of coaching staff, it 
remains interesting to consider whether liability may also lie against governing bodies in 
respect of the implementation of rules which may pose a risk of harm to players (e.g. the 
2008 Experimental Law Variations of the International Rugby Board}. 1418 
451 In respect of the use of exemption clauses to exclude delictual liability arising 
from participation in a sporting activity, the reader is referred to the case of 
Johannesburg Country ·Club v Stott & Another. 1419 The facts of this matter were as 
follows: 1420 The respondent and h·er husband (the deceased) were both members of the 
appellant golf club. The deceased had played a round of golf ori the appellant's ·course, 
during which round a thunder storm with resultant rain developed over the course. A· 
· siren warning of the threat of lightning was sounded and the deceased took cover from 
the storm under a shelter on the course. The shelter was struck by lightning and the 
deceased .$uffered severe injuries to which he eventually succumbed three weeks later. 
The respondent instituted a claim for loss of maintenance against the club. The appellant 
raised the special plea that the respondent and the deceased had, at all relevant times, 
1417 For more detailed discussion of these individual duties of coaches (with reference mainly to American case 
law), see J MT Labuschagne & J M Skea 'The liability of a coach for a sport participant's injury' Stellenbosch 
Law Review 1999 (2) 158 
1418 See, for example, O'Connor, T., mBringing it down on their own heads: negligence and changes to the laws 
of rugby' [2008] Irish Law Times 191. The Australian High Court heard a matter in Agar v Hyde and Agar v 
Worsley [2000] HCA 41 (3 August 2000) where two Australian rugby players had suffered serious spinal injuries 
due to the result of the impact of scrums. The players sued a number of people, but the focus of the High Court 
judgement was whether the International Rugby Board, as the body responsible for making the Laws of the 
Game of rugby union, owed a duty of care to players to ensure that they were not exposed to an unnecessary 
risk of serious injury (the players alleged that each member of the Board owed such a duty, and that the rules 
of scrimmaging applicable at the time exposed them to such a risk). The Court held that no such duty of care 
could be established for each individual member of the Board, as no individual member had the power to make 
the rules of the game; and also as there were several layers of authority responsible for interpretation and 
implementation of the rules that existed between the IRB and the players, including the state, national or 
international associations and match officials. A further factor was the fact that the IRB members did not have 
the power to control the conduct of players (in this case the injuries had resulted from breaches of the laws of 
the game by forwards from the opposing team). The court also held that the dispute could give rise to an 
indeterminate number of claims by an indeterminate number of people throughout the world, which factor also 
argued against the recognition of a duty of care. 
1419 2004 (5) SA 511 (SCA) 
1420 Taken from a case note by Cornelius, S 'Golf: Validity and enforceability of exemption clauses in South 
African law' International Sports Law Journal 2006 (available online at http://www.articlearchives.com/law-
legal-system/trial-procedure-appeals/1492351-1. html) 
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both been members of the appellant club and, as such, were both contractually bound to 
the constitution and rules of the club. The rules contained a clause which provided that 
the club 'shall in no circumstances whatsoever be liable for any loss of or damage to the 
property of any member or guests brought onto the premises of the club whether 
occasioned by theft or other.wise, nor shall the club be held responsible or in any way 
liable for personal injury or harm however caused to members or their children or their 
guests on the C:lub premises and/or grounds'. The court a quo considered the special 
plea and dismissec:l it, and the appellant took the matter on appeal to the Supreme Court 
of Appeal. ' 
452 The cdurt, b¥ way of ·Harms JA~ ·confirmed that South African law requires that 
any exemption from common law.liaQility would be binding on a person only if it is clear 
that such person consented thereto, and that the nature and extent of such exemption 
must be clear. .Exemption clauses are viewed with suspicion and generally interpreted 
restrictively. The special defence relied on the interpretation which the court would 
assign to the second part of the exemption clause (which dealt with injury or harm to 
persons and not property). The court interpreted the clause and concluded that it only 
provides for exemption against liability for 'personal injury or harm' and not against 
claims of dependents. The ordinary meaning of the expression 'personal harm' generally 
does not include' loss of maintenance, neither does it cover funeral expenses. And due to 
the drastic nature thereof, a clause can only exempt a party from civil liability for 
negligence in the death of. another, if at all possible, where the parties have expressly 
agreed to such exemption. In this case, the clause did not provide for such exemption 
and the appeal was dismissed. 1421 The court left open the question whether contractual 
clauses which exempt parties against civil liability for negligently causing the death of 
another are in line with public policy, in light of the importance which the common law 
1421 Ibid. 
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and the Constitution attaches to the sanctity of life. 1422 This question has not been 
authoritatively decided to date. 
453 Cornelius has observed that Stott's case emphasises the importance of ensuring 
that a contract is properly drafted, and confirms the role of the rules and presumptions in 
the drafting and interpretation-of contractual terms. The author warns that a failure to 
take note of the rules and presumptions of interpretation ·during the drafting of a 
contract, could lead to unwanted and unexpected consequences, especially in-respect of 
often far-reaching exemption clauses. 1423 Sports governing bodies, clubs, event 
-
organisers and others who are involved in sport (which often has at least some degree of 
risk of potential injury to persons) need to ta~e· heed of su.et;1, warning in 9rder: to guard 
against potential liability. Also, in light of the courts' approach to interpreting and : 
enforcing exemption clauses, 1424: it might be preferable to consider obtaining _ · . 
comprehensive insurance as an··alternative to placing too much trust in.contractua'I 
exemptions of liability. 
§6 The role of the law of nuisance 
454 In conclusion it should be noted that other forms of liabilJty (related to the law of 
delict) may exist in respect of potential damage to property or physical injury related to 
sporting activity. A case concerning the law of nuisance recently confronted the Western 
Cape Provincial Division of the High Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal. 
The South African law of nuisance has developed over the years in a casuistic process, in 
which the courts have applied Roman and Roman Dutch property law as well as English 
law principles of nuisance. It has become accepted law1425 that courts should not follow 
1422 See par 12 of the judgment (and the minority judgment of Marais JA at par 14 et seq) 
1423 See Cornelius (footnotes to par 452 above) 
1424 For a helpful exposition of the current position regarding exemption clauses in contract law, see Stoop, P N 
'The Current Status of the Enforceability of Contractual Exemption Clauses for the Exclusion of Liability in the 
South African Law of Contract' (2008) 20 SA Mercantile Law Journal 496 
1425 Regal v African Supers/ate (Pty) Ltd 1963 (1) SA 102 (A) 
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the English tort of nuisance, and that South African law recognizes a general basis for 
liability based on aqi.Jilian liability. 1426 
455 In the case of A/lac/as Investments (Pty) Ltd & Another v Milnerton Golf C/ub1427 
the court was confronted with a claim based on nuisance brought by the owners of a 
property which borders on a Cape Town golf course. The applicants claimed that an 
excessive number of golf balls were entering their property and that several balls had 
caused or were likely to cause further damage to their homes and, possibly, personal 
injury. In response to the complaint the respondent golf club had taken certain 
precautionary measures (including planting trees and causing the sixth hole to be played 
as a par 4 on all days except Wednesdays and Saturdays), but without admitting liability 
to do so. The club denied that the applicants had made out a case that the conduct of the 
golf course constituted nuisance. 
The court (by way of Traverso DJP) held that a dispute between neighbours entailed a 
determination of whether there had been an abuse of a right, which was to be 
determined on the particular facts, and with reference to considerations of 
reasonableness and fairness. An interference was unreasonable if it was not 'expected in 
the circumstances', and what was reasonable had to be assessed objectively and with 
regard to the circumstances of each particular case. In assessing the reasonableness of 
the club's actions the court considered the following facts: 
That, at the time that the property was purchased, and at all relevant 
times, the applicants had known and understood that golf would be played 
immediately adjacent to their property, which would probably be struck by 
golf balls, causing damage; and 
That the respondent had gone to great lengths in an attempt to remedy 
the applicants' complaint. 
1426 See discussion above of the general delictual action (action in tort) based on the Actio Legis Aquiliae 
1427 2007 (2) SA 40 (C) 
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It was held (inter alia with reference to foreign case law 1428) that the applicants. failed to 
show that the club's conduct was unreasonable in the sense that the humber of ·golf balls 
striking their property and the damage caused exceeded what they could reasonably 
have expected in· the normal course of residing in a property situated. on a golf course: 
'[T]he [club] has shown its willingness to take reasonable measures to minimise the risk of 
damage by golf balls. to the applicants' property. The applicants, on the other: hand, seem 
to adopt the attitude that this responsibility lies with the respondent alone ... Living next to 
' . 
a golf course brings certain benefits in relation to the environment in which one li'(es. 
However, it also entails a real danger that the properties so situated will be susceptible to 
being hit by golf balls. That is a risk that any reasonable person will accept.' 
~-; 
The court further held (with reference to the possibility of the applicants erecting 
additional netting to stop golf balls) that as a matter of fairness the applicants could not 
refuse to take relatively inexpensive measures themselves to protect their property, but 
then expect the respondent to take unreasonable action to avoid damage thereto. 
Accordingly, the applicants' claim was rejected upon the court's finding that the club had 
not unreasonably interfered with their rights of ownership. 
456 The matter was taken on appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal. 1429 Farlam JA 
reversed the decision of the court a quo and held that the number of balls which had 
entered the premises of the applicants between December 2003 and March 2007 (a total 
of 875 balls according to the evidence) was clearly excessive and, that while the club's 
use of the land for purposes of a golf course was reasonable, it had failed to sufficiently 
guard against a nuisance which exceeded the bounds of what was normally expected in 
terms of the law relating to good neighbourly conduct. 1430 Amongst the factors taken into 
1428 Campbel/town Golf Club Ltd v Winton and Another [1998] NSWSC 257 (unreported, NSWCA Case No 40056 
of 1996, 23 June 1998) 
1429 A/lac/as Investments (Pty) Ltd & Another v Milnerton Golf Club & Others 2008 (3) SA 134 (SCA) 
1430 Sport and the Law Journal Issue 2 Vol. 16 'Sports Law Foreign Update' at 66 
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account by the court, interestingly, were the length of the 6th hole (a relatively short par 
5 of approximately 400 metres, which appeared to tempt a significant number of golfers 
to 'go big' with the driver in order to reach the green in two strokes), the fact that most 
golfers tend to slice the ball out to the right (i.e. in the direction of the applicants' 
·property), and also that technological advances in respect of golf balls and clubs had 
increased the danger (i.e. players tend to hit the ball both further and higher). The court 
held that, on the evidence of the number of golf balls which have entered the property 
and their frequency, what the applicants had to endure 'clearly goes substantially further 
than what a neighbour is obliged to put up with on the application of the principle of 
"give and take, live and let live", which forms the basis of [South African] law on this 
point.'1431 Th.e court continued to reject the club's argument that the course had been in 
existence since 1925 and that the applicants had known at the time of the purchase of 
the property of the adjacent land's use as a golf course and, accordingly, that it was 
susceptible to be being hit by golf balls (the 'coming to the nuisance' defence). The court 
held that 'it is clear that the [applicants] did not know that the hole was badly designed 
and gave rise to ... safety concerns.'1432 
The court accordingly granted an interdict in favour of the applicants, which prohibits the 
club from using the 6th hole on the course until such time as it implements a system of 
barriers near the tee off position (the interdict was suspended for one month in order to 
enable the club to implement such system). 
1431 At par. 21 of the Supreme Court of Appeal judgment 
1432 Ibid. 
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SPORT AND COMPETITION LAW. 
§1 Introduction 
457 It has been observed that the common law doctrine of restraint of trade (which 
operates mainly within the employment context of professional athletes) and the 
Competition Act (89 of 1998) are the most important sources of law in respect of 
potentially anti-competitive agre·ements or practices in South African sport. 1433 It should 
be noted that at the time of writing, South African-law has to date not yet been faced 
with competition law challenges to conduct related to sport or its commercial 
operations. 1434 Accordingly, tile following section will only provide a very brief overview of 
the relevant legar'framework, and for·more detailed discussion of sport and competition 
law (in other jurisdictions) the reader is referred.to more specialized texts on the subject. 
The working and' role of the restraint of trade doctrine has been discussed elsewhere in 
this chapter1435 and will not be further examined here, aside from reiterating that South 
African courts have to date not yet expressly pronounced on whether the doctrine may 
find application outside the contractual context (e.g. in respect of challenges to the rules 
or decisions of sports governing bodies outside of the provisions of a contract), as is the 
position in other jurisdictions. It has been suggested that the doctrine may fruitfully be 
employed in this manner, and that such an extension of the doctrine would be consistent 
not only with developments in other jurisdictions but also with the development of the 
common law in line with the foundational values of the South African Bill of Rights and 
1433 Loubser 'Sport and Competition Law' in Basson & Loubser Sport and the Law in South Africa Butterworths 
(loose-leaf) 2000 at Ch 8-50. Brassey, M (ed.) Competition Law Juta Law (2003) explains the interaction 
between the common law doctrine of restraint of trade and legislative regulation of competition as follows (at 
61): 
'[T]he limitation at common law on contracts in restraint of trade as being contrary to public policy only 
operates in relation to contracts in restraint of trade and not in relation to restrictions that are necessary or 
ancillary to day-to-day trading operations. For this reason the Legislature has recognised the need to go further 
than the ordinary restraint of trade doctrine at common law and to intervene in the ordinary contractual arena. 
It is recognised that firms may become powerful through business methods that are lawful and contractually 
valid, but which, if left unchecked, may assist those firms to reach a position in a market where the normal 
forces of competition are unable to restrain the exercise by those firms of market power. This may ultimately 
lead to excessive prices being charged and a stranglehold on the supply of a certain product or service, 
resulting in prejudice to trade and to consumers.' 
1434 The reader is referred, however, to the discussion of sports broadcasting regulation in par 579 et seq below, 
in respect of expected developments in the near future regarding the countering of anti-competitive practices in 
this industry (and, specifically, the relevance of Chapter 10 of the Electronic Communications Act, 36 of 2005) 
1435 See par 353 et seq above 
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the courts' obligation to promote such values in the development and application of rules 
of the common law. 1436 
§2 The Competition Act {89 of 1998) and sport 
458 The Competition Act (hereinafter 'the Act') 1437 has the purpose to promote and 
maintain competition, and it provides for ~he control and elimination of restrictive 
horizontal and vertical trade practices, of abuse of dominance, and of harmful 
concentration of economic power. The Act applies to 'all economic activity within, or 
having an effect within, the Republic', 1438 and it has been held that a claimant does not 
have to show that such economic activity has had an adverse effect. 143~9 The various 
facets of the organization, operation and commercialization of sport ar_e not excluded 
from the ambit of the Act, and it thus applies to sport as it does to other commercial 
activities (as far as sport constitutes an economic activity). 1440 
459 The Act does contain two important exemptions in respect of its application (which 
may serve to exclude a sports matter from the ambit of its purview). Collective 
bargaining in the employment context, within the meaning of the right to fair labour 
practices as contained in section 23 of the Constitution1441 and in terms of the Labour 
Relations Act1442 is excluded from the application of the Act. 1443 The Act also does not 
apply to 'concerted conduct designed to achieve a non-commercial socio-economic 
1436 See the discussion in the section on restraints of trade in South African law as contained in par 353 et seq 
above 
1437 The 1998 Act (which came into effect on 1 September 1999) replaced the Maintenance and Promotion of 
Competition Act 96 of 1979, which had established an administrative body (the Competition Board) to 
investigate competition matters. The 1979 Act covered three areas or categories of conduct, namely 
acquisitions, restrictive practices and monopoly situations - see Brassey, M (ed.) Competition Law Juta Law 
(2003) at 74 et seq. 
1438 Section 3(1) of the Act 
1439 American Natural Soda Ash & Others v Competition Commission of SA & Others Supreme Court of Appeal 
Case No. SCA 554/03 (judgment delivered 13 May 2005) 
1440 Loubser in Basson & Loubser Sport and the Law in South Africa Ch 8-46 
1441 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
1442 Act 66 of 1995 
1443 Section 3(1)(b) of the Competition Act 89 of 1998 
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objective or similar purpose.'1444 Section 10(4) 1445 of the Act reflects recognition by the 
Legislature of the social value of intellectual property rights and the need for the 
Competition Commission 1446 to be able to exempt certain prohibited practices from the 
application of the prohibited conduct contained in chapter 2 of the Act. 1447 
460 The Competition Act has set. up certain bodies to deal with the prohibited practices 
which are identified in the Act, which bodies have different functions .. These are the 
following: 
The Competition Commission: 
The Commission has administrative and quasi-judicial functions .invplving 
the investigation and evaluation of alleged contraventions of the Act as 
well as.control of mergers. The Commission has extensive powers of 
investigation in terms of the provisions of sections 45 - 49 of the Act; 
The Competition Tribunal:· 
The tribunal adjudicates on alleged contraventions of the Act as well as 
mergers. The Tribunal, along with the Competition Appeal Court enjoys 
exclusive jurisdiction in respect of issues that arise in civil actions 
regarding the provisions of the Act. 1448 The Tribunal may order interim 
1444 Section 3(1)(e) 
1445 Section 10(4) provides that '[a] firm may apply to the Competition Commission to exempt from the 
provisions of this Chapter an agreement or practice, or category of agreements or practices, that relates to the 
exercise of intellectual property rights, including .a right acquired or protected in terms of the Performers' 
Protection Act, 1967 (Act 11of1967), the Plant Breeders' Rights Ad, 1976 (Act 15 of 1976), the Patents Act, 
1978 (Act 57 of 1978), the Copyright Act, 1978 (Act 98 of 1978), the Trade Marks Act, 1993 (Act 194 of 1993), 
and the Designs Act, 1993 (Act 195 of 1993).' 
1446 See the discussion in the text below 
1447 See Wilson, J in Brassey Competition Law Juta Law (2003) supra at 316 
1448 Sec 65 of the Act, and see the discussion of the Competition Appeal Court in the text below 
532 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
relief or interdict prohibited practices, or impose an administrative penalty 
. or fine; 1449 -
The Competition Appeal Court: 
. The Competition Appeal Court has the status of a division of the High Court. 
· : of South Africa. It considers appeals from, or the review of, decisions of 
the Competition Tribunal. Section 65 of the Act confers exclusive 
jurisdiction on the Competition Tribunal and the Competition Appeal Court 
in respect of issues that arise in civil actions regarding the provisions of the 
Act. According to this section, a provision of an agreement that is 
prohibited in terms of the Act or which may be declared void in terms of 
· · ... the Act can· only be declared void by· the Tribunal or the Competition 
Appeal Court, and any issue concerning prohibited conduct under the Act 
· which arises in any action in a civil court (a Magistrates Court or High 
. Court) ·must be referred to the Tribunal to be considered on its-merits, with 
the possibility of appeal to the Competition Appeal Court. 1450 As Loubser 
has pointed out, this ousting of the jurisdiction of the divisions of the High 
Court over matters concerning issues arising under the Act may entail 
considerable additional delay and costs in cases where e.g. a restraint or 
restrictive provision in a sports-related contract is questioned in terms of 
the provisions of the Act. 1451 
Decisions of the Competition Appeal Court may be taken on appeal to the 
Supreme Court of Appeal, although a party wishing to appeal a decision of 
the Competition Appeal Court in circumstances where the Competition Act 
does not .allow for such an appeal must apply for and obtain 'special leave' 
from the Su'preme Court of Appeal (i.e. that, in addition to a reasonable 
1449 Sections 59-61 of the Act 
1450 Sec. 65(1) and (2) of the Act; Loubser op cit. Ch 8-45 to Ch 8-46 
1451 Loubser Ch 8-46 
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prospect that the appeal will succeed, there are special circumstances that 
warrant a further·.appeal). 1452 
461 The Competition Tribunal has in recent years shown itself to be a regulatory body 
with real teeth, and the Tribunal has issued substantial fines to firms who were found to 
be involved in a price-fixing in a number of high-profile matters. It should be noted that 
in terms of the Act, contrary to the position in jurisdictions such as the United States, the 
competition authorities are not empowered by the Act to order criminal penalties·or the 
payment of civil penalties to injured parties. The available remedies in the terms of the 
Act1453 are· for the competition authorities to interdict the further occurrence of anti- .. 
competitive conduct, to impose positive behavioural _and structural conditions on 
corporate conduct, and to impose penalties ori respondent firms. 1454 In terms of section 
59 of the Act, the Tribunal may impose administrative penalties both ·for prohibited 
practices and for contraventions of the merger control provisions 1455 in the Act. An 
administrative penalty may not exceed 10% of the respondent firm's annual turnover in 
the Republic (and its exports from the Republic) during the preceding financial year. 1456 It 
has been observed that the administrative penalties provided for in the Act, while taking 
into account considerations of damage and unjust enrichment, are primarily penal in 
nature. 1457 The factors that the Tribunal is required to consider when determining an 
appropriate penalty are the following: 
The nature, duration, gravity and extent of the contravention; 
Any loss or damage suffered as a result of the contravention; 
The behaviour of the respondent firm; 
The market circumstances in which the contravention took place; 
1452 Ameri~an Natural Soda Ash & Others v Competition Commission of SA & Others Supreme Court of Appeal 
Case No. SCA 554/03 (judgment delivered 13 May 2005) 
1453 Part D of chapter 5 of the Act 
1454 See Wilson, J in Brassey (ed.) Competition Law Juta Law (2003) supra at 317 et seq. 
1455 Chapter 3 of the Act 
1456 Section ~9(2) of the Act 
1457 See Wilson, J in Brassey (ed.) Competition Law Juta Law (2003) supra at 325 
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The level of profit derived from the contravention; 
The degree to which the respondent firm has co-operated with the 
Commission or Tribunal; and 
Whether the respondent firm has previously been found in contravention of 
the Act. 1458 
In line with the enforcement provisions found in competition laws elsewhere (e.g. in 
respect of Article 82 of-the EC Treaty which deals with abuse of dominance, and in terms . 
of which the European Competition Commission may impose substantial fines of up to 
10% of the offending undertaking's turnover), the South African Competition Commission 
has in recent years issued substantial fines to firms engaged in a variety of activities, 
ranging from a major local bread manufacturer to a critical health care provider. At the 
time of writing, proposed amendments to the Competition Act have been criticized as 
being.unconstltutional and ambitious (including e.g. controversial prop6sals that directors 
and managers of companies may be imprisoned for up to 10 years or fined up to ZAR 
500 000 for being involved in prohibited activities or even just for possessing knowledge 
of such activities). 
462 In the sporting context, various activities regarding the organization and 
commercialization of sport may come into conflict with the prohibited practices covered 
by the Act. These include, foremost, practices and policies regarding the restriction of 
movement of players through the provisions of employment contracts and regulations, 
merchandising arrangements and the collective selling of broadcasting rights. 1459 Other 
potential conflicts may also arise, regarding such diverse issues as common ownership of 
1458 Section 59(3) of the Act 
1459 E.g. see discussion of UEFA's marketing of broadcasting rights for the Champions League competition, in 
Gardiner et al Sports Law 3rd ed Cavendish Publishing 2006 at 391 et seq. See also the interesting paper by 
Falconieri, Palomino & Sakovics 'Collective vs. Individual Sale of TV Rights in League Sports', August 2002, 
available online at 
http://www.econ.ed.ac.uk/papers/Collective vs Individual Sale of TV Rights in League Sports.pdf; and the 
article by Findlay, Holohan & Oughton 'A Game of Two Halves? The Business of Football', available on the web 
site of the Football Governance Research Centre, Birkbeck, University of London (available online at 
http://www. football-research .org/gof2h/Gof2H-cha 06. htm). 
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competing clabs in a league, player-agent reg.ulations and ticketing arrangements for 
events. 1460 
463 It should also be borne in mind that the application of competition law in the 
sporting.co·ntext m·ust proceed with due regard for the special characteristics and 
exigencies of this form of activity: In the· Euro.pean Union the 'sporting exception' to 
competition rules has often been invoked; namely that the practice of sport is subject to 
European Community law to the extent that it constitutes an economic activity. 1461 
However, as has been ·observea, this principle is 'easy ·to state but less easy to app1y in 
practice', mainly due to ttie fact that many rules that are characterized as mere 'rules of 
sporting ·conduct' have unden·iable and -o~en :fai~ly direct economic effects. 1462 
Furthermore, it must be remembered that the peculiarities of the sporting context also 
relate, specifically, to the role of competition in sport and in the organization of sports. 
Sport depen·ds. on· the existence of conipetitron and it is usualiy not in the interest of a 
sports body or participant to 'eliminate competitors from the market, as this would make 
the sport less attractive fo~ spectators, s.pon~'ars and advertisers. 1463 Accordingly, the 
1460 In respect of ticketing arrangements, compare the decision of the European Competition Commission in the 
France 1998 World Cup case regarding abuse of dominance in terms of Article 82 of the EC Treaty - Case 
IV/36.888 1998 Football World Cup (see Gardiner et al Sports Law 3rd ed Cavendish Publishing 2006 at 360-
362). 
1461 Cf. Walrave and Koch v Union Cycliste Internationale [1974] ECR 1405; Dona v Mantero [1976] 1333; 
Bosman's case [1996] 1 CMLR 645; Deliege [2000] ECR I-2549. E.g. in the Dona case, the following was said in 
the context of eligibility rules based on athletes' nationality: 
'[The European Union freedom of movement provisions] do not prevent the adoption of rules or of a practice of 
excluding foreign players from participation in certain matches for reasons which are not of an economic 
nature, which relate to the particular nature and context of such matches and are thus of sporting interest only, 
such as, for example, matches between national teams from different countries.' 
See, in respect of the jusiticiability of 'rules of the game' and 'ethical principles of sport' in respect of their 
economic consequences, Ken Foster 'Is There a Global Sports Law?' Entertainment and Sports Law Journal Vol. 
2 No. 1, Frank Cass Publishers, Spring 2003 1 at 5; 16. 
A recent judgement on this issue (by the European Court of First Instance) in the appeal of David Meca-Medina 
and Igor Majcen v Commission of the European Communities (Case C-519/04 P; judgment delivered 18 July 
2006) has seen a review of the earlier cases mentioned above, and a finding that "the mere fact that a rule is 
purely sporting in nature does not have the effect of removing from the scope of the Treaty the person 
engaging in the activity governed by that rule or the body which has laid it down' (at par 27 of the judgment). 
1462 Lewis & Taylor Sport: Law and Practice 2003 at 347-8 
1463 Loubser supra at Ch 8-46, quoting Beloff, Kerr & Demetriou Sports Law Hart Publishing 1999 at 6.33. In the 
context of professional sport, and the enterprises undertaking the business of sport at the higher levels, the 
competitive nature and quality of the sporting event as an entertainment spectacle is the primary determinant 
of the financial success of the undertaking. Competition therefore features both on the field of play ('sporting' 
competition) and off it ('economic' competition), within leagues and similar competitive structures. Wise & 
Meyer distinguished the sports industry from others in the American context, as follows: 
'The economics of team sports requires that franchises compete on the field but co-operate to some extent as 
businesses. To attract fan interest, owners argue that competition on the field must be balanced - opposing 
teams must have a roughly equal chance of winning each game and league champions must rotate. Unlike Ford 
and General Motors, however, the Celtics do not want the Knicks to go out of business.' 
536 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
'rule of reason' approach has developed in the EU, which was explained in the well-
known Bosman case as follows: 
'If a rule which at first sight appears to contain a restriction of competition. is necessary in 
order to make that competition possible in th~ first place, .it must indeed be assumed that 
such a rule does not infringe [competition law restrictions of anti·~.competitive 
practices]'. 1464 
This prindple appears to be of a pragmatic nature, and to have particular resonance in 
the sporting sector, where it is accepted that 'certain forms of co-ordination_ or restraint 
between "competitors" are necessary for the spo(!:!ng _"product" to be created in the first 
place. '1465 As has been observed: 
'[S]ports teams are nqt engaged in a series of indiyidupl bu!?iness ventures. R~ther, the 
venture is necessarily a collective one: they must agree among themselve~ ~n a host of 
issues in order to create and define the product itself. Put more simply, competition on the 
field is dependent on co-operation off it. Such restraints on off-field competition are 
essential in order for the product (the athletic contest) to exist at all.'1466 
(Wise & Meyer International Sports Law and Business (2 vols.), Kluwer Law International 1998, Vol. 1 11). The 
competition nature of sport is an inherent element and central determinarit of the very activity of sport - see 
Szymansky "Income Inequality, Competitive Balance and the Attractiveness of Team Sports: Some Evidence 
and a Natural Experiment from English Soccer" March 2000 (available on the Net as 
http :/mscmga. ms. ic.ac. uk/stefa n/EJCB. pdf). 
This 'crisis of personality' is best described as follows: 
'The conventional textbook firm in economic theory has an interest in increasing its market power and 
ultimately it maximizes its own interest (and profit) when it achieves maximum market power as a monopolist. 
In professional team sport once a team became a monopolist, revenue would disappear altogether; output 
would be zero since it would be impossible to stage a match. One major function of the league is to ensure that 
no team achieves too much market power, or excessive dominance. The league therefore aims to restrict 
competition.' 
(Gratton & Taylor Economics of Sport and Recreation E&FN Spon 2000 193-194). See also A. Daly & A. 
Kawaguchi 'Competitive Balance in Australian and Japanese Sport' The Otemon Journal of Australian Studies 
Vol. 30 (2004) 23-36; Downward, P. and Dawson, A. The Economics of Professional Team Sports Routledge, 
London & New York 2000, at 44. 
1464 From the opinion of Advocate General Lenz in Union Royale Beige des Societes de Football Association ASBL 
v Bosman [1996] 1 CMLR.645 at par 265, as quoted by Lewis & Taylor supra 350 
1465 Lewis & Taylor supra 350-351 
1466 Ibid. 351 
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Conversely, one could argue that the peculiar characteristics of the organization of sport 
(and, particularly, the monopoly position and powers enjoyed by sports governing bodies 
in terms of the European model of governance) may tend to facilitate unlawful or unfair 
competitive practices. 1467 
464 It should be noted that it has been observed that the European Court of Justice 
has rejected the existence of a rule of reason approach under Article 81 of the Treaty (or 
at least rejected such a label for its flexible approach to the application of the 
provisfon). 1468 While it has been observed that recent sta.tements and decisions of the 
European Commission suggest that the sporting exception has been considerably 
expanded from its narrow 'rules of the game' origin in order to take into account the 
commercial realities of the sports industry, it appears that judicial authority for the exact 
scope of this. doctrine remains scanty. 1469 Mash has observed that the judgment of the 
ECJ in Wouters v. Algemene Raad van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten ('NOVA') 1470 
provides welcome clarification in this regard: 
'The Court's reasoning promotes a ca-se-by-case analysis of rules of self-governing bodies 
(or associations of undertakings), taking into account the context in which the rules 
operate. On this basis, and in the light of the Commission's recent approach to UEFA's 
broadcasting regulations and rules on common ownership, the sporting exception doctrine 
could arguably be re-defined as covering any rules which in the subjective opinion of the 
sporting association, are necessary for the proper conduct or overall functioning of a 
particular sport ... [The Wouters decision] does support the proposition that the European 
Court is ready to recognize a context-sensitive approach as part of its Article 81(1) analysis 
in relation to rules made and enforced by a self-regulating statutory body. The sports 
sector must now wait for an authoritative statement from the European Court as to 
1467 See the discussion in the text below regarding abuse of dominance and the relevance of the governance 
structure employed in professional sports 
1468 See Mash, J 'The illusive nature of the European Commission's 'sporting exception' Sport and the Law 
Journal Issue 2 Vol. 13 (2005) 25-32 at 30 
1469 Ibid. 32 
· 1470 European Court of Justice opinion, Case C-309/99 (where the ECJ was asked to consider the compatibility 
with Article 81 of a Dutch rule prohibiting the formation of multi-disciplinary partnerships involving barristers 
and accountants) · 
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whether this approach will e.xtend to rules of non-statutory sports governing bodies, that 
steer an increasingly blurred path between sporting regulation and commercial 
governance. '1471 
It is submitted that, in respect of considering whether sports-related conduct or practices 
fall foul of the provisions of the South African Competition Act, all the relevant 
circumstances of. the specific .context of the sport as well as th.e need to promote 
competition through sometimes prima facie restrictive practices in order to promote or 
maintain the viability of the sport, must all be considered with proper weighting of the. 
interests of the various stakeholders. 1472 
465 The applic;:ati?D of the Co[l1petition Act in the sporting context has to ,date not 
been tested by tbe courts, and one would have to wait and see_how these $pecific 
- - . . . . .... 
considerations in respect of sport will be applied when such opportunity arises .. I~ is 
. - . . . . 
hoped, however, that the courts as well as the Competition Commission ~nd .Tribunal will, 
. where applicable, show an insight and sensitivity into the special nature of sport, as the 
European Competition Commission has done in recent times. 1473 
466 In respect of the potential role of competition law relating to sports broadcasting 
rights, it should be noted that the national regulator's 1474 current Discussion Paper on 
Sports Broadcasting Rights Regulation 1475 has specifically highlighted the importance of 
guarding against anti-competitive behaviour by subscription broadcasting services, in 
light of complaints by new, recently-licensed entrants to the subscription service industry 
regarding the role in the market of Multichoice, the largest subscription broadcaster (with 
its sports broadcasting subsidiary, Supersport International). 1476· It is also expected that 
1471 Ibid. 
1472 See also Gardiner et al Sports Law 3rd ed Cavendish Publishing 2006 at 365-367 
1473 Gardiner et al supra at 397 
1474 The Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA) 
1475 
'Review of Sports Broadcasting Rights Regulations - Discussion Document, September 2008' - published in 
General Notice 1238 of 2008, Government Gazette No. 31483, 2 October 2008 
1476 For current developments regarding the regulation of the sports broadcasting undustry in South Africa, see 
the discussion in par 585 et seq below 
539 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
the implementation of Chapter 10 of the Electronic Communications Act, 1477 which deals 
with the introduction of pro-competitive mea'sures in anti-competitive markets, will play 
an important role in this regard. 1478 
§3 The practices prohibited in terms of the Competition Act 89 of 1998 
,. 
I Restrictive horizontal practices 
467 . Restrictive.horizontal practices are prohibited by section 4(1) of the Act, 
which· pmvides as follows: 
'An agreeme·nt between, or concerted practice by, firms, or a decision by ~i'ri 
association of firms, is prohibited if -
(e) it is between parties in a horizontal relationship and it has the effect of 
substantially preventing or lessening competition in a market, unless a 
party to the agreement, concerted practice or decision can prove that 
any technological, efficiency or other pro-competitive gain resulting 
from it outweighs that effect; or 
(f) it involves any of the following restrictive horizontal practices: 
(i) directly or indirectly fixing a purchase or selling price or any 
other trading condition; 
(ii) dividing markets by allocating customers, suppliers, 
territories, or specific types of goods or services; or 
(iii) collusive tendering.' 
1477 Act 36 of 2005 
1478 See the discussion in par 590 et seq below 
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The object ofthe prohibition-in·section 4(1)"is threefold, namely an agreement 
between firms, a concerted practice by firms or a decision by an association of 
firms. 1479 An 'agreement' includes a contract, arrangement or understanding, 
whether or not it is legally enforceable. A 'concerted practice' by firms means co-
operative or co-ordinated conduct between firms, achieved through direct or 
indirect contact, that replaces their independent action, but whicb does not 
amount to an agreement. 'Firms' are defined in the Act as including a person, 
partnership or trust, and clubs and other sports bodies would undoubtedly qualify 
as firms for purposes of the Act. 1480 It should also be noted that the meaning of 
'firm' is not limited to its common law meaning. The word 'person' (in the above 
definition) includes any company or body of persons whether incorporated or 
unincorporated 1481 , and the provision thus apples to companies. 1482 A 'horizontal 
relationship' is defined as a.relationship between competitors. 
The exemption regarding the proof of technological efficiency or a pro-competitive 
gain which outweighs the anti-competitive effect of an agreement or concerted 
practice is similar to the provisions of Artide 81(3rof the EC Treaty. 
Sections 4(2) to 4(4) of the 'Ji.ct contain·a presumption of the existence of an 
-
agreement to engage in a restrictive horizontal practice between two or more 
firms, if there is cross-shareholding between firms or where they have at least 
one director or substantial shareholder in common. 1483 As Loubser has pointed 
out, media companies often have substantial shareholding in competing sports 
bodies, and the presumption of contravention of section 4 may arise in instances 
where these bodies engage in conduct that might be viewed as a restrictive 
horizontal practice (e.g. where they appear to divide geographical markets in 
1479 See Campbell, J in Brassey Competition Law (2003) at 129 
1480 Loubser supra at Ch 8-46(1) 
1481 In terms of section 2 of the Interpretation Act 33 of 1957 
1482 See Campbell, J in Brassey Competition Law (2003) supra at 129 note 1 
1483 In terms of sec 4(5) of the Act, the provisions of sec 4(1) do not apply to an agreement between or a 
concerted practice engaged in by a company, its wholly owned subsidiary, a wholly owned subsidiary of that 
subsidiary or any combination of them, or between the constituent firms within a single economic entity similar 
in structure as a company and its wholly owned subsidiaries. 
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respect of the employment of-players, or enter into exclusive broadcasting 
agreements with media companies). 1484 
468 It is important to determine the relevant market for purposes of application 
of the prohibitions contained in the Act. The relevant market is usually determined 
primarily in respect of the' product or service market and the geographical 
.market. 1485 The market in which sports bodies or participants operate may be 
local, regional; national or international, depending on the nature of the activity or 
restriction-concerned. 1486 Accordingly, competition policy in respect of sports 
broadcasting rights raises difficult questions in determining the relevant market 
for the sport concerned. 1487 As has been ·observed in respect of the prohibitive 
effect of the competition provisions contained in the EC Treaty (i.e. Article 81 1488), 
· it is necessary to show not simply that the rule or practice is restrictive but also 
.that the rule or practice has an appreciable effect on a relevant market . 
. Therefore, a key element in any competition law analysis is defining the relevant 
· market: a broad definition of the relevant market may lead to the conclusion that 
the rule or practice under scrutiny has no appreciable impact on competition 1489 
(similarly a broad definition of the relevant market may lead to a conclusion that 
the undertaking under scrutiny does not enjoy a dominant position in the market 
- Article 82 of the EC Treaty; section 8 of the Competition Act 89 of 1998 -
discussed below). 1490 
1484 In respect of broadcasting rights regulation, see par 585 et seq below 
1485 Loubser supra Ch 8-46(1); Beloff, Kerr & Demetriou Sports Law 1999 at 6.43 
1486 Ibid. 
1487 E.g. whether there should be a distinction drawn between pay-television and non-subscription television, 
whether there are separate markets for live and recorded sports, and what the relevant geographical market is 
in respect of sports broadcasting - see Loubser supra Ch 8-46(3). In the report of the UK Competition· 
Commissioner in the Vivendi/BSkyB merger (April 2000), the Commission was op the opinion that pay-TV and 
free-to-air TV can be regarded as separate markets. This view appears to have also been followed in other 
jurisidictions (e.g. in Italy and Germany) - see Lewis & Taylor Sport: Law and Practice (2003) at 400-401 
1488 Article 81 prohibits 'all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and 
concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the 
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the common market .. .' 
1489 Or of not 'substantially preventing or lessening competition in a market', in the wording of sec 4(1) of the 
Competition Act 89 of 1998 (as quoted above). . 
1490 Lewis & Taylor supra at 354; see also Simkins, C in Brassey Competition Law (2003) supra at 109-110 
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469 In light of the fact that these prohibitive provisions of the Competition Act 
89 of 1998 have to date not yet been tested or applied specifically in the sporting 
context (unlike the position in e.g. the European Union, where many sports-
related competition cases have in recent years confronted the relevant 
competition authorities as well as the courts), it may be necessary to include 
some disclaimers with regard to the expected application of the Act to sports 
bodies. It should be noted that courts and competition authorities elsewhere have 
increasingly recognized the peculiarity of the sporting context when considering 
restrictive practices which would fall foul of competition laws in other industries. 
Reference has been made above to both the potential application and scope of the 
'sporting exception' and the 'rule of reason' principle as applied in the European 
context. Lewis & Taylor have gone so far as to state that the effect of the 'rule of 
reason' principle as well as the peculiar nature of competition in sport (especially 
the required co-operation and restriction of free and unfettered :competition off 
the field of play) imply that 'the fundamental economic principl_e that the public 
interest is best served by unrestrained competition in a completely free market 
·environment simply does not apply in the sports sector:'1491 
One should therefore consider whether a horizontal 'restrictive' practice, which is 
necessary to preserve competitive balance between clubs or other sports bodies 
and is proportionate to such purpose, may over-all be determined to be pro-
competitive. 1492 
470 Furthermore, in light of the above discussion of the peculiarity of the 
professional sports industry and the necessity of restricting competition between 
e.g. teams in a league, heed may also need to be taken of the collective nature of 
the business venture; in this light a sport's rules, practices and decisions should 
not be viewed in the same way as agreements among horizontal business 
1491 Lewis & Taylor supra at 352, with reference to Kinsella and Daly 'European Competition Law and 
Sports'(2001) 4(6) Sports Law Bulletin 7 (emphasis provided in the original) 
1492 Lewis & Taylor 352 (par B2.72) 
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competitors in a traditionally structured industry. 1493 The 'firm' in the meaning of 
the Competition Act may therefore need to be considered as the league or 
competition organizer, as the collective entity encompassing the teams, clubs or 
franchises as a whole. 1494 
II Restrictive vertical practices 
471 Section _5 of the Competition Act 89 of -1998 prohibits restrictive vertical 
practices, and provides as follows: 
'(1) A restriction between parties in:a vertical relationship is prohibited if it has 
the effect of substantially preventing or lessening competition in a market, 
unless a party to the agreement can prove that any technological, 
efficiency or other pro-competitive gain resulting from that agreement 
outweighs that effect. 
(2) The practice of minimum retail price maintenance is prohibited. 
(3) Despite subsection (2), a supplier or producer may recommend a minimum 
resale price to the reseller of a good or service provided -
(a) the supplier or producer makes it clear to the reseller that 
the recommendation is not binding; and 
(b) if the product has its price stated on it, the words 
'recommended price' appear next to the stated price.' 
A 'vertical relationship' is defined in the Act as the relationship between a firm and 
its suppliers, it customers or both. As Loubser has pointed out, this provision may 
1493 Lewis & Taylor 351 (par B2.68) 
1494 Ibid. Note, however, the authors' reference to criticism of this 'single entity' theory in the United States and 
among European competition regulators (Lewis & Taylor 351-352), and the apparent rejection of this 'single 
entity' theory in Australia in News Ltd v Australian Rugby League Ltd (1996) ATPR 41-466 (as discussed by 
Gardiner et al Sports Law 3rd ed Cavendish Publishing 2006 at 390-391). 
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apply to various types of agreements within the sporting context,.including 
exclusive dealing agreements between sports bodies or clubs and· their suppliers, 
agreements whereby sports bodies supply team-branded products to retailers on 
an exclusive dealing basis, and even a transfer fee system which can have vertical 
restrictive implications for the relationship between players and their employers 
where the former are regarded as suppliers of services to their employers. 1495 The 
Act does not define the meaning of a 'supplier', and it is submitted that common 
sense would lean towards players being deemed to be suppliers of services for 
purposes·of the application of these provisions. Accordingly, any employment or 
related practice which 'has the effect of substantially preventing or lessening ~ 
competition in a market' would require competition law scrutiny or be open to 
challenge in terms· of section 5(1) of the Act. 
III Abuse· of dominance 
472 The Competition Act, in its Part B, 1496 prohibits the abuse of dominance in 
a market, which has been explained succinctly as follows: 
'A firm that dominates a market may not exploit its power in order to gain an anti-
competitive advantage over its competitors, customers or suppliers. It may not 
charge its customers excessive prices, improperly discriminate between customers 
1495 Loubser supra at Ch 8-48. In the context of American professional sports, it has been observed that the 
industry constitutes a textbook example of a bilateral cartel, made up of club or team owners and unionised 
players. The club owners exercise r:nonopoly power in the product market (in respect of the entertainment 
product provided through games and events), and monopsony power in the input market (the input of labour 
by players/athletes) - they constitute the only 'buyer' for the product of player labour. Accordingly, these 
cartels confront each other in a love/hate, cooperation/conflict relationship, with neither being strong enough to 
exercise total dominance over the other - Adams, Walter & Brooke, James W. 'Monopoly, Monopsony, and 
Vertical Collusion: Antitrust Policy and Professional Sports' Antitrust Bulletin 42 (3), (1997) 721-747. 
For an interesting exposition of developments in Australasian professional sport from monopsony to a bilateral 
monopoly (mainly through individual players' legal challenges to labour market controls imposed by teams and 
through the advent of players' associations and collective bargaining), see Braham Dabscheck 'Industrial 
Relations in Australasian Professional Team Sports' The Otemon Journal of Australian Studies Vol. 30 (2004) 3-
22. 
1496 Sections 6-9 of the Act 
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in the prices it quotes .them or improperly dictate the way its suppliers, competitors 
or customers deal with others. '1497 •. 
Sections 7, 8 and 9 of the Act deal with abuse of a dominant position. Section 7 
deals with the circumstances in which a firm is deemed to be dominant in a 
.market, section 8 deter.mines the standards against which a dominant firm is 
judged to have abused its dominance, and section 9 prohibits price discrimination 
.py a dominant firm. 1498 
473 Sports governing bodies (and their 'commercial arms' tasked with 
regulating the commercial aspects of a sport) will always be exposed to potential 
claims of abuse of dominance, especially in light of the monopolistic nature of 
~ such governing bodies in terms of the European system of sports governance 
·which characterizes the governance of the three major South African professional 
sports .. These bodies, and especially national governing hodies (and their 
commercial arms which control the professional competitions etc), can by their 
very nature and the nature of their authority in regulating most aspects of the 
sport at all levels of participation be characterized as monopoly regulators with 
inherent market dominance. 1499 Their very reason for being is the establishment 
of a monopoly of control of professional sport and exploitation of its commercial 
spin-offs, and to fulfill a regulatory function of maintaining monopolies of control 
also at national level. 150° For example, in respect of the economic characteristics 
of professional_ team sports, it has been noted that the most valued product of a 
1497 David Unterhalter, writing in Brassey (ed.) Competition Law (2003) supra at 180 
1498 Ibid. 
1499 See Ken Foster 'Can Sport be Regulated by Europe? An Analysis of Alternative Models', in Caiger & Gardiner 
Professional Sport in the EU at 59. 
1500 As has been stated in respect of the establishment of FIFA: 
'The main idea behind [the meeting in 1904 of the founding members of the organisation] was to create a body 
with legitimacy to arbitrate over conflicts among national football associations and later to assure the presence 
of one national association per country and the development of football across all member nations. This 
legitimacy came with time, when an ever-growing number of affiliations pleaded their affiliation to FIFA, and 
with the monopolistic characteristic that the body impressed at all levels of football governance: Only one 
association per country would be officially recognised as sovereign responsible for the control and the 
development of the sport within its boundaries.' 
Ducrey, P; Ferreira, C; Huerta, G & Marston, K 'UEFA and Football Governance: A New Model' International 
Sports Law Journal 2004/1-2 at 81 
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sports league is the world or national championship contest, which only a 
monopoly can supply. 1501 Accordingly, aspects of the conduct of such bodies are 
open to scrutiny in terms of competition law. This was recently confirmed in 
respect of the application of Article 82 of the EC Treaty 1502 in the decision of the 
Grand Chamber of the ECJ in the case of Motosykletistiki Omospondia El/ados 
NPID (MOTOE) v Elliniko Dimosio. 1503 It was held that the abuse cif a dominant 
position by a sports regulatory body (in casu, in motorcycling) in respect of 
sanctioning new events is subject to the prohibition contained in Article 82. As one 
commentator has observed, the ECJ's view in this regard is not surprising, but in 
line with a long line of earlier decisions whose effect has been summarized as 
follows: 
'Case law [of the ECJ] demonstrates the Court's consistent view that sport, in so far 
as it constitutes an economic activiSy, falls within the scope of application of the EC 
Treaty, albeit that it is open to. sport to explain and justify its ~ractices in so far as 
they are necessary for: its proper. organisation. In short, EC law accepts that sport is 
'special' - it has features, such as the need for balanced competition and 
uncertainty as to outcome, which are not found in. typical industries - but it is not 
so 'special' that it can be granted a blanket exemption from the rules of the EC 
Treaty. '1504 
474 It should be remembered that the mere position of power of a sports 
governing body may not, per se, lead to a finding of abuse of a dominant position. 
As has been observed in respect of the abuse of dominance in terms of Article 82 
1501 See Neale, W.C. (1964) 'The Peculiar Economics of Professional Sport' Quarterly Journal of Economics 78, 
1: 1-14, as discussed in Paul Downward and Alistair Dawson The Economics of Professional Team Sports 
Routledge, London & New York 2000 at 21. 
1502 See the discussion in the text below 
1503 Case C49/07 (judgment delivered 1 July 2008) 
1504 See the 'discussion by Stephen Weatherill ('Article 82 and sporting "conflict of interest": The judgment in 
MOTOE') in the Sport and the Law Journal Issue 2 Vol. 16 (March 2009) 10 
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of the EC Treaty, 1505 it is not having a dominant position that is problematic, but 
rather the abuse of such a dominant position: '[I]t is not the power to regulate a 
given sporting activity as such which might constitute an abuse but rather the 
way in which a given sporting organisation exercises such power.'1506 
Section 8 of the Competition Act 89 of 1998, which shows marked resemblance to 
Article 82' of the EC Treaty, prohibits certain instances of abuse of dominance in a 
relevant market. Section 7 first defines the concept of dominance, as follows: 
'A firm is dominant ·in .a market if -
.(a) it has at least 45% uf·that market; 
(b) it has at least 35%, but less than 45%, of that market, unless it 
can show that it does- not have market power; or 
(c) it has·less than 35%""0f that market, but has market power.'1507 
It should be noted that, even if a firm satisfies any of the above requirements, the 
provisions of the Act relating to abuse of dominance may not be applicable to it. 
In terms of section 6(1) of the Act, the Minister of Trade and Industry has set a 
de minimis threshold; i.e. the prohibition relating to abuse of dominance does not 
apply in respect of a firm which has an annual turnover in, into or from South 
1505 Which prohibits any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the common market 
or in a substantial part of it, which is prohibited as incompatible with such common market in so far as it may 
affect trade between Member States. Art. 82 provides that such abuse may in particular consist of the 
following: 
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or unfair trading conditions; 
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers; 
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing 
them at a competitive disadvantage; 
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by other parties of supplementary 
obligations, which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection woth the 
subject of such contracts. 
1506 
'Commission debates application of competition rules to sport', European Commission press release dated 
24 February 1999, IP/99/133 (as quoted In Lewis & Taylor supra 62.32) 
1507 Lewis & Taylor (supra, at 62.77 on 355) have pointed out that under UK competition law, restrictions on 
competition are generally considered de minimis where the parties' combined share of the relevant market does 
not exceed 25%. · 
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Africa of below ZAR 5 million or assets in South Africa of a value below ZAR 5 
million. 1508 
475 In the determination of whether a firm in fact enjoys a dominant position 
in a market (also in terms of _the above guidelines as set down in section 7), it 
must of course first be determined what market is involved." Unterhalter has 
explained this exercise as follows: 
'The market. is determined neither anecdotally nor impressionistically ... but 
according to an economic conception that tre.ats the market as a group of products, 
sold (or potentially sold) in a defined area, by firms that constrain one another in a 
competitive process by offering products in thatarea that are, according to the 
preferences of consumers, substitutes for o.ne another ... The definition of a market 
is the definition of boundaries. Those boundaries·ar:e defined ·across a number of 
dimensions. There are boundaries between products, between territorial spaces and 
in time.'1509 
For further discussion of the considerations that may. affect the determination of 
the relevant market, the reader is referred to more specialized texts in this 
regard. 1510 
In the context of Article 82 of the EC Treaty, the issue of dominance was 
considered in the case of Hoffman-La Roche & Co AG v Commission: 1511 
'The dominant position ... relates to a position of economic strength enjoyed by an 
undertaking which enables it to. prevent effective competition being maintained on 
the relevant market by affording it the power to behave in an appreciable extent 
independently of its competitors, its customers and ultimately of its consumers. 
Such a position does not preclude some competition, which it does where there is a 
1508 Section 6(1); Unterhalter, D in Brassey Competition Law (2003) supra at 181 
1509 Unterhalter, D in Brassey Competition Law (2003) supra at 183 
1510 E.g. see the discussion by Unterhalter in Brassey Competition Law (2003) supra at 183 et seq. 
1511 [1979] ECR 461 
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monopoly or quasi-monopoly, but enables the undertaking which profits by it, if not 
to determine, at least to have an appreciable influence on the conditions under 
which that competition will develop, and in any case to act largely in disregard of it 
s0 long as such conduct does not operate to its detriment.'1512 
'' 
-·-rhe concept of abuse of such dominant market power is an objective one, and 
relates to conduct by such firm where, as a result of its presence in the market, 
competition is diminished and the maintenance of the degree of competition still 
existing is hindered. 1513 
476 Section 8 of the Act prohibits certain specific instances of abuse of a 
"dominant position: 
'It is prohibited for a dominant firm to -
(a) charge an excessive price to the detriment of consumers; 
. (b) refuse to give a competitor access to an essential facility when it is 
economically feasible to do so; 
(c) engage in an exclusionary act, other than an act listed in paragraph 
(d), if the anti-competitive effect of that act outweighs its 
technological, efficiency or other pro-competitive gain; or 
(d) engage in any of the following exclusionary acts, unless the firm 
concerned can show technological, efficiency or other pro-
competitive gains which outweigh the anti-competitive effect of its 
act: 
1512 See Gardiner et al Sports Law 3rd ed Cavendish Publishing 2006 at 360 
1513 Loubser supra Ch 8-48, with reference to Beloff, Kerr & Demetriou Sports Law Hart Publishing 1999 at 6.45. 
In Hoffman-La Roche & Co AG v Commission [1979] ECR 461 the concept of abuse was described as follows 
(again in the context of the provisions of Art. 82 of the EC Treaty): 
'The concept of abuse is an objective concept relating to the behaviour of an undertaking in a dominant position 
which is such as to influence the structure of the market where, as a result of the very presence of the 
undertaking in question, the degree of competition is weakened and which through recourse to methods 
different from those which condition normal competition in products or services on the basis of transactions of 
commercial operators, has the effect of hindering the maintenance of the degree of competition still existing in 
the market or the growth of that competition.' 
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:.;·. 
(i) requiring or inducing .a supplier or customer to not 
deal with a competitor; . 
(ii) refusing to supply s<::arce :g_oods to a competitor 
when supplying those goods is economically 
feasible; 
(iii) selling goods or services on condition that the buyer 
purchases separate goods or services unrelated to 
the object of a contract, or forcing a buyer to 
accept a condition unrelated to the object of a 
contract; 
. (iv) selling goods or services below their marginal or 
. average variable cost; or ~ • i1'' .. 
(v) buying-up a scarce supply of:inter:m~di\:lte goods or 
resources required by a competitor.' 
. ~: 
As Loubser has pointed out, potentially abus.ive conduct includes the collective selling of 
broadcasting rights; the application ·of non-objective entry criteria to leagues or 
competitions, charging excessive prices for sport-related merchandise, and selling goods 
or services on condition that the buyer purchases certain separate goods or services. 1514 
477 It is submitted that events in the 'rebel' Indian Cricket League 1515 which had its 
inaugural competition in 2007, which is (at the time of writing) unsanctioned by the 
Board of Control for Cricket in India and has led to player bans for participating players 
and the imposition of other sanctions by cricket governing bodies in various jurisdictions, 
provides some good examples of the types of conduct by a sports body which might 
constitute abuse of a dominant position in the sporting context. Apart from the player 
bans that have apparently been imposed on cricketers who signed up for the ICL, by the 
1514 Loubser supra Ch 8-50 
1515 See further discussion of the Indian Cricket League and its legal implications elsewhere in this chapter 
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BCCI as well as other domestic cricket boards, and the BCCI's refusal to sanction the ICL, 
it was reported in late. 2007 that the ICL was the subject of legal action in India. Zee 
Telefilms, the organizer and financial backer of the ICL, filed a petition against the BCCI 
in the Delhi High Court in August 2007 requesting an order that the BCCI be restrained 
from interfering in the ICL's signing of players as well as alleged conduct by the BCCI in 
'out-hiring' cricket stadiums in India that are owned and managed by state governments, 
in an attempt to· prevent the ICL from staging events. The Delhi High Court granted an 
interim order in favour of Zee on 27 August 2007. It appears from reports that following 
the BCCI's banning of ICL'players (which means that such players would not be able to 
play club cricket), there were fears that public sector undertakings such as Air India and 
IndianOil Corp·oration would dismiss their player employees who were employed for the 
sole purpose of playing club cricket. The Delhi High Court reportedly requested such 
public sector undertakings not to dismiss players. 
It was also reported that India's Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Commission 
(MRTPC) was investigating.the BCCI's refusal to share infrastructure (specifically access 
to stadia) with the '!CL. At the time of writing, no further information regarding the 
outcome of this investigation is available. It appears that this last, however, is the type 
of conduct which would constitute abuse of a dominant position within the meaning of 
the above section 8 (b) of the South African Competition Act. 
§4 Competition provisions in respect of (sports) broadcasting 
478 As has been observed in the European context, it is probably in the area of 
television broadcasting that the competition authorities have most frequently been 
involved in the business of sport. 1516 It is expected that, apart from possible competition 
law challenges to e.g. player bans by domestic governing bodies (such as the position in 
1516 Lewis & Taylor Sport: Law and Practice (2003) at 399 
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South African cricket, which is discussed elsewhere in this chapter), the sports 
broadcasting market in South Africa also holds the most potential for competition law 
challenges in future. This is especially probable in light of the recent entry of new 
licensed subscription broadcasters to what has, to date, been a relatively small sports 
broadcasting market. 
479 Concerns regarding vertical restrictive practices in respect of the sports 
broadcasting market were raised by the Competition Commission and Tribunal in a 
matter that fell within their function of control over mergers. The Tribunal issued an 
unconditional Merger Clearance Certificate on 1 March 2005 approving a merger between 
Venfin Media Investments (Pty) .Ltd and SAIL Group Ltd ~or 'SAIL'). 1517 SAIL is a .public 
company which controls a number of .. other firms. SAIL Group provides various 
professional services to the sport and entertainment industries. SAIL assists franchises 
that own sport brands to commercialise and correctly manage their brands. It also 
provides management advice to promote financial sustainability and return on 
investment for shareholders so that brands can attract and retain suitable commercial 
partners. It creates, strategically manages and executes sponsorships and events for 
corporate clients with a view to building their brands and maximising their return on 
investment. 
Two of the primary acquiring firms in the merger owned a 33% and 66% (respectively) 
stake in free-to-air broadcaster e.tv. The Tribunal was concerned that the merger raised 
potential vertical concerns, because these two acquiring firms, who through their wholly 
owned subsidiaries could exercise control over SAIL, were also in a position to exercise 
control over e-tv, and may have had an incentive to use SAIL to foreclose broadcasting 
rivals of e-tv in relation to sports broadcasting rights or be able to use that control or 
influence to direct sports broadcasting rights away from rival sports broadcasters to e-
tv. 1518 The concern stemmed from the fact of SAIL's ownership of various sporting 
1517 Venfin Media Investments (Pty) Ltd/SAIL Group Ltd Decision of the Competition Tribunal of the Republic of 
South Africa (Case No. 67/LM/Sep04), 1 March 2005 
1518 For discussion of the sports broadcasting industry in South Africa, see par 583 et seq below 
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companies, inter alia, rugby affiliated companies (SAIL holds interests in various 
provincial rugby .Unions and, at the time, a controlling interest in the Blue Bulls Co (Pty) 
Ltd franchise). 
The Tribunal was satisfied that the merger did not raise vertical competition concerns on 
the basis of the practice of collective selling of broadcasting rights in the major sports by 
the governing bodies concerned. It explained its findings as follows: 
'[W]itnesses tor the merging parties testified:.at the hearing that sporting companies do not 
make the d_ecisions in r~!~tion to sporting br.0?19casting rights. In the case of rugby, we 
were advised that broadcasting decisions are made by SANZAR or the South African Rugby 
Board (sic). The various rugby companies that SAIL owns equity in have no say over the 
" .- . . ~ 
.. - .. ~ 
allocation of broadcasting rights. The second concern was that SAIL also advises sporting 
bodies and negotiates on their behalf. We were specifically concerned about their 
relationships with the Premier Soccer League ("PSL"). The PSL is the body responsible for 
awarding broadcasting rights in respect of soccer. We were advised at the hearing that 
SAIL - in its capacity as·an agent to the PSL - Would not be able to prescribe to the PSL to 
which television stations they should assign or sell their broadcasting rights. [Testimony on 
behalf ·of SAIL pointed out] that the PSL itself through its board of governors negotiates for 
its broadcasting rights ... [SAIL does not have] a non-exclusive relationship with the PSL, 
but [has] appointed two other companies to find sponsorships for it. The third potential 
concern was that because of VenFin's relationship with Vodacom [major sports sponsor], it 
may be able to use the latter's influence as a sponsor to direct broadcasting rights to e-tv. 
We were advised that this would not be ,possible for two reasons. Firstly, the parties 
advised us that the sponsor is not able to influence the choice of broadcaster - that is the 
decision of the governing body of sport. Secondly, VenFin's interest in the Vodacom Group 
is only 15%, which is insufficient an interest to give it any influence over group sponsorship 
decisions. As part of its investigations, the Commission canvassed the views of both 
Supersport and SABC - e-tv's rivals in the domestic market for sports broadcast rights. 
According to the Commission neither of these parties raised any concerns with the merger.' 
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The discussion elsewhere in this chapter refers to recent developments in light of current 
(at the time of writing) proposals to re-vamp the sports broadcasting regulation 
framework. 1519 
480 · The Electronic Communications Act, 2005 (hereafter 'the EC Act') 1520 deals with 
the licensing of electronic communications services1521 by the Independent 
Communications Authority of South Africa (or 'ICASA'). 1522 In terms of chapter 3 of the 
EC Act, ICASA may grant licences (for a period not exceeding twenty years, or for a 
shorter period if requested by the applicant or determined by ICASA) 1523 for electronic 
communications network services, broadcasting services, and electronic communications 
services. 1524 Section 6 of the Act provides for Ii cerise exemptions. in relation to certain 
types of services. Section 8 of the Act provides for standard terms and condtions for 
licenses, which may take into account -
(a) whether the service is intended for the public generally or a limited group, 
such as the provision of- electronic communications network services or 
electronic communications services to other licensees contemplated under 
theAct; 
(b) the licence area of the authorised service; 
1519 See the discussion in par 585 et seq below 
1520 Act 36 of 2005 
1521 Which are defined in section 1 of the Act as meaning 'the emission, transmission or reception of 
information, including without limitation, voice, sound, data, text, video, animation, visual images, moving 
images and pictures, signals or a combination thereof by means of magnetism, radio or other electromagnetic 
waves, optical, electro- magnetic systems or any agency of a like nature, whether with or without the aid of 
tangible conduct, but does not include content service'. 
1522 Established in terms of section 3 of the Independent Communications Authority of South Africa Act, 13 of 
2000. For further discussion of the activities of !CASA in regulating sports broadcasting, see par 586 et seq 
below 
1523 Section 5(10)(a) of the EC Act 
1524 Section 5(2) of the EC Act. Section 5(3) provides that 'electronic communications network services, 
broadcasting services and electronic communications services that require an individual licence, include, but are 
not limited to -
(a) electronic communications networks of provincial and national scope operated for commercial purposes; 
(b) commercial broadcasting and public broadcasting of national and regional scope whether provided free-to-
air or by subscription; 
(c) electronic communications services consisting of voice telephony utilizing numbers from the national 
numbering plan; 
(d) any electronic communications network service, broadcasting service orelectronic communications service 
where a state entity (directly or indirectly) holds an ownership interest of greater than twenty-five (25%) 
percent of theshare capital of the person providing such service; and 
(e) such other services as may be prescribed that [!CASA] finds have significant impact on socio-economic 
development.' 
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(c) the duration of the licence; 
(d) the protection of the interests of the subscribers and end-users, including, 
but not limited to-
(i) the handling and resolution of complaints and disputes; 
• (ii.) the provision of appropriate remedies and redress in respect of such 
complaints and disputes; 
(iii) the transparency of information about services, tariffs and the 
rights of subscribers; and 
(iv) any other matter ICASA determines to be necessary in order to 
achieve the effective protection of subscribers; 
(e) the public interest in ensuring service interoperability, non-discrimination 
and open access, interconnection and facilities leasing;· 
(f) the public interest in securing the efficient functioning of electronic 
communications networks including but not limited to preventing or 
restricting harmful interference within the radio frequency spectrum; 
(g) any universal access and universal service obligations; 
(h) the public interest in the provision, availability and use, in the event of a 
disaster, of electronic communications networks and electronic 
communicationsservices; 
(i) the public interest in ensuring the protection of public health for the 
prevention or avoidance of the exposure of natural persons to 
electromagnetic fields created in connection with the operation of 
electronic communications networks and the provision of broadcasting and 
electronic communications services; 
(j) the international obligations of the Republic, including compliance with 
relevant international standards adopted by the Republic; 
(k) the public interest in ensuring the distribution of broadcasting services; 
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(I) the public interest in facilitating the dissemination and development of a 
diverse range of sound and television broadcasting services on a national, 
regional and local level, that cater for all language and cultural groups and 
provide entertainment, education, news and information; 
(m) the public interest in facilitating and maintaining a competitive electronic 
communications environment and in regulating and controlling anti-
competitive practices; and 
(n) the efficient use-of the radio fr.equency spectrl:lm and migration to digital 
use of such. radio frequency spectrum, 1525 
481 Chapter 9 of the EC Act deals with broadcasting services. Section 51 regulates 
commercial broadcasting services licenses, an-d section 66 d·eals with 'limitations on cross-
media control of commercial broadcasting services. Section 60 provides for restrictions 
on subscription broadcasting services relating to sports broadcasting rights. Section 60 
provides as follows: 1526 
'S 60 (1)Subscription broadcasting services may not acquire exclusive rights that prevent 
or hinder the free-to-air broadcasting of national sporting events, 1527 as identified in the 
public interest from time to time, by the Authority, after consultation with the Minister and 
the Minister of Sport and in accordance with the regulations prescribed bythe Authority. 
(2) In the event of a dispute arising concerning subsection (1), any party may notify the 
Authority of the dispute in writing and such dispute must be resolved on an expedited basis 
by the Authority in accordance with the regulations prescribed by the Authority. 
1525 Section 8(2) of the EC Act 
1525 See also the discussion regarding currently (at the time of writing) proposed changes to the regulation of 
sports broadcasting in par 590 et seq below 
1527 The reader is referred to the discussion in par 590 et seq below on current (at the time of writing) proposals 
for changes to the regulatory framework regarding sports broadcasting (and, specifically, ICASA's proposals to 
move away from the currently-applicable system of listing of events in the national interest to implementation 
of the competition provisions contained in Chapter 10 of the EC Act) 
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(3) The Authority must prescribe regulations regarding the extent to which subscription 
broadcast. services must carry, subject to commercially negotiable terms, the television 
programmes provided by a public broadcast service licensee. 
(4) Subscription broadcasting services may draw their revenues from subscriptions, 
dvertising and sponsorships, however, in no event may advertising or sponsorship, or a 
combination thereof, be the largest source of annual revenue.' 
482 Chapter 10 of the EC Act deals with 'competition matters'. It provides that the 
Competition Act, 19981528 applies to competition matters in the electronk 
... 
communications industry, subject to the EC Act. 1529 ICASA is a regulatory authority for 
the purpose:s of -~he Competition Act, and it is provided that ICASA and the Competition 
Commission may request and receive assistance and advice from one another regarding 
relevant proceedi ngs. 1530 
Where ICAS.A. determines that the holder of a-licence under the EC Act or a person 
providing a service pursuant to a licence exemption has engaged in an act or intends to 
engage in any act that is likely to substantially prevent or lessen competition by, among 
other things -
(a) giving an· undue preference to; or 
(b) causing undue discrimination against, 
any other licensee or person providing a service pursuant to a licence exemption, ICASA 
may direct the licensee, by written notice, to cease or refrain from engaging in such 
act. 1531 ICASA is to prescribe, in terms of regulations, the actions which would constitute 
such conduct which is likely to prevent or lessen competition, as well as detailing 
1528 Act 89 of 1998 
1529 EC Act section 67(9) 
1530 EC Act sections 67(11) and (12) 
1531 EC Act section 67(1) 
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procedures for complaints and the monitoring and investigation of such conduct as well 
as penalties that may be imposed for failure to comply with a written notice to cease or 
refrain. 1532 
483 Section 67( 4) of the EC Act provides that I CASA must prescribe regulations 
defining the relevant markets and market segments, as applicable, in order that pro-
competitive conditions may be imposed upon licensees having significant market power 
where ICASA determines such markets or market segments as having ineffective 
competition. The regulations must, inter alia -
'(a) define and identify _the retail or whol~sale markets or market segments in whic_h it_ 
intends to impose pro-competitive measures in cases where such markets are 
found to have ineffective competition; 
(b} set out the methodology to be used to determine the effectiveness of competition. 
in such ~arkets -~r market segments, taking into account subsection (8); 153·3 . 
. . 
(c) set out the pro-competitive measures the Authority may impose in order·to remedy 
the perceived market failure in the markets or market segments found to have 
ineffective competition taking into account subsection (7); 1534 
1532 Section 67(2) 
1533 Section 67(8) provides for the review of pro-competitive conditions: 
'(a) Where the Authority undertakes a review of the pro-competitive conditions imposed upon one or more 
licensees under this subsection, the Authority must -
(i) review the market determinations made on the basis of earlier analysis; and 
(ii) decide whether to modify the pro-competitive conditions set by reference to a market 
determination; 
(b) Where, on the basis of a review under this subsection, the Authority determines that a licensee to whom 
any pro-competitive conditions apply is no longer a licensee possessing significant market power in that market 
or market segment, the Authority must revoke the applicable pro-competitive conditionsapplied to that licensee 
by reference to the previous market determination based on earlier analysis; 
(c) Where, on the basis of such review, the Authority determines that the licensee to whom pro-competitive 
conditions apply continues to possess significant market power in that market or market segment, but due to 
changes in the competitive nature of such market or market segment the pro-competitive conditions are no 
longer proportional in accordance with subsection (7), theAuthority must modify the applicable pro-competitive 
conditions applied to that licensee to ensure proportionality.' 
1534 Section 67(7) provides that pro-competitive terms and conditions may include but are not limited to -
'(a) an obligation to act fairly and reasonably in the way in which the licensee responds to requests for access, 
provisioning of services, interconnection and facilities leasing; 
(b) a requirement that the obligations contained in the licence terms and pro-competitive conditions must be 
complied with within the periods and at the times required by or under such terms and conditions, failing which 
a penalty may be imposed; 
(c) a prohibition against discriminating in relation to matters connected with access, provisioning of services, 
interconnection and facilities leasing; 
(d) an obligation requiring the licensee to publish, in such manner as the Authority may direct, all such 
information for the purpose of ensuring transparency in relation to -
(i) access, interconnection and facilities leasing; or 
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(d) •. declare licensees in the relevant market or market segments, as applicable, that 
have significant market power, as determined in accordance with subsection 
(6), 1535 and the pro-competitive conditions applicable to each such licensee; 
(e) set out a schedule in terms of which the Authority will undertake periodic review of 
t~e markets an~ market ;;egments, t~king into account subsection (9) 1536 and the 
determincition in respect of the effectiveness of competition and application of pro-
... ~.. - . . . 
competitive measures in those markets; and 
(ii) the provision of electronic communications network services, electronic communications 
services or any other service offered by the licensee applicable to the relevant market or 
market segments at issue; 
(e) an obligation to publish, in such manner as the Authority may direct, the terms and conditions for -
(i) access, interconnection and facilities leasing; or 
(ii) the provision of electronic communications network services, electronic communications 
se·rvices or any other service offered by the.licensee applicable to the relevant market or 
market segments at issue which maytake the form of a reference offer; 
(f) an obligation to maintain a separation for accounting purposes between different matters relating to -
(i) access, interconnection and facilities leasing; 
(ii) the provision of electronic communications network services, electronic communications 
services or any other service offered by the licensee applicable to the relevant market or 
market segments at issue; and 
(iii) retail and wholesale prices; 
(g) a requirement relating to the accounting methods to be used in maintaining the separation of accounts 
referred to in paragraph (f); 
(h) such price controls, including requirements relating to the provision ofwholesale and retail prices in relation 
to matters connected with the provision of - _ 
(i) • ·access, interconnection and facilities leasing; or· 
(ii) electronic communications network services, electronic communications services or any other 
. service offered by the licensee applicable to the relevant market or market segments at issue; _ 
(i) matters relating to the recovery of costs and cost orientation and with regard to broadcasting services, the 
appropriate a.moµnt of South African programming, including-
(i) music content; 
(ii) news and information programmes; and 
(iii) where appropriate, programming of local or regional significance; 
(j) matters relating to the accounts, records and other documents to be kept and made available for inspection 
by the Authority.' 
1535 Section 67(6) provides that the methodology to be used in determining the effectiveness of competition in 
markets or market segments must include (but is not limited to) an assessment of the following: 
'(a) When defining the relevant market or market segments the Authority must consider the non-transitory 
(structural, legal, or regulatory) entry barriers to the applicable markets or market segments and the dynamic 
character and functioning of the subject markets or market segments; 
(b) When conducting an analysis of the effectiveness of competition in tile relevant markets or market 
segments the Authority must take the following factors, among others, into account: 
(i) An assessment of relative market share of the various licensees in the defined markets or 
market segments; and 
(ii) A forward looking assessment of the market power of each of the market participants over a 
reasonable period in terms of, amongst others: 
(aa) actual and potential existence of competitors; 
(bb) the level, trends of concentration, and history of collusion, in the market; 
(cc) the overall size of each of the market participants; 
(dd) control of essential facilities; 
(ee) technological advantages or superiority of a given market participant; 
(ff) the degree of countervailing power in the market; 
(gg) easy or privileged access to capital markets and financial resources; 
(hh) the dynamic characteristics of the market, including growth,innovation, and 
products and services diversification; 
(ii) economies of scale and scope; 
(jj) the nature and extent of vertical integration; 
(kk) the ease of entry into the market, including market and regulatory barriers to 
entry.' 
1536 Section 67(9) provides that '[s]ubject to the provisions of this Act, the Competition Act applies to 
competition matters in the electronic communications industry.' 
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(f) provide for monitoring and investigation of anti-competitive behaviour in the 
relevant market and market segmer:its.'1537 
484 · Section 67(5) of the EC Act provides that a licensee has significant market power 
with regard to the relevant market or market segment where !CASA finds that the 
particular individual licensee or class licensee -
'(a) is dominant; 1538 
(b) has control of _essential facilities; or 
(c) has a vertical relationship that [!CASA] determines could harm competition in t~e 
_market or market segments applicable to th~ particular cat~gory of licence.' 
.•. 
As mentioned elsewhere in this chapter, a~ !CASA 2008 Discussion Paper with a view to · 
new regulations regarding sports broadcasting rights regulations has mooted a re-
vamping of the South African sports broadcasting regulatory framework, in favour of 
increased implementation of the above competition provisions of Chapter 10 of the 
Electronic Communications Act with a view to countering a perceived potential for anti-
competitive behaviour in the subscription broadcasting market. 1539 Developments in 
respect of the expected regulations will be watched with interest. 
1537 Section 67(4) 
1538 The term 'dominant' is defined in section 1 of the EC Act as having the same meaning as given to the term 
in section 7 of the Competition Act 89 of 1998 - see the discussion on abuse of dominance in terms of the 
Competition Act in the text above 
1539 See the discussion in par 590 et seq below 
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§5 · Competition law and. new competitions and leagues 
485 Finally, in light of the above observations regarding the role of the nature of the 
governance arid organization of sport in respect of the applicability of the various forms 
of prohibited practices and conduct in terms of the Competition Act, it is germane to 
briefly examine developments in respect of alternative structuring of sporting 
competitions in various new sports leagues, which have seen the introduction of 
structures more akin to the 'North American' model of sports governance in sports that 
have traditionally followed the European model. The discussion will do so with reference 
to an example from cricket, namely the Indian Premier League, which is a sanctioned 
league which was (at least in part) developed as a response to the 'rebel' Indian Cricket 
League. 
486 The 'Indian Premier League' (or IPL), which is sanctioned by the International 
Cricket Coundl and commenced its inaugural competition in April 2008, follows a 
revolutionar)i model based on the English Premier League Football, the National Football 
League.·(NFL) and. Major League Baseball (MLB) in the USA. The IPL is set to be the first 
steps towaras domestic Twenty20 leagues in Australia, South Africa, England and India, 
aimed at producing eight teams (winner plus runner-up per domestic competition) to 
participate in an ICC-organised Champions League Twenty20 competition (along the lines 
of the UEFA Champions League in European football), the inaugural edition of which was 
scheduled to be played in October.2008 (the competition was re-scheduled and is to be 
played in South Africa in late 2009). 
487 The IPL is a franchise model in which corporations and sponsors are able to 
purchase and manage teams along the lines of the North American professional sports 
leagues, including the possibility that franchisees' initial limited revenue sources of 
collecting gate monies and income from in-stadia advertisements could later be 
supplemented by the listing of teams on stock exchanges for purposes of trading. 
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According to reports, no salary caps will operate in respect of designated (foreign) 
players and assoeiation football-type player buy-outs between teams will be allowed. 1540 
The IPL has reportedly already succeeded in its first season in breaking all kinds of 
records in respect of the amounts of money generated: A consortium of India's Sony 
Television and Singapore-based World Sports Group secured the broadcasting rights to 
the league for a ten-year period at a record cost of US$ 1.026 billion. The winning bids 
for the eight franchises that would operate within the league were announced recently -
following rumours that amongst the bidders were sucb luminaries as Hollywood film star 
Russell Crowe and iconic ex-Indian batsman Sachin Tendulkar - and the IPL earned.a 
total of US$ 723 million (with. the most expensive franchise, Mumbai, fetching US$ 
111.9). At the time of writing it has been reported that a number of current South. 
African national cricketers had been confirmed as signing up to the IPL, for undisclosed. 
amounts. 1541 
These developments pose· the question of whether the IPL and, especially, its 
organisational structure, might be the future of the game of cricket on.the international 
stage. As has been observed, the IPL has 'generated an unprecedented level of: 
commercial and sporting interest for a "new" sports property and is arguably the Biggest 
new sporting concept since the re-branding and re-structuring of the top tier of European 
club football into the "UEFA Champions League' during the 1990s'. 1542 
488 Chris Walsh 1543 has examined the IPL as a prime example of a modern 
development in the organisation of professional sports leagues in the form of sports 
franchises, reminiscent of the North American model of sports organisation in the major 
professional leagues. While 'English' sports such as cricket and rugby union have 
154° From an article in the Indian newspaper The Hindu, 14 September 2007, available online at 
http://www.hindu.com/2007/09/14/stories/2007091461922300.htm - last accessed on 31 January 2008 
1541 The following players have been reported as having signed with the IPL: Mark Boucher, Loots Bosman, 
Herschelle Gibbs, Jacques Kallis, Justin Kemp, Albie Morkel, Shaun Pollock, Ashwell Prince, Makhaya Ntini, AB 
de Villiers and Graeme Smith. 
1542 Chris Walsh (a solicitor with London-based firm OnSide Law - http://www.onsidelaw.co.uk), writing in a 
World Sports Law Report online report, Volume 6 Issue 4 (April 2008) 
1543 Ibid. 
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traditionally been organised in terms of the European model 1544 and competitions have 
followed the promotion and relegation system in terms of this model, the IPL has now 
introducedthe franchise model (of a fixed number of franchisees who enjoy a 
geographical monopoly within a 'closed' professional league, where competitive balance 
is normally maintained t_hrough measures such as salary caps and draft picks of players, 
as is the norm in the NFL, NBA, NHL.and Major League Baseball in the USA). This 
franchise model has now not only been incorporated into cricket (through the IPL), but 
already characterises.the Super 14 rugby competition played in South Africa, New 
Zealand ar:rd Australia, as.well as the officially sanctioned (by the FIA1545 ) Al Grand Prix 
'World Cup of Motor Sport' Series (which recently saw the completion of its third season 
and, with·the-reportecLinvolvemento"f super-manufacturer Ferrari from 2009, is set to 
reach new heights in terms of its support and interest for motor racing fans). 
Walsh observes that there is no. limitto the IPL's ambitions, quoting IPL chairman and 
commissioner Lalit Modi" as declaring· that 'without a doubt our objective is to be bigger 
than the English Premier League [football]' (which is the world's single most watched 
sporting leag.ue. 15•46 While the English Premier League (currently the Barclays Premier 
League) is.a corporation with the twenty competing clubs as shareholders, the IPL's 
franchise system consists of individual franchisees whose expectation is that the capital 
value of each franchise will grow as the league matures, revenues increase and the brand 
develops, which will eventually enable the franchisees to trade their franchise on terms 
agreed with the franchisor (the IPL) in order to realise its capital growth. 1547 As Walsh 
indicates, under the IPL's financial model, each franchisee will benefit from a share of the 
central revenues and will have the opportunity to develop, exploit and retain local 
revenues. The revenue streams are split into central (media, sponsorship and official 
suppliers) and local (gate, title sponsorship, shirt sponsorship, licensing, merchandising 
1544 See discussion of this model of organisation elsewhere, in Louw, A M 'An Anomaly Tolerated by the Law: 
Examining the Nature and Legal Significance of International Sports Governing Bodies' (2007) 1 South African 
Public Law 211, and the references cited there 
1545 Federation Internationale de /'Automobile, world governing body for motor sport 
1546 It was reported more than half a decade ago that at that time the EPL was broadcast to more than 152 
countries and matches were regularly watched by more than half a billion people (or by 1 in 12 people on the 
planet) - see Dennis Campbell 'United (versus Liverpool) Nations' The Observer, 6 January 2002 
1547 Walsh supra 
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and match-day promotions) streams, while.there are also marketing and other collateral 
benefits for the franchisees. 1548 The prospects for significant return on franchisees' 
investment appear to be excellent if viewed against the backdrop of the American 
professional leagues and trends in respect of the value of franchises: The average 
National Football League (NFL) and National Basketball Association (NBA) franchise 
values have almost doubled since 2002 to approximately US$1 billion and approximately 
US$350 million respectively.l.?49 
Of course, while the franchise model has certain advantages for ·franchisees ~e.'g. the fact 
that there is no system of relegation and, ·accordingly, more financial stability and 
relatively low risk to the investment), there are also disadvantages. Importantly, as 
Walsh points out,. the IPL (as a league with brand new franchises) has faced ·accusations 
of greed and lack of tradition, and critics question·.whether the IPL can be genuinely 
competitive when players have been auctioned as 'hired guns' to represent cities.they 
may never have even visited. 1550 It appears that the $UCcess of the Il?L as a spo.rting ·• 
product will depend to a large extent on whether fans will develop a loyalty to·teams that 
were set up on such an artificial basis155:; this is especially true for spectators.optsid~ 
India who have little or no geographical or cultural affiliation to the city-based teams: For 
these spectators, at least, it appears that the attraction of having the opportunity to 
watch top international players compete (and sometimes in interesting new 
permutations, e.g. team-mates in international teams who are now pitted against each 
other in the IPL matches) would have to trump more traditional factors in respect of the 
generation of fan loyalty'. 
489 It was announced on 25 March 2009 that the second season of the DLF-sponsored 
Indian Premier League (the 2009 competition) is to be played in South Africa from 18 
April 2009. The tournament will see 59 matches between the franchises being played at 
six venues throughout the country. The decision to move the IPL outside India was taken 
1548 Ibid. 
1549 Ibid. 
1550 Ibid. 
1551 Walsh, supra 
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following security concerns (as originally scheduled, the tournament would have 
coincided with the Indian general elections in April 2009, and it is assumed that the 
recent terrorist attacks on the Sri Lankan cricket team in Lahore, -Pakistan and the 
Mumbai attacks of late 2008 have also been a consideration). English and South African 
cricket authorities were requested to undertake feasibility studies for the hosting of the 
event, and according to reports it appears that a deciding factor in South Africa's 
successful bid was the expected weather in South Africa in the months of ,April and May, 
as well as the existing infrastructure to host matches and·the·interest of local fans in the 
'Twenty20' form of the game. It was reported that Cricket South Africa is set to be paid 
in the region of between ZAR 70-90 million for hosting the tournament, and organisers 
have speculated that spin-offs from the event for the local economy (which are expected 
to include an estimated 30 000 room nights in local accommodation) will be very 
lucrative. 
Lalit Modi, the IPL commissioner, was quoted as stating that it was expected that the 
cost of moving the tournament to South Africa would in all likelihood lead to a financial 
loss for the 2009 leg, but that broadcasting and sponsorship obligations (in the context of 
the long-term contracts that are in place) precluded cancelling the tournament in its 
second season. 1552 
490 Apart from the implications for individual cricketers of the 'rebel' ICL tournament 
(discussed elsewhere in this chapter) and the waves created in its wake, it appears likely 
that the alphabet soup of new professional cricket leagues like the ICL and the IPL - and 
especially the new role of the franchise model of professional leagues - have the potential 
to significantly change the game of cricket and its future governance (and, quite possibly, 
its stature as an entertainment product in the global sports market) - even more so than 
the effects of Kerry Packer's machinations in the 1970s. Of course, such change is not 
necessarily unproblematic, as it has (for example) been observed that a tournament such 
1552 From a report in The Mercury, 25 March 2009 
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as the IPL poses a significant threat in respect of the potential for match-fixing and 
corruption. 1553 
At the t.ime of Writing it has been reported that the domestic cricket authorities in South 
Africa, Australia and New Zealand were apparently engaged in discussions regarding the 
establishment of a Twenty20 cricket league (the proposed 'Southern Premier League') 
between franchises from the three countries, along the lines of the IPL and ICC 
Champions' League structures. The potential role of competition law in such 
developments will merit close scrutiny. 
1553 It was reported that before the commencement of the inaugural IPL tournament, Lord Condon, the 
chairman of the ICC's Anti-Corruption Unit (ACU), had warned a board meeting of the ICC that the IPL raised 
the greatest fear of corruption within the game since the previous scandals in recent years (referring to the 
2000 cricket match-fixing scandal) - see Sport and the Law Journal Issue 2. Vol. 16, 'Sports Law Foreign 
Update' at 40. In April 2009 it was reported that the name of the Commissioner of the Indian Premier League, 
Lait Modi, was found on a 'hit list' (of targets for assassination) of alleged Indian crime boss Chhota Shakeel. It 
was reported that it was rumoured that Modi had failed to respond to a demand for money, and that notorious 
Indian gambling syndicates were involved - from a report by Andrew Donaldson 'Indian cricket league boss 
found on gangster's hit list', The Sunday Times, 5 April 2009. 
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§6 The common law action for unlawful competition 
491 Apart from the specific legislative protection provided by means of the 
Competition Act, the common law provides protection for unlawful competition under the 
rubric.of the general Aquilian action-for delict (the actio legis Aquiliae). 1554 As has been 
observed elsewhere in this chapter, the South .African law of delict (or 'tort') does not 
contain·a clo5ed list of specific torts; rather, in terms of the Aquilian action, a wide 
variety of different forms of conduct which unlawfully infringe on subjective rights are 
action-able. lh ttie context of unlawful competition·, such con'duct must be connected in 
some way with competition between business entities. Van Heerden & Neethling1555 have 
described the concept of unlawful competition as 'nothing more than a collective term for 
dissimilar acts (such as damage to property, defamation, misuse of a patent, interference 
with a contractual relationship, passing off, injurious falsehood, boycott and breach of a 
statutor.y duty) which, to an extent at least, infringe different interests, with the common 
qualifications that they_are all wrongful and in some way connected with the competitive 
struggle.' 
492 This general action for unlawful competition has enjoyed recognition in South 
African law since as early as 1922, when the following was observed in the case of 
Matthews v '(oung: 1556 
'In the absence of special legal restrictions a person is without doubt entitled to the free 
exercise of his trade, profession or calling ... But he cannot claim an absolute right to do so 
without interference from another. Competition often brings about interference in one way 
or another about which rivals cannot legitimately complain. But the competition ... must 
itself remain within lawful bounds. All a person can, therefore, claim is the right to exercise 
his calling without unlawful interference from others. Such an interference would constitute 
an iniuria for which an action under the lex Aquilia lies if it has directly resulted in loss.' 
1554 See the discussion in par 491 et seq above 
1555 Van Heerden & Neethling Unlawful Competition Butterworths 1995 at 4 
1556 1922 AD 492 at 507 
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In light of the court's recognition in Atlas Organic Fertilizers (Pty) Ltd v Pikkewyn Ghwano 
(Pty) Ltd1557 that 'the law of South Africa recognizes and grants a general action in the 
case of unlawful competition, based on the principles of the lex Aquiliae', the courts have 
applied the general principles o.f Aquilian liability1558 to a number of forms of unlawful 
competition, including_ passing off, misrepresentation as to a rival's own performance, 
acquisition .and use of a competitor's trade secrets, copying and adoption of a rival's 
performance, competition in conflict with statutory provisions and boycott. 155-9 No more 
will be said here regarding the common law action for unlawful competition, and the 
reader is referred to speci.alized texts on the subject. 
493 The common law .action for passing-off ,1560 which resorts under the Aqu-iltan 
action for unlawfulcompetitiori, is best illustrated in the sporting context by discussion of 
the 1994 judgment of the:Transvaal Provincial Division of the High Court in the-case of 
Federation Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) & Others v Bartlett & Others. 1561 . 
In this matter FIFA, world controlling body for football, along with a number of foreign 
companies involved in the licensing of trade marks, emblems and other intellectual 
property associated with the World Cup, sought relief against the respondent, Bartlett, 
who had designed a trade mark in 1965 which consisted of the words 'world cup' 
superimposed on a map of the world device. In 1969, Bartlett had registered the trade 
mark in the South African trade marks registry, in class 25 (for use in respect of 'men's 
clothing and footwear') and in class 28 (in respect of 'soccer equipment'). In 1989 
1557 1981 (2) SA 173 (T), at 186. See also Schultz v Butt 1986 (3) SA 667 (A); Dun and Bradstreet (Pty) Ltd v 
SA Merchants Combined Credit Bureau (Cape) (Pty) Ltd 1968 (1) SA 209 (C); William Grant and Sons Ltd v 
Cape Wine and Distillers Ltd 1990 (3) SA 897 (C); Aetiology Today CC t/a Somerset Schools v van Aswegen 
1992 (1) SA 807 (W) -
1558 See the discussion of the requirements for the Aquilian action in the section on liability for sports injuries in 
par 438 et seq above 
1559 Van Heerden & Neethling supra at 63 (and the cases quoted there) 
1560 See also the discussion of the protection of athletes' image rights in par 523 et seq below. Another sports-
related passing off action was heard by the Supreme Court of Appeal in the case of Premier Trading Company 
(Pty) Ltd and Others v Sportopia (Pty) Ltd (218/97) [1999] ZASCA 48 (1June1999), which involved a claim 
relating to imported roller skates. 
1561 1994 (4) SA 722 (TPD). See also discussion in par. 575 et seq below of the currently pending (at the time 
of writing) matter of FIFA v Metcash Trading Africa (Pty) Ltd, Transvaal Provincial Division of the High Court, 
Case No. 53304/07 
569 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Bartlett assigned the trade marks with goodwill to a company of which he was a director, 
and also afforded the rightto exploit the trade m.arks between June 1993 and December 
1994 to a sportswear marketing and manufacturing company. 
The applicants alleged that Bartlett and the other respondents had embarked on a 
campaign of unlawful conduct in South Africa which was calculated to cause serious 
irreparable damage to them. It was alleged that the respondents were, by their conduct 
and in certain correspondence,' making misrepresentations to the effect that they held . 
the licensing rights in South Africa in respect of World Cup USA 1994, and.that Bartlett. 
was attempting· to extract commission and royalty payments from the applicants' 
sponsors and sub..:licensees. The applicants sought (inter alia) the following relief: 
(ii) An interdict based on passing-off and unlawful competition; 
(iii) An order in terms of section 18 of the (then applicable) Trade 
Marks Act15~2 to the effect that the words 'world cup' contain 
'matter commor:i to the trade or otherwise of a non-distinctive 
character'. The- applicants sought an order to the effect that an 
·amendment be made of the registered trade marks by adding a 
disclaimer stating that '[r]egistration of the trade mark shall give 
no right to the exclusive use of the words "world cup" separately 
and ap_art from the mark'; and 
(iv) (in the alternative), an order for the expungement of the Bartlett 
trade ma!ks from the trade marks register qn the grounds of 
non-use in terms of the (then applicable) section 36{l)(b) of the 
Trade Marks Act. 
494 The court, in evaluating the evidence in respect of the claim based on unlawful 
competition, evaluated the state of South African law at the time with regard to the 
1562 Act 62 of 1963. This Act was replaced by the Trade Marks Act 194 of 1993 
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= . practice of character merchandising. The same court had in 1981, in the case of Lorimar 
Productions Inc & Others v Sterling Clothing Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd, 1563 held that 
character merchandising was not so well known in South Africa that the court could 
'without proper evidence in this regard assume that the man in the street will have any 
knowledge thereof'. In Bartlett, the court by way of Joffe J held that markets may have 
changed in the years since Lorimar, and that a mass of evidence was availabl~ to 
conclude that character merchandising had taken hold in South Africa and that the man 
in the street would have knowledge thereof and would make the link between the 
merchandising property and the events or circumstances which made it famous (and that 
such link is established by licensing or a license). 1564 The court described the practice of 
character merchandising as follows: 
'Character merchandising is defined as being the business of merchandising popular 
names, characte.rs and insignia in order to enhance the sales of consumer products in 
relation to which such names and characters are used ... The association of a famous 
person or character with a consumer product can boost that product's sales considerably. 
Th.e fame and popularity of the name or character in question enhances the desirability of 
the product from the consumer's point of view. The association between the name or 
character, which can be referred to as the 'merchandising property', and the consumer 
product is usually created by depicting the merchandising product prominently on the 
product. A typical merchandising product is the well-known cartoon character Mickey 
Mouse. As the proprietor of the merchandising property has already invested substantial 
time and money in developing and popularizing such character, and it is the fame and 
desirability of the merchandising property which will promote the sale of the goods to 
which it is applied, the proprietor of the merchandising property charges a royalty of 
license fee for the use of his merchandising property. The royalty is payable in terms of a 
license agreement under which the owner of the merchandising property authorizes the 
licensee to utilize the merchandising property in relation to his goods ... It appea.rs that the 
1563 1981 (3) SA 1129 (T) 
1564 At 738B of the Bartlett judgment 
571 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
consumer makes·a connectio·n and an association between the character and its creator or 
owner and the p~oducts featuring the character.'1565 
The court continued to hold as follows: 
'Although not constituting character merchandising jn_ the strict sense, licensing the use of 
properties such as the Barcelona Olympic Games logo, the Olympic rings device, the Davis 
. C~p tennis logo and logos as~ociated with_ o~her major ,international sporting events, such 
as the World Cup soccer tournament, can be regarded as character merchandising in the 
broad sense. [W]hen an event like the World Cup soccer tournament is in the public eye, 
use of the insigni_a sxmbolizing such ~n event in relation to _clothing and similar goods will 
cause the public to believe that such goods have a trade connection with the events 
.. . . . . ~ 
symbolized by the insignia. A link is established between the goods featuring the 
. ~ . - . 
merchandising property and the person who or entity which is the original source of the 
. . . . -
mate~ial which launched the merchandising property on its path to fame and fortune. '1566 
On this basis, the _court found that the respondents' chara~ter merchandising conduct in 
casu constituted the delict of passing off, with reference to the definition of passing off as 
formulated in the earlier case of Capital Estate and General Agencies (Pty) Ltd & Others v 
Holiday Inns Inc & Others: 1567 
'The wrong known as passing~off consists in a representation by one person that his 
business (or merchandise, as the case may be) is that of another, or that it is associated 
with that of another, and, in order to determine whether a representation amounts to a 
passing-off, one enquires whether there is a reasonable likelihood that members of the 
public may be confused into believing that the business of the one is, or is connected with, 
that of another.' 
1565 At 736E-J of the Bartlett judgment 
1566 At 737B-D of the judgment 
1567 1977 (2) SA 916 (A) at 929C 
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The court reiterated that the unlawfulness of passing· off; as a form of wrongful 
competition, is to be found in the fact that'it results, or is calculated to result, in the 
improper filching of another's trade and an improper infringement of his goodwill ahd/or 
because it may cause injury to the other's trade reputation.'1568 On the basis of this the 
court held that the respondents were guilty of passing off and unlawful competition, 
sufficient to grant the order claimed by the applicartts: 1569 
'The evidence clearly established. that the applicants and their licensees have a reputation 
and goodwill in South Africa. This is established by the fact that various prominent retailers 
... are anxious to obtain and pay for licenses from the applicants for the purpose of 
manufacturing and marketing clothing bearing the World Cup insignia. Furthermore, by 
reason of the fact that applicants are engaged in character merchandising,· it is sufficient to 
M ~ ~ • 
create· in the public's mind a link befween the merchandising. product and the applicants. As 
a result of the" conduct of [respondents] the applicants are likely to suffer inj.ury or ·damage . 
.. 
Firstly, the applicants and their licensees are likely to lose revenue and, secondly, because 
of the uncertainty created by their conduct, potential licensees are refraining from entering 
into licensing agreements with the applicants, thereby depriving the applicants of income.' 
Accordingly, the court made an order prohibiting the respondents from using the words 
'world cup' together with the words' 1994' and/or "94' and/or 'America' and/or USA'. 
The court's further findings regarding the respondents' use of the registered trade marks 
and of copyright infringement will not be discussed here. 
1568 With reference to Brian Boswell Circus (Pty) Ltd & Another v Boswell Wilkie Circus (Pty) Ltd 1985 (4) SA 
466 (A) 
1569 At 739! - 740B of the judgment 
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PART IV. SPORT AND COMMERCE 
§1 Introduction: The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in Sport 
495 The protection of intellectual property has been inextricably interwoven with the· 
development of professional sport as an industry in all jurisdictions. Probably the single 
biggest driving force behind the growth of a global sports industry was the development 
of television as a vehicle to bring matches and events to the masses. The sports 
broadcasting and advertising industries have poured vast amounts of money into sport in 
different parts of the world, and this phenomenon characterized development of the 
industry everywhere from the middle of the 20th century. From humble beginnings (such 
as the annual fee of US$2 500 the Mutual Broadcasting System paid to the National 
Football League in the USA in 1939 for the right to show its championship and broadcast 
commercials1570 ) this industry simply exploded to the point of the astronomical amounts 
that make up today's sports broadcasting market. A couple of examples from football and 
cricket: In English football, the entry of BSkyB into the market of broadcasting Premier 
League matches (in 1992) has facilitated a phenomenal increase in the TV rights fees. In 
the 15 year period between 1986 and 2001, the rights fee increased from £6.3 million for 
a two year period to £1.1 billion over three years (or from £3.1 million to £367 million 
per year). 1571 It was announced on 1 March 2006 that Indian sports and media agency 
Nimbus Communications Limited had concluded a deal with the Board of Control for 
Cricket in India to acquire the global media rights to all international and domestic cricket 
played in India until 2010. This agreement is the biggest commercial deal in the history 
157° Compare this figure to the NFL's 8-year national television contract signed in 1998 worth $17 .6 billion - see 
John Wolohan in Blackshaw & Siekmann (eds.) Sports Image Rights in Europe T.M.C. Asser Press 2005 at 347 
157 i See Geoff Walters The Professional Footballers' Association: A Case Study of Trade Union Growth Football 
Governance Research Centre, Birkbeck, University of London 2004 at 17 . 
. According to recent reports (see The Observer, 12 February 2007), at the time of writing BSkyB and Setanta 
Sports are reportedly paying £ 1. 7 billion to hold the exclusive rights to screen live matches of the English 
Premiership in Britain for the next 3 years. Broadcasters in 208 other countries have reportedly recently 
doubled their payments to secure English Premiership rights, to a combined £ 625 million - my sincere thanks 
to Ben Challis for providing this information. 
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of cricket: Nimbus prevailed over media giants such as ESPN Star Sports and Sony 
Entertainment Television, and paid l:JS$ 612 million for the media rights. 1572 
496 Rather ironically, recent years have seen the media branching out into the role of 
participants, as broadcasting corporations and networks have purchased clubs and 
teams. 1573 Not to be outdone, sports teams have entered the broadcasting industry to 
corner an· even bigger slice of the economi'C pie. 1574 It is now cliche to remark that sport 
has become big business. 1575 The ·global sports industry is .alive and kicking largely due to 
television. 
497 · One of the cl~arest (.an.d earliest) ·examples of the interweaving of intelJectual 
property rights-and the development of professional sport as an entertainment industry, 
which dates from the middle of·the 20th century,' involves the development of protection 
for the individual's likeness and aspects of the· persona in the laws of the United States of 
America. Significantly, the development of a 'right of publicity' had its origin in the 1953 
case of Hae/an Laboratories, Inc v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 1576 where the term was 
coined by Judge lerome Frank: The Topps case involved exploitation of the commercial 
value of the liken·esses of baseball ·players in the then burgeoning baseball card industry. 
A distinct right of publicity is now recognized (either in terms of statute or under the 
1572 See the report available online on the web site of the Asser Sports Law Centre at http://www.sportslaw.nl 
(last visited 8 March 2006). 
1573 Rupert Murdoch (Fox, Sky and Star TV networks) has holdings in British and German football clubs, major 
league baseball teams in the United States and rugby league clubs in Australia. The Italian television magnate 
Silvio Berlusconi is the principal owner of AC Milan football club, and he has a major stake in Sportal, the 
Internet sport company. Canal Plus, the French television station, owns the Paris St. Germain football club. See 
Mark Marqusee 'Sport as Apocalypse', available online at http://www.frontlineonnet.com/fl1716/17161100.htm. 
See also Downward, P. and Dawson, A . .The Economics of Professional Team Sports Routledge, London & New 
York 2060, at 37. 
1574 E.g. Manchester United football club and the New York Yankees baseball franchise, both of which have 
entered the Internet and broadcasting business. See, in genera.I, section 2.5 of the final report of the Sports 
Directorate of the Netherlands Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport, entitled The Balance Between the Game 
and the Money (2000). 
1575 Philip Knight, founder of the Nike Corporation, characterised sport in the mid-1990s as 'the dominant 
entertainment in the world'. Chris Gratton & Peter Taylor Economics of Sport and Recreation E&FN Spon 2000, 
at 3) remarked the following in 2000: 
'Sport is now recognised as an important sector of economic activity, part of the increasingly important leisure 
industry which accounts for over a quarter of all consumer spending and over 10 per cent of total employment 
in the UK, and brings in over £20 billion per annum in foreign exchange. Sport is not the largest sector of the 
leisure industry, but it is among the fastest growing.' 
In respect of commercialisation of sporting competition, Downward and Dawson (The Economics of Professional 
Team Sports Routledge, London & New York 2000, at 36-37) identify sports leagues' main sources of revenue 
(historically) as gate receipts, merchandising, sponsorship, the sale of TV rights, transfer fees and the sale of 
match schedules to the gaming industry. 
1576 202 F.2d 866 (2d. Cir.) 
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common law) in more than 30 U.S. states. Other countries and jurisdictions have been 
less forthcoming in providing similarly strong forms of protection against unauthorized 
exploitation of the likeness, name, etc of celebrities or sports stars, with the result that 
the protection that exists is often to be found through application of other, more general, 
principles of law. More will be said on this in the section on imag·e rights .below. 
498 The phenomenal worldwide growth of professional sport-.as an entertainment 
industry has increasingly emphasized a need for the protection offered by intellectual 
property statutes and common law rights. In South Africa intellectual property protection 
is mainly based in statute. The most important statutory instruments for current 
purposes are the Trade Marks Act-194 of 1993 and the Copyright Act 98 of 1978. 1577 The 
common law plays a residual role in this regard, for example by means of the common -
law action based on unlawful competition (e.g. 'passing- .off', misrepresentation; leaning 
on, etc.). A combination of actions is possible. 1578 · 
499 Professional sport, as part of the wider entertainment industry, of course 
generates a variety of intellectual property that is worthy (and often in constant. need) of 
protection by the relevant rights holders. Such property, being commercially valuable, is 
often exploited for commercial gain by unscrupulous persons or commercial enterprises. 
In order to counter such practices, it is important for South African law to provide 
efficient legal relief and protection in this regard. In fact, South Africa is currently 
considered to possess a world-leading body of legislative protection that was developed 
especially due to the exigencies of the professional sports industry. The best example is 
the Merchandise Marks Amendment Act 61 of 2002, which was passed to deal with the 
1577 Other specifically-applicable statutory instruments that may play a role in the protection of intellectual 
property are the Patents Act 57 of 1978 and the Designs Act 57 of 1967 
1578 Compare, however, the judgment of Schutz JA in Payen Components SA Ltd v Bovie Gaskets CC & Others 
1995 ( 4) SA 441 (A), where the court warned against the use of actions based in unlawful competition as 
'catch-all' remedy in cases that should rather resort under the specific headings of actions based in the 
protection afforded to intellectual property by the relevant statute (at 454): 
'In my opinion a Court should be wary of allowing the sharp outlines of these two established branches of the 
law of unlawful competition, evolved through long experience, to be fudged by allowing a vague penumbra 
around the outline. Unlawful competition should not be added as a ragbag and often forlorn final alternative to 
every trade mark, copyright, design or passing off action. In most such cases it is one of the established 
categories or nothing.' 
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practice of ambush marketing in the run-up to the ICC Cricket World Cup 2003.1579 More 
will be said later specifically about ambush marketing. 1580 
Predictably, the very popularity of professional sport as an entertainment industry has· 
contributed to the value of the intellectual property generated by it. As one author has 
explained in the context of the image rights of ·athletes: 
'Commercial entities continue to view sports stars as compatible with their goods, services 
or product~ and pay handsomely for these individuals to be associated with them ... This is 
attributable to the prominent position of spo~ in today's society and the largely 
unreplicated loyalty that sports fans display towards particular sports and teams. 
Consequently, investment in the industry is a particularly attractive proposition for 
commercial entities seeking to acquire a financial and marketing advantage over their 
competitors.' 1581 
Sports broadcasts are, next to films, the most popular programmes on television, and 
exclusive rights to sports broadcasts have proven to be the ideal tool to commit 
consumers to either pay-TV or public broadcastirig channels. 1582 In the case of free-to-air 
television, access to sports broadcasts plays an important role in increasing advertising 
revenues. The potential commercial value of such property has ensured that not only 
have traditional forms of intellectual property protection become more and more 
relevant, but that issues of public interest are also increasingly coming under scrutiny. In 
the context of sports broadcasting, examples are the issue of public access to events 
(e.g. the listing of events of national interest and restrictions in respect of limitation of 
access by broadcasters through the sale of rights of exclusivity) 1583 and competition law 
1579 Further ambush marketing controls are contained in the Safety at Sports and Recreational Events Bill (see 
section 39; sections 19 and 22), which, at the time of writing, is still being debated in Parliament. Further 
special measures are contemplated by means of designated legislation regarding the 2010 FIFA World Cup (e.g. 
see the 2010 FIFA World Cup South Africa Measures Act 12 of 2006). 
1580 See par 562 et seq below 
1581 Gelder, P 'Image is Everything: An Analysis of the Legal Protection of the Image of Sports Athletes' 
International Sports Law Journal 2005/1-2 25 
1582 See van der Wolk, A 'Sports Broadcasting: Fair Play from a EU Competition Perspective' International Sports 
Law Journal 2006/1-2 84 
1583 In respect of broadcasting rights regulation in South Africa, see par 585 et seq below 
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scrutiny of the practice of the collective selling of broadcasting rights by teams and 
franchises within sports leagues. Just as the advent of television in the latter half of the 
20th century has probably been the most important driving force behind the phenomenal 
growth of the modern global sports industry, the influx of money associated with the 
involvement of television and the broadcasting industry has exposed this activity to 
increased scrutiny by public regulators and the law. 
500 Commercially· valuable intellectual property generated by the professional sports 
industry includes a plethora of different forms, including television, satellite and internet 
(and more recently mobile phone) broadcasts of games and events, recordings of 
highlights packages of games and events, commercially exploitable photographs and 
images of players and teams, trade mark and copyright in players' or tea~s' kit, logos 
and emblems, brand names in sporting franchises, athlete or team domain names, the 
content of fixture lists and betting sheets, compilations of player statistics, supporters' 
merchandise, stadium naming right_s; etc. 
The following discussion will focus briefly on a few selected issues of relevance 
regardin~ the comm~rcialization of sport in South Africa and specific_ally al~o the 
exploitation of intellectual property in the sports context, with a view to providing an 
overview of the legal protections available in this jurisdiction to rights holders and 
interested parties. 
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§2 Intellectual property protection in South Africa: The applicable 
. legislation 1584 
I Copyright 
501 -Copyright is a creature·of statute in South Africa, as all copyright is regulated by 
the Copyrig'ht:Act 98 of 1978 (as amended). 1585 Once the requirements for a copyright as 
laid down 'in the Act-are met, the copyright subsists automatically and no formal 
procedures are req!Jired for registration. In order to qualify for copyright protection, a 
work must first be one that is mentioned in the Act. For this purpose the Act recognises 
certain categories or subjects of copyright. The work itself must then qualify in a number 
of respects, namely propriety, originality, it must be in material form and the author 
must be a qualified person. All these requirements are dealt with in the Act, and the 
reader is referred to the Act and specialised works on the subject. 1586 
.. 
... ~ . , 
502 South African. copyright legislation borrowed heavily from the English law statutes 
to assist in· its development. Prior to the first copyright Act being passed in South Africa, 
the Roma·n-Dutch.law was relied upon. :fhis common law base was repealed by the 1916 
Copyright Act, which was modeled on the equivalent English legislation. The 1916 Act 
provided, simply, that the British Act applied in South Africa. When the British legislation 
was amended and updated by means of the 1956 Copyright Act, South Africa again 
followed suit by repealing the South African 1916 Act by means of the 1965 Copyright 
Act (which was again largely based on the 1956 English Act). The 1965 Act was repealed 
by the current Copyright Act of 1978. The 1978 Act drew on the 1965 Act to a fair 
degree, but is also different in some substantial respects, and thus it reflects a new 
independent course for South African intellectual property law. The 1978 Act has since 
been subsequently amended to reflect changes in South African copyright law (most 
1584 I wish to thank Chris Schembri and Tanya Waker for kindly allowing me to reproduce sections of student 
notes compiled by them for purposes of providing an overview of the applicable intellectual property law 
regimes in terms of the legislation (for this section) 
1585 See section 41(4) of the Act 
1586 E.g. Dean, O H The Handbook of South African Copyright Law Juta & Co (looseleaf) 
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significantly by means of the· copyright Amendment Act 125 of 1992, which introduced 
concepts such as computer programmes and programme-carrying signals as independent 
copyright-protected works). 
503 The applicable copyright regime in terms of the Act will not be discussed here, and 
the reader is referred to specific provisions of the Act for more information on aspects 
such as first ownership of copyright,:587 assignment and licensing of copyright, 1588 the 
direct and indirect forms of ·infringement of copyright, 1589· remedies for infringement1590 
(including the author's moral rights1591 ) and· exemptions to infringement1592 (and 
specifically the 'fair dealing' provisions). 1593 . 
II Patents 
504 Similarly to copyright, the law regarding patents is also a creature of statute. It is 
currently regulated by the Patents Act 57 of 1978. Prior to this, patents were regulated 
by the Patents Act 37 of 1952, This Act was- repealed by the 1978 Act, but the 1978 Act 
stipulated that all patents granted under the 1952 Act wo_uld still fall to be determined by 
that Act, thus the 1952 Act still has limited application. 
No more will be said here regarding patent law, as this form of intellectual property has. 
limited application to sport, and the reader is referred to specialised works on the 
subject. 
1587 Section 21 of the Act 
1588 Section 22 
1589 Section 23 of the Act 
1590 Section 24 
1591 Section 20 
1592 Sections 12-19B of the Act 
1593 Section 12 
581 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
III Trade marks 
505 Two Acts apply to trade rriarks: the Trade Marks Act 62 of 1963, and the Trade 
Marks Act 194 of 1993. Section 3 of the 1993 Act states that the 1963 Act will apply to 
all applications and proceedings commenced before the new Act came into force. The 
existing law will be used to determine the validity of an entry in the Register of 
Trademarks, where such entry existed at the date of commencement of the new Act ( 1 
May 1995). The new Act applies in all other respects after this date. 
The purpose of the new Act was to bring South African trademark law into line with EC 
law and UK law because these jurisdictions are important trading partners of South 
Africa. Changes were thus effected using GATT (the General Agreement on Trade and 
Tariffs) and other internationally accepted trademark provisions. 
-. 
506 A trade mark is defined in the 1963 Act as being a device, band, heading, label, 
signature, word, letter, numeral, or any combination thereof. A device is further defined 
as being any visual representation or illustration capable of reproduction on a surface, 
whether by printing, embossing, or any other means (and containers are also 
registerable as trademarks). The 1993 Act contains a definition which is to the same 
effect, but is also wider, as it includes a configuration, pattern, ornamentation, colour 
etc. 
The definition of a trade mark in terms of its function under the 1963 Act was that it is 
used to indicate a connection in the course of trade between goods and services and 
someone having the right to use the mark, and it distinguishes goods and services from 
the same kind of goods and services associated with other people. This means that a 
trademark is registerable in respect of both goods and services, and that a trademark 
must actually be used in the course of trade. If a trademark is not used for a period of at 
least five years (in terms of Ssection 36 of the old Act, and Section 27 of the new Act) an 
aggrieved person may make application for the rectification of the Register, which means 
that the trademark will be removed from the Register. Further, if a trademark is 
registered with no intention on the part of the applicant to use the mark in relation to 
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goods and services for which it is registered, and no such use has taken place, such 
trademark may be removed from the Register by rectification. 
Under the 1993 Act, a trademark is defined as a mark used by a person in relation to 
goods and services for the purpose of distinguishing the goods and services from the 
same kind of goods and services connected in the course of trade. The 1993 Act thus 
defines a trademark in terms of its distinguishing function only, i.e. a trademark must 
have the ability to distinguish. The origination function, where a trademark is used to 
identify the maker of goods or the supplier· of services, has fallen away. Pra_ctically, 
however, the effect of the two sections will be the same. 
507 The trade marks registry resorts under the Companies and Intellectual Property 
Registration Office (CIPRO) which, in turn, resorts under the government Department of 
Trade & Industry. All applications for trademarks, all trademarks and the names and 
addresses of the proprietors and registered users, with the date of registration and the 
date of expiry, must appear in the Register. The Register is a public document which is 
open to public inspection. 
Under the 1963 Act the Register was divided into Parts A and B. Part B allowed for the 
registration of marks that did not qualify for registration in Part A of the Register, 
because they were not distinctive, but through use, they would acquire the necessary 
distinctiveness for registration in Part A. Part B would afford limited protection to the 
mark until it was capable of registration in Part A, wherea~er it would acquire full 
protection. Section 10 of the 1963 Act defined the conditions for registration in Part A 
(i.e. that a trademark must contain or consist of a distinctive mark; a mark that is 
reasonably required for use in the trade is not registerable; and the name of a company, 
individual or firm which is not represented in a special manner is not registerable unless 
proven to be distinctive). Section II of the 1963 Act laid down the requirements for a Part 
B registration, i.e. that the trademark shall be capable of becoming registered in Part A, 
through use. 
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508 The basic requirement for registration is thus that the trademark must be 
distinctive, but this term bears a special meaning in terms of the Act. The 1963 Act 
implied that the mark itself must have some inherent ability to distinguish (e.g. an 
invented word which is unusual has an inherent ability to distinguish, because it is 
unique, and thus would be registerable). 
A mark·may also ac;quire distinctiveness through use (i.e. if it has less inherent ability to 
distinguish, but still has a small amount of ability to distinguish, this small inherent 
ability. to distinguish may be supplemented by distinctiveness acquired ·by use). If the 
mark has no inherent ability to distinguish, ·however, no amount· of distinctiveness 
acquired by use would make it registerable under the 1963 Act. Thus for registration 
under the~ 1963 Act, a trademark must· either:· have an inherent ability to distinguish, in 
which case it qualifies for registration· in Part· A of the Register, or it must have a small 
inherent ability to distinguish,· and an ability ~o acquire distinctiveness by use, in which 
case it would qualify for registration in either Part A or Part B, depending on the level of 
distinctiveness already obtained by use. 
509 Under the 1993 Act, the Trade Marks Register is now combined into one and 
there is no division into Parts A and B. Accordingly, there is one set of requirements for 
registrability, which are set out in Section 9 of the Act. Section 9 provides that a 
trademark may be registered if it is capable of distinguishing the goods and services of a 
proprietor from the goods and services of another. A trademark is capable of 
distinguishing if it is inherently capable of distinguishing or if it is capable of 
distinguishing because of prior use of the mark. 
510 The new Act has removed the requirement of the mark always having some 
inherent ability to distinguish and simply considers whether the mark is distinctive in 
fact. A mark that has no inherent ability to distinguish, but has become distinctive by 
use will now thus qualify for registration. Because there is no longer a Part B to the 
Register, marks which have not yet been used in trade must have an inherent ability to 
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distinguish, otherwise they cannot be registered. It is thus no longer possible to register 
an indistinctive mark on the basis that it may become distinctive through use. 
511 In respect of infringement of a trade mark, only the provisions of the 1993 Act 
are relevant since this is the Act that will, after 1 May 1995 (the commencement date of 
the new Act) determine all infringement proceedings. Infringement is regulated by 
Sections 33 and 34 of the 1993 Act. 
Section 33 provides that no trademark infringement action may be brought under Section 
34 if the trademark is not registered under the Act (this would include· registration under 
the 1963 Act as well). For the infringement of such trademarks one can still bring an 
action at-common law ie passing off. In terms of Section .33, the fact that a:trademark is 
registered does oot mean that one cannot commit the delict of passing -Off by: its use, and . 
one ·can still bring an action for: passing off against a registered trademark. •. c 
512 Sections 34(1)(a),(b) and (c) spell out the three types of infringing situations: 
Section 34(1)(a) covers the traditional situation where someone-without authorization 
uses an established trademark for his own goods and services. The elements that have to 
be established are: 
unauthorized use; 
in the course of trade; 
in relation to goods and services in respect of which the trademark is 
registered; 
of an identical mark, or 
of a mark so nearly. resembling it that it is likely to deceive or cause 
confusion. 
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This applies only where the goods and services are the same, but no actual deception or 
confusion is required :~the court will engage in a notional enquiry as to whether the marks 
are confusingly or deceptively similar. 
Section 34(1)(b) goes further than the provisions of the 1963 Act; it prohibits the use of 
a mark -·which is identical to or similar to a trademark in respect of goods and services 
which are so similar to the goods covered by the registered trademark that there is a 
likelihood of deception or confusion. The 1963 Act limited the protection to the same 
goods and·; services,. and in cases involving different .categories of goods -and services, 
only an action in common law was available (passing off). 
The interpretation of 'similar' is that the marks must be similar in use, so the court will 
look aLconditions in the marketplace and surrounding circumstances in the trade etc, 
Section·34(1)(c) deals:with trade mark dilution, which has its origins in the common law 
delict of passing off (in terms of which one cannot filch someone's trade by imitating a 
mark which that person uses to identify his goods). This common law right has been 
incorporated into the· 1993 Act, in Section 10(17), which prevents the registration of a 
trademark· which .. w:o.uld cause dilution of an already registered trademark (while 
S34(1)(c) makes· the use of such.a mark an infringement). The elements are as follows: 
the marks must be used in respect of goods and services, but these do not 
have to be the same or similar, use on ahy goods or services will suffice; 
the two marks need only be similar, not identical; 
the registered trademark must be well-known in the Republic; 
the use of the offending mark must be likely to take unfair advantage of, 
or be detrimental to the distinctive character or repute of the registered 
trademark; 
the use must be in the course of trade; and 
confusion or deception is not essential. 
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if a trademark is used too often in relation to too many goods and services it becomes 
'diluted' and loses its ability to -distinguish the original product. The dilution may also 
taint the mark if it is associated with inferior products. 
Section 34(2) of the 1993 Act covers all the situations where the use of a registered·. 
trademark without permission does not amount to infringement (i.e. exclusions to the 
infringement provisions). __ 
513 The remedies for infringement are contained in section 34(3), and are as follows: -
(1) an interdict; 
(2) an order for. the removal· of the infringing mark, or for the delivery up of the 
goods to which the trademark is attached, ·if the trademark is inseparable~ -
from these goods; 
(3) damages; 
( 4) in lieu of damages; an award of reasonable royalties. This provision was 
inserted because of the difficulties in proving ·damages in trademark 
infringement cases.. Here· the court asks what amount would have been 
payable by a notional licensee exercising the rights that the infringer 
exercised. This amount then becomes payable to the plaintiff. Such 
reasonable royalties thus differ from the reasonable royalties found in the 
Copyright Act, 1594 where reasonable royalties provide a means of calculating 
damages only, and is not the final amount actually payable; 
(5) the court may also set up a a special enquiry to assess damages and may 
determine the terms of reference of this enquiry. 
1594 Section 24(1A) of the Copyright Act 98 of 1978 
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514 Finally, some remarks on the protection of well-known foreign trademarks, whjch 
are unregistered in South Africa. The 1963 Act provided no protection for such marks. 1595 
With respect to registrability of these marks under the 1963 Act, there were contrary 
indications. The Registrar exercised his discretion and refused to register the American 
'Burger King' trademark in South Africa, ·while in another case the Registrar allowed the 
registration of the foreign 'Victoria's Secret' mark. 
This position was remedied by section 35 of the 1993 Act, which has brought South 
African law into line with the requirements of the Paris Convention. According to section 
35, the trademark mu·st be well-known in.,the Republic; it must be the mark of a national 
of a Convention country, or of a person who is.domiciled in a Convention country, or who 
has a real / effective commercial ·or industrial establishment in a Convention country; the 
trademark need not be registered in South Africa, and the proprietor need not carry on 
business or have any goodwill in-South Africa .. · 
In terms~of section 35(3) the. proprietor of such a trademark may restrain the use in the 
Republic of a trademark which constitutes (or an essential part of which constitutes) a 
reproduction, imitation or translation of the well-known trademark in respect of goods 
and ·services which ·are identical or .. similar to the goods and services for which the 
trademark is well-known,· and such:use is likely to cause deception or confusion. 
515 For further information regarding trade mark protection in South Africa the 
reader is referred to expert works on the subject. 1596 
1595 Tie Rack pie v Tie Rack Stores (Pty) Ltd 1989(4) SA 427 (T). In this case, Tie Rack shops were established 
widely in the UK and the trademark had reputation and goodwill there. The trademark also had recognition and 
a reputation in South Africa. The overseas proprietor had never actually traded in South Africa or established 
goodwill here. The Court held that if a mark is not registered in South Africa, is not used here and has no 
trading goodwill, then it can be used in South Africa by someone else other than the overseas proprietor. The 
conclusion was that the overseas proprietor had no protectable rights in South Africa. 
1596 For example, Webster, C E & Morley, G E Webster and Page: South African Law of Trade Marks, Unlawful 
Competition, Company Names and Trading Styles 1997 (looseleaf) 
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IV The Counterfeit Goods Act, 1997 
516 Counterfeit gl)ods (often referred to as pirate merchandise) are of course a major· 
source of concern for intellectual property rights holders, specifically in the sports 
industry. Major events, especially, often function like a magnet to those who import and 
trade in goods (specifically counterfeit sports kit and memorabilia) related to well-known 
teams and athletes. This problem is especially prevalent also in South Africa, which has 
its fair share of counterfeit goods that are manufactured in the country or imported from 
elsewhere (e.g. Asia), and upcoming major events such as the 2009 FIFA Confederations 
Cup, the 2009 DLF Indian Premier League Cricket tournament and the 2010 FIFA World 
Cup South Africa™ promise to· pose significant challenges in this regard .. -
517 Protection for intellectual property rights holders in respect of counterfeit goods 
comes Jn a variety of forms (which will only be, mentioned here),- and include the· 
following: 
-. 
Copyright infringement claims· in terms of the Copyright Act 98 of 1978 
(section 27 of this Act deals with criminal liability for copyright 
infringement); 
Trade mark infringement claims in terms of the Trade Marks Act 194 of 
1993; 
Common law action in terms of passing off; and 
Possible procedures in terms of customs and excise legislation (i.e. 
whereby intellectual property rights holders can record their rights with 
customs officials for the purpose of detaining of suspect goods upon 
importation). 
Specific protection is to be found in the Counterfeit Goods Act 37 of 1997 (as amended), 
which provides that dealing in counterfeit goods is unlawful (provided that the goods give 
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rise to copyright.or trade mark infringement). The Act provides wider protection than the 
Copyright and Trade Marks Acts: It penalises a wider range of conduct than these other 
statutes; it makes the dealing in counterfeit goods a criminal offence subject to 
investigation and prosecution by the South African Police Services and the criminal 
justice .system; it provides wide-ranging search and seizure powers to the police servies 
and designated inspectors acting under search and seizure warrants; and, apart from 
severe penalties, the Act also makes provision for the delivery-up of offending goods 
even in cases where there is no criminal convic~ion. 
518 The Act protects copyright and trade mark rights holders, as well as 'interested 
persons' (i.e. who have an interest in goods bearing or embodying such rights, referred 
to as 'protected goods'). The Act also provides protection for the holder of rights to use a 
specific mark in terms of a notice issued in terms of section 15 of the Merchandise Marks 
Act, 1597 which others are prohibited from using. The 'interested persons' who are 
protected (and granted remedies) in terms of the Act include the owners or licensees of 
trade marks or copyrighted works in respect .of protected. goods; importers, exporters or 
distributors of protected goods; and the duly authorised agents of such interested 
"-
persons .. 
519 'Counterfeit goods' are defined in the Act as goods -
which are manufactured, in the Republic or elsewhere, without the 
authority of the owner of an intellectual property right subsisting in 
protected goods in the Republic, where the protected goods are imitated to 
such an extent that the manufactured goods are substantially identical 
copies of the protected goods; and 
to which a trade mark or copyright which subsists in protected goods in the 
Republic (or colourable imitation thereof) is applied, with the intention of 
1597 For more information on this section, see the discussion of ambush marketing protection in par 562 et seq 
below 
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causing confusion between the manufactured goods and the protected 
goods. 
The Act also provides rather wide protection relating to the prohibited acts in respect of 
counterfeit goods. These acts, which amount to 'dealing in' counterfeit goods, include the 
following: 
Possession or controlling such goods in the course.of. business;· 
Manufacturing such goods for use, other than private or domestic use; 
Selling, hiring out, bartering or exchanging of such goods or offering or 
exposing them for sale;-
.. ". Exhibiting· such goods in public for the purposes of-trade;· 
- ·Distributing such goods for the purposes of trade or any other purpose. 
with the result that the intellectual property right owner suffers prejudice; 
Importing or exporting such goods, exceprfor private or domestic use; and . 
Disposing .of such goods in any other manner in the course of trade. 
Criminal penalties include, in the case of a first conviction, a fine not exceeding RS 000 
per article or item, or imprisonment for a period not exceeding three years, or both; or in 
the case of a second conviction, a fine not exceeding RlO 000 may be imposed per article 
or item, or imprisonment for a period not exceeding five years, or both. 
520 The procedure and remedies provided for in the Act include a criminal complaint 
procedure and civil remedies. Any person with an interest in the protected goods who 
reasonably suspects that a counterfeiting offence is being, has been or is likely to be 
committed, may lay a complaint with a designated 'inspector' (i.e. an official appointed 
by the Minister of Trade and Industry, a police official holding the rank of sergeant or 
higher, or the Commissioner for Customs and Excise). If sufficient information is 
furnished to such inspector that a prohibited act is being performed or is likely to be 
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performed (and that the complainant is entitled to lodge the complaint, that an 
intellectual property right subsists in protected goods and that the suspicion on which the 
complaint is founded, is reasonable), the inspector may take appropriate steps in respect 
of such counterfeiting activity. The inspector must obtain a warrant from a judge of the 
High Court or a magistrate ·in chambers (although, in certain prescribed circumstances, 
an inspector may· ·proceed without a warrant). An inspector acting under a warrant may 
enter any place, premises or vehicle to -
· seize, detain and/or remove any counterfeit goods; 
collect evidence relating to the counterfeiting activities; 
·cor:tduct any searches reasonably necessary; 
s·eal off any place, premises or vehicle where counterfeiting activities have 
taken or are taking place; 
seize, detain, and/or remove any tools used in the counterfeiting activities; 
question persons and take down statements; 
procure relevant books, documents and materials; and 
take reasonable steps to terminate the counterfeiting activities. 
Seized goods are, where .possible, removed to a counterfeit depot, which is a place 
designated as such by the Minister, and such goods shall be subject to return in certain 
circumstances: The inspector or complainant must apply to court _for the confirmation of 
any seizure, detention and removal of counterfeit goods and any other steps taken in 
relation thereto by the inspector within 10 days, failing which the seizure, detention, 
removal or steps will cease to have any effect. A court in any criminal or civil proceedings 
may order that the seized goods be delivered up to the owner of the intellectual property 
right or to the complainant and that the identity be disclosed of any persons involved in 
the manufacture, importation or distribution of the counterfeit goods. In certain 
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circumstances, goods which have been delivered up may not be released again into 
commerce or exported. 
521 Where counterfeiting activities are suspected on reasonable grounds, an ex parte 
application may be brought before a judge in chambers for an order directing the sheriff 
or another designated person to enter any place or premises, to search, seize and 
remove documents, records and alleged counterfeit goods (i.e. an Anton Piller-type 
order). The order may also direct the disclosure by the respondent of any documents, 
information and material. Before an ex parte order will be granted, there must be a 
prima facie case of infringement of an intellectual property right and the judge must be 
satisfied that the usual procedure for the discovery of evidence is likely to be frustrated 
because of the concealment or destruction of evidence. Safeguards against abuse of the 
procedure include the right of the respondent to have his or her attorney present during 
the execution of the order; the compulsory preparation of an inventory of any 
documents, records or goods seized or removed; and the filing of a statement under oath 
with the court by the applicant's attorney, reporting the search. 
522 As mentioned above, it is expected that the upcoming major sporting events in 
South Africa will pose significant challenges in respect of control over the dealing in 
counterfeit goods. This issue also poses questions relating to the socio-economic 
conditions of the majority of the South African public (and e.g. the role of informal street 
traders and their ability to gain tangible benefit from such major events). The Counterfeit 
Goods Act, along with the relevant ambush marketing protections (discussed elsewhere 
in this chapter) promise to provide effective tools for protecting the commercial interests 
of rights holders and stakeholders in such major events, but enforcement of the 
provisions of such legislation may pose other (and possibly constitutional) challenges in 
respect of the rights and interests of members of the public. 
Aside from the specific prelevance of dealing in counterfeit goods surrounding specific 
events, it should be noted that this is an ongoing problem which may pose a significant 
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threat for certain sectors and industries connected with high level sport. In March 2009 
three subsidiaries ·of a major local clothing manufacturer, House of Monatic, were 
liquidated in the Western Cape High Court after the South African Revenue Service 
earlier: uncovered irregularities at the companies. The three companies included surfwear 
label O'Neill SA and Canterbury, the national rugby team (Springboks) uniform 
manufacturer. A director of the ·holding company claimed that Canterbury's trade was 
damaged by counterfeit goods flooding the -sports market. 
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§3 Athletes' image rights {and unauthorised 'celebrity /personality 
merchandising' in terms of·South African law) 1598 
523 The subject and purpose of image rights have been defined, succinctly, as follows: 
'[T]he ability of an individual to exclusively control the commercial .use of his name, 
physical/pictorial image, reputation, identity, voice, personality, signature, ini.tials or 
nickname in advertisements, marketing and all other forms of media ... The sportsperson ... 
often earns a substantial license fee or royalty that is paid for the privilege of allowing his 
name to be used for promotional purposes.'1599 
The main sources of income for players and athletes in exploitation of their image rights 
are sponsorship, merchandising or licensing and endorsements. Gelder1600 explains the 
difference between these as follows: 
Sponsorship involves an investment by an individual or corporation in a 
particular activity, whereby the sponsorship agreement may offer the 
sponsor an environment free of competition; 1.601 
Merchandising (and licensing) involves the exploitation of 'images, themes 
or articles which have become famous', and this commonly refers to the 
use of the name, logo, trade marks and other properties relating to a 
sports star, club or organization and which is unconnected to the main 
1598 The material covered in this section is based substantially on the author's article 'Suggestions for the 
Protection of Star Athletes and Other Famous Persons against Unauthorised Celebrity Merchandising in South 
Africa', which appeared in (2007) 19 South African Mercantile Law Journal 272-301. The material is used here 
with the permission of the publishers, Juta & Co. The South African Mercantile Law Journal may be accessed at 
http://www.jutalaw.co.za/catalogue/itemdisplay.jsp?item id=3602. 
1599 Cloete (ed.) Introduction to Sports Law in South Africa LexisNexis Butterworths, Durban (2005) 176. 
Blackshaw & Siekmann (eds.) Sports Image Rights in Europe T.M.C. Asser Press 2005 (at 7) quote a typical 
grant of rights-clause in a sports image licensing agreement as defining sports image rights broadly as follows: 
'Access to the services of the personality for the purpose of filming, television (both live and recorded), 
broadcasting,(both live and recorded), audio recording, motion pictures, video and electronic pictures (including 
but not limited to the production of computer-generated images), still photographs, personal appearances, 
product endorsement and advertising in all media; as well as the right to use the personality's name, likeness, 
autograph, story and accomplishments (including copyright and other intellectual property rights), for 
promotional or commercial purposes including, but without limitation, the personality's actual or simulated 
likeness, voice, photograph, performances, personal characteristics and other personal identification.' 
1600 Gelder, P 'Image is Everything: An Analysis of the Legal Protection of the Image of Sports Athletes' 
International Sports Law Journal 2005/1-2 25 
1601 Compare, however, the dangers of ambush marketing and those associated with cross-sponsorship of 
events - see the discussion below 
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business (namely playing ofthe game or hosting games or events) 1602 -
therefore the placing of sports trade marks, logos, etc on corporate 
products1603 ; and 
Endorsement relates to the communication to 'the relevant public that [the 
sports star or athlete] approves of the product or service or is happy to be 
associated with it ... he adds his name as an encouragement to members of 
the relevant public to buy or use the service or product.'1604 
The important role of athlete's images for use in the above commercial activities is clear. 
A number of famous athletes in other·jurisdictions have succeeded in actions based on 
infringement of their image rights through unauthorized use, including Brazilian striker 
Romario 1605 and German goalkeeper Oliver Kahn, 1606 British racing driver Eddie Irvine1607 
and China and Houston Rockets basketball superstar Yao Ming. 1608 
524 Athletes' image rights enjoy varying degrees of protection in different 
jurisdictions. While in Europe there are certain countries that provide strong protection 
by means of specific publicity and privacy statutes or constitutional provisions (e.g. 
France, the Netherlands, Italy and Germany), other systems provide less clear-cut 
protection to players (although this has not necessarily hampered the commercial use 
and value of such 'rights'). An example is the UK, where image rights as such do not 
1602 Gelder supra at 25, quoting from Irvine v Talksport Ltd [2002] 2 All ER 414 (Ch D) 
1603 See Cloete (ed.) Introduction to Sports Law in South Africa LexisNexis Butterworths, Durban (2005) 175 
1604 Ibid. 
1605 Following legal action, Romario was reportedly awarded nearly £2.7 million in lost wages and compensation 
for unauthorised use of his image rights in advertising by former club Flamengo 
1606 Kahn famously obtained a court order against videogame manufacturer Electronic Arts (EA) for their 
unauthorized use of the player's name and likeness in their FIFA 2002 game. A Hamburg regional court ruled in 
April 2003 that even though EA had apparently obtained the permission of world football players' association 
FifPro for such use, the failure to obtain the individual player's permission constituted infringement of Khan's 
image rights. EA was ordered to remove the game from shops. At the time of writing it is unknown whether 
Kahn succeeded in his £500 000 claim for damages against EA. For more on the Kahn case, see Michael 
Gerlinger 'Germany', in Blackshaw & Siekmann (eds.) Sports Image Rights in Europe T.M.C. Asser Press 2005 
(Chapter VIII). 
1607 Irvine v Ta/ksport Ltd [2002] 2 All ER 414 (Ch D), referred to below 
1608 It was reported in 2003 that Coca Cola had removed images of Yao Ming from their product in China and 
apologized to the player for their unauthorized use of his image, after the Pepsi-sponsored player instituted 
action against Coke claiming nominal compensation of 1 yuan (or roughly 12 US cents) and an open apology 
from the soft-drink manufacturer. 
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exist under English law. 1609 As will be shown below, protection of the athlete's image and 
its commercial exploitation in England is found primarily in the law of passing off as an 
action that is available in cases of 'false endorsement' (i.e. where the athlete's action is 
based· on a misrepresentation by a defendant that the athlete has endorsed a product or 
service). 1610 Irrespective of the absence of a specific proprietary right to·the image of the 
athlete, these 'rights' are valuable and a thriving trade in the licensing of image rights is 
well established. 'Image rights' in the UK are also considered to be capital assets for tax 
purposes. 1611 
525 The normal position is that the employment contract of players will include 
provision for control·of image rights; this is often expressly regulated in standard players' 
contracts and is also an issue that is often subject to collective bargaining between clubs 
and management and players' ·unions. It is however possible that these rights can be 
excluded in order to provide the athlete with more power in respect of their exploitation, 
and this is mostly the case with star athletes (who understandably have more bargaining 
power to negotiate such right). One example of an exception to the rule involves David 
Beckham's move from Manchester United to Real Madrid. Man. United had allowed 
Beckham to retain control over his image rights and reportedly paid him an amount of 
£33 300 per week while under contract for the use of his image on club merchandise. 1612 
It appears that Real Madrid agreed to respect existing contracts and that Beckham was 
allowed to continue exploiting his image outside the control of the club. Another example 
of an exception from English Premier League football is that of Arsenal players Dennis 
Bergkamp and David Platt, who negotiated separate contracts regarding exploitation of 
their image rights between their marketing firm and the club (thereby removing 
1609 The recognition of a 'character right' of this nature was expressly rejected by the Court of Appeal in the 
case of Elvis Presley Enterprises Inc v Sid Shaw Elvisly Yours [1999] RPC 567 at 597-598 (following the well-
known earlier passing off case of McCullough v Lewis A May Ltd [1947] 2 All ER 845 (Ch. D) 
161° Compare the Irvine v TalkSport judgment, discussed below. Other forms of protection are found in 
copyright and trade mark law, the law of libel, the tort of malicious falsehood and the Trade Descriptions Act of 
1968. 
1611 See the short article by Andrew Braithwaite and Sonya Pennington 'Image Rights: Do they exist and who 
should own them?', available online at http://www.sportandtechnology.com/paqe/0035.html [last accessed 27 
February 2007] 
1512 Ibid. 
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compensation paid for the use of such image rights from the ambit of remuneration 
payable in terms of their employment contracts). 1613 
526 Contractual provisions regarding the licensing or assignment of image rights of 
athletes (whether contained in players' contracts or other, ancillary, commercial 
agreements - e.g. a contract for promotional services), usually contain a raft of 
supporting provis+o_ns in· order to facilitate the exploitation of such rights by the relevant 
rights ho·lder. These may commonly include. the following: 
An· undertaking by the licensor athlete to perform promotional services 
.{e;gi. public appearances; phot"ographic shoots, etc); 
Ar::l:!:.Jndertaking by the.licensee to provide assistance to the licensor in 
preventing-infringement of the rights by third parties; 
An .undertaking by the licensorto refrain from licensing identical or similar 
rights to third parties; and 
An undertaking by the licensor athlete to refrain from certain behaviour 
that ma~ affect.the value of the rights granted (e.g. public drunkenness, 
. sexual impropriety, etc). 1614 
This last, the so-called 'morality clause', can be very important in protecting sponsors 
and rights holders. For example, Nike signed a five-year US$45 million endorsement 
agreement with NBA player Kobe Bryant just days before he was arrested in 2003 for 
alleged sexual assault. While McDonalds and Nutella both dropped the athlete from their 
1613 In the matter of Sports Club, Evelyn and Jocelyn v Inspector of Taxes SpC00253 (SC Brice and Everett, 8 
June 2000), Simons Tax Cases [2000] STC (SCD) 443, the Special Commissioners of the Inland Revenue held 
that that payment for these two players' 'promotional services' were not salary payments disguised in order to 
avoid income tax, but were genuine commercial transactions for the acquisition of rights that had independent 
value over and above the value of the players' services as rendered in terms of the employment contracts - see 
Lewis, A & Taylor, J Sport: Law and Practice Butterworths (2003) at D3.4; Blackshaw & Siekmann (eds.) Sports 
Image Rights in Europe T.M.C. Asser Press 2005 at 316-317 
1614 Dan Harrington and Nick White ('United Kingdom'), in Blackshaw & Siekmann (eds.) Sports Image Rights in 
Europe T.M.C. Asser Press 2005 at 335; for some provisions usually included in an athlete endorsement 
contract in the USA, see Vasser et al Sports Law: Cases and Materials 5th ed. Anderson Publishing Co. 2003 at 
598-600 
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· roster of celebrity endorsers following the arrest, Nike resumed promotional use of 
photographs of Bryant after the charges were dropped in September 2004. 
527 The practice of commercial exploitation of athletes' image rights is a very recent 
development in South Africa. Following in the footsteps ·of their counterparts elsewhere 
(think of Thierry Henry and cars, David Beckham and cologne), increasing numbers of 
well-known local footballers, cricketers and rugby players have in recent years appeared 
in television, print and radio advertisements for products or services ranging from potato 
crisps and soft drinks to medical insurance. According to information available at the time 
of writing, top local players (mainly in the 'big 3' professional sports of football, cricket 
and rugby) can routinely command between ZARl - 2 million per year in terms of 
endorsement contracts with individual player sponsors for use of their images· in 
advertising. It appears that it has also happened frequently in recent years that 
?dvertisers have· made use of the images ofwell-.known athletes without their consent; 
according to one source it is frequently necessary for athlete management ·companies to 
resort to threats of litigation to prohibit such conduct. 1615 Despite the grow.ing market 
and these trends, however, South African courts have to date (maybe surprisingly) not 
been faced with any matter specifically relating to the unlawful or unauthorized 
appropriation of the image rights of an athlete. This does not mean that such action 
should not be expected before long, however, and the following discussion will briefly 
examine the grounds upon which protection in such cases could be based in any future 
litigation. 
528 The conclusion to this section will make reference to the fact that, in the absence 
of specific statutory protection or of recognized proprietary protection for image rights 
under the common law, image rights are currently mainly regulated contractually by 
means of specific provisions in standard players' contracts ih the major professional 
1615 I would like to thank Peter Schultz of Prosport International (one of the premier South African sports 
management companies - on the web at http://www.prosoortinternational.com) for discussing these issues 
with me 
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sports. Accordingly, and similar to th·e position in certain other jurisdictions (e.g. 
England), while South· African law does not currently recognize 'image rights' as 
commercially exploitable and legally protectable property, the reality is that they are 
recognised in·commercial practice and regulated accordingly by means of contract. 
529 South African law does not expressly recognize a 'right of publicity' as is the case 
in parts of the United States. There is also no specific legislative protection available to 
individl:Jals in such cases, apart from the possibility of trade mark or copyright protection 
under the releva'nt statutes. 1616 Accordingly, the basis for protection is mainly to be found 
in the common law (as in other common law ·systems such as the UK and Australia) -
e.g. in th~ law relating to ~nfair competition - or in constitutional protection of the right 
of privacy. 1617 It is submitted that this situation is unsatisfactory, and that more specially 
tailored protection should be available in cases of unauthorized commercial exploitation 
of image rights. More will be said on this below. 
530 South African law recognizes that every person possesses a number of personality 
rights. Protection for infringement of such rights is available in terms of the common law 
right to privacy and the law of defamation. Protection is found mainly in the law of delict 
. (or tort, although it should be borne in mind that South African law does not know a 
closed group of torts but rather follows the Roman law approach of a general action for 
damages caused by the unlawful action or omission of the perpetrator in terms of the 
Actio Legis Aquiliae, or 'Aquilian action'1618). While delictual liability may lie against a 
1616 For example, while the Performers' Protection Act 11 of 1967 makes provision for protection of the 
performances of certain persons (such as actors, singers, musicians and dancers), this Act relates only to 
performances of literary and artistic works and does not relate to e.g. the on-field performance of athletes 
engaged in sport. 
1617 As contained in section 14 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, and which right also 
enjoys protection under the common law (e.g. see Jansen van Vuuren v Kruger 1993 (4) SA 842 (A)) 
1618 See the discussion of the South African law of delict in par 438 et seq above. A plaintiff claiming with the 
Aquilian action must prove the elements of a delict, namely conduct on the part of the defendant (a commission 
or an omission in cases where there was a legal duty to act) which violated the plaintiff's subjective right(s) and 
which was unlawful (in light of the bani mores or legal convictions of the community); was committed with fault 
(in the form of intent or negligence) on the part of the defendant; that there was sufficient causation (namely 
that the defendant's conduct in fact caused the plaintiff's damages and also that the requirements for legal 
causation were satisfied - namely that the consequences of the defendant's wrongful act should legally be 
imputed to him and are not too remote); and that damage ensued for the plaintiff - see the discussion of the 
elements of the Aquilian action in Van Heerden & Neethling Unlawful Competition Butterworths, Durban (1995) 
66 et seq. 
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defendant for patrimonial damages caused unlawfully and with the necessary fault on his 
or her part, South African law also protects the plaintiff who· has suffered non-patrimonial 
damages, i.e. when there has been interference with the recognized personality interests 
of the plaintiff even though his or her economic or patrimonial position has not been 
affected. It is trite in South African law that such interference is actionable as an iniuria, 
where liability is based on 
·~ wrongful act designedly done in contempt of another, which infringes his dignity., his 
person or his reputation. If we look at the essentials of iniuria we find ...• ~hat th_ey are 
three. The act complained of must be wrongful; it mu.st be. intentional.; and it must violate 
.. 
one or other of those real rights, those rights in rem, _related to yersonality, which every 
free man is entitled to enjoy .'1619 
·-
For present purposes, it is important to note that both the fama (or 'good name') and the 
dignitas enjoy protection. Unlawful infringement of the fama is protected through the 
means of the law of defamation, namely the unlawful, intentional publication of words or 
conduct about a person which have the effect of prejudicing such person's good name or 
. . 
reputation. The meaning of dignitas has been held to be wider than simply the 'dignity' of 
a person, and includes the whole of the legally protected personality apart from the 
corpus (or the person of the plaintiff) and the fama; the concept of the dignitas which is 
protected by means of the actio iniuriarum therefore encompasses a collection of 
interests relating to the personality. 1620 
531 From this very brief exposition of the protection of personality rights in terms of 
South African law it is clear that athletes will usually enjoy protection for an alleged 
infringement of their personality rights caused by unauthorized or unlawful commercial 
exploitation of their image rights. This will be the case where such conduct by a 
defendant has in fact infringed one or more of the above personality rights, e.g. where 
1619 As per Innes, J in R v Umfaan 1908 TS 62 at 66 
1620 See O'Keeffe v Argus Printing and Publishing Co Ltd 1954 (3) SA 244 (C) 
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such use has the effect of lowering the reputation of the athlete in the eyes of others a 
defamation action would be available; 1621 where such use infringes the privacy of the 
athlete an action for breach of privacy would be available either under the common law 
right or the constitutional protection afforded to the right of privacy in the Bill of 
Rights. 1622 This is relatively uncontroversial and straightforward, as long as the necessary 
elements of the iniuria or infringement can be proven. In March 2007 the Pretoria High 
Court ruled that the proposed commercial distribution of a DVD entitled Kamp 
Staaldraad: The Real Story (featuring visuals of the infamous 2003 Springbok rugby 
training camp) would violate the privacy and dignity of the players concerned. Following 
an urgent interim interdict obtained by five Springbok players1623 in September 2006 to 
stop.distribution of the DVD by former security consultants to the team, the court 
interdicted the producers from publishing or distributing it in any way, as the depiction of 
the naked, dirty and tired players would not only infringe their privacy and dignity but 
would also infringe copyright in the material (which the court held is vested in SA Rugby 
(Pty) Ltd). 1624 
532 The Supreme Court of Appeal, in the 2007 case of Grutter v Lombard & 
Another, 1625 had occasion to evaluate the law in South Africa in respect of protection of 
aspects of the identity and, specifically, was faced with a claim of appropriation of the 
name of another for personal advantage. This matter involved an application by an 
attorney (Grutter, who had practiced from shared premises with another attorney, 
Lombard, in terms of an agreement which had subsequently been terminated) for an 
order prohibiting Lombard from continuing to use the name 'Grutter & Lombard' for 
1621 For examples from the UK of cases where implied 'shamateurism' on the part of an amateur golfer and of 
an amateur Welsh international rugby player were held to constitute defamation, see (the locus classicus of) 
Tolley v Fry [1931] All ER 131 and Williams v Reason [1988] All ER 262 respectively. It is of course doubtful 
whether, in modern day sport and society, the inference that an ·amateur player has agreed to endorse a 
product for financial gain would constitute a defamation, although it would of course depend on the 
circumstances of any case. 
1622 Section 14 of The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
1623 Corne Krige, Victor Matfield, Werner Greeff, Richard Bands and Schalk Burger 
1624 Following the interim interdict, 19 more players joined the application along with SA Rugby (Pty) Ltd, who 
claimed that the proposed distribution of the film would infringe copyright vesting in the company. Rabie J ruled 
on the application for the final interdict on 9 March 2007. 
1625 [2007] SCA 2 (RSA), judgment delivered on 20 February 2007 
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purposes of trade. The Pretoria High Court had dismissed the application but granted· 
Grutter leave to appeal. 
The Supreme Court of Appeal (by way of Nugent JA) clearly stated that the 
respondents'1626 conduct in continuing to use the appellant's name in the course of trade 
of the law practice did not constitute the common law wrong of passing-off, 1627 nor did 
the appellant claim an exclusive right to use the name 'Grutter' (which right the court 
held the appellant 'clearly does not have'). The learned judge summarized the appellant's 
case as simply being that 'he is known to be the person named i_n the description of the 
practice and that he does not wish to be identified with the practice now that his 
association with it has come to an end.'1628 The respondents claimed that the parties had 
practiced previously in partnership, and that the name of the practice was the.~property .of 
such partnership (and that, consequently, that upon dissolution of the partnership~each 
of the former partners became entitled to continue using the· name of the former _ : -
partnership, provided it did not place the other former partner at risk of incurring . 
liability). The Court rejected this argument and found that there had never beeh a 
partnership between the parties, and that their agreement had simply been one to share 
premises, administrative facilities and certain of the overhead expenses that these 
entailed. This agreement having come to an end, it remained for the court to determine 
whether Lombard was entitled to use Grutter's name in the description of his (Lombard's) 
practice without consent. 
The Court proceeded by pointing out that the extent to which the features of a person's 
identity - for example his or her name or likeness - constitute interests that are capable 
of legal protection has received little attention from South African courts. The Court 
referred extensively to generally accepted academic opinion that features of personal 
identity are capable (and deserving) of legal protection. 1629 After reiterating the accepted 
1626 Second respondent was another attorney, Oosthuizen, who continued practicing with Lombard under the 
name 'Grutter & Lombard', and had been joined to the proceedings for purposes of the relief sought (an order 
prohibiting the use of the appellant's name in respect of the respondents' law practice). 
1627 See discussion below 
1628 At par. 3 of the judgment 
1629 At par. s~et seq. of the judgment 
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elements of an iniuria ·in South African .law for purposes of. delictual liability, 1630 the Court 
referred to O'Keefe v Argus Printing and.Publishing Co Ltd1631 where it was held that the 
actio iniuriarum was capable ·of protecting ·a person against unauthorized publication of 
his or her name and likeness in an advertisement (which it was held in that case could 
constitute an impairment of such person's dignity). The Court continued to refer to the 
.. 
judgment of O'Regan Jin the Constitutional Court in Khumalo v Holomisa, 1632 where it 
~ . . ~ 
was tield that privacy is but_one of 'a varie_ty of personal rights' that are included in the 
. . . 
concept of dignitas in the cqntext of the actio iniuriarum, and observed that the interest 
. . . 
that a person has in preserving his or her identity against unauthorized exploitation 
seems to be qualitatively indistinguishable and equally encompassed by that protectable 
'variety of perso.nal rights'. 1633.Th~ Court found further support for this view in the 
protection that is afforded to human dignity by section 10 of the Bill of Rights1634 as 
. . 
contained in the-Constitution } 635 [\Jugent JA continued to hold as follows: 1636 
'But as C!ppears from the formulation of the elements of an iniuria ... not every intrusion 
upon those .protectable rights' of personality will necessarily constitute an iniuria. Whether a 
... .. " ~ . 
particular act constitutes a wrongful (or unlawful) violation, and thus an iniuria, must 
necessarily be determined by considerations of legal policy as in the case of any civil 
wrong. For an individual who chooses to live in a community cannot expect always to be 
shrouded in anonymity. One can envisage various circumstances in which considerations of 
public policy will justify conduct that impinges upon features of a person's identity. But it is 
not necessary to consider what those circumstances might be because I can see no such 
1630 With reference to R v Umfaan 1908 TS 62 
1631 1954 (3) SA 244 (C) 
1632 2002 (5) SA 401 (CC) 
1633 Grutter v Lombard at par. 12 of the judgment 
1634 Section 10 provides that '[e]veryone has inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity respected and 
protected' 
1635 With reference to Khumalo v Holomisa supra, where the following was held (as quoted in Grutter par.12): 
'In our new constitutional order, no sharp line can be drawn between these injuries to personality rights. The 
value of human dignity in our Constitution is not only concerned with an individual's sense of self-worth, but 
constitutes an affirmation of the worth of human beings in our society. It includes the intrinsic worth of human 
beings shared by all people as well as the individual reputation of each person built upon his or her own 
individual achievements. The value of human dignity in our Constitution therefore values both the personal 
sense of self-worth as well as the public's estimation of the worth or value of an individual. It should be noted 
that there is a close link between human dignity and privacy in our constitutional order. The right to privacy 
entrenched in section 14 of the Constitution, recognises that human beings have a right to a sphere of intimacy 
and autonomy that should be protected from invasion. This right serves to foster human dignity. No sharp lines 
then can be drawn between reputation, dignitas,and privacy in giving effect to the value of human dignity in 
our Constitution.' 
1636 At par. 13 of the judgment 
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considerations that justify the unauthorized use by the respondents of Grutter's name for 
their own commercial advantage. What is conveyed to the outside world by the use of 
Grutter's name is that he is in some way profe?sionally associated with the respondents, or 
at least that he is willing to have himself portrayed as being associated with them, which ... 
is a misrepresentation of the true state of affairs for which there can be no justification. It 
was submitted on behalf of_ the respondents that in fact the respondents do not intend to 
mislead and have ensured that all enquiries that are made in relation to Grutter are always 
re-directed to him. That d.oes not seem to me to meet the objection. In my view Grutter is 
entitled to insist 'that there should be no potential for error in the first place and was 
entitled to the order that he claimed.' 
The Court accordingly upheld the appeal a·nd made an order that the respondents were 
prohibited from using the name 'Grutter' in the description of their practice o.r respeE:tive 
practices, and were prohibited from re13rese"nting in a·ny way that the applicant is 
associated with their practice or respective practices. 
While it is submitted that the judgment in GrDtter's case has limited application in 
respect of cases of unauthorized·celebrity mercha-ndising (or, more specifically, cases 
related to the alleged infringement of athletes' image rights) - namely in respect of its 
relevance in determining whether such conducf has infringed a claimant's personality 
rights - it may be of more importance (in respect of Nugent JA's observations in the last-
quoted section above) in respect of those instances where the alleged unauthorised 
conduct creates an impression of endorsement of the defendant's product by the 
celebrity or athlete. 1637 
533 In addition to above-mentioned protection against unauthorized use of the name, 
likeness etc of the celebrity or sports star which is to be found in the protection of 
personality rights, the Advertising Code of the Advertising Standards Authority of South 
Africa (or ASA) also provides specifically for protection of privacy of individuals. The Code 
provides that an advertisement should not portray or refer to, by whatever means, any 
1637 I.e. to point to delictual liability for an inuria in such 'endorsement' cases. See also discussion of the action 
for passing-off and the English Irvine v Ta/ksport case in the section that follows 
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living persons, unless their express prior permission has been obtained. 1638 The 
prohibition does not apply in certain circumstances. 1639 
534 Apart from the issue of potential infringement of personality rights, a more 
complicated (and usually more pertinent) .question is whether or to what extent the 
athlete enjoys protection for patrimonial aamages suffered as a consequence of such 
unlawful conduct by the defendant; therefore whether South African law recognizes a 
proprietary interest_and property rights.that may be infringed in such cases. In light of 
the fact that it is a worldwide trend thaf star athletes earn the majority of their income 
from the commercial exploitation of image rights rather than from actual winnings or 
income derived from on:field performance, it is of utmost importance to determine 
whether such patrimonial interests enjoy direct protection as 'property' of the athlete. 
As mentioned, South African law does not currently reco·gnize any specific proprietary 
interest in the image, likeness, voice or other aspetts·ofthe persona of persons such as 
famous athletes. Protection for the patrimonial value of such aspects must be found in 
other areas of the law. Specifically, it is possible for an athlete to claim for infringement 
of copyright (where copyright exists in respect of the athlete's likeness, name, etc) or for 
infringement of a trade mark. The problem, however, is that copyright protection 
requires the likeness, name, etc to have been reduced to a material form and for the 
unauthorized conduct by the defendant to constitute a reproduction in material form of a 
substantial part of such an original work. 164° Furthermore, for a work to qualify for 
copyright protection it must be original (in the meaning that its creation included 
1638 Par. 11.1 of the Code 
1639 E.g. in respect of crowd or background shots (provided the portrayal and the content in which it appears is 
not defamatory, offensive or humiliating); advertisements for books, films, radio or television programmes, 
press features and the like, in which there appear portrayals of or references to individuals who form part of 
their subject matter; police or other official notices; and where, in the opinion of the Advertising Standards 
Authority, the reference or portrayal is not inconsistent with the individual's right to a reasonable degree of 
privacy and does not constitute an unjustifiable commercial exploitation of the individual's fame or reputation -
Par 11.2 of the Code. 
1640 See the Copyright Act 98 of 1978. Compare the position in Austria, where a specific provision (section 78) 
in the Austrian Copyright Act (Urheberrechtsgesetz) provides that an image of a person must not be published 
or made accessible by the public if the legitimate interest of the person is infringed. This right, which is known 
as the 'right in one's own image' is however not understood as a form of copyright. See Blackshaw & Siekmann 
(eds.) Sports Image Rights in Europe T.M.C. Asser Press 2005 at 32 
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sufficient independent skill, effort and labour on the part of the creator1641 ) and 
substantial enough to warrant pr_otection. It is doubtful whether an athlete's name would 
qualify in these respects; Copyright in a photograph of the athlete would usually (absent 
an assignment) vest in the person who is responsible for the composition of the 
photograph or who has commissioned the taking of the photograph .1642 Protection under 
the Trade Marks Act1643 requires thata trade mark be registered, with the intention of 
the trade-mark holder to use the mark for trading purposes. While there is evidence that 
more and more athletes have started to resort to registering their likenesses, names, 
autographs, etc as trade marks, 1644 in the absence of such specific precautionary conduct 
by the athlete he or she will be limited in their options for recourse against unscrupulous 
celebrity merchandisers to a common Jaw claim for unlawful competition (which could 
e.g. be based on passing off). 1645 Other possible problems w.ith trade ·ma-rk protection .are 
that the use of an athlete's image on goods (for example) would usually only be 
descriptive of the nature of the .goods and not intended to denote trade origin; ·it could 
also be difficult to prove a likelihood of confusion amongst the-public as to the origin of 
such goods where in celebrity merchandising cases the consumer often buys the goods 
simply because they contain the likeness of the celebrity (and not because such use of 
the likeness indicates an association with the produ~tion of the goods). 1646 
Another statutory basis for intellectual property protection is the Performers' Protection 
Act, 1647 which makes provision for protection of the performances of certain persons 
(such as actors, singers, musicians and dancers). This Act, however, relates only to 
performances of literary and artistic works and does not relate to e.g. the on-field or in-
competition performances of athletes engaged in sport. 
1641 See Kalamazoo Division (Pty) Ltd v Gay 1978 (2) 184 (C); Klep Valves (Pty) Ltd v Saunders Valve Co Ltd 
1987 (2) SA 1 (A); Waylite Diaries CC v First National Bank Ltd 1993 (2) SA 128 (W) 
1642 See the definition of the 'author' of a photograph in sec 1(1); and sec 21(1)(c) of the Copyright Act 98 of 
1978. See also Blackshaw & Siekmann (eds.) Sports Image Rights in Europe T.M.C. Asser Press 2005 at 324-
325 
1643 Act 194 of 1993 
1644 Cloete (ed.) Introduction to Sports Law in South Africa LexisNexis Butterworths, Durban (2005) 177 
1645 Cloete op cit. 177. See also the facts of the English case of Irvine v TalkSport Ltd [2002] 2 All ER 414 (Ch 
D), discussed below 
1646 See Lewis, A & Taylor, J Sport: Law and Practice Butterworths (2003) at D3.44 toD3.46; Blackshaw & 
Siekmann (eds.) Sports Image Rights in Europe T.M.C. Asser Press 2005 at 318-321 
1647 Act 11 of 196 7 
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535 So, it appears that the current.state of South African law demands that the 
victims of unauthorized celebrity merchandising should seek their relief within the 
confines of one of the above claims based on infringement of intellectual property rights, 
unlawful competition (which will be discussed below) or in infringement of the right of 
privacy or of one or more of the personality rights. It is submitted, in the light of what 
follows, th·at the correctness of this situation is questionable. 
It remains:problematic to base protection for the possible patrimonial damages caused 
by unauthor.ized 'personality merchandising'1648 on the infringement of personality rights 
(in the absence of recognizing a personality right with monetary components). For this 
reason the author cannot agree with the followinQ dictum of Stegmann J in Moroka 
Swallows Football Club Ltd v The Birds Football Club and Others, 1649 which was accepted 
and relied upon by Harms JA in the Stanton Woodrush case: 1650 
'The mere fact that a person_ has made -a name famous does not give him a right of 
property in the name. He cannot stop ~ther entrepreneurs from making such use of the 
famous name in the marketing of their goods and services as they may be able to make 
without either defaming any person or causing a likelihood of confusion as to the origin of 
.. · "'-• 
the goods or services. Provided that he does not commit the delicts of defamation or 
passing off or offend against any specific statutory prohibition, there is no reason why an 
entrepre[leur should not take the benefit of such advantage as he may be able to gain in 
the marketing of his goods and services by associating them with names that have become 
famous:• 
It is widely accepted nowadays that unauthorised commercial exploitation of aspects of 
the famous persona (including the name) may cause patrimonial damages (e.g. loss of 
licensing fees or royalties, dilution of the value of such aspects for marketing purposes or 
a 'closing of the market' for the rights holder, etc). It is submitted that it is no longer in 
1648 As it was called in the Stanton Woodrush case supra 
1649 1987 (2) SA 511 (W), at 531E - G 
1650 South African Football Association v Stanton Woodrush (Pty) Ltd t/a Stan Smidt & Sons & Another 2003 (3) 
SA 313 (SCA) 
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step with modern commercial practice and realities to insist that the only available 
protection is to be found in e.g. the law of defamation (which deals specifically with 
compensation in cases of iniuria, and not for patrimonial damages). It is the very 
patrimonial nature of the damages occasioned by this commercial practice which needs 
to be addressed. It is submitted, with respect, that our courts will 'drop the ball' if any 
future actions arising from such .practices are approached on this 'traditional' basis, just 
as they did earlier with the failure to recognise the commercial practice of unauthorised 
character merchandising 1651::as a wider genus of unlawful· action that causes harm to 
rights holders .. 
536 Following the initial Teluctance of South African courts to recognise this 
commercial practice and its legal implications, in the case of Lorimar Productions~Inc v 
Sterling Clothing Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd and Others (the 'Dallas' case 1652 - where the 
court held in the course of proceedings for passin-g off that the practice of character 
merchandising was not suffidently well-known in South Africa to assume that th·e 'man in 
the street' would have any knowledge thereof1653), and ignoring earlier.calls for ·such 
recognition, 1654 the same court finally recognised and indeed described the practice of 
character merchandising in the 1994 case of FIFA v Bartlett. 1655 However, such 
1651 Character merchandising was described as 'the business of merchandising popular names, characters and 
insignia in order to enhance the sale of consumer products in relation to which such names and characters are 
used' - see Federation Internationale de Football Association v Bartlett 1994 (4) SA 722 (T) at 736 (discussed 
elsewhere in this chapter). In Australia this practice (in its proper or traditional form) has been described as the 
use of 'the reputation of a well-known fictitious character like Mickey Mouse or Superman to give name to and 
add to the popularity of goods not otherwise connected with the character' (Children's Television Workshop Inc 
v Woolworth's (NSW) Ltd (1981) 1 NSWLR 273 at 275). 
1652 1981 (3) SA 1129 (T) 
1653 At 1152E-G of the judgment 
1654 As early as 1978, Lionel Bowman had expressed the need for South African law to provide a remedy in 
character merchandising cases, pointing out that no statutory protection existed in such cases where no trade 
mark or copyright was involved (which is still the case today). Bowman observed that both 'modern conditions' 
and the nature of the Aquilian action in South African law warrant the development of such a remedy. See 
Bowman, L 'Character merchandising in South Africa' Australian Intellectual Property Law Journal (1978) 395 at 
404 
1655 1994 (4) SA 722 (TPD). At p736F-J of the FIFA judgment, Joffe J described the way that character 
merchandising functions in commerce as follows: 
'The association of a famous person or character with a consumer product can boost that product's sales 
considerably. The fame and popularity of the name or character in question enhances the desirability of of the 
product from the consumer's point of view. The association between the name or character, which can be 
referred to as the "merchandising property", and the consumer product is usually created by depicting the 
merchandising product prominently on the product. A typical merchandising product is the well-known cartoon 
character Mickey Mouse. As the proprietor of the merchandising property has already invested substantial time 
and money in developing and popularizing such character, and it is the fame and desirability of the 
merchandising property which will promote the sale of the goods to which it is applied, the proprietor of the 
merchandising property charges a royalty or license fee for the use of his merchandising property. The royalty 
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recognition of the practice has not provided a distinct remedy based on a distinct and 
legally recognised property right in the· case of celebrity merchandising. Our courts 
continue to view cases of character merchandising (and will, supposedly, treat cases of 
celebrity merchandising in a similar. fashion, if and when such cases confront the judiciary 
in future) as resorting under the delict of unlawful competition or (more specifically) 
passing off. 
537 The generally accepted definition of the delict of passing off was formulated as 
follows by the· (then) Appellate Division in the case of Capital Estate and General 
Agencies (Pty) Ltd v Holiday Inns Inc: 1656 
'Ttie wrong known as passing off-consists in a representation by one person that his 
business (or merchandise, a_s the case may be) is that of another, or that it is associated 
with that of another, and, in_ o_rder to determine whether a representatioo amounts to a 
passing off, one enquires ~hether there is a reasonable likelihood that members of the 
public may be confused into believing that the business the one is, or is connected with, 
that of another ... Whether there is a reasonable likelihood of such confusion arising is, of 
course, a question of fact which will have to be determined in the light of the circumstances 
of each case.' 
The requirements to show passing off have on occasion been described, succinctly, as 
'the classical trinity of reputation (or goodwill), misrepresentation and damage'. 1657 
An action for passing off would be available to an athlete in cases where another has 
unlawfully made use of the image, etc of the athlete and thereby represented that the 
athlete has endorsed the goods or services in question or that these goods or services 
is payable in terms of a license agreement under which the owner of the merchandising property authorizes the 
licensee to utilise the merchandising property in relation to his goods. Generally a licensor exercises a measure 
of supervision over the use of the merchandising property which is the subject of the license and such 
supervision is commonly exercised by a licensing agent ... It appears that the consumer makes a connection 
and an association between the character and its creator or owner and the products featuring the character.' 
1656 1977 (2) SA 916 (A) at 929. See also Premier Trading Co (Pty) Ltd v Sporttopia (Pty) Ltd 2000 (3) SA 259 
(SCA) 
1657 Harms JA in Caterham Car Sales and Coach Works Ltd v Birkin Cars (Pty) Ltd 1998 (3) SA 938 (SCA) 
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are connected to the athlete (e.g. by representing that use of the athlete's image was 
licensed by him or her in respect of the marketing of such goods or services). Our courts 
have followed developments elsewhere and departed from the earlier requirement in 
cases of passing off in English law, which has been tempered in recent years 1658, namely 
the presence of a 'common field of activity' between the commercial undertakings of 
plaintiff and defendant. In the Capital Estate case, Rabie JA stated that the question as to 
the reaso.nable likelihood of confusion between the products or businesses of the parties 
to a passing off action is one of fact. Once this likelihood has been est.ablished on the 
evidence 'even if the parties concerned cannot be said to be carrying on their activities in 
a common field, it is difficult to see how the absence of such a common field can 
nevertheless constitute a ground for denying relief to an aggrieved party.'1659 The 
absence of a common field is nothing more than a factor in determining the likelihood of 
confusion. While apparently ·sound in equity, this approach is however less sound 
dogmatically. Passing off is a species of the broader Aquilian action of unlawful 
competition; as such it should only be present in cases of genuine competition. As was 
stated in the Lorimar case: 1660 
'Competition is normally the casus be/Ii [in cases of passing off]. In general terms 
competition involves the idea of a struggle between rivals endeavouring to obtain the same 
end. It may be said to exist whenever there is a potential diversion of trade from one to 
another. For competition to exist the articles or services of the competitors should be 
related to the same purpose or must satisfy the same need.' 
Where a common field of activity is absent - and this will more often than not be the 
case in respect of the activities of athletes or other celebrities vis a vis the professional 
celebrity merchandiser - one can strictly speaking not refer to such an action as based 
1658 Compare the judgment in Annabel's (Berkeley Square) Ltd v G Shock (t/a Annabel's Escort Agency) 1972 
R.P.C. 838; Treasure Cot Co Ltd v Hamley Bros. Ltd (1950) 67 R.P.C. 89. Similar development of the 
requirements for an action of passing off has also taken place in Australian law. 
1659 The Capital Estate case at 929E-F 
1660 1981 (3) SA 1129 (T) at 1141 of the judgment 
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on passing off or unlawful competition. 1661 While the name of a remedy is of course less 
important than· its availability, it is submitted that it is in most celebrity merchandising 
cases dogmatically incorrect to speak of unlawful competition. 1662 
538 The main objections to the use·of passing off (or unlawful competition) in cases of 
celebrity merchandising are the following: 
,;' 1) When one appli~s the traditional form of this action the 
celebrity will be denied a remedy through the absence of a 
common field of activity in most cases; 
2) Even when one applies the extended form of this action (e.g. 
on the basis of.th·e Capital Estate case's rejection of the 
sacrosanct nature of the common field of activity-
requirement) the celebrity would have to prove a 
misrepresentation by the defendant which has caused 
damage to his trading or promotional goodwill (the 
requirement of an association in the public mind). The 
plaintiff celebrity may have a hard time proving such 
deception or confusion as to an association in cases where 
the parties' fields of activity are very different; 1663 
3) The most fundamental problem facing the celebrity is that 
the proprietary interest which the action for passing off 
seeks to protect is that of the goodwill of a business or 
undertaking. As has been observed, the plaintiff celebrity will 
1661 Van Heerden & Neethling Unlawful Competition Butterworths (1995), at 208-209 and 193, have argued that 
such cases where there is an absence of competition involve another form of unfair trade practice, namely 
'misrepresentation as to the source, origin or business connection of a non-competitive performance'. 
1662 See also the criticism expressed by Mostert, F W Grondslae van die Reg op die Reklamebeeld ['Bases for the 
Right to the Advertising Image'] Unpublished doctoral thesis, Rand Afrikaans University (1985) at 33 note 61 
1663 See Mostert op cit. at 328-330; 336-337 
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not necessarily be involved in any undertaking or business, 
or such business will not necessarily be his own. 1664 
As has been observed elsewhere, the real point in unlicensed celebrity merchandising 
cases is 'whether a person's right of property in his name or likeness [or other aspects of 
the persona or personality] is entitled to protection'; a passing off action provides no 
property right in tbe indicium protected, but only 'a right to prevent its use by others to 
indicate a connection with the plaintiff'. 1665 The essential complaint in these types of 
cases is not misrepresentation, but rather misappropriation: The plaintiff 'has lost a 
commercial opportunity for exploiting his character or r-eputatiori.'1666 
It is submitted that the practical dangers inherent in basing a claim on passing off (or 
more generally on.unlawful competition) in these types of cases are well illustrated by ·· 
the facts of a judgment in another jurisdiction which dealt with unauthorized commercial 
exploitation of aspects of a famous athlete's·persona: In one .of the series of cases in 
Canada which,recognized the common-law tort of misappropriation of personality (which 
is in essence identical to the American right of publicity), Athans v Canadian Adventure 
Camps Ltd, 1667 the court was faced with a claim by a professional water skier who was 
actively engaged in the commercial exploitation of his image, expertise and personality 
through endorsements. The defendant, which operated a summer camp for children, 
published a brochure in order to advertise its water-skiing program, and inclu·ded a 
graphical representation of a figure which was identifiable as the athlete and apparently 
reproduced from a photograph of him. Athans claimed damages for passing off and for 
wrongful appropriation of his personality. 
The court held that no case of passing off had been made out on the facts, as the use of 
the drawings in the brochure were on a balance of probability not likely to give rise to 
confusion between the plaintiffs and the defendant's businesses. It was highly 
1664 Mostert op cit. 33 note 61 
1665 Andrew Terry 'Exploiting celebrity: Character merchandising and unfair trading' University of New South 
Wales Law Journal Vol. 12 (1989) 204, at 229 
1666 Terry op cit. at 236 
1667 (1977) 80 D.L.R. (3d) 583, Ont. HC 
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improbable that the segment of the public who would have read the brochure would have 
associated the defendant's business with the plaintiff. 
Iris submitted that this is a likely finding on similar facts in any such case that 
should come-before a South African court. 1668 However, the Canadian court had access to 
a more satisfactory remedy in order to ensure the availability of equitable relief to the 
athlete. The court held that the defendants had used the plaintiff's image for their 
commercial advantage, while the plaintiff had the exclusive right to use the indicia of his 
image in the marketing of his personality. Accordingly, commercial use of his 
repres_~ntati?nal imag~ b~ the defendant, without his consent, constituted an invasion . 
and pro tanto an impairment of ~is exclusive right to market his personality. More 
important than the $500 in damages which was awarded to Mr. Athans was.th_e 
recognition of direc:t protection in cases such as this. 
539 The CL!rrent state of South African law in this respect is simply unsatisfactory. 
Athletes are li!J1ited in their rights of recourse _in the protection of the patrimonial aspects 
of their irnage_s to th~ above limited although diverse bases for protection, which are not 
ideally suited to protect such athletes in the context of modern sports business and in 
light of the ever-increasing activity of sports commodification and commercialization in 
practice. Challis has observed the following in respect of this 'traditional' approach to the 
protection of image rights in other jurisdictions, which, as we have seen, also resonates 
in South Africa: 
1668 It is submitted that it is likely that the absence of a common field of activity will remain a potential hurdle 
especially in celebrity merchandising cases, for as long as protection is sought on the basis of passing off. Here 
one can refer to the judgment of Corbett CJ in the case of Royal Beech-Nut (Pty) Ltd t/a Manhattan 
Confectioners v United Tobacco Co Ltd t/a Willards Foods 1992 (4) SA 118 (A). In this case the court approved 
of the decision in the Capital Estate case that the absence of a common field of activity should not preclude a 
finding of passing off. But Corbett CJ continued to state the following (at 123G-H): 
'In my view, the court will not readily conclude that in the case of disparate goods the defendant's product will 
be regarded as another horse from the plaintiff's stable. There must be cogent grounds to justify this 
conclusion. And it must be borne in mind that what has to be gauged is the likely reaction of ordinary members 
of the purchasing public, not that of lawyers or traders or persons engaged in the kinds of business conducted 
by the parties.' 
Clearly such an approach would constitute a hurdle for the celebrity in proving passing off in cases where he or 
she has no common field of activity with the merchandiser and indeed does not necessarily even produce or 
endorse any product. Compare also the court's approach in the Lorimar case supra at 1154-1155, and the 
criticism by Hertzog 'Ongelisensieerde karakterkommersialisering of "character merchandising" as daad van 
onregmatige mededinging in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg' 1982 De Jure 77 
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'In jurisdictions where image rights do subsist, the development of the law usually follows 
one (or both) of two paths. The first is the development of an actionable right to privacy 
(or a 'dignitarian' right) and the second is the development of an economic right whereby a 
celebrity's image or personality can be exploited economically. These privacy and publicity 
rights are usually set in the context of existing regimes of copyright law, performer's rights, 
trade mark law, trades description legislation, data protection provisions and the laws of 
defamation, which can also, to an extent, protect creative works, performances, trade and 
personal information.'i669 
Challis has argued that three recent court decisions in the United Kingdom, namely Irvine 
v TalkSport, 1670 Arsenal Football Club Pie v Reed1671 and Niema Ash v Loreena 
McKennit1672 have 'taken these "privacy" and "personality" strands and have, through the 
- . . 
use of the law of passing off, a re-interpretation of trade mark law and recent moves to 
embrace a new "law of privacy", developed what might possibly be called a "fledgling" 
image right'. 1673 The author observes, however, that the situation as it stands ·in the UK 
is not conducive to legal certainty regarding the protection of aspects of the persona by 
means of a free-standing economic right to the exploitation of the image or persona. In 
fact, he observes that '[copyright, trade description legislation, data protection 
regulations and defamation laws], along with passing off, trade mark law and privacy 
seem to provide for a hotch-potch of image right protection - but not a clear self 
standing image or personality right'. 1674 
There appears to have been little change from the incidental nature of protection 
afforded to aspects of the persona in English law since Cornish remarked in 1989 that it 
is considered improper to use a person's name or likeness without his consent for 
1669 Ben Challis 'United Kingdom: The right image? Does the UK need a stand alone image right for the new 
millennium?', available on the web site of http://www.musiclawuodates.com [last accessed 21 February 2007] 
1670 See the discussion in the text below 
1671 Court of Appeal [2003] EWCA Civ 96 
1672 Court of Appeal [2006] EWCA Civ 1714 
1673 Challis op cit. 
1674 Ibid. 
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advertising purposes, but 'however unethical it may be, it is not settled how far it is 
actiona bl.e. '1675 
540 It is submitted that the same. is true in South Africa, and that what our law needs 
is something along the lines of such a 'stand alone image right', as is the case in certain 
other jurisdictions referred to. But while Challis has called for legislative reform in this 
regard in the UK, I believe the basis for such a right already ·exists in the South African 
common law. It is submitted that there has been judicial recognition of an eminently . 
suitable niche for such protection. In the ·case of Hawker v Life Offices Association,1676 · 
which case involved an application by an insurance agent who had been blacklisted by 
the industry's controlling body and was thus prevented from earning a living as such; · 
Howie J held (with reference to the earlier case of Matthews and Others v Young 1677 ) as 
follows: 
'In the absence of legal and contractual restrictions, applicant has the subjective right to 
exercise his chosen calling without unlawful interference from others ... That right does not 
solely relate to factors of personality. It has a monetary component ... Although ... unlawful 
interference with an employee's liberty to earn his livelihood in his chosen sphere is not 
juridically the same as unlawful interference with a trader's right to goodwill, the two 
situations are, in my opinion, so closely analogous, especially as regards the instigation of 
a· boycott, that the law [relating to boycotts of a trader's undertaking] must constitute 
important guidelines in the present case.'1678 
It is submitted that this 'right to the earning capacity', as it has been called, provides a 
suitable niche for protection in cases of unlicensed or unauthorized celebrity 
1675 Cornish, WR Intellectual Property 2nd ed. (1989) at 420: Andrew Terry shared the same sentiments in 
respect of the position in Australian law, in an article published in 1989 ('Exploiting celebrity: Character 
merchandising and unfair trading' University of New South Wales Law Journal Vol. 12 (1989) 204, at 210), 
when he stated that the key to successful character merchandising lies in the possession of a property right in 
the intangible values sought to be protected. The author observed that the intellectual property regime (trade 
mark, copyright and design protection) which confers these property rights is insufficient to protect the 
Australian character merchandiser in every case. 
1676 1987 (3) SA 777 (C) 
1677 1922 AD 492 at 507 
1678 Hawker's case at 780 
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merchandising (or infringement of athletes' image rights). The subject of this right, which· 
Neethling has characterised as 'personal immaterial property', 1679 shows characteristics of 
both aspects of the personality as well as patrimonial interests (and infringement of such 
right causes patrimonial damage). Recognition of this right as constituting the proper 
basis for patrimonial protection would also be in line with earlier calls for law reform in 
this respect, 1680 which have also criticized copyright and trade mark law as providing 
limited protection in these types of cases. 1681 
It is acknowledged that South _African law needs to.recognise a form of direct protection 
in such cases by means of recognition of a proprietary interest and corresponding 
property right in the aspects of the persona of celebrities (including athletes) that are 
commercially valuable and vulnerable .to ·Unauthorized exploitation by others. 1682 Such an 
approach would bring South African law in line with developments elsewhere, e.g. the 
American right of publicity (mentioned above) and the Canadian tort of misappropriation 
of personality, 1683 and, it is submitted, be more in line with modern commercial (sports) 
practice. 
1679 Neethling, J Van Heerden-Neethling's Unlawful Competition 2nd ed LexisNexis, Durban (2008) at 115 et seq. 
1680 Mostert, F 'The Right to the Advertising Image' 1982 South African Law Journal 413 had earlier argued for 
the recognition of a distinctive and autonomous intellectual property right, namely the right to the 'advertising 
image', which the author defined as follows: 
'Under the advertising image is understood every name, mark, symbol or character that is identified with a 
particular product, business or person, and that harbours potential° advertising value and possible goodwill for 
products or businesses of other entities in various other unrelated fields of commerce.' (At 424) 
Mostert further argued that: 
'The unauthorized appropriation of an advertising image for promotion purposes would result in the 
infringement of the right to the advertising image and constitute unlawful conduct. The damages claimed would 
consist of the possible royalty money or remuneration the holder of the right to the advertising image would 
have been entitled to claim for its use.' Apart from this, Mostert argued that such infringement would in most 
cases also bring about infringement of the holder of the advertising image's goodwill, by the fact that the 
defendant would have foreclosed on the plaintiff's opportunities to license others in the same line of business or 
by robbing existing licenses of their exclusivity (Mostert at 425). 
As to classification of this right to the advertising image, see Mostert at 426 et seq. 
1681 See Mostert op cit. at 427-428. It is important to note that Mostert's proposed 'right to the advertising 
image' was subsequently criticised - see Coetser, PP J Die Reg op Identiteit ['The Right to Identity'] (1986), 
who proposed that South African law should recognize an immaterial property right to the individual 
merchandising power (which would only be available to natural persons for protection of the patrimonial 
interest inherent in the individual's persona, and would not for example be available in cases of alleged 
infringement of rights in respect of fictional characters). 
1682 Louw, AM Character Merchandising and the Celebrity in South African Law Unpublished LL.M dissertation, 
University of Stellenbosch (1996) 
1683 The last established in Krouse v Chrysler Canada Ltd (1973) 40 D.L.R. (3d) 15, Ont. CA and confirmed in 
Athans v Canadian Adventure Camps Ltd (1977) 80 D.L.R. (3d) 583, Ont. HC. The content of the protection 
afforded by this common law tort (which is also known as the common law right of publicity, reminiscent of the 
terminology of the similar remedy available in American law) has been described as follows: 
'The tort of misappropriation of personality is legal recognition of a person's exclusive right to use or exploit his 
or her persona. The tort can be invoked when: 
- there is an element of commercial exploitation of a person's personality (this could be that person's figure, 
profile, face, name, voice, or stance - anything that is recognizable to the viewing public); 
- the person is clearly identifiable in the medium used; 
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541 When the Americans speak of a property right to the publicity value of aspects of 
the celebrity's persona, the objective is to recognize a subjective right to an interest 
which has commercial value and the infringement of which causes patrimonial damage 
(even though these aspects of the persona are bound to the personality itself). 1684 The 
incorporeal nature of such a subjective right would make it an immaterial property 
right.168s . 
When one .considers another immaterial property right, the right to the goodwill of a 
business or.undertaking, one sees that it bears a:marked resemblance to the subject of 
the celebrity's right of publicity in American law. The goodwill of an undertaking is 
comprised of certain components of the undertaking, inter alia the personality of the 
entrepreneur, the locality of the business, the value of trade names and trade marks, 
etc. The undertaking has a greater value than the sum of all these components and the 
surplus·.value is immaterial property (the goodwill, which has been defined as 'the 
attractive force that brings in custom'1686). 
The cel·ebrity's persona is also made up of certain components (such as the name, 
likeness, voice, sporting skill, etc), but it has a greater value than the sum of these 
components. This surplus value is constituted by the celebrity's fame. In the context of 
celebrity merchandising, such fame is the attractive force that brings in custom, as is 
shown by the phenomenal sales of celebrity-endorsed merchandise and memorabilia. It 
The person does not consent to this use; and 
-damages are proven.' 
From a short article entitled 'Whose public persona? - The common law right of publicity', Coaches Report, 
Spring 1999, Vol. 5 No. 4 (available online on the web site of the Centre for Sport and Law Inc. at 
http://www.sportlaw.ca [last accessed 21 February 2007]). 
1684 For cases that recognized the nature of the right of publicity as an intangible property right, see Waits v 
Frito-Lay, Inc. 978 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir., 1992)(California); Herman Miller, Inc. v Palazetti Imports and Exports, 
Inc. 270 F.3d 298 (Michigan); Prima v Darden Restaurants, Inc. 78 F. Supp 2d 337 (D.N.J. 2000)(New Jersey); 
Cardtoons L.C. v Major League Baseball Players' Association 95 F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 1996)(0klahoma); Joplin 
Enterprises v Allen 795 F. Supp 349, 350 (W.D. Wash. 1992)(Washington). 
1685 The American state right of publicity has been described and distinguished from the right of privacy as 
follows: 
'The right of publicity is a property right in the commercial use of one's persona. Approximately half of the 
states recognize it. Some of these make it descendible and assignable; in others it expires with death. Although 
publicity rights are conceptually related to privacy rights, an area of tort law, the publicity right itself is a 
property right in the elements of personal identity. Privacy is a more limited right, which usually protects names 
and likenesses only. Privacy is a personal right that cannot be sold or given away, and lasts only through a 
person's lifetime.· Publicity, in contrast, is alienable, may survive death, and has been expanded to protect a 
person's voice, gestures and mannerisms.' 
Rodrigues, U 'Race to the stars: A federalism argument for leaving the right of publicity in the hands of the 
states' Virginia Law Review Vol. 87 No. 6 (2001) 1201-1227 at 1202 
1686 See The Commissioners of Inland Revenue v Muller & Co. 's Margarine (Ltd) 1901 AC 217 at 224 
618 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
is submitted that one can actually speak of a 'personal goodwill' of the celebrity in this 
regard. 
The problem of course is in finding a basis in law for the recognition of this 'personal 
goodwill', and it is submitted that there has been judicial recognition of an eminently 
suitable niche for this purpose in Hawker's judgment supra. 
542 Recognition of protection for the image rights of athletes (and other famous 
personalities) on this basis would be a significant step forward for South African law 
towards providing the level of protection afforded in other jurisdictions. While, as has 
been shown, such protection in the UK is largely limited to the tort of unlawful 
competition and passing off, 1687 this is not unproblematic, and there have indeed been 
calls for legislatiV.e reform in order to ·establish a self-standing image right for 
celebrities. 1688 
In illustrating the benefits of the recognition of this basis for protection over the more 
traditional notion of the application of passing off in such cases, one can referto the 
TalkSport case referred to earlier which involved English racing driver Eddie Irvine. In the 
judgment of the Chancery Division, Laddie J held that in 'endorsement cases' (i.e: where 
the unauthorized celebrity merchandiser has falsely created an impression of 
endorsement by the athlete - compare the facts of the case 1689 ) it is not necessary for a 
plaintiff to prove a common field of activity in trade as in other passing off cases. 
However, such plaintiff would have to prove two, interrelated, facts, namely 
that at the time of the acts complained of the plaintiff had a significant 
reputation or goodwill; and 
1687 Compare the Irvine v TalkSport Ltd case referred to earlier; see also Challis op cit. 
1688 See the interesting article by Ben Challis entitled 'United Kingdom: The right image? Does the UK need a 
stand alone image right for the new millennium?', available on the web site of 
http://www.musiClawuodates.com [last accessed 21 February 2007] 
1689 The defendant in Irvine had used a legally-obtained photograph of the plaintiff racing driver in an 
advertisement for its radio station. The photograph, which showed the driver talking on a mobile phone, had 
been manipulated by removal of the phone and the substitution of a radio (with the name of the station 
emblazoned on it), without plaintiff's consent. The plaintiff claimed that this conduct amounted to a 
misrepresentation as to endors~ment by the plaintiff of the defendant's radio station. 
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that the actions of the defendant 'gave rise to a false message which would 
be understood by a riot insignificant section of his market that his goods 
have been endorsed, recommended or are approved of by the claimant'. 
Recognition in South Africa of the right to the earning capacity of an athlete, which 
earning capacity can be substantial in any given case as a result of the efforts of such 
athlete in establishing a commercially valuable reputation and is a worthy object for 
protection against unauthor!zed exploitation by others, would eliminate the need to 
resort to (what.is submitted to.be) an artificial exercise in trying to fit the .requirements 
. . 
for passing off to the facts of these types of cases. A plaintiff's proof of the value of the 
earning capacity would be a question to be determined on the facts of each case, and 
would be similar to the first step referred to by Laddie J in Ta/kSport, namely proof of a 
significant reputation or goodwill. However, a court's recognition of the right to the 
earning capacity might, it is submitted, give rise to a presumption of such a 'significant 
goodwill' - surely the defendant·merchandiser's appropriation of the plaintiff's persona 
would establish this? Once the value o(this patrimonial interest has been established, 
though, it would be sufficient to found liability on the part of the defendant to show that 
he or she had acted in such a way as to unlawfully infringe said right to the detriment of 
the plaintiff athlete. 1690 Gone would be the need to refer to areas of activity and whether 
the merchandiser has operated in a related field to that of the celebrity athlete; gone 
also the requirement of misrepre:=;entation or of confusion as in trade m~rk cases 1691 and 
the question whether or to what extent the athlete has a history of endorsement and the 
commercial exploitation of aspects of his or her persona. 1692 Significantly also, the 
169° Compare the judgment in Dippenaar v Shield Insurance Co Ltd 1979 (2) SA 904 (A), where it was stated 
(at 724) that '[t]he capacity to earn money is considered to be part of a person's estate and the loss or 
impairment of that capacity constitutes a loss, if such loss diminishes the estate'. It is submitted that the same 
is true in cases of unauthorized celebrity merchandising, where the 'loss or impairment' is found in the dilution 
of the commercial value of the persona, or the closing of the market occasioned by such unlawful conduct on 
the part of the merchandiser. 
1691 See Alberts, W 'Character merchandising in South Africa' Journal of Business Law Vol. 3 Part 2 (1995) 77 at 
78-9 
1692 E.g. compare the facts of the Irvine v TalkSport case discussed earlier, where the plaintiff was able to show 
such a history of previous endorsements, evidencing his goodwill. Dan Harrington and Nick White (in Blackshaw 
& Siekmann (eds.) Sports Image Rights in Europe T.M.C. Asser Press 2005 at 323) have observed that, under 
UK law, unauthorized commercial use of indicia (merchandising cases) which fall short of endorsement may still 
entitle the celebrity or athlete to apply for relief in terms of passing off, although the 'chances of success are 
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celebrity would not be unsuited or denied protection merely because of the level of his or 
her fame, as has happened elsewhere. 1693 Mere unauthorized use of the protected aspect 
of the persona .or image would constitute infringement of the property right, the 
unlawfulness of which is to be determined with reference to the bani mores and sense of 
justice of the community. 
543 As.mentioned, the athlete's earning capacity (as in fact the earning capacity of 
any individual) operates in a sense as a-personal goodwill analogous to the goodwill of a 
business undertaking (although one must distinguish goodwill and earning cap·acity). Van. 
Heerden & Neethling 1694-explain the earning capacity as an intangible creation of the 
human mind and endeavour in ~the·field of economics, as follows: 
'Although in exceptional·circumstances a. person may already have an earning capacity at 
birth, as a rule.she gradually d_evelops this intangible asset through her energy,_ effort, 
initiative, studies, exper:ierice, fir:iancial expenses, and so forth until it reache~ its full 
growth and potential. This creation is _9efinitely comparable with other creations in t~e 
economic sphere, especially the goodwill of an undertaking. However, unlike the goodwill 
and other creations of the human mind in the field of economics, culture or technology, 
earning capacity cannot ... exist or continue to exist independently of its creator.' 
It is submitted that the athlete (or other celebrity with a commercially viable and 
marketable persona1695) indeed possesses an earning capacity which is greatly enhanced 
by his or her fame. This fame constitutes an important part of the goodwill of such 
athlete. Here one can also refer to the following, which was observed in the American 
context: 
likely to be slim' (the successful applicant would have to show that the defendant's misrepresentation caused 
confusion with the public as to a connection between the individual or rights holder and the product or service). 
The authors express reservations about the correctness of this situation in light of modern commercial practice. 
1693 In the English case of Re Elvis Presley Trade Marks [1997] RPC 543 (Chancery 18/3/97) it was held that the 
name 'Elvis' could not be registered as a trade mark as, ironically, it had lost its distinctiveness (the ability to 
distinguish the proprietor of such mark's goods from those of others) as a result of its well-known nature. 
1694 Unlawful Competition Butterworths, Durban (1995) at 114 
1695 It should be noted that the right to the earning capacity is not exclusive to those who have achieved fame; 
every individual with an earning capacity possesses this right, although the value (also for purposes of the 
calculation of damages) would depend on the attributes (e.g. fame in the case of a rock star or extraordinary 
beauty in the case of a model) that are relevant to such person's ability and capacity to earn. 
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'A celebrity must be considered to have invested his years of practice and competition in a 
public personality which eventually may reach marketable status. That identity, embodied 
in his name, likeness, statistics a_nd other personal characteristics is the fruit of his labors 
and is a type of property. '1696 
Whe11 aspects of the persona are used for promoting products or services without the 
. . . . ,. .. . 
celebrity's consent, he or she will be deprived of the ability or capacity to earn revenues 
through the licensing of the use of such aspects for the merchandising of that particular 
(or a similar) product_or service. Accordingly, such unlicensed celebrity merchandising 
will constitute an infringement1697 of the celebrity's right to the earning capacity, and his 
loss will li_e in the loss of revenues he would have received in terms of a licensing 
agreement. 169_8 Wh_en such an infringement is also contra bonos mores, it would give rise 
to Aquilian liability for the celebrity's patrimonial damage. 1699 
1696 Berkman 43 Brooklyn Law Review (1976) 539. See, generally, Van Heerden & Neethling Unlawful 
Competition supra at 112-116. 
1697 See Neethling & Le Roux supra at 727, where it is stated that an infringement of the right to the earning 
capacity:is not only caused by the loss of such capacity, but also by 'enige belemmering van die reghebbende 
se beskikking daaroor of genot daarvan' ['any interference with the rights holder's disposition or enjoyment 
thereof'). 
1698 Which is analogous to or could be modeled on the statutory alternative to conventional damages provided 
for in section 24(1A) of the Copyright Act 98 of 1978, which provides for a notional, reasonable royalty which 
would have been payable by a licensee - see discussion in Dean, 0 H Handbook of South African Copyright Law 
Juta & Co. (looseleaf - service revision 13, 2006) 1-74 to 1-75. 
The possible forms·of damage in these cases have also been described as follows: 
'The damage <:a used by unauthorized manipulation or appropriation of a person's image for commercial 
purposes comes in two forms, the first being the invasion of the subject's privacy and the related loss of control 
or autonomy over the use of his or her image and the second being the loss of control inherent in the · 
defendant's reaping an economic benefit from another person's image and the reputation and goodwill 
associated with it ... with the resultant reduction in the scope of future potential licensing opportunities in the 
market sector.' Jones 'Manipulating the law against misleading imagery: Photo montage and appropriation of 
well-known personality' (1999) 1 European Intellectual Property Review 28. 
As for discussion of the Oliver Kahn case (see the discussion supra) as an interesting example of the problems 
inherent in determining the fair market value of a 'lost license fee', see Michael Gerlinger in Blackshaw & 
Siekmann (eds.) Sports Image Rights in Europe T.M.C. Asser Press 2005 at 126'-128. For discussion of the four 
most common types of actions or conduct where the right of publicity arises in American case law (namely (1) 
appropriation of one's name or likeness for advertising or endorsement; (2) unauthorized use of one's name or 
likeness on commercial products; (3) appropriation of one's unique style or characteristics; and (4) 
appropriation of one's performance) and the forms of harm caused by such exploitation), see Spahn, Kenneth 
E. 'The right of publicity: A matter of privacy, property or public domain?' 19 Nova Law Review (Spring, 1995) 
1013. 
1699 Another possible form of damage can also be identified here. The unlicensed merchandising use of the 
celebrity's persona could dilute or erode the value of such persona in this secondary market (the merchandising 
market), if wide-spread use of this persona causes it to lose its uniqueness as a merchandising tool (and thus 
its commercial appeal). The unlicensed use of the persona in connection with a disreputable product or service 
could also serve to damage the reputation of the celebrity, which might (apart from possible infringement of 
personality rights) cause patrimonial damage of the right to the earning capacity in the celebrity's primary 
. 622 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Similar to the level of protection offered by the right of publicity in the United States and 
the Canadian tort of misappropriation of personality, athletes would have access to a 
remedy aimed at directly protecting against patrimonial damages caused by infringement 
of a proprietary interest (by means of an application for an interdict or an action for 
damages). It should be noted, however, that exceptions to a finding of infringement 
similar to those recognized elsewhere may exist also in the case of protection by means 
of this right (e.g. where use is made of aspects of the athlete's persona not for direct 
commercial purposes but rather for informationai purposes 1700 this might not necessarily 
be marked as unlawful). 1701 
544 To ·date there has been no judicial acceptance of such a basis for protection of 
athletes' image rights by South African courts, even though the right to the earning 
capacity as subjective right does enjoy widespread judicial acceptance. 1702 It is hoped 
that this issue will come before the courts in the near future, that recognition of this 
basis for protection will be sought and the availabflity of the most suitable remedy finally 
resolved. In the meantime, the existing protection afforded by other branches of 
intellectual property law (e.g. copyright and trade mark protection) and the common law 
(e.g. the general action for unlawful competition, passing off, etc) remain available to 
claimants, subject to the possible problems referred to earlier. 
market (e.g. the activity of sporting competition in which a famous athlete is involved - i.e. he or she may lose 
team placings). 
1700 E.g. compare the judgment of the Tribunal de Commerce de Liege in the case of Real Madrid v Unibet (24 
November 2006, French version available online at http://www.droit-technologie.org/jurisprudences/commerce 
liege 241106.pdf ); compare also the case of CBC Distribution & Marketing Inc v Major League Baseball 
Advanced Media LP (a judgment of a federal magistrate in the Eastern District of Missouri, 8 August 2006 - this 
judgment was subsequently affirmed in C.B.C. Distrib. and Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced 
Media, L.P., Nos. 06-3357 /3358 (8th Cir, Oct. 10, 2007), although it appears on different grounds), where it 
was held that the use of player statistics in fantasy games on the internet did not infringe the state publicity 
rights of players as their names were used only in association with their statistics and did not imply an 
endorsement or sponsorship nor provided the unauthorised defendant with a commercial advantage. In this 
matter it was also held that the defendant's First Amendment rights to freedom of speech outweighed the 
players' rights of publicity. See further, on treatment of the issue of the public interest in information in the 
German context, Michael Gerlinger ('Germany') in Blackshaw & Siekmann (eds.) Sports Image Rights in Europe 
T.M.C. Asser Press 2005 at 112 et seq. 
1701 E.g. compare the conflict between rights of privacy and other constitutionally protected rights such as 
freedom of expression and freedom of the press that have often been at loggerheads in other jurisdictions' 
treatment of such cases - compare the discussion by Challis supra. · 
1702 See the Hawker case supra; Santam Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk v Byleveldt 1973 (2) SA 146 (A); 
Dippenaar v Shield Insurance Co Ltd 1979 (2) SA 904 (A); Southern Insurance Association Ltd v Bailey 1984 
(1) SA 98 (A); President Insurance Co Ltd v Mathews 1992 (1) SA 1 (A); Ferguson v Santam Insurance Ltd 
1985 (1) SA 207 (C); Lebona v President Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk 1991 (3) SA 395 (W) 
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545 The reader "will note that the discussion throughout has assumed that the type of 
protection argued for (namely direct protection of the celebrity's persona against 
unauthorized commercial exploitation) should in fact be available. It has not touched on 
the arguments of others elsewhere, on the more philosophical issues surrounding the 
question of whether celebrity should be protected in this way .1703 While, for example, 
proponents of the.·:American right of publicity have advanced a number of arguments in 
favour of this right (e.g. that the labour· and effort involved in achieving celebrity and a 
marketable persona.should be protected, that unjust enrichment through 
misappropriation sh,ould be prevented, that protection by means of the right acts as an 
incentive to others to produce performances that appeal to the public and encourages 
creativity), others have argued that such protection is unduly restrictive (e.g. of the 
interests 9f consumers, as it raises the prices of celebrity merchandise and advertising 
and shifts wealth from the masses to a small group of the generally already wealthy) and 
especially that it threatens values such as freedom of speech and of economic 
activity. 1704 There are those in the United Kingdom, for example, who argue that such a 
strong form of protection of the persona should not be imported into that jurisdiction, 
and that the existing legal protections (e.g. the passing off action) should be sufficient to 
safeguard the interests of.the celebrity while avoiding the negative aspects of a publicity 
1703 For probably the m'ost exhaustive critical evaluation of the American right of publicity, see Michael Madow 
'Private ownership of public image: Popular culture and publicity rights' California Law Review Vol. 81 No. 1 
(January 1993.) 125-240; for critical evaluation of an interesting example from English law, see Story, A. 
'Owning Diana: From people's princess to private property' Web Journal of Current Legal Issues (1998) -
available online at http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/1998/issue5/story5.html (last accessed 9 March 2007). 
1704 For example, the following has been observed specifically in the context of the interplay between the 
American right of publicity and the First Amendment freedom of speech guarantee: 
'Perhaps ironically; one root of the problems with these cases lies in the very elusiveness of a theoretical 
justification for the right of publicity. When the government can clearly identify a purpose in limiting speech, 
courts have some basis on which to evaluate whether the speech limitation lives up to that purpose. But 
because the right of publicity rests upon a slough of sometimes sloppy rationalizations, courts have little way of 
determining whether a particular speech limitation is necessary or even appropriate in order to serve the law's 
normative goals. Instead, they appear to assume that the sum of a set of inadequate justifications equals far 
more than its parts, and allow right of publicity claims to run roughshod over the speech interests of the public.' 
Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley 'What the right of publicity can learn from trademark law' 58 Stanford Law 
Review 1161 (2006). For further discussion of the competing interests and implications of the 'property model' 
of the American publicity right, see Marks, K. S. 'An assessment of the copyright model in right of publicity 
cases' California Law Review Vol. 70 No. 3 (May 1982) 786-815; see also Felcher, P.L. & Rubin, E.L. 'Privacy, 
publicity, and the portrayal of real people by the media' Yale Law Journal Vol. 88 No. 8 (July 1979) 1577-1622; 
Volokh, E. 'Freedom of speech and information privacy: The troublin·g implications of a right to stop others from 
speaking about you' Stanford Law Review Vol. 52 No. 5 (Symposium: Cyberspace and Privacy: A new legal 
paradigm?) (May 2000) 1049-1124 (at 1069 et seq). 
For some recent American examples where the issue of freedom of speech and limitations on the right of 
publicity have come to the fore, see the California cases of Comedy III Productions, Inc v Gary Saderup, Inc 25 
Cal. 4th 387 (Cal. 2001) [case concerning unauthorised portrayal of images of the Three Stooges on t-shirts] 
and Winter v DC Comics 99 Cal. App. 4th 458 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) [blues musician brothers Johnny and Edgar 
Winters' claim based on an unauthorised portrayal of characters reminiscent of them in a comic book]. 
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or 'personality' right. On balance, though, it is submitted that it is generally accepted 
that the current state of the law in the UK in this regard (as in South Africa) is not 
satisfactory, and that some form of change is needed. 
The reason why these arguments for and against the recognition of a patrimonial right to 
aspects of the persona have not been addressed is simply that South African law in its 
current state falls short of the level of protection it should provide to those whose fame is 
exploited by means·of misappropriation of aspects of the persona for commercial 
gain. 1705 As it stands, the South African legal system constitutes a 'soft' jurisdiction; one 
with welcoming ports for the new wave of pirates who ply their trade in the modern 
celebrity merchandising market. It is both the lack of precedent in cases of this nature as 
well as tbe unsatisfactory state of the available remedies (as highlighted above) that 
make the celebrity or athlete especially vulnerable in the face of a potential 'wrong . 
without a remedy'. 1706 It is for this reason that a change in approach is suggested, in the 
interests of both equity and legal certainty. 
546 Development of the common law along the lines advocated here would also be 
consistentwith the objective normative value system underpinning the Constitution, and 
the courts' duty to develop the common law in light of the Bill of Rights and these very 
values. 1707 Recognition of a satisfactory remedy for celebrities in these cases would .be in 
line with the promotion of dignity and also with the demands of equity; recognition of the. 
patrimonial interest involved and the requisite property right would be in line with other. 
provisions of our Constitution. 1708 Not to mention the increased importance of the 
influence of foreign and international law in our modern jurisprudence. 1709 
1705 I tend to agree with the views expressed by Haemmerli regarding the inherent justification for the type of 
protection afforded by a right such as the American right of publicity, and that those whose personas are used 
for commercial purposes should, in principle, have access to a suitable remedy - see Haemmerli, A 'Whose 
who? The case for a Kantian right of publicity' 49 Duke Law Journal 383 (1999). Compare also the view 
expressed in the American right of publicity case of Hirsch v S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc 280 N.W. 2d 129 (Wis. 
1979), where it was remarked that 'it is a form of commercial immorality to "reap where another has sown'". 
1705 Haemmerli op cit. at 401 
1707 See section 39(2) of Act 108 of 1996; Carmichele v Minister of Safety and Security & Another 2001 (4) SA 
938 (CC) at par 54; NK v Minister of Safety and Security (2005) 26 IU 1205 (CC) at 1213-1215 
1708 E.g. the right to freedom of trade, occupation and profession contained in section 22 of Act 108 of 1996 
1709 Interestingly, in the UK context, Lewis & Taylor Sport: Law and Practice Butterworths (2003) (at 03.62) 
have argued that Art. 1 of Protocol 1 to the Human Rights Act 1998 might be applicable in celebrity 
merchandising cases in a very similar manner as that of the South African common law right to the earning 
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547 In conclusion, therefore, it is hoped that South African courts will be able to 
review the current position in the near future, to bring a measure of certainty to those 
who are targets of the unconscionable and blatant marketing tactics that so often 
characterize commercial aspects of the sports industry. While we have seen that the 
legislature has intervened to provide measures to effectively combat ambush marketing 
around sports events, the individual athlete remains exposed to similar dangers in 
respect of the merciless pirating of commercially valuable property. 1710 In light of the 
commercial realities, it is time for the courts to recognize the truism that what is worth 
copying is worth protecting: When unscrupulous merchandisers misappropriate aspects 
of the celebrity's persona precisely because they recognize its commercial value, a court 
should not add insult to injury by ignoring such value in the process of applying ill-suited 
grounds for relief, which will often provide no real relief at all. Why should the celebrity 
necessarily need to show that the public may be confused as to an association between 
him or her and the product of the merchandiser, as is the case in passing off and trade 
mark cases? Does the mere fact of misappropriation not, res ipsa loquitur, testify to the 
fact that the celebrity's persona has value as a marketing tool and is in fact worthy of 
protection? 
capacity (as argued above) - although not as the basis for a directly available property right but rather in terms 
of the obligation on .courts to develop the common law in line with the European Convention. Article 1 provides 
that '[e]very natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions', and is primarily 
applicable vertically (as against the state, to restrain arbitrary interference with the individual's enjoyment of 
his or her property). The authors refer to the earlier case of the European Court in Van Marie v Netherlands 
(1986) 8 EHRR 483, where the court had (notwithstanding the fact that Netherlands law does not recognise a 
property right to goodwill) held that the applicant accountants had built up a clientele which had the nature of a 
private right and could be viewed as an asset and likened to a 'possession' within the meaning of Article 1. 
Although admitting that there is authority that Art 1 does not apply to matters that are essentially ones of 
private law, Lewis & Taylor argue (at 03.64) for the possible application of this provision in cases of 
unauthorised celebrity merchandising as follows: 
'To the extent that image rights are not protected by [UK] law, celebrities lose the ability to agree to, and 
charge for, the use of their image and thereby suffer loss of income. This clearly constitutes an interference 
with peaceful enjoyment of their goodwill, and such unauthorised commercial exploitation would appear to offer 
little in the way of justification in the public interest. The courts are under an obligation, as a public body, to 
develop and apply the law in a way that respects Convention rights.' 
1710 Technological advances are also creating more and more opportunities for the unscrupulous celebrity 
merchandiser; compare the practice of unauthorised registering of the names of celebrities as domain names -
see Ezer, D.J. 'Celebrity names as web site addresses: Extending the domain of publicity rights to the internet' 
University of Chicago Law Review Vol. 67 No. 4 (2000) 1291-1315 (where it is argued that the American right 
of publicity is preferable to trade mark and copyright law to combat such practices). It is submitted that the use 
of the right to the earning capacity in South African law (as advocated here) could provide as effective a 
remedy in such cases. 
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Unlike the position 25 years ago, the practice of celebrity merchandising is now a well-
known one. As has been argued the suitable basis for relief of those prejudiced by this 
practice is also already established. It is hoped that the courts will make this connection, 
and provide long-overdue recognition of the property right at stake. While critics have 
increasingly observed that the American publicity right is expanding to worrying degrees 
and threatening to become unmanageable, it is believed that the courts can administer 
the necessary controls to avoid such dangers. Judicial conservatism can serve to limit the 
scope of the right, but should l')ot serve to deny its existence and availability as a general 
premise. 
548 As mentioned earlier, even though South African law does not currently recognize 
'image rights' as commercially exploitable and legally protectable property (similar to the 
position in certain other jurisdictions,- e.g. England), the reality is that such 'rights' are 
recognised in commercial practice and regulated accordingly by means of contract in the 
major professional sports. By way of example, the 2008 Standard Players' Contract in 
professional rugby, which is at the time of writing in force between provincial unions and 
players (as negotiated between SARPA1711 and SARE0 1712), contains the following 
provisions relating to the use of players' images1713 (in clauses 32-42): 
'Use of your image by the Province 
32. For the duration of this agreement the Province may, subject to clause 34, use, and 
may permit its sponsors to use, your image to promote -
32.1. the Game of Rugby; -
1711 South African Rugby Players' Association, the registered trade union which represents the majority of 
professional rugby players and which is the recognised collective bargaining agent for professional rugby 
players in terms of the provisions of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 
1712 South African Rugby Employers' Organisation, the registered employers' organisation which represents the 
14 provincial rugby unions which employ professional rugby players and which is the recognised collective 
bargaining agent rugby employers in terms of the provisions of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 
1713 The player's 'image' is defined as follows in the interpretation clause of the 2008 Collective Agreement 
between SARPA and SAREO (to which the 2008 Standard Players' Contract is annexed as a First Schedule): 
'"Image" means a player's name, nickname, shirt number, signature, voice, picture, photograph, likeness 
and/or biographical information'. 
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32.2. the Province; 
32.3. the Province's teams or squads; 
32.4. any competition or tournament in which the Province's teams participate; 
32.5. the Province's sponsors, and/ or their business undertakings, products or services. 
33. The Province may use your image beyond the period of this agreement for the 
purposes of promoting the Game of Rugby and the Province teams, for example in match 
programs, yearbooks and magazines, but not for commercial purposes. 
34. Despite clause 32 -
34.1. the Province's sponsors may only use your image in association with the image of at 
least three other players, and in a manner that creates and furthers the sponsors' 
association with the Province, and I or its teams and squads, rather than with you 
personally; 
34.2. the Province and its sponsors shall ensure that whenever they use your image you 
are attired in provincial apparel; 
34.3. the Province and its sponsors may not use your image in a manner that harms your 
good name or offends your moral or religious sensibilities. Whenever the Province is of the 
view that the use of your image may cause such harm or offence it will give you notice in 
writing of its intention, or the intention of its sponsor, to use your image. You must then 
notify the Province of your objection in writing within 48 hours, and state the ground(s) on 
which you object. If you fail without reasonable cause to 'object within the 48 hour period, 
you will be deemed to have waived your right to object. The Province will then advise you, 
within a further 72 hours of receiving your objection, whether despite such objection it, or 
its sponsor, intends using your image. Thereafter, you may refer a dispute to expedited 
arbitration in terms of clause 55 of this agreement. 
34.4. the Province will use its best efforts to ensure that its sponsors do not use your 
image disproportionately more often than they use the image of other players in the team; 
35. Any marketing, advertising and I or promotional material created by the Province and / 
or its sponsors as contemplated in clauses 32 and 33 which incorporates your image, shall 
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belong exclusively to the Province and / or such sponsor but may only be used as 
contemplated in this agreement. 
Your own use of your image 
36. For the duration of this Agreement you will not, without the prior written consent of 
the Province, enter into or make·any agreement or arrangement, whether legally binding or 
not, concerning the use of your image, or otherwise engage in any promotional activity, or-' 
communicate with the-: media, or write for the media, or be involved in a radio or television~ 
broadcast, or enter into any agreement relating to the internet. 
37. Should you wish to obtain the Province's consent as contemplated ~n clause 36 you 
must address a written request to the Province in the fcirm of Annexure IV. :rhe Province 
will respond in writing within 3 working days of receiving the request and shall ·either grant 
or deny the request. Should the Province deny your request it shall provide brief reasons 
for such denial. 
38. If the Province fails to respond within the time period contemplated in clause 38 the 
Province shall be deemed to have granted the request. 
39. The Province may not withhold the consent contemplated in clause 36 unless the 
agreement or arrangement, or promotional activity, or communication with the media, or 
writing or broadcast or agreement relating to the internet, as the case may be -
'4 .. ~~ .. :. ,._ 
39.1. relates to products or services competitive with those of the Province and/ or its 
Nominated Sponsors1714 ; 
39.2. involves the disclosure of confidential information, or is prejudicial to the -" .. 
interests of the Province, SA Rugby, .the IRB or the Game of Rugby; 
1714 A 'nominated sponsor' is defined in the interpretation clause of the 2008 collective agreement between 
SARPA and SAREO as follows: 
'(a) Any one of a maximum of 7 sponsors nominated by the provinces annually and communicated to SARPA in 
writing; and 
(b) the official title sponsors of the Super 14, Currie Cup, Vodacom Cup, Under 21 and Under 19 competitions.' 
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39.3. tends to bring the Game of Rugby into disrepute; or 
39.4. is otherwise in conflict with your obligations under this agreement. 
40. When participating in any promotional activity after having obtained the Province's 
consent you may not, without the prior written consent of the Province, appear in the 
Provincial jersey, or appear in, or make use of, any marks, words, names and the like 
which create an association with the Province. However, you and the Province may, subject 
to an agreed revenue sharing arrangement, .enter into a joint-venture promotional activity 
agreement in terms of which the Province agrees that you may appear in the Provincial 
jersey, or appear in or make use of any marks, words, names and the like contemplated in 
this clause. 
41. You may ~ot, without the prior consent of the Province 1715 -
41.1. apply your signature, name, nickname or other visual representation of your identity 
to any team or match jersey (whether a home or away or practice jersey) or to any team 
shorts or soc.ks. This prohibition shall apply notwithstanding that the trade marks of the 
Province or any of its sponsors have been removed from such items; 
41.2. sign photographs depicting scenes in the stadium during, preceding or after a match 
in which you have participated; 1716• 
41.3. take pictures of yourself wearing the Province's jersey, shorts or socks ('colors'), or 
otherwise displaying any of the Province's trade marks or those of its sponsors, or allow 
such pictures of yourself to be taken, or have sketches yourself wearing such colors or 
trade marks drawn or otherwise reproduced on any surface whether by printing, 
embossing or other means. 
42. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this agreement, if an existing agreement1717 
between you and a third party concerning any matter set out in clause 36 and relating to 
1715 A footnote to the Standard Players' Contract notes that '[i]t is recorded that the provisions of this clause 
have been included to protect the player and the province from unauthorised commercial exploitation of the 
player's image or the province's trade marks by private entrepreneurs who, for example, induce players to sign 
je~seys or match-winning photographs and then sell the items to members of the public at exhorbitant rates.' 
1716 A footnote to the Standard Players' Contract notes that '[t]his includes but is not limited to scenes from the 
. dressing room, or of pre· or post-match interviews or award ceremonies.' 
630 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
products or services competitive with those of the Province, or one or more of its Nominated 
Sponsors, terminates during the term of this agreement, the Nominated Sponsors -~hose. rights 
are affected shall have the first option of entering into an agreement with you on at lea~ similar 
terms to those offered by such third party. Should the Nominated Sponsor elect not to exercise 
the option you shall be entitled to renew the agreement with the third party.'1718 
It was reported in January 2009 that the SA Rugby Union has recently resolved to 
partially release its hold on players' control over their image rights, in an attempt_to 
address the exodus of top players to European clubs on lucrative contracts. 1719 It is 
expected that the ability to license the use of their images will bring in millions of rands 
for a number of top players, who will be able to earn more from such activity_ than from 
their existing players' contracts. It is hoped that such players will decide to stay in South 
Africa rather than seek employment with clubs abroad. 
549 In professional cricket there is currently a commercial rights arrangement in place 
between Cricket South Africa (or the 'CSA', which contracts 18 players for service in the 
national side), the six domestic franchises (which contract approximately 90 players) and 
the SA Cricketers' Association (the professional players' association, which is at the _time 
of writing fully representative of all professional cricketers in South Africa). This 
arrangement regulates commercial rights relating to the use of player attributes (image 
rights) and player appearances (in terms of contractual obligations with the official 
sponsors of the CSA and the franchises). -
In terms of this arrangement, two players' trusts have been established to act as vehicles 
for the granting of rights to the CSA and the distribution of revenue from such 
commercial rights to players. The National Players' Trust has as its beneficiaries the 
professional cricketers who play for the national team, while the Franchise Players' Trust 
1717 A footnote to the Standard Players' Contract notes that an 'existing agreement' is one that is in existence 
at the time of conclusion of the player's contract with the Province. 
1718 The 2008 Standard Players' Contract contains further special provisions relating to footwear and protective 
and technical gear (in clause 43 et seq.) 
1719 See the report by Harmse and Borchardt 'Boks set to earn millions', 25 January 2009 (avaiiable online at 
http://www.sport24.co.za - last accessed 18 February 2009) 
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(or 'All Players Trust') 1720 serves the same function in respect of players in the domestic 
franchise system. SACA serves as trustee on both these trusts. At the time of writing, a 
five year grant of rights agreement is in force between each ofthese trusts respectively 
and Cricket SA. 1721 
SACA facilitates the granting of commercial rights (e.g. to use of the attributes of 
players) to CSA, who then license the use of such rights to its official sponsors, 
merchandisers, licensees and the International Cricket Council (for purposes of official 
ICC events such as the ICC Champions Trophy, the ICC Cricket World Cup and the World 
Twenty20 championship). 1722 Within the trusts, the players determine how revenue from 
the granting of rights are to be shared between players, based on criteria such as the 
number of years that a player has been contracted and 'match points' relating to the 
number ofgames which a player has played. Revenues related to participation in ICC 
events for players in the national team are shared based on the contractual category of 
such players (i.e. in terms of the A+, A, Band C categories into which nationally 
contracted players are divided). Retired players are eligible to share in revenues for a 
period of 6 months after retirement. 
It appears that the system of players' trusts is currently viewed as a highly successful 
vehicle for the management of commercial rights in professional cricket. The players' 
association (SACA) has in recent years succeeded in negotiating more favourable terms 
for players in respect of the exploitation of their image rights. For example, while a 
previous licensing agreement between SACA (on behalf of the National Players' Trust) 
with videogame manufacturer Electronic Arts (EA Games) for the use of players' 
attributes in their EA Cricket game had earned the players revenues in the region of ZAR 
60 000 per annum, SACA has managed to negotiate a more lucrative deal collectively 
(with players' associations in e.g. England and Australia), which has entitled South 
African players to benefit from royalties based on international sales of the game 
1720 As referred to in the Executive Summary (par. 13.1) of SACA's proposals for the Memorandum of 
Understanding with Cricket South Africa (see the discussion elsewhere in this chapter) 
1721 Ibid. 
1722 For these official ICC events, which are now (with the exception of the ICC Cricket World Cup) held on an 
annual basis, a participation fee is paid by the ICC to each member board, as well as a dividend (which is 
shared between Cricket South Africa and SACA, on behalf of the players). 
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(especially in the large Indian market), and currently such players' share of revenues is 
approximately ZAR 900 000 per annum. 1723 
1723 From a briefing by Tony Irish, CEO of the SA Cricketers' Association, at the SARPA/SAREO workshop on 
players' image rights, held in Cape Town, 23 June 2008 
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§4 Sports Sponsorship1724 
550 The late great Edward Grayson observed that the practice of 'sponsorship' has no 
traditional legal status; and that '[l]ike sport itself, it leans more to description than 
delineation'. 1725 The practice of sponsorship may take many forms, although the following 
serves as a succinct definition encompassing the basic elements, namely 'the 
advancement of money by a commercial company to an individual, agent, or association. 
in return for media exposure of the sponsor's product, name, trademark or logo'. 1726 In 
the context of sport, a sponsorship contract could involve such financial assistance to 
teams, individual athletes or players, sports governing bodies, event organizers, groups 
of supporters, etc, 1727 while other forms of sponsorship involvement include the growing 
market in corporate naming rights to stadia and sporting venues 1728 and the related 
activity of.athlete endorsements, 1729 vending rights, venue suite sales, etc. 
551 A major area of sponsorship activity is that of broadcast sponsorship, where a 
sponsor's financial outlay is utilized in respect of the costs of a television or other 
broadcast. Between the different sporting codes the value or suitability of competitions 
and events for broadcasting purposes differs. It has for example been observed that 
1724 I wish to express my sincere thanks to David Sidenberg of BMI Sport Info, an independent market research 
company which specialises in the sports sponsorship industry, for kindly providing the very helpful statistical 
and other information regarding the South African sports sponsorship market as contained herein 
1725 Edward Grayson Sport and the Law 3rd ed. Butterworths, London 2000 446 
1726 See Grayson op cit. 451. Sports sponsorship has also been defined as 'the support of a sport, sports event, 
sports organisation or competition by an outside body or person for the mutual benefit of both parties' - From 
the 'Howell Report', report of the Committee of Enquiry into Sports Sponsorship, Central Council for Physical 
Recreation, London (1983). Lewis and Taylor describe sponsorship as 'an investment in cash or kind in an 
activity, in return for access to the exploitable commercial and marketing potential associated with that activity' 
(Lewis & Taylor Sport: Law and Practice 2003 at 706); see also Gardiner et al Sports Law 2nd Edition 2001 at 
507. Gratton & Taylor Economics of Sport and Recreation E&FN Spon 2000, remarked that sports sponsorship 
had hardly existed as an economic activity in the United Kingdom before 1970, yet had grown by 1999 to have 
an estimated worth of £350 million. The authors also remarked that, globally, sports sponsorship as an industry 
was estimated in 1999 to have a worth of approximately $20 billion, having grown in value by over 300 per 
cent in the 1990s alone (Gratton & Taylor 163). 
For some more detailed discussion of major developments in this international industry, see Amis, J & Cornwell, 
B (eds.) Global Sport Sponsorship Berg Publishers, Oxford & New York 2005. 
1727 The South African Supreme Court of Appeal had occasion in South African Football Association v Stanton 
Woodrush (Pty) Ltd t/a Stan Smidt & Sons & Another 2003 (3) SA 313 (SCA) (at p322) to discuss the 
distinction between sponsorship and the practice of trade mark licensing, in the context of the placing of a 
brand name on playing kit. 
1728 See Cloete et al Introduction to Sports Law in South Africa 174-5. See also the discussion in par 596 et seq 
below 
1729 See the discussion on athletes' image rights and the practice of celebrity merchandising in par 523-549 
above 
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cricket is the ideal vehicle for television broadcasts and broadcast advertising: One Day 
International matches usually last in the region of eight hours, 1730 the sporting spectacle 
is confined to a relatively small enclosed area (and therefore easily captured on camera), 
and the breaks between overs provide ideal ·opportunity for commercials. Other sports 
(e.g. motor sport events, marathon running and yachting) provide more challenges in 
respect of the logistics and costs of coverage. It is important in cases of broadcast 
sponsor involvement to note that conflicts may arise between the rights and interests of 
e.g. event sponsors and such broadcast sponsors, especially in respect of the exclusivity 
of rights obtained by each. This should be carefully considered by sponsors at the time of 
negotiation of agreements. 1731 . 
552 American commentator Kim Skildum-Reid wrote in 2003 that sponsorship was 
entering its 'last generation', where sponsors are starting to realize that success in this 
activity is about nurturing a brand's connection with a target market by putting that 
market's needs first; it is about how a sponsor can 'use the most emotional and 
personally relevant of all marketing media to improve [a] brand's relationship with a 
target market and, more importantly, their relationship to [a] brand'. 1732 According to the 
author, this has led to a very different model of sponsorship. While in the past sponsors 
attempted to create bonds with an event, the trend now is to create bonds with target 
markets, through a variety of means. 1733 
553 Sponsorship is a 'below the line' form of advertising, which is not carried by the 
traditional media. Accordingly, the value of sponsorship for the sponsor lies not in paid 
brand advertising in the media but rather in indirect reference to its name, brand, 
1730 This is even more applicable to the newest (and much shorter) format of the game, the Pro20 or Twenty20 
format (20 overs a side), and might be one of the reasons for the phenomenal amounts paid for the 
broadcasting rights to the recently-established Indian Premier League (or IPL) tournament - see the discussion 
of the IPL elsewhere in this chapter. 
1731 For more on the dangers inherent in cross-sponsorship of sports events, see par 559 below 
1732 See Kim Skildum-Reid 'Last Generation Sponsorship', available on the web site of 
http://www.powersponsorship.com [last accessed 16 February 2007] 
1733 Ibid. 
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product or service (i.e. by mention. in an event title or on athletes' clothing). 1734 In South 
Africa, as elsewhere, the practice of licensing event and stadium naming rights, for 
example, has also become a mainstream source of revenue for sports bodies. 
554 Section 3.1 of the Advertising Standards Authority of South Africa (ASA)'s 
Sponsorship Code (a code of conduct for those engaged in sponsorship in inter alia 
sport) 1735 defines 'sponsorship' as follows: 
'Sponsorship is·a form of marketing communication whereby a sponsor contractually 
provides financial and/or other support to an organization, individual, team, activity, event 
and/or broadcast in return for rights to use the sponsor's name and logo in connection with 
a sponsored event, activity, team, individual, organization or broadcast. 
. . 
The objective of investing in sponsorship is to create a positive association between a 
sponsor's image, product or brand and a sponsored event or activity, team, individual, 
organization or broadcast, within the sponsor's target market in order to attain marketing 
and corporate objectives.' 
The ASA is an independent body established and funded by the advertising industry 'to 
ensure that its system of self-regulation works in the interests of the public'. The ASA 
runs a Sponsorship Dispute Resolution Committee and a Sponsorship Appeals 
Committee, which consists of member of the signatories to the Code within the 
advertising industry, and rulings are made by peers. While the Code is not legally 
enforceable, the ASA may advise persons of their rights and obligations. Rulings by the 
ASA or a Committee may include orders for the withdrawal of advertising as well as other 
sanctions to members of the industry (e.g. withholding advertising space or referral to a 
disciplinary hearing). 1736 While this code of conduct is therefore not a primary weapon in 
the arsenal of sponsors, who will need to enforce their rights through the applicable 
1734 Lewis & Taylor Sport: Law and Practice Cavendish Publishing 2003 at 706 
1735 The Code is available on the ASASA web site at htto://www.asasa.org.za 
1736 See, generally, the provisions of the Code 
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branch of intellectual property law (e.g. copyright or trade mark protectior.i), common law 
actions (e.g. in cases of passing off) or actions for breach of contract, it does provide a 
possible avenue for action against persons or organizations within the advertising 
industry in cases of questionable practices relating to sports sponsorship. This may 
include cases of unauthorized celebrity merchandising (e.g. infringement or 
misappropriation of an athlete's image rights in advertising and promotional services). 1737 
The ASA hears an average of 4 000 complaints per year, of which approximately 96% are 
brought by members of the public, and 4% from competitors of business undertakings. 
Roughly 47% of such complaints relate to instances of alleged misleading claims in 
advertising. 
555 At the time of writing, it appears that the ASA has to date had only a single 
complaint related to (sports) sponsorship (in terms of its Sponsorship Code). The dispute 
arose out of an advertisement by mobile phone network MTN, which ran a newspaper 
advertisement during 2007 with the bold heading 'Turning Young Men into Bafana 
Bafana'. 1738 Rival. mobile telephone network Vodacom, the official national team sponsor, 
brought a complaint against MTN, claiming that the advertisement infringed Vodacom's 
sponsorship rights which it had obtained from the SA Football Association (SAFA). It was 
also alleged that SAFA had registered the word 'Bafana Bafana' as a trade mark for 
mobile phone services and that Vodacom had been given the right to use the mark in 
advertising, and that MTN's advertisement constituted infringement of such trade mark. 
The ASA ruled against MTN (which was not an official football sponsor associated with the 
national team), and the ruling was taken on appeal to the ASA's Sponsorship Appeals 
Committee. The Appeals Committee upheld the ruling in May 2008, finding that MTN's 
conduct implied a joint sponsorship of the national football team by MTN and Vodacom, 
and as such constituted ambush marketing. 1739 The Committee held that MTN was in 
breach of the Sponsorship Code's provision regarding 'Imitation and Confusion', which 
1737 See the discussion of athletes' image rights in par 523 et seq above 
1738 Referring to the popular nickname of the national football team (and translated, roughly, as 'our boys') 
1739 From a briefing by Ms Lillian Mlambo, ASA Communications Manager, Cape Town, 23 June 2008 
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provides that 'imitation of the representation of other sponsorships should be avoided if 
this misleads or generates confusion, even when applied to non-competitive products, 
companies or events'. 
The Committee's ruling has been criticized as being confusing; e.g. the Committee's 
finding that Vodacom could no.t:claim .an exclusive right to the use of the words 'Bafana 
Bafana', but that a competitor in·the same industry was not entitled to use those words 
to promote its own event. 1740 It also appears that the Committee ruled that sponsorship 
is under no statutory control, but solely under the control of the ASA Sponsorship Code, 
which ignores the role of the· relevant ambush marketing legislation. 1741 
It is debatable to what extent the ASA Sponsorship Code may serve to address instances 
of illegitimate sports sponsorship activities-in- future and, specifically, to what extent its 
available processes for lodging complaints will.serve as a satisfactory avenue for redress 
for those whose commercial or other interests.are affected by such sponsorship conduct 
or activities. 
556 The ASA's Sponsorship Code dates from 1999 and it appears that it is at the time 
of writing in the process of review by the Marketing Association of South Africa (MASA) in 
consultation with FIFA, with a view specifically to the FIFA 2010 World Cup. 1742 
557 The South African sports sponsorship market is rather limited in terms of size in 
comparison with markets elsewhere (e.g. in North America, the UK and Europe). By way 
of comparison, sponsorship spend in South Africa in 2007 amounted to approximately 
US$ 0.8 billion, whereas sponsorship spend in North America and Europe in the same 
year was in the region of US$ 14.9 billion and US$ 10.6 billion respectively. 1743 A major 
impetus for the impressive growth of direct sponsorship spend in the industry from a 
base of ZAR 65 million in 1985 to ZAR 3 064 million in 2007 (including leverage spend, 
174° From a report available on Marketingweb, 5 June 2008 
1741 Such as the Merchandise Marks Act, 1941 (as amended), which is discussed in the section on ambush 
marketing in par 562 et seq below -
1742 From the briefing by the ASA's Communications Manager, Cape Town, 23 June 2008, referred to above. 
1743 Figures adapted from the 2007 IEG Sport Sponsorship Report and the 2007 BMI Adult SportTrack report -
courtesy of David Sidenberg, BMI Sport Info 
638 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
more than ZAR 5.5 billion), was South Africa's readmission to international sport 
following the boycott of ap_artheid sport. The market experienced unprecedented growth 
of more than 58% from 1990 to 1992. 1744 The local sports sponsorship market's average 
annual compound growth rate of around 19.4% compares very favourably with growth 
rates in all other markets. 1745 Expectations are that future major events, specifically the 
upcoming 2010 FIFA World Cup South Africa™, will serve to continue this very positive 
growth trend (with due regard, of course, for the expected effects of the current 
worldwide economic recession at the time of writing). 
According to available information more than 1 000 companies are currently involved in 
sponsorship, with the top 10 companies accounting for more than 50% of direct 
sponsorship spend. 1746 Within the top ten, the telecommunications companies, banks, 
South African Breweries (primarily through their flagship brand Caste Lager), South 
African Airways and oil and petroleum manufacturer Sasol are the .dominant sponsors. 1747 
It appears that the sport which is leading the way in terms of sponsorship is soccer 
(football), which has shown the following trends: 
Media returns for all soccer sponsors increased from ZAR 1.5 billion in 
2006 to more than ZAR 2.7 billion in 2007; 
In 2007, sponsors of soccer spent over ZAR 1 billion on their sponsorship 
rights (excluding leverage), representing more than 30% of total direct 
spend in the overall SA sponsorship market; and 
Whereas year-on-year spend on soccer increased by almost 60% in 2007, 
all other sports combined increased by less than 10%. 1748 
According to available information, more than 80 different sporting codes receive at least 
some sponsorship money each year (while money is also, in addition, channeled into 
1744 Source: BMI Sport Info 
1745 Ibid. 
1746 See the report by Ingrid Salgado 'Sport no longer a playground for sponsors', Business Report, 9 October 
2005 [available online at http://www.busrep.co.za - last accessed 15 February 2007]. 
1747 Source: BMI Sport Info 
1748 Source: BMI Sport Info 
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schools, universities and macro-sport codes as well as sponsorship backing for high-
profile individual sports personalities). The top 5 sporting codes are soccer (football), 
rugby union, cricket, motor racing and golf, which five codes together account for 
approximately 67% of total sponsorship spend. This is not surprising if one considers that 
these 5 codes enjoy a disproportionate share of broadcast coverage of sport (e.g. with 
more than 50% of the total hours of television coverage allotted to these codes). 1749 
At the time of writing, reports are filtering in regarding the impact of the current 'credit 
crunch' and world-wide economic recession on sports sponsorship. It is expected that, 
similar-to developments in other jurisdictions, the South African sports sponsorship 
market may be significantly affected in the foreseeable future. 
558 The commercial activity of sports sponsorship is of course open to an array of 
possible disputes between different parties. One such type of dispute in respect of major 
international events is that involving conflicting sponsors, and the authority of 
international governing bodies to regulate event sponsorship to the exclusion also of 
existing rights holders in respect of the sponsorship of individual athletes. This issue has 
been especially prevalent in international cricket. The ICC Cricket Word Cup in 2003 saw 
such a situation where the International Cricket Council required participating cricketers 
to sign agreements limiting the rights of existing player sponsors in order to ensure 
exclusivity for official sponsors of the tournament. This led to a dispute between sub-
continent players (notably Indian cricketers) and the ICC. A similar dispute developed 
prior to the 2007 ICC Cricket World Cup between Cricket Australia and the ICC, when the 
ICC refused the participation of Australian team sponsor Travelex, as such sponsor would 
have conflicted with the official event sponsors who had been appointed by the Global 
Cricket Corporation, the media rights partner for the event. Cricket Australia referred the 
1749 Ibid. For more on television broadcast coverage of the different sporting codes in South Africa, see par 583-
584 below 
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matter to the ICC's Disputes Resolution Committee, which found that the ICC's decision 
was correct in the circumstances. 1750 
559 By way of illustration of the type of contractual dispute that may be encountered 
in respect of sports sponsorship, a matter is at the time of writing pending in the Cape 
High Court between.·sports clothing manufacturer Puma and Premier Soccer League club 
Ajax Cape Town. In this matter, Puma has applied for summary judgment in the amount 
of ZAR 1.8 m against Ajax.on the basis of alleged breach of a clothing sponsorship 
I 
contract. In terms of the contract, which was in force from 2005 to mid-2008, Ajax was 
obliged inter a/ia to purchase supporters' clothing to a minimum value of ZAR 200 000 
per year. Puma claims that Ajax failed to adhere to this and other obligations of the 
agreement. This application follows litigation in 2008 regarding Ajax's termination of said 
contract. Ajax terminated .the agreement and concluded a new sponsorship agreement 
with Puma's competitor,. Adidas, which agreement is to be in force for 11 years and is to 
the value of ZAR 60 m ... Pama unsuccessfully attempted to prevent the conclusion of the 
Adidas contract by means of an urgent application, in which Puma averred that it was 
entitled to be granted an opportunity to renew the previous contract on the basis that it 
could provide similar benefits as Adidas .. 
Apart from this type of situation and the possible disputes arising from sponsorship 
contracts between sponsors and rights holders (e.g. governing bodies, event organizers, 
teams or athletes), the practice of cross-sponsoring of events may also generate disputes 
regarding the demarcation of rights and issues of exclusivity. 
560 Other issues of relevance to sports lawyers include public regulation of sports 
sponsorship, e.g. by means of banning of tobacco sponsorship of sports events. In March 
1999 the South African Parliament passed the Tobacco Products Control Amendment Act, 
which came into effect on 1 October 2000. 1751 Section 4 of this Act prohibits all tobacco 
1750 The report of this matter is available as Cricket Australia v ICC Development (International) Ltd, in 
International Sports Law Review 2007, 2 (May), SLR 61-75, Sweet & Maxwell (2007) 
1751 Act 12 of 1999, which amended the Tobacco Products Control Act, 83 of 1993 
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advertising, sponsorships and promotions. Since April 2001 no advertisement may 
contain trade marks, brand names, logos or company names used on tobacco products, 
a.nd no such marks may be used in connection with inter alia sporting activities or events. 
Contravention of this prohibition constitutes an offence and is punishable by a fine or 
imprisonment. 1752 • 
561 The following section will consider ambush marketing protection in South·African 
law, which, of·course, is of significant potential relevance to sponsors and their legal 
advisors.·:-
1752 Section 9 of Act 12 of 1999 
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§5 Ambush Marketing 
562 This section will not discuss the origins and history of ambush marketing practices 
and the legal responses thereto in other jurisdictions, which responses have included 
significant new laws in a number of countries in recent years in order to protect major 
sporting events from ambush marketing. The reader is referred to more specialized texts 
for this purpose. 1753 This section will briefly examine the available legal protection in 
South Africa and, more specifically, the special regulation of sponsors' and event 
organisers' commercial interests, marks etc regarding the 2010 FIFA World Cup South 
AfricarM. 
I Legal protection against ambush marketing 
563 Section 3. 7 of the Advertising Standards Authority of South Africa (ASA)'s 
Sponsorship Code (a code of conduct for those engaged in sponsorship in inter a/ia 
sport) 1754 defines 'ambush marketing' as follows: 
'The attempt of an organization, product or brand to create the impression of being an 
official sponsor of an event or activity by affiliating itself with that event or activity without 
having paid the sponsorship rights-fee or being a party to the sponsorship contract.'1755 
1753 E.g. Johnson, P Ambush Marketing: A Practical Guide to Protecting the Brand ofa Sporting Event Sweet & 
Maxwell, London (2008) 
1754 The Code is available on the ASA web site at http://www.asasa.orq.za. See also the discussion on sports 
sponsorship in South Africa, contained in par 550-561 above 
1755 Ambush marketing is also sometimes referred to as 'parasitic' or 'guerrilla' marketing - see Townley, S; 
Harrington, D; Couchman, N 'The legal and Practical Prevention of Ambush Marketing in Sports' Psychology & 
Marketing Vol. 15(4) 1998 at p333: 
'Ambush marketing, or parasitic marketing, consists, in the sports context, of the unauthorized association by 
businesses of their names, brands, products, or services with a sports event or competition through any one or 
more of a wide range of marketing activities. The association is unauthorized in the sense that the controller of 
the commercial rights of such an event, usually the relevant governing body, has neither sanctioned nor 
licensed it, either itself or through its commercial agents. The term ambush has been applied because of the 
tendency for such activities to be devised by competitors of official sponsors or suppliers of sports events and to 
take place during the build up to or during the event itself; thus maximum commercial impact is achieved. The 
activity is often carefully planned to take advantage of inadequacies in an event's commercial program and real 
or apparent loopholes in the legal protection available to event owners and sponsors.' 
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'Ambush marketing'·is defined as follows in the Safety at Sports and Recreational Events 
Bill :1756 
'[A]n intentional act or an attempt on the part of a person which utilizes or attempts to 
utilize the commer_cialization, publicity .or public interest in an event arranged, organized or 
sponsored by oth~rs to pbtain an unauthorized and unpaid for commercial benefit from, or 
association with, an event, without any official involvement or connection with such event.' 
. -
A further definition is found in par 1.1.6 of the City of Johannesburg's 2010 FIFA World 
Cup South Africa™ By-Laws (in draft form at the time of writing): 
' . ,, . 
'.: . 
. . ... 
"'Ambush Marketing" means marketing, promotional, advertising or public relations activity 
in words, sound or any other form, directly or indirectly relating to the Competition, and 
which claims or implies an association with the Competition and/or capitalises or is 
intended to capitalise on an association with, or gains or is intended to gain a promotional 
benefit froni it to the prejudice of any sponsor of, the Competition, but which is undertaken 
by a person which has not been grar.ited the right to promote an association with the 
Competition by FIFA and whose aforesaid activity has not been authorised by FIFA' 
564 As Cloete et al have o9served, 1757 the justification for legal measures to combat 
ambush marketing - i.e. to protect the exclusivity of official sponsors' rights and the 
often very substantial commercial outlay in associating with sporting events - is well 
illustrated with reference to the facts of the case of Motor Racing Enterprises (Pty) Ltd (in 
liquidation) v NPS (Electronics) Ltd. 1758 The appellant was the organizer of the South 
African leg of the FIA's Formula 1 Grand Prix, and the respondent had agreed to sponsor 
1756 In section l(iii). For more on the SASRE Bill, which was first published for comment in March 2005 and 
appears to be in the process of revision at the time.of writing, see the discussion elsewhere in this chapter. 
1757 Cloete et al Introduction toSports Law in South Africa LexisNexis Butterworths (2005) at 179 
1758 1996 (4) SA 950 (A) 
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the event at a cost of ZAR 22 million (payable in installments, which extended well 
beyond the date upon which the event was to take place). The respondent obtained 
naming rights, the exclusive right to be official sponsor of the race, and that all public 
references to the race were to indicate the respondent's sponsorship. The appellant, 
however, took no steps to ensure that public reference to the race referred to the 
respondent's sponsorship, and also allowed another sponsor to erect advertisements 
around the ·track that gave the impression that such sponsor was the official sponsor of 
the event. The appellant claimed an order for specific performance against the 
respondent for payment of the outstanding installments, and the respondent raised the 
defence of the exceptio non adimpleti contractus. 1759 The court upheld this defence on a 
finding that the parties' obligations in terms of the sponsorship contract were reciprocal. 
As Cloete et al observe, the end result was that the appellant was liquidated and South 
African ~otor sport suffered irreparable harm 1760 (the country has to date never again 
hosted a Formula 1 race, although it appears at the time of writing that negotiations 
. -
have been initiated by a motor sport development company, which was recently 
estabished under the auspices of the Gauteng provincial government, t_o re-introduce the 
South African Formula 1 Grand Prix at the Kyalami race~tra.ck.in Johannesburg in the 
near future). 
565 Ambush marketing takes mainly two forms, namely the 'association' and the 
'intrusion' cases. In cases of ambush marketing by association, the ambush marketer's 
conduct is aimed at or has the effect of creating the impression in the minds of the public 
that the ambush marketer or his product or brand is in some way associated with the 
sporting event, most commonly an impression that it is an official sponsor of the event. 
566 In the intrusion cases, which do not necessarily involve any association or 
perceived association with official event sponsors, the ambush marketer attempts to ride 
1759 See the discussion of this contractual defence against a claim for performance in the section on Sport and 
Employment in par 272 above (with reference to the employer's duty to remunerate the employee) 
176° Cloete et al supra at 179 
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on the coattails, as it were, of the event and the interest it generates. This can be done 
in a myriad ways; e.g. through in-store promotions, advertising in the different media, 
competitions offered to consumers, etc. One example that is often cited is that of the 
unauthorized use of airspace at an event by for example using a branded blimp to 
'intrude' in such airspace and advertise a product or brand which has no official 
connection with the event or other sponsors. 
In the South African context, the 2006 FIFA World Cup in Germany saw a complaint by 
FIFA to the Advertising Standards Authority against electronics giant LG Electronics (Pty) 
Ltd, which had run a competition in terms of which the winners could wiri a trip to the 
final of the FIFA World Cup in Germany. The competition was advertised with extensive 
use of allusions to the event, even though LG was not an official event sponsor; this was 
found to amount to unlawful ambush marketing and LG was ordered to refrain from such 
conduct. 
567 Ambush marketing first came to prominence in South Africa during the 2003 ICC 
Cricket World Cup,1761 which was officially sponsored by inter alia Pepsi. The event saw 
much-publicized instances of anti-ambush marketing measures aimed at protecting 
official event sponsors, which included the controversial instance of a spectator being 
escorted from a match at the Centurion Park stadium for opening a can of Coca Cola. 1762 
Ironically, the situation in 2003 was diametrically opposite to what had happened at the 
1996 Cricket World Cup, where Coca-Cola was an official event sponsor and Pepsi 
launched a massive advertising campaign (with extensive use of the slogan 'Nothing 
official about it'), which included concluding sponsorship agreements with individual 
players who took part in the event (e.g. top Indian batsman Sachin Tendulkar). Events at 
the 1996 ICC World Cup came to be known as the 'Cola wars'. While Coca-Cola was a 
sponsor of the event, hot air balloons were launched at cricket grounds bearing the 
1761 Although the first reported instance of attempted ambush marketing took place during the 1996 Comrades 
Marathon. The event's official sponsor was a local financial institution. A competitor pledged to pay athletes who 
would finish the race with a sticker on their face bearing such competitor's logo. 
1762 A Johannesburg businessman felt the sting of measures enforced in terms of the new legislation during the 
tournament at the match between Australia and India on 15 February 2003, when he was evicted from 
Centurion stadium in Pretoria for drinking Coca-Cola and refusing a request by security personnel to surrender 
cans of the soft drink (he was, however, subsequently readmitted to the stadium). 
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branding of their rivals, Pepsi. Between that event and the 2003 World Cup, .Pepsi had 
become one of cricket's 'Global Partners', the top bracket of sponsors, by signing a 
seven-year deal with Rupert Murdoch's Global Cricket Corporation. 1763 As Pepsi's conduct 
has been described - 'the poacher had turned gamekeeper' - and the.organisers of the 
2003 event were obliged to stamp out ambush marketing in favour of event sponsors 
such as Pepsi. 1764 
568 The .run-up to the 2003 cricket event, and pressure from event_ rights holders the 
International Cricket Council, led to the passing of new legislation in Squth Africa to 
specifically address the threat of ambush marketing. 1765 This legislative response was 
two-fold: 
The Trade Practices Amendment Act 26 of 2001 inserted a new section 
9(d) into the Trade Practices Act, 1766 which provision prohibits a person 
from making,_publishing or displaying false or misleading: statements, 
communications or advertisements which suggest or imply ~ contractual or 
other connection with a sponsored event or the person sp·onsoring such 
event. 1767 The application of this provision is wide, as is illustrated by 
section 1 of the Act, which defines an 'advertisement' to mean the 
following: 
'Any written, illustrated, visual or other descriptive material or oral 
statement, communication or representation or reference distributed to 
1763 The GCC had bought the sponsorship and television rights to ICC events as part of a seven-year deal at a 
reported cost of US$550 million. 
1764 See Rodney Hartman Ali: The life of Ali Bacher Viking 2004 at 417. 
1765 The Australian government enacted similar legislation to deal with unfair ambush marketing in the run-up 
to the 2000 Olympics. The Sydney 2000 Games (Indicia and Images) Act 1996 outlawed any unauthorised 
visual or aural representation suggesting a connection with the event - see Gardiner et al Sport Law 2001 at 
513. Portugal also enacted similar legislation prior to the Euro 2004 football championship. 
For more on ambush marketing in general, see Janet Hoek 'Ambush Marketing' in Amis, J & Cornwell, B (eds.) 
Global Sport Sponsorship Berg Publishers, Oxford & New York 2005 at 207 et seq; Wise & Meyer International 
Sports Law and Business Kluwer Law International (1997), Vol. 3 at 1965 et seq. and 2016 et seq. 
1766 Act 76 of 1976 
1767 Contravention of section 9(d) constitutes a criminal offence and is subject to hefty fines or imprisonment 
(i.e. two years' imprisonment for a first offence, five years for a second offence), although it has been observed 
that it is unlikely that prosecuting ambush marketers would be a high priority for the South African police and 
prosecuting authorities - Johnson, P Ambush Marketing: A Practical Guide (2008) supra at 140 
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members of the public or brought to their notice in any manner whatsoever 
and which is intended to -
(a) promote the sale or leasing of goods or encourage the use thereof 
or draw attention to the nature, properties, advantages or uses of 
goods or to the manner in, condition on or prices at which goods 
may be purchased, leased or otherwise acquired; or 
(b) promote or encourage the use of any service or draw attention to 
the nature, properties, advantages or uses of any service or the 
manner in, conditions on or prices at which any services is rendered 
or provided.' 
.. The Me_n;handise Marks Amendment Act 61 of 2002 was promulgated in 
. order to increase the powers of the Minister of Trade and Industry to 
regulate the use of trade marks in respect of inter alia sporting events. 
This am·endment followed from (and incorporated) draft legislation which 
was formulated by the Association of Marketers and submitted to the 
Department of Sport and Recreation and the Department of Trade and 
Industry. The main thrust of the Amendment Act was to amend the 
definition of an 'event', which is defined to include the following: 1768 
'[A]ny exhibition, s~ow or competition of a sporting, recreational or 
entertainment nature which is -
(a) held or to be held in public; 
(b) likely to attract the attention of the public or to be newsworthy; and 
(c) financed or subsidized by commercial sponsorship, 
and includes any broadcast of such exhibition, show or competition' 
1768 Section l(a) of the Amendment Act. Section l(b) of the Amendment Act provides for the insertion of the 
definition of a 'protected event' (namely an event designated as such by the Minister in terms of section 15A). 
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The Amendment Act has inserted section lSA in the Merchandise Marks Act 17 of 1941, 
and provides as follows: 
'Abuse of trade mark in relation to event:' 
15A (l)(a) The Minister may, after investigation and proper consultation and subject to 
such conditions as may be appropriate in the circumstances, by notice in 
the Gazette designate an event as a protected event and in that notice 
stipulate the date -
(i) with effect from which the protection commences; and 
(ii) on which the protection ends, which date may not be later than one 
month after the completion or termination of the event. 
(b) The Minister may not:deslgn'ate a·n event as a protected event unless the 
staging-bf the eve ht is iri the- public interest and the Minister is satisfied 
that the organisers have created sufficient opportunities for small 
businesses and in particular for those of the previously disadvantaged 
communjties. 
(2) For the peri_od during which _an event is protected, no person may use a 
trade mark in relation to such event in a manner which is calculated to 
achieve publicity for that trade mark and thereby to derive special 
promotional benefit from the event, without the prior authority of the 
organiser of such event. 
(3) For the purposes of subsection (2), the use of a trade mark includes -
(a) any visual representation upon or in relation to goods or in relation 
to the rendering of services; 
(b) any audible reproduction of the trade mark in relation to goods or 
to the rendering of services; or 
(c) the use of the trade mark in promotional activities, 
which in any way, directly or indirectly, is intended to be brought 
into association with or to allude· to an event.'1769 
1769 It should be noted that the Minister's powers in respect of this section were extended specifically for 
purposes of the FIFA World Cup 2010, by means of the 2010 FIFA World Cup South Africa Second Special 
Measures Act 12 of 2006, section 2, which provides as follows: 
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Section lSA ( 4) provides that any contravention of subsection (2) is a criminal offence, 
which offence is punishable by a fine of ZAR60 000 or up to three years imprisonment for 
a first offence or a fine of ZARlOO 000 or up to five years imprisonment for a subsequent 
offence. 1 ~70 
569 It is clear that this section is quite far-reaching, making provision as it does inter 
a/ia for prohibition of the use ('abuse') of a marketer's own trade mark. It also clearly 
provides quite substantial protection against ambush marketing, and its real value lies in 
the fact that it covers both the so-called 'association' cases as well as 'intrusion' cases 
(compare the wording of section 15A (2) as quoted above). This has assuaged earlier 
criticism of the shortcomings of the previously available grounds to combat ambush 
marketing (such as action under the Trade Marks Act, the Copyright Act, unlawful 
competition and passing off, etc) as well as of other suggested legislative amendments at 
the time. 1771 The template of this far-reaching legislative mechanism has been followed 
elsewhere1772 while other jurisdictions have introduced apparently ever-increasing 
protection by means of statute, 1773 although it should be noted that such legislative 
protection in South Africa and elsewhere is not immune to criticism regarding the reach 
and scope of the measures imposed and their possible effects on the rights of persons 
and parties other than event sponsors. 1774 In particular, it should be noted that the 
'If the Minister of Trade and Industry declares the 2010 FIFA World Cup South Africa a protected event in terms 
of section 15A (1) of the Merchandise Marks Act, 1941 ... he or she may, notwithstanding section 15A (1) (a)(ii) 
of that Act, stipulate by notice in the Gazette a date later than one month but not later than six months after 
the completion or termination of the final competition as the date on which the protection afforded by such a 
declaration ends.' 
1770 A court finding a person guilty of this offence may also order confiscation of goods in respect of which the 
offence was committed (e.g. promotional material). 
1771 See the article by Owen Dean, 'Legal aspects of ambush marketing', published on the web site Legal City, 
11 February 2000 [available online at http://www.leqalcity.net - last accessed 15 February 2007]. 
1772 Compare the nearly identical wording of section 25 (2) and (3) of the ICC Cricket World Cup West Indies 
2007 Act, 28 of 2006, which was passed by the Parliament of the Republic of Trinidad & Tobago, 1 November 
2006 
1773 E.g. compare the London Olympic Games and Paralympic Games Act'2006 and New Zealand's Major Events 
Management Act (No. 35 of 2007), and, more generally, see Johnson, P Ambush Marketing: A Practical Guide 
to Protecting the Brand of a Sporting Event Sweet & Maxwell, London (2008) chapter 5 
1774 E.g. see the discussion of what Phillip Johnson calls horizontal and vertical 'creep' in respect of the adoption 
of new legislation on ambush marketing based on developments in other jurisdictions, in Johnson, P 'Look out! 
It's an ambush' International Sports Law Review 2008, 2/3, p24-29 
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current South African legislative protection in respect of the 2010 FIFA World Cup South 
Africa™, for example, might be open to constitutional challenge in respect of the effect of 
restrictions imposed on the rights of others (e.g. in respect of the right of freedom of 
expression, freedom of trade and occupation, and the right of property, as guaranteed in 
the Bill of Rights1775). This is especially poignant in the context of South Africa's 
developmental state with its high levels of poverty, and the urgent need to encourage 
alternatives to formal employment (e.g. encouraging opportunities for street vendors 
surrounding major tournaments, although the prevalence of illegal importation of 
counterfeit goods such as sporting apparel remains problematic). More will be said below 
regarding anti-ambush marketing protection specifically in respect of the 2010 football 
World Cup. 
570 The other (common law and intellectual property legislation) protections are of 
course still available, subject to possible practical limitations (e.g. whether an interdict to 
prohibit ambush marketing conduct after the event has any value, and e.g. the problems 
of quantifying damages ex post facto in an unlawful competition or passing off claim 
\ 
relating to an intrusion ambush). 
571 It should furthermore be noted that the Consumer Protection Act, 2008 (which is 
at the time of writing not yet in force 1776 ) contains provisions regarding the marketing of 
goods or services, which also prohibits ambush marketing by association with an event. 
Section 29 of the Bill, which is found in Part E (which deals with consumers' 'right to fair 
and responsible marketing'), provides as follows: 
'529. A producer, importer, distributor, retailer or service provider must not market any 
goods or services-
1775 In sections 16, 22 and 25, respectively, of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. See the 
discussion below 
1776 The Consumer Protection Act, 68 of 2008 was signed into law by the President of the Republic on 24 April 
2009 and published in the Goverment Gazette on 29 April 2009. The Act will come into force on a date 
unknown during the course of 2009/10 
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(a) in a manner that is reasonably likely to imply a false or misleading 
representation concerning those goods or services ... ; or 
(b) in a manner that is misleading, fraudulent or deceptive in any way, including 
in respect of ... the sponsoring of any event;' 
572 Finally, section 39 of the Safety at Sports and Recreational Events Bill, 2005 (the 
'SASRE Bill', which to the knowledge of the author has at the time of writing not yet been 
passed into law), provides further provisions regarding ambush marketing of sports 
events. Sections 19 and 22 of the Bill pn;wide ~or safety and security planning for events 
and security measures, amongst which are contained certain provisions relating to 
ambush marketing (e.g. regarding a prohibited and restricted item policy in respect of 
access points, a spectator and vehicle search policy, and the enforcement of an ambush 
marketing policy within a stadium or venue and 'its precinct, which is designed to protect, 
amongst others, the proprietary and commercial interests of an event organizer and an 
accredited event sponsor). Section 39 of the Bill provides as follows: 1777 
'If relevan.t and in addition to the anti-ambush marketing provisions as contemplated 
in section 19 and 22 [of the Bill], it shall be mandatory for a proper anti-ambush marketing 
strategy to be implemented at a stadium or venue and, where applicable, within its 
precinct, prior to, during and after an event hosted at a stadium or venue, by either 
the controlling body, the event organizer, the stadium or venue owner, or an event 
organizer appointed stadium or venue anti-ambush marketing body or any collective 
combination of such persons in terms of this Act and in consultation with the National 
Event Inspectorate and/or any special purpose committee established by the [South African 
Police Services] for the co-ordination of State security operations for an event, by way of 
1777 It should be noted that, at the time of writing, a significantly revised 2009 version of the SASRE Bill appears 
to be in circulation, although the author has no further information regarding the status of such Bill and 
expectations for its passing into law. The 2009 version of the Bill does not contain anti-ambush marketing 
provisions. 
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anti-ambush marketing control measures, which include, amongst others, the following 
measures which may be· prescribed from time to time: 
(a) where applicable, the development, prior to an event, of, a comprehensive 
written stadium or venue anti-ambush marketing policy and plan, which 
policy plan shall be designed to integrate fully into the overall safety and 
security plan as contemplated in section 19 [of the Bill]; 
(b) the plan referred to in paragraph (a) shall comply in all respects to the 
. . 
provisions of this [Bill] ... ; 
(c) the implementation and active enforcement of the plan as contemplated in 
paragraph (a); 
(d) where applicable, the design and incorporation of a written media public 
information and education component into the plan-contemplated i'n 
paragraph (a), which, amongst others, must provide for th.e-tinieous 
implementation of a public information and education·_m_edia campaign, 
pripr to an event, that provides public inform~tio~, o~.; amonQSt others, the 
requirements and measures which have been put in plpce to prot~ct the 
• :. w 
. proprietary immaterial and related commercial prqperty rights of controlling 
bodies, event organizers and official sponsors and merchandisers of events; 
(e) the enforcement, by the [South African Police Services] in consultation with 
a stadium owner or an event organizer, at a stadium or venue and within 
its precinct, during an event, of all applicable legislation which provides for 
the protection of proprietary immaterial and related commercial property 
rights of an organizer and an official sponsor and merchandiser of an event, 
including, amongst others, the: 
i. Copyright Act, 1978 (Act No.98 of 1978); 
ii. Intellectual Property Laws Amendment Act, 1997 (Act 
No.38 of 1997); 
iii, Counterfeit Goods Act, 1997 (Act No. 37 of 1997); 
iv. Merchandise Marks Act, 1941 (Act No. 17 of 1941, as 
amended); 
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v. Trade Marks Act, 1993 (Act No.194 of 1993, as amended); 
vi. Trade Practices Act, 1978 (Act No. 78 of 1978, as 
amended); 
(f) For the purpose of this section, a stadium or venue precinct shall, extend to 
a maximum distance of 2 kilometers around the entire outer perimeter of a 
stadium or venue.' 
573 Effective combating of ambush marketing cannot necessarily only be achieved 
through legislation such as that adopted in South Africa. There are commentators who 
argue that efficient sponsorship practices may eventually close the field to ambush 
marketers-by makin·g such practices ineffective .. 1778 Furthermore, it is also possible to 
regulate ambush marketing by means of contractual provisions in respect of certain 
persons (e.g. spectators, by means of ticket terms and conditions1779 ). The reader is 
referred to specialised texts on ambush marketing in respect of the possible ways of 
protecting an event against ambushers, which are largely similar in South African law to 
other jurisdictions. 1780 By way of summary, the following possible bases for protection are 
available to sponsor? and event organisers: 
Th·e use of contractual regulation (by· means of the matrix of sponsorship 
and event management contracts surrounding an event, and the practice 
of 'saturation sponsorship'); 1781 
1778 See Kim Skildum-Reid 'Last Generation Sponsorship', available on the web site of 
http://www.oowersponsorship.com [last accessed 16 February 2007] 
1779 E.g. compare the terms and conditions applicable to tickets offered by The Cricket Tour Company, official 
travel agent of the ICC Cricket World Cup West Indies 2007, which provides as follows: 
'The Holder shall not engage in any form of Ambush Marketing and shall not conduct any activity that conflicts 
with, impairs, infringes or denigrates the rights of Tournament Partners. The Holder shall not be entitled in or 
around the Venue to conduct, carry out or cause to be conducted or carried out (i) unauthorised promotions; 
(ii) .any advertising or marketing; or (iii) any unauthorised commercial activity.' 
1780 See, generally, Johnson, P Ambush Marketing: A Practical Guide to Protecting the Brand of a Sporting Event 
Sweet & Maxwell, London (2008) · 
1781 Compare the contractual arrangements that were in place for the 2007 ICC Cricket World Cup, and which 
are expiained in the report of the ruling of the International Cricket Council's Dispute Resolution Committee in 
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Protection of relevant intellectual property rights associated with the 
event1782 (compare FIFA's protected marks for its 2010 World Cup, as 
discussed below); 
Ticketing terms and conditions; 1783 
Venue security and media accreditation; 
Common law passing off and unfair competition actions; 1784 
Advertising and sponsorship codes of practice; 1785 
Specific legislation (and 'sui generis protection'); 1786 and 
Planning laws (and e.g. municipal by-laws). 1787 
574 It should be noted that ambu?h marketing in the strict serise of the term as 
described above is not the only potentially controversial commercial practice related to 
the sponsorship of sports events. In _2005 South African motor sport saw an incident of 
cross-sponsoring, which led to unhappiness on the part of one of the major sponsors of 
the sport. A fuel company, which has be.en involved with SA motor sport for a number of 
years, was deprived of title rights to a motor rally on the basis of a subsequent 
agreement between the event organizers, Motorsport SA, and another fuel company, 
Cricket Australia v ICC Development (International) Ltd, 2007 (International Sports Law Review, 2007, 2 (May) 
Sweet & Maxwell 2007) - the Cricket Australia/Travelex dispute 
1782 See Johnson, P Ambush Marketing: A Practical Guide (2008) supra chapters 2-3 (and discussion of the 
statutory protection of intellectual property in South Africa in terms of (primarily) the Copyright Act 98 of 1978 
and the Trade Marks Act 194 of 1993) 
1783 Special rules have been formulated in South African law to deal with cases of the imposition of contract 
terms by means of tickets and notices - see the discussion elsewhere in this chapter in par 445 above 
1784 See the discussion elsewhere in this chapter in par 491 et seq 
1785 E.g. the Advertising Standards Authority's sponsorship and advertising codes of practice, referred to in the 
text supra 
1786 Event-specific legislation has frequently been passed in recent years to provide protection for specific 
events. Such legislation may be supplementary to existing legislative protection against ambush marketing 
(e.g. the FIFA 2010 Special Measures Acts - referred to below), or may be special legislation aimed at 
establishing sui generis protection for an event (compare the 'London 2012 Olympics association right', created 
by the London Olympic Games and Paralympic Games Act, 2006 - see the discussion by Johnson, P Ambush 
Marketing: A Practical Guide (2008) supra chapter 5). Other examples of such event-specific legislation are the 
Sydney 2000 Games (Indicia and Images) Protection Act, 1996 (Australia); Law Decree 86/2004 of April 17, 
2004 (on the protection of the insignia of 'EURO 2004') (Portugal); Law of August 17, 2005 No.167 (Measures 
for the protection of the Olympic symbol in relation to the Turin 2006 Olympics) (Italy); ICC Cricket World Cup 
West Indies 2007 Act, 28 of 2006 (Parliament of the Republic of Trinidad & Tobago, 1 November 2006). 
For criticism of the trend in the development of such event-specific legislation in various jurisdictions in recent 
years (what the author refers to as vertical and horizontal 'creep'), see Johnson, P 'Look Out! It's an Ambush' 
International Sports Law Review Sweet & Maxwell, 2008, 2/3, p24-29 
1787 Compare the municipal by-laws which have been proposed for the various host cities for the FIFA 2010 
event (see the discussion below regarding the proposed municipal by-laws for the city of Johannesburg). 
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which agreement provided that no naming rights to a championship event could be 
provided to a competitor of the latter. This incident highlighted the possible risks inherent 
in cross-sponsoring, where, even though official event sponsors coul~ not be guilty of 
ambush marketing, a measure of hijacking of the sponsorship value derived by other 
sponsors.can occur. Proper planning of cross-sponsorship agreements to events should 
include clear guidelines and information to potential sponsors of the areas of exclusivity 
their sponsorship dollar is buying. Avoiding or resolving such disputes will likely be an 
area where sports lawyers will be called upon in future to be more active, and would 
involve proper understanding of the relevant principles of contract law as well as 
thorough knowledge of sponsorship practices and the valuation of rights. 1788 
II Ambush ·marketing protection for the 2010 FIFA World Cup S~uth Africa™ 
575 Mention was made above of the specific South African legislation that are aimed 
at protecting major events against unlawful ambush marketing, specifically section 9(d) 
of the Trade Practices Act 76 of 1976 (as amended) and section 15 of the Merchandise 
Marks Act 17 of 1941 (as amended). 
The 2010 FIFA World Cup South Africa™ was designated as a protected event by the 
Minister of Trade and Industry (in terms of section 15A (1) (a) of the Merchandise Marks 
Act) by means of a notice in the Government Gazette of 25 May 2006. 1789 The Minister's 
powers in respect of section 15A were furthermore extended specifically for purposes of 
the FIFA World· Cup 2010, by means of the 2010 FIFA World Cup South Africa Second 
Special Measures Act 12 of 2006, 1790 in terms of which the duration of protection for the 
1788 For more information on this incident regarding a rally championship, see the report by Ingrid Salgado 
'Sport no longer a playground for sponsors', Business Report, 9 October 2005 [available online at 
http://www.busrep.co.za - last accessed 15 February 2007]. 
1789 Notice 683 of 2006 (Government Gazette No. 28877, 25 May 2006) 
1790 In terms of section 2 of this Act, which provides as follows: _ 
'If the Minister of Trade and Industry declares the 2010 FIFA World Cup South Africa a protected event in terms 
·of section 15A (1) of the Merchandise Marks Act, 1941 ... he or she may, notwithstanding section 15A (1) (a)(ii) 
of that Act, stipulate by notice in the Gazette a date later than one month but not later than six months after 
the completion or termination of the final competition as the date on which the protection afforded by such a 
declaration ends.' 
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event was extended from the one month period provided for in section 15A (1) (a) (ii) to 
a period of six months following the end of the event. 1791 
The Minister has also declared the use of certain words and emblems relating to the 
event to be prohibited in terms of the Merchandise Marks Act. 1792 The phrases that have 
been prohibited include '2010 FIFA World Cup South Africa', 'Football World Cup', 'FIFA 
World Cup', '2010 FIFA World Cup' and 'Soccer World Cup', and such prohibition relates 
to use of such phrases in connection with the 2010 event and only applies to 'activities 
connected to 2010 FIFA World Cup South Africa in the area of Football or Soccer 2010 
FIFA World Cup'. 1793 Furthermore, the prohibition does not apply .to the media, provided 
the reportage is fair and not imbued with unscrupulous business enterprising. 1794 
It should also be noted here that the Counterfeit Goods Act 37 of 1997 provides 
additional protection, which may also be relevant in combating ambush marketing, 1795 
while the 2010 event's designation as a '"protected event' in ter:ms of the Merchandise 
Marks Act might also mean that no person may register any domain name or have 
content on their web site which is likely to be associated with the event without obtaining 
authorisation from the event organisers. 1796 
Finally, it was announced in the week ending 24 April 2009 .that regulations prohibiting 
the unauthorised promotion and resale of tickets for the 2010 FIFA World Cup had been 
proclamated. 
576 Ambush marketing protection for the 2010 FIFA event has been criticised from 
various angles, primarily because of the apparently far-reaching and intrusive nature of 
many such measures in respect of the rights of the public and (especially) small 
enterprises and the informal business sector. While this discussion will not evaluate the 
merit in such criticism, it is informative to briefly focus on the City of Johannesburg's 
1791 The 2010 FIFA World Cup is scheduled to be played from 11 June to 11 July 2010 
1792 Notice 1791 of 2007 (Government Gazette No. 30595, 14 December 2007) 
1793 Ibid. 
1794 Ibid. 
1795 See the discussion in par 516 et seq above 
1796 See the article by Glazier, D 'FIFA threatens World Cup domain owner', 5 October 2006 (available on the 
web site of http://www.itweb.co.za - accessed 8 April 2009). See also the discussion of domain name rights in 
par 599 et seq below · 
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draft Municipal By-Laws in respect of the 2010 FIFA World Cup South Africa™ to illustrate 
the extent of proposed protection. 1797 
The purpose of the draft Johannesburg Municipal By-Laws is described as ineluding the 
following for the term of the tournament: 
The regulation of advertising within its jurisdiction; 
The effective administration of Controlled Access Sites; 1798 
The. regulation of Special Events and the administration, management, 
maintenance and the general enhancement of neatness of Public Open 
Spaces; 
Appropriate traffic, guidance, management and control measures; and 
The regulation of street trading. · 
Chapter 2 of the draft By-Laws deals with advertising (including provisions on safety, 
design and construction and maintenance of advertising structures), and includes 
extensive prohibitions on advertising (which are quoted in full here): 
'2.1. General Prohibitions 
2.1.1. No Person may, in any place owned, leased, administered by or under the Control 
of the Municipality, engage in Ambush Marketing for the Term. 
2.1.2. No Person shall, except with the prior Approval of the Municipality granted 
specifically with regard to the Competition, conduct any Advertising activity 
1797 The status of the draft By-Laws (of which a copy is on file with the author) is, at the time of writing, 
unknown 
1798 In terms of par. 1.1.21 a 'Controlled Access Site' is defined to mean -
'1.1.21.1. the locations of the Matches including without limitation, the Stadium; 
1.1.21.2. the locations of the Official Events; 
1.1.21.3. any other areas in respect of which admission is regulated by Accreditation; 
1.1.21.4. Accreditation centres; 
1.1.21.5. [International Broadcast Centre]; 
1.1.21.6. Official Training Sites; 
1.1.21. 7. Team Hotels; 
1.1.21.8. the official hotels for the FIFA Delegation; 
1.1.21.9. FIFA Fan Parks; and 
1.1.21.10. any other area within the area of jurisdiction of the Municipality, designated or demarcated by the 
Municipality as a Controlled Access Site and shall include private property located therein.' 
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on any Public Advertising Media -
2.1.2.1.during the Final Draw and for a period of one week immediately prior to 
and one week immediately following the Final Draw; 
2.1.2.2.during the period of the Competition and for a period of two weeks 
immediately prior to the first Match and two weeks immediately following 
the final Match, in the following areas, including on private property falling 
therein -
2.l.2.3. 
2.1.2.4. 
2.1.2.5. 
2.1.2.6. 
at any Controlled Access Si_te, or 
within a one kilometre radius of the venue of the Final 
Draw, or of a Stadium or as demarcated by the 
Municipality; 
within a 100 (one hundred) metre radius of a FIFA Fan Park 
or as demarcated by the Municipality; and 
at any place visible from the principal public road(s), as 
designated by the Municipality by means of appropriate 
signage, leading to the venue of the Final Draw or to a 
Stadium, and within two kilometers from the perimeter of 
the Final Draw venue or Stadium, as the case may be or as 
demarcated by the Municipality. 
2.1.3. No Person shall, except with the prior Approval of the Municipality granted 
specifically with regard to the Competition, and to the extent applicable and 
within the Municipality's jurisdiction, conduct any Advertising activity on 
any PubHc Advertising Media -
2.1.3.1. 
2.1.3.2. 
during the Final Draw and for a period of two weeks 
immediately prior to the Final Draw; 
during the period of the Competition and for a period of 2 
weeks immediately prior to the first Match and 2 weeks 
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2.1.3.3. 
2.1.3.4. 
2.1.3.5. 
2.1.3.6. 
immediately following the final Match, in the following 
areas: 
immediately outside or surrounding airports; 
in or immediately outside or surrounding main train 
stations; and 
within a 1 kilometre radius of the central business 
district of the area of jurisdiction of the Municipality 
or as demarcated by the Municipality; and 
to the extent the Municipality has jurisdiction, on 
the principal routes from the airport and main train 
stations to the central business district of the area 
of jurisdiction of the Municipality and to the 
Stadium. 
2.1.4. No Person shall, during the Term erect, maintain, distribute or display a 
Sign or a Billboard at a Controlled Access Site or within an Exclusion Zone, 
without the prior written Approval of the Municipality granted specifically 
with regard to the Competition.' 
'Advertising' is defined in the By-Laws as 'the act or process of notifying, warning, 
informing, displaying, making known or any other act of transferring information in a 
visual or oral manner', and 'advertisement' is defined as 'a visual representation including 
but not limited to a sign, illustration, object, mark, symbol or device of any kind which is 
visible to the public from, including but not limited to, any street or any public place or 
any other vantage point or which is under or over-hanging from any bridge, building or 
other structure, including sky writing, used for advertising activity; or any combination of 
such elements with the object of transferring information'. 
The provisions contained in Chapter 6 of the draft By-Laws regarding street trading are . 
similarly extensive. These provisions include (inter alia) a prohibition on street traders 
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leaving property or goods overnight on a public amenity or verge; a prohibition on 
attaching any object to a tree, parking meter, larrip-pole, electricity pole, telephone pole, 
etc; a prohibition on sleeping overnight at the place of the street trading business; and a 
prohibition on erecting any structure for the purpose of providing stielter at the place of 
the street trading business. Street traders are also prohibited from conducting business 
in certain areas (including a garden or park to which the public has a right of access, and 
a verge contiguous to an auto tell,er bank machine). Street traders are also expressly 
prohibited from conducting ambush_ marketing. 1799 
Chapter 7 of the draft By-Laws contain similarly extensive 'miscellaneous provisions', 
which include powers of entry to inspect premises for authorised officials, and powers to 
remove and impound signs, billboards, advertising structures and advertisements. An 
authorised official may instruct any person to leave a public open space if the authorised 
official reasonably believes that the person is contravening any provision of the By-laws 
and such person fails to immediately terminate such contravention upon the instruction 
of that authorised official (and failure to adhere to such an instruction shall constitute an 
offence under the By-laws). 1800 
Paragraph 7.5 of the draft By-laws deals with search and seizure powers of the 
Municipality on public roads and in respect of contraventions of street trading, and 
provides (inter alia) as follows: 
'7.5.1 Subject to any applicable legislation including without limitation the Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act, 2000 (Act No. 3 of 2000) and the Road Traffic Act 1989 
(Act No 29 of 1989), an Authorised Official may search, remove and/or impound 
any Goods, Property, container, structure, materials, substance, shelter, tent 
vehicle of any nature whatsoever, whether or not unattended:-
7.5.1.1. which he/she reasonably suspects of being used or are intended to 
be used or have already been used in or in connection with the 
business of Street Trading or a contravention of these By-laws; 
1799 Par. 6.1.1.15 of the draft By-Laws 
1800 Par. 7.4 of the draft By-Laws 
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7.5.1.2'. left or parked at any unauthorised parking area; 
7.5.1.3. which he/she finds in park or on a public road or public place and 
which in their opinion constitutes an infringement of these By-laws, 
whether or not such Goods, Property, container, structure, 
materials, substance, shelter, tent or vehicle which is in the 
possession of or under the control of any person at the time of such 
impoundment or removal.' 
Similar proposed By-Laws for the host city Cape Town were reported in 2008 as having 
experienced obstacles in the process of their passing (and were viewed by some as being 
unconstitutional .in respect of the Municipality appearing to attempt to usurp 
governmental powers that are properly within the sphere of the national government). 
The constitutionality of such measures, more generally, may be open to potential judicial 
scrutiny. 
577 At the time of writing, a potentially important test case regarding the ambit and 
interpretation of the 2010 FIFA World Cup anti-ambush marketing protection measures is 
currently awaiting judgment in the Gauteng North (formerly Pretoria) High Court. 1801 This 
matter involves an application by FIFA against South African retail group Metcash Trading 
Africa for an order prohibiting the use of a mark, 'Astor 2010 Pops', on lollipops. 1802 The 
mark is a· registered trade mark and depicts the South African national flag in the zero 
numerals contained in '2010', and the get-up of the lollipops further contains soccer balls 
depicted on the background to the device. Metcash claims to have used the 'Astor' trade 
mark since 1985 in respect of the marketing of its goods, which mark is claimed to enjoy 
1801 The matter was heard on 12 December 2008, with judgment reserved. On 6 April 2009 judgment was still 
outstanding. 
1802 Federation Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) v Metcash Trading Africa (Pty) Ltd Gauteng North 
High Court case number 53304/07. My thanks to Deon Bouwer of Bouwers Inc, attornies for the Respondent, 
for kindly providing me with copies of the parties' heads of argument and supporting documentation in this 
matter. 
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a substantial reputation in the market place. 1803 FIFA have applied for the following 
orders: 
To restrain the Respondent from infringing its registered trade mark (to 
the 'South Africa 2010 Bid & Device') 180~ by making unauthorized use, in 
the course of trade, of the mark '2010 Pops' and/or '2010' in conjunction 
with depictions of the South African flag and/or depictions of soccer balls in · 
relation to the product; 
To restrain the Respondent from passing its product off as being those of 
FIFA or as being products made under license, or as being connected or 
associated with FIFA or with the 2010 World Cup; and 
To restrain the Respondent from competing unlawfully with FIFA by 
contravening section lSA of the Merchandise Marks Act, 1941, and/or 
section 9(d) of the Trade Practices Act, 1976. 
FIFA's claims therefore relate to whether the Respondent's conduct constitutes a 
statutory trade mark infringement in te.rms of section 34(1) o.f the Trade ~arks Act, 
1993, 1805 whether such conduct constitutes passing off, or whether it constitutes unlawful 
competition in contravention of the Merchandise Marks and Trade Practices Acts. 
FIFA claims that its World Cup tournaments have received significant publicity and public 
interest in South Africa and that, as a result of an enormous repute and goodwill in the 
2010 event, there are 'strong common law rights in that event', which vest in FIFA. 1806 As 
a result, FIFA claims that the Respondent's use of its trade mark and packaging would 
cause the general public to believe that there is some association between the 
Respondent's product and FIFA as the organizer of the 2010 event (i.e. 'passing off'). 1807 
In respect of determination of the likelihood of deception or confusion with the public, 
FIFA argues that such confusion or deception can exist in members of the public believing 
1803 Par. 1 of the Respondent's heads of argument 
1804 Registered trade mark number 2003/04015 
1805 Act 194 of 1993. Section 34 of the Act is referred to elsewhere in par 512 above 
1806 At par. 11.1 of the Applicant's heads of argument 
1807 Par. 15.2 of the Applicant's heads of argument 
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that the Respondent's goods are endorsed by FIFA (i.e. such as in cases of character 
merchandising). 1808 
Metcash has denied that its conduct constitutes passing off, mainly on the basis, firstly, 
that FIFA does not market lollipops and, secondly, that the law relating to passing off 
provides that one may use offending marks .if you clearly distinguish your goods from 
that of another. In this last respect, Metcash claims that the 'Astor' trade mark clearly 
distinguishes its product from those of FIFA. FIFA, for its part, has argued that the use of 
the 'Astor' mark has no bearing on its contention that an impression of endorsement has 
been created (as its is only logical to assume that all licensees or sponsors of a sports 
tournament would use their own trade marks on the licensed products, as payment of 
·the license fee is done for the expected promotional gain to one's own marks), and that 
Metcash's first ·contention is irrelevant in light of the fact that a common field of activity 
is not required to prove passing off. 1809 
In respect of the section 15A prohibition as contained in the Merchandise Marks Act, 
Metcash has argued that proper recognition should be given to the difference in scope 
between the protection afforded by section 15( 1) and section 15A of the Act. It contends 
that section 15A merely restricts use of a trade mark in respect of a protected event 
where such use is made in relation to the event, and to derive special promotional 
benefit from the event; According to its argument, this protection is less than that 
provided for in section 15(1), which allows the Minister of Trade and Industry to prohibit, 
either absolutely or conditionally, the use of the South African national flag or of any 
mark, word, .letter or figure or any arrangement or combination thereof in connection 
with an event. 1810 Metcash has referred to the fact that FIFA had earlier applied to the 
Minister for a blanket prohibition in terms of section 15(1)(b) of the Act of any use of 
'South Africa 2010' or of the depiction of a football 'for any purpose and in any context 
other than use by [FIFA] or its mandatories', but that the Minister had refused to grant 
such a prohibition and instead restricted the terms of the prohibition so as to exclude the 
1808 Par. 17 of the Applicant's heads of argument . 
1809 Capital Estates and General Agencies (Pty) Ltd & Others v Holiday Inns Inc 1977 (2) SA 916 (A) 
1810 Par. 26 et seq. of the Respondent's heads of argument 
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'South Africa 2010' emblem, the picture of a football and the word marks 'South Africa 
2010' and 'SA 2010'. 1811 The prohibition which was published by the Minister was also 
qualified, in that it restricted the use of such marks only to 'activities connected to the 
2010 FIFA WORLD CUP SOUTH AFRICA in the area of FOOTBALL or SOCCER 2010 FIFA 
WORLD CUP'. 1812 Accordingly, the Respondent's argument goes that FIFA is seeking to 
rely on section 15A of the Act, which provides a lesser form of protection, to afford it 
protection which extends beyond the scope of the protection which it sought but failed to 
obtain in terms of section 15(1) of the Act. 
Metcash has denied claims that the mark connotes a formal connection with the 2010 
FIFA World Cup event and constitutes ambush marketing. It argues that the football 
connotation of the 'Astor' mark relates to a football development programme for under-
privileged youths, which it had launched in 2005 at the same time as its '2010 Pops'-
confectionery (and that the '2010' reference was included to refer to the year when such 
initiative is planned to terminate). 1813 FIFA denies such alleged significance of the 
reference to the year 2010, as it claims that this was not publicized in Metcash's, 
promotional material. 
In a similar vein, Metcash argued that its conduct does not fall foul of section 9(d) of the 
Trade Practices Act, as its lollipops are marketed with reliance on its well-known 'Astor' 
mark in a market place within which its association with football is well known, and 
accordingly its usage of the mark cannot be said to imply or suggest a contractual or 
other connection or association with the 2010 event. Metcash further argued that FIFA's 
assertion that any reference to 'South Africa' and the year 2010 creates a connotation of 
the sort proscribed in section 9(d) is not backed up with any evidence. 
Metcash has further argued that section 15A of the Merchandise Marks Act must be read 
in light of the Constitution, and that the restriction on the use of their trade mark (which 
was registered in 2004, prior to the date that the 2010 event was declared a protected 
1811 Ibid. par. 34 
1812 Ibid. par. 35 . 
1813 At par. 2 et seq. of the Respondent's heads of argument 
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event) violates Metcash's right of property1814 in respect of its trade mark as well as its 
freedom of expression. 181•5 With reference to the courts' method of statutory 
interpretation in light of the Constitution 1816 (which requires that, in the event of 
competing interpretations, a court must read down a statute so as to ensure an 
interpretation consistent with the Constitution), Metcash argues that a proper 
interpretation of. section lSA as only prohibiting use of a trade mark which is unfair and .. 
likely to result in material harm to FIFA's marks would constitute a justifiable limitation of 
its rights under section 36 of the Bill of Rights. 1817 However, Metcash contends that 
FIFA's 'broad and limitless' interpretation of the section's prohibition limits its rights 'in an 
extremely invasive manner which could not ... be justified on any limitations exercise'. 1818 
In terms of the provisions of the Bill of Rights, FIFA bears the onus to prove justification 
of any limitation of Metcash's fundamental rights, which Metcash contends it has failed to 
do. 
578 The outcome of the Metcash matter will be watched with interest, as it constitutes 
a test case for the rights and interests of numerous small traders and businesses (also in 
the informal sector) who may not be financially able to challenge FIFA's alleged 
'monopolisation' of the 2010 event. From FIFA's perspective it provides an opportunity to 
assess the efficacy and extent of the existing legal protection against ambush marketing 
for purposes of the 2010 event, as other such cases are bound to follow. In April 2009 it 
was reported that FIFA had obtained a court order against a tavern in Pretoria, which is 
situated close to the Loftus Versfeld stadium (a 2010 match venue), to remove World 
1814 In terms of section 25 of the Bill of Rights 
1815 In terms of section 16 of the Bill of Rights 
1816 With reference to Govender v Minister of Safety and Security 2001 (4) SA 273 (SCA) and S v Coetzee 1997 
(3) SA 527 (CC) 
1817 The limitation clause, which provides as follows: 
'S 36(1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general application to the extent 
that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including: 
a) the nature of the right; · 
b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
c) the nature and extent of the limitation; 
d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and 
e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. 
(2) Except as provided in subsection (1) or in any other provision of the Constitution, no law may limit any right 
entrenched in the Bill of Rights.' 
1818 At par. 45 of Respondent's heads of argument 
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Cup-related signage. The tavern had placed the words 'World Cup 2010' beneath the 
main sign on its roof, and had erected banners featuring the flags ~f prominent football-
playing nations with the numeral '2010' and the words 'Twenty Ten South Africa' on 
them. An application was launched in the Gauteng North High Court claiming interdicts 
against the tavern owners on the grounds of infringing FIFA's registered trade marks 
('WORLD CUP 2010', 'SOUTH.AFRICA 2010' and 'TWENTY TEN SOUTH AFRICA'), for 
passing ·off under the common law, and unlawful competition through the violation of 
section lSA of the Merchandise Marks Act and Section 9(d) of the Trade Practices Act. 
The court granted all the relief claimed. 1819 
It remains to be seen how many more such legal challenges will be brought in the run-up 
to (and during) the event in 2010. 
1819 See the report available online at http://www.themarketinqsite.com/live/content.php?Item. ID=8980 
(accessed 23 April 2009) 
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§6 Sports Broadcasting 1820 
I Sports broadcasting rights 
579 Similar to the position in other jurisdictions· (notably the UK and Australia 1821 ), 
South African law does not recognize a proprietary right to a sports event. While such a 
right to a sports. event which is worthy and capable of protection against 
misappropriation appears to enjoy recognition in. the United Sates of America, 1822 in 
South Africa the rights to broadcast a sporting event or to disseminate news regarding 
the results and action on the field of play must be protected by means of other 
mechanisms and/or through a combination of other, recognized, legal rights. As has been 
explained in the context of English law, the development of a valuable and viable 
commercial programme around a sports event necessitates a foundational matrix of 
different rights, as follows: 1823 
(i) Access rights to the venue: The event organizer must have the right to 
exclusive possession of the venue (either through rights of ownership or 
· through an agreement of lease or other basis), and must be able to control 
access to the venue, and to stop unauthorized persons entering the venue 
and exploiting the commercial value of the event. This includes the 
imposition of terms and conditions of entry (usually imposed by means of 
contractual provisions incorporated on tickets or by means of prominent 
notices at the venue) which may be utilized to prevent those who enter the 
venue from commercially exploiting e.g. footage of action on the field of 
play obtained through the use of private recording or broadcasting 
1820 I wish to sincerely thank Brandon Foot (legal counsel for local sports broadcast content aggregator 
SuperSport) for his very helpful comments on a draft of this section 
1821 Compare Victoria Park Racing v Taylor (1937) C.L.R. 479; Australian Broadcasting Corp v Lenah (2001) 208 
C.L.R. 199 
1822 On the basis of International News Service v Associated Press 248 US 215, 63 L Ed 211, 39 S Ct 68 (1918); 
Pittsburgh Athletic Co v KQV Broadcasting Co 24 F Supp 490 (WD Pa 1937); Lewis & Taylor Sport: Law and 
Practice Cavendish Publishing 2003 at 405, 583 and 679; Johnson, P Ambush Marketing: A Practical Guide to 
Protecting the Brand of a Sporting Event Sweet & Maxwell, London (2008) at 2-3 
1823 See Lewis & Taylor op cit. 584 
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equipment (and also, increasingly, to prohibit ambush marketing, as Was 
the case in respect of ticket terms for the ICC Cricket World Cup 2007). 1824 
Such control of access rights to the venue may include accreditation of 
members of the media or of e.g. sports photographers; 
(ii) Contractual restrictions on participants and official event sponsors: 
Restrictions on participants are aimed mainly at ensuring that the 
commercial value of the event is not diluted by athletes' personal 
sponsorship or endorsement deals, while restrictions on official partners 
are aimed at ensuring that they do not overstep their own contractual 
rights nor inadvertently assist others in hijacking the goodwill in the event 
(e;g. through ambush marketing); and 
(iii) The creation, protection and enforcement of copyright, trade mark and· 
other intellectual property rights that may subsist in the elements that go 
to make up a sports event. 
580 In respect of ownership of the copyright in content relating to a sports broadcast, 
the following table sets out the qualifying criteria necessary for. copyright to subsist in 
each of the elements of such a broadcast, in terms of the provisions of the Copyright Act 
98 of 1978. 1825 
1824 See the discussion on liability in delict (or tort) for sports injuries above, for discussion (specifically in 
respect of exemption of liability clauses) of the law regarding imposition of contract terms on event tickets 
1825 I have followed the method of presenting this information as employed in Lewis & Taylor Sport: Law and 
Practice Butterworths LexisNexis (2003) at 682 (par. 04.22) 
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-. 
Copyright protected Qualifying criteria First owner of Term of protection 
element required to obtain copyright 
copyright protection 
.. . 
- -
Cinematograph Must be represented Person by whom the 50 years from the 
fi I m 182.6 · . .• ._ in digital_ data or arrangements for year in which the 
. 
- signals or otherwise making of the film work is made1830 
-
reduced to material were made 
. ~ . ~ form1827 (producer) 1828 /the 
... ' ~ broadcaster1829 
; .. .. 
Sound recording Must be represented · Person by whom the 50 years from the 
in digital data or arrangements for end of the year in 
signals or otherwise making of the sound which first 
reduced to material recording were published 1832 
form made 
- (prod ucer)/the 
broadcaster1831 
.. 
,. 
Broadcast Must be The first broadcaster 50 years from the 
broadcast1833 (broadcaster) end of the year in 
1826 Defined in the Act as 'any fixation or storage by any means whatsoever on film or any other material of 
data, signals or a sequence of images capable, when used in conjunction with any other mechanical, electronic 
or other device, of being seen as a moving picture and of reproduction, and includes the sounds embodied in a 
sound-track associated with the film'. 
1827 Section 2(2) of the Act · 
1828 The author of a cinematograph film (read with section 21(1)(a) of the Act 
1829 Where the making of the work was commissioned or made in the course of employment of the author 
(section 21(1)(c) or (d)) 
1830 Or SO years from the end of the year in which the work is made available to the public/first published -
Section 3(2)(b) 
1831 Where the making of the work was commissioned or made in the course of employment of the author 
(section 21(1)(c) or (d)) 
1832 Section 3(2)(c) 
1833 Section 2(2A) 
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.. 
which the first 
broadcast takes 
place1s34 
Programme-carrying Must be transmitted The first person 50 years from the 
signal 1835 .by a satellite18.36 emitting the signal end of the year in 
to a satellite which the signals 
(broadcaster) are emitted to a 
satellite1837 
--Broadcasting Must be written Person who first Life of the author 
- -
script1s3s down, recorded, creates the work plus 50 years 
represented in_ (producer)-or -
_·digital data or -. broadcaster1840 
signals or otherwise 
reduced to material 
form1s39 
-
Broadcast graphics Must be written Person who first Life of the author 
as artistic down, recorded, makes or creates plus 50 years 
works/I itera ry represented in the work (producer) 
works) digital data or or broadcaster 
signals or otherwise 
reduced to material 
1834 Section 3(2)(d) 
1835 A 'programme-carrying signal' is defined in section 1 of the Act as 'a signal embodying a programme which 
is emitted and passes through a satellite'. A 'programme' is defined, in relation to a programme-carrying signal' 
as 'a body of live or recorded material consisting of images or sounds or both, embodied in a signal'. 
1836 Section 2(2A) 
1837 Section 3(2)(e) 
1838 Par. (b) of the definition of a 'literary work', section 1 of the Act 
1839 Section 2(2) 
1840 Definition of the 'author' of a literary work (section 1), read with section 21(1)(c) and (d) (where work was 
commissioned or created in the course of employment 
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I form 
581 Provided that the arrangement with any non-employee production 
crew/commentators contains appropriate copyright assignments, 1841 the broadcaster will 
normally be the first owner of the copyright in the broadcast (and accordingly the rights 
holder in respect of broadcasting of the live event footage and of highlights or clips). The 
event owner could obtain an assignment of the copyright arising from the broadcaster's 
production of match footage (which would be contained in the broadcasting rights 
contract), in return for the granting of a limited license to broadcast the event 
footage. 1842 
582 In respect of copyright to sports broadcasts, it should be noted that the Copyright 
Act, 1978 makes special provision (in section 19(2)) in respect of exceptions to 
infringement (i.e. 'fair dealing' or fair use) in respect of a copyrighted sports 
broadcast. 1843 Section 19 provides for general exceptions from protection of programme-
carrying signals, 1844 and provides as follows: 
'S 19(1) The copyright in programme-carrying signals shall not be infringed by the 
distribution of short excerpts of the programme so carried -
(a) that consists of reports of current events; or 
(b) as are compatible with fair practice, 
1841 In terms of section 21(1)(e) _ 
1842 See Lewis & Taylor supra at 683. Such an assignment of copyright is the norm in broadcast rights license 
agreements, and copyright normally subsists in the relevant sports federation 
1843 The excemptions to copyright infringement in terms of the Copyright Act 98 of 1978 are contained in 
sections 12 to 19B of the Act. Section 12(1) deals specifically with 'fair dealing' with a copyrighted literary and 
musical work (which provisions apply mutatis mutandis to broadcasts as copyrighted works - section 18 of the 
Act). 
1844 The Act protects (inter alia) 'broadcasts' and 'programme-carrying signals' in terms of copyright. A 
programme-carrying signal is defined in the Act as 'a signal embodying a programme which is emitted and 
passes through a satellite'. A 'programme' is defined, in relation to a programme-carrying signal, as 'a body of 
live or recorded material consisting of images or sounds or both, embodied in a signal". Satellite broadcasts 
are, of course, covered in this respect. 
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and to the extent justified by the informatory purpose of such excerpts. 
(2) The provisions of this section shall not apply with reference to a programme carried by 
programme-carrying signals representing a sporting event.' 
II The broadcasting industry 
583 The South African sports broadcasting industry is a relatively small one compared 
to the broadcasting landscape in e.g. the European Union. There are currently only three 
broadcasters active in the television market, namely the public free-to-air broadcaster, 
the South African Broadcasting Corporation (or 'SABC'), private commercial free-to-air 
broadcaster etv (which entered the market in 1998), and subscription pay-TV 
broadcaster Multichoice (which runs its digital satellite television or 'DSTV' service, and 
has as its subsidiary SuperSport International, which aggregates sports content for 
it). 1845 Four additional pay-TV operators (e.sat, On Digital Media, Walking on Water and 
Telkom Media) were recently licensed to enter the market, although it has been observed 
that options for available sports content for these new operators are very limited in light 
of Multichoice's virtual monopoly of high interest events in the major sports. 1846 Apart 
from its rights in respect of the major domestic cricket tournaments as well as the DLF 
Indian Premier League, in terms of an agreement concluded in early 2008, SuperSport 
has secured broadcasting rights to South African rugby up to 2015 (other than the 
Vodacom Tri-Nations and Vodacom Super 14 tournaments, 1847 which it holds until 2010 
in terms of the current SANZAR contract). SuperSport is currently also the rights holder 
in respect of Premier Soccer League matches (in terms of the controversial 5-year/ZAR 
1845 SuperSport does not hold a broadcasting license, but provides content to license holders M-Net and 
Multichoice 
1846 From a report by Lloyd Gedye ('No sporting chance for new pay-TV players') in the Mail & Guardian, 30 
September 2007 (available online at htto://www.journalism.co.za - last accessed 26 January 2009) 
1847 At the time of writing it has been reported that SA Rugby is considering withdrawing from the Super 14 
tournament at the end of the 2009 season, with a view to a possible move to sign domestic franchises up with 
the UK's Magners League in the next season 
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1.4 billion contract which sparked the 2007 dispute with the SABC which eventually 
culminated in a settlement providing for both concurrent screening and exclusive access 
to certain matches for the public broadcaster). 1848 
Complaints by the recent new entrants to the subscription television market, to the effect 
that Multichoice's current long-term contracts in respect of the most popular sports 
(specifically rugby and cricket, as well as the rights to the next two Olympic Games) may 
lead to anti-competitive behaviour if left unchecked, have contributed to the Independent 
CommJ .. mications Authority of South Africa (ICASA)'s current proposals for regulatory 
reform ofthe sports broadcasting rights market.1849 
584 It was observed in 2002 that the South African broadcasting market has 
comparatively low pay-TV penetration, 1850 and that subscription fees are relatively high 
compared to other markets. At the time, pay-TV accounted for only 18% of total 
television households (compared to 45% in the UK at the time). 1851 Due to historical 
inequalities and widespread poverty amongst the majority of the population, radio 
remains the most accessible medium for many people. 
As was mentioned in the preceding discussion of sports sponsorship, the top 5 sporting 
codes in South Africa (soccer or football, rugby union, cricket, motor racing and golf) 
account for approximately 55% of the total hours of television coverage. In 2007, the 
breakdown of the percentage of total sports television hours between these codes was as 
follows: soccer, 21.0%; rugby union, 11.2%; cricket, 9.7%; golf, 7.6%; and motor 
racing (track, off-road, rallies and cycle events), 6.0%. 1852 It appears that broadcast 
coverage in respect of the different sports and the different broadcasters follows broader 
socio-economic patterns. While the predominantly 'black sport' of soccer consistently 
remains the top-ranking code in terms of hours of coverage on the national free-to-air 
1848 See the discussion elsewhere in this section 
1849 See the discussion in the text that follows (and, specifically, par 4.3.5 - 4.3. 7 of the !CASA Discussion 
Paper, Sepember 2008 - see par 590 et seq below) 
1850 Although 3 additional pay-TV operators were recently licensed to enter the market - see the discussion 
above 
1851 Independent Communications Authority of South Africa Discussion Paper on Sports Broadcasting Rights 8 
August 2002 (published for public discussion by means of Notice 1356 of 2002, Government Gazette No. 
23713, 8 August 2002) at 24 
1852 Source: BMI Sport Info 
674 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
broadcaster, the SABC (which is also the official broadcaster of the 2010 FIFA World Cup 
South Africa™), pay-TV digital broadcaster SuperSport, which enjoys its market 
penetration mainly in the privileged (and still predominantly white) households, 1853 
broadcast a staggering 98% of all rugby coverage in 2007 .1854 It also appears that the 
traditionally 'white sport' of rugby enjoys significantly more support amongst black adults 
than may be commonly believed; according to available information there are now more 
black male spectators (2 349 000) than white male spectators (1 793 000), 1855 albeit of a· 
much higher base in terms of population numbers. It also appears that support amongst 
black adults for rugby is very closely linked to trends in respect of the extent of coverage 
of the sport by the national public broadcaster, the SABC. 1856 
III Sports broadcasting rights regulation 
585 An important issue regarding television sports broadcasting is that of events 
which are deemed to be of special public importance and the rights of access of the 
public thereto (free from the requirement of subscribing to pay-TV services). This is an 
issue which has attracted the attention of law-makers in a number_ of jurisdictions. For 
example, in the European context, compare article 3 (a) of EC Directive 97/36 (the 
'Television without Frontiers' directive): 
'Each Member State can take whatever measures it wishes, compatible with Community 
law, in order to ensure that television .broadcasters subjected to its legislation do not 
broadcast in an exclusive manner events which the Member State considers of particular 
significance to society, in such a way as to deprive a large section of the Member State's 
public from viewing such events, either live or broadcast later, on freely accessible 
1853 This is apparently rapidly changing, due to the Premier Soccer League rights arrangement as well as the 
introduction (by Multichoice) of cheaper bouquets of channel content (such as the 'Compact' bouquet) which 
are more affordable and attractive to lower-income subscribers 
1854 Ibid. 
1855 Sports sponsorship information indicates that this is also due to the 'shrinking' number of white members of 
the population 
1856 Ibid. 
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channels. In this case, the Member State involved shall draw up a list of national and 
international events that it considers of particular significance for society. Furthermore, the 
Membe.r State shall determine whether these events shall be broadcast live in their entirety 
or in part or, alternatively, where necessity or suitability in the public interest arises, later 
in their entirety or in part.'1857 
. South Africa has also opted for such an approach in recognition of the public's rights of 
access to certain events of special significance (although, as the discussion below will 
show, there are at the time of writing indications of a significant revamping of the sports 
broadcasting regulatory framework to, apparently, place more emphasis on potential 
competition matters). Section 30(7) of the Broadcasting Act 4 of 1999 provides as 
follows: 
'Subscription broadcasting services may not acquire exclusive rights for the broadcast of 
national sporting events, as identified in the public interest from time to time by the 
[Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (or ICASA)] in consultation with 
the Minister and the Minister of Sport and in accordance with the regulations determined by 
'[ICASA] through a public process.'1858 
586 Thelndependent Communications Authority of SA (or 'ICASA') is the regulator of 
telecommunications and the broadcasting sector in South Africa. ICASA was established 
in 2000 in terms of the Independent Communications Authority Act 13 of 2000 and 
derives its mandate and powers from this and other statutes. 1859 ICASA's mandate is to 
regulate the telecommunications and broadcasting industry in the public interest, and to 
1857 Compare also the working of the 'anti-siphoning' provisions of the Australian Broadcasting Services Act, 
1992 (as referred to in the !CASA Discussion Paper (September 2008)) - see the discussion that follows in the 
text 
1858 The meaning of 'national sporting .event' is not defined in the Act, and will apparently depend on the 
determination of !CASA in terms of this section 
1859 These other statutes are the Independent Broadcasting Act of 1993, the Broadcasting Act of 1999, the 
Telecommunications Authority Act of 1996 and the Electronic Communications Act of 2005. For further 
information on !CASA see their web site at http://www.icasa.orq.za 
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act as consumer watchdog of the industry. 1860 ICASA's regulation of the sports 
broadcasting market is mainly in terms of the Broadcasting Act, 1999 and the Electronic 
Communications Act, 2005. 
587 In terms of the above section 30(7) of the Broadcasting Act, !CASA conducted an 
inquiry into sports broadcasting rights in 2002. The organization published a discussion 
paper in August 2002, 1861 inviting public comment on the issue of identifying 'national 
sporting events', and to generate discussion on the appropriate framework for regulating 
the acquisition of sports rights by South African free-to-air and subscription broadcasting 
licensees. 1862 After the receipt of a number of submissions from stakeholders and public 
hearings conducted in Johannesburg and Cape Town at the end of 2002, a draft position 
paper and regulations were sent to the Ministers of Sport and Recreation and 
Telecommunications. !CASA released its position paper and regulations on 'Sports 
Broadcasting Rights' on 25 July 2003. 1863 
588 The regulations set out the criteria for listing events as 'national sporting _ 
events', 1864 which events (currently1865) are the following: 1866 
The Summer Olympic Games; 
Commonwealth Games; 
186° For more specific information regarding ICASA's functions and activities, see their web site at 
http://www.icasa.org.za 
1861 
'Inquiry into Sports Broadcasting Rights', Government Gazette 23713, Notice 1356, 8 August 2002 
1862 See the !CASA Annual Report 2003: Broadcasting, at 7-8 - available at http://www.icasa.org.za 
1863 Notice 2029, Government Gazette No. 25249, 25 July 2003. 
1864 See par. 3.1 of the Regulations. The reader is invited to compare the position in Italy, where an event is 
considered to be of special significance for purposes of the prohibition on exclusive broadcasting if it satisfies 
two of the following criteria: 
1) The event and its outcome enjoy special and widespread popularity in italy and are of interest to 
others besides those who would normally view it; 
2) The event enjoys a generalized consensus on the part of the population, it has special cultural 
characteristics and it enhances Italian cultural identity; 
3) The event involves the national team of one or another sport in an important international 
tournament; 
4) The event is traditionally broadcast on non-pay television and has gathered a wide public of viewers in 
Italy. 
See Colucci, M 'Italy' in International Encyclopedia of Sports Law Kluwer Law International (Suppl. 1 - August 
2004) at par. 255 and par. 256 as to a list of such special events. 
1865 At the time of writing, !CASA is in the process of conducting hearings with a view to the publication of 
updated sports broadcasting rights regulations (which are expected to be published in March 2009) - see the 
discussion below 
1866 Par. 4 of the Regulations 
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. All Africa Games; 
In respect of the FIFA World Cup, the African Cup of Nations, the IRS 
Rugby World Cup and the ICC Cricket World Cup: 
(i) All South African team matches; 
(ii) The opening match; 
(iii) 2 quarter finals; 
(iv) 1 semi-final; 
(v) 3rd and 4th position play-off (if South Africa is involved); 
(vi) Final.match; and 
(vii) Opening and closing ceremonies. 
The finals of the following national knock-out competitions: 
(i) ASSA Cup (football); 
(ii) Coca '.Cola Cup (football); 
(iii) SAA Super Eight Cup (football); 
(iv) Currie Cup (rugby); and 
(v) Standard Bank Cup (cricket). 
Finals of the following international knock-out competitions (if a South 
African team is involved): 
(i) CAF Champions League (football); 
(ii) CAF Cup Winners Cup (football); and 
(iii) The Super 14 (rugby). 1867 
International events: 
(i) . In football, rugby and netball: All international matches played in 
South Africa involving the senior South African national team; 
1867 Previously the Super 12 tournament 
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(ii) In cricket: All one day international matches played in South Africa 
involving the senior national team .1868 
Athletics: 
(i) The Comrades Marathon; 1869 and 
(ii) The Two Oceans Marathon. 
The process of lis~ing events of national interest did however not proceed without 
concerns being expressed by the major sports codes, which are significantly dependent 
on revenues from the sale of broadcasting rights. 1870 
589 Following the passing of these regulations, South African football saw a highly-
publicized broadcasting rights dispute, the first high profile matter of its kind in South 
Africa. In 2007 a significant legal dispute developed between the-SA Broadcasting 
Corporation (SABC), the public broadcaster, and the P_remier Soccer League (PSL), 
regarding broadcasting rights to domestic Premier Soccer League matches. Broadcasting 
rights are collectively sold by the PSL. 1871 The PSL announced in June 2007 that 
SuperSport (a sports content aggregator subsidiary of Multichoice, the biggest 
subscription broadcaster operating in the market) had been awarded a more than ZAR 1 
billion contract1872 to broadcast PSL matches for the next five years, which caused 
widespread and heated responses (also in Parliament) regarding the public's free-to-air 
access to the domestic competitions. It was subsequently reported that the SABC had 
1868 This does notably not include Test (or 5-day) matches played in South Africa 
1869 This annual event, which is run between the cities of Pietermaritzburg and Durban in the KwaZulu-Natal 
province, is the world's longest ultra-marathon 
187° For a useful exposition of these developments in respect of the listing of events, see the short article 
entitled 'Broadcasters and fans await stance on sports' in the Business Day 'Business Law Review', January 
2003, compiled by the corporate law firm of Edward Nathan & Friedland 
1871 The National Soccer League Rules (as emended 17 June 2008) provides as follows regarding broadcasting 
rights: 
'Television and radio rights for all matches of the League will belong to the League, and no matches may be 
televised or filmed without the consent of the League ... It will be misconduct for a club to enter into a 
contractual agreement with a broadcaster, whether television, radio or via any other media or format, without 
th~ written permission of the League.' [Rules 16.3 and 16.4] 
1872 Elsewhere reported as a ZAR 1.6 billion deal 
679 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
only previously paid ZAR 350 hlillion 1873 for the rights (amid reports that the public 
broadcaster had been accused of bad faith negotiation and of taking the PSL rights for 
granted in light ofthe previous broadcasting contract). The SABC applied to the 
Johannesburg High Court for an interdict to restrain the PSL from negotiating with other 
broadcasters for the sale of rights on the free market at the end of the season. The 
SABC, the then Premier League broadcaster, alleged an earlier verbal agreement with the 
PSL to the effect that, on expiry of the current contract, the PSL would be obliged to first 
re-offer the rights to the SABC and would only be allowed to approach other broadcasters 
upon a refusal or failure to take up such offer by the SABC .. Following the granting of an 
interim interdict to the SABC, the PSL was joined as respondent by free-to-air channel e-
tv. The SABC subsequently withdrew from the application, following a deal in July 2007 
with the other parties involved to settle the matter. According·to the agreement1874 
between the parties, the SABC acquired exclusive screening rights to 110 matches, and 
33 matches were to be screened concurrently with SuperSport (which had sold the rights 
to these matches to the SABC), while SuperSport acquired exclusive screening rights to 
more than 100 matches. The deal with SuperSport had, according to PSL chairperson 
Irvin·Khoza, reportedly catapulted the PSL into the top 10 ranked leagues in the world in 
regard to commercial broadcast deals. In fact; the state of the PSL following the rights 
dispute appears to be quite healthy: Khoza 1875 reported that the annual income of the 
League in 2008 was in the region of ZAR 500 million (compared to ZAR 86 million in 
2002), and that each club in the League currently receives a monthly grant of ZAR 1 
million (compared to ZAR 250 000 in.2002). Banking group ASSA also recently signed a 
ZAR 500 m.illion/5-year deal as title sponsors of the League. 1876 
590 The aftermath of the 2007 rights dispute may be significant for the local sports 
broadcasting industry. To' date, South Africa has not seen scrutiny of the types of issues 
that have occupied regulators elsewhere (e.g. in the European Union). There have, for 
1873 The SABC apparently refused to take part in the tender 
1874 A 'tripartite' agreement, and not a classic sub-license agreement 
1875 In a speech at the event of the biennial General Meeting of the Premier Soccer League, 8 November 2008 
1876 Ibid. . 
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example, been no competition cases involving the collective selling of rights within sports 
leagues. The 2008 Discussion Paper on sports broadcasting regulation 1877 has expressly 
hinted at the need for more active regulation of the selling of sports broadcasting rights 
(and for implementation of the competition provisions of the relevant legislation) in light 
of the experience of the PSL-rights dispute. 
In light of the responses to the PSL rights dispute in Parliament and other quarters at the 
time, it should be noted here that government may in future, more generally, intervene 
in the event of any similar (proposed) _deal which might be viewed to undermine the 
public interest in respect of access to free-to-air sports coverage. The discussion in par 
202 et seq above has referred to the extensive powers in respect of dispute resolution 
and the issuing of binding directives which have been granted to the Minister of Sport 
(and/or SASCOC) in terms of the.2008 amendments to the National Sport.and Recreation 
Act. It remains to be seen how these regulatory powers will be exercised in future. 
591 At the time of writing, !CASA is currently considering proposed reviews to the 
existing regulations on sports broadcasting rights, 1878 which are expected to be published 
in March 2009. 1879 In October 2008, !CASA gave notice by means of the publication of a 
Discussion Paper1880 that it was planning to publish regulations in terms of sections 60(1) 
and (2) of the Electronic Communications Act, 2005 (the 'EC Act'1881 ). Section 60(1) of 
the EC Act provides as follows: 
'Subscription broadcasting services may not acquire exclusive rights that prevent or hinder 
the free-to-air broadcasting of national sporting events, as identified in the public interest 
from time to time, by the Authority [!CASA], after consultation with the Minister [of 
1877 See the discussion that follows in the text 
1878 A call for submissions to !CASA on amendments to the existing sports broadcasting regulations was 
published on 22 September 2008 
1879 It appears at the time of writing that this process has been postponed until after the 2009 general elections 
(which were held on 22 April 2009), as !CASA is required to consult with the Ministers of Communications and 
Sport respectively (anticipating a Cabinet re-shuffle following the elections) 
1880 By means of General Notice 1238 of 2008, Government Gazette No. 31483, 2 October 2008 ('Review of 
Sports Broadcasting Rights Regulations - Discussion Document, September 2008') 
1881 Act 36 of 2005 
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Telecommunications] and the Minister of Sport and in accordance with the regulations 
prescribed by the Authority.' 
Section 60(2) of the EC Act deals with disputes, and provides as follows: 
'In the event of a dispute arising concerning subsection (1), any party may notify the 
·Authority of the dispute in writing and such dispute must be resolved on an expedited basis 
by the Authority in accordance with the regulations prescribed by the Authority.' 
The aim?. of the disCU??ion document which was published for comment appear to show a 
_•:__ n 
strong developmental ,focus, IJl!hich also refers to the role of sports broadcasting in 
respect of the transformation of South African sport: 
'This review ... seeks to ensure that sport is as accessible as possible to the people of South 
Africa, while at the same time, it continues to drive competition in the fast changing 
technological and market contexts. The Authority believes that exposure to more sporting 
codes by historically disadvantaged individuals and communities will accelerate the 
transformation of the sporting codes themselves. In particular, the changing market 
environment driven by digitization and the liberalization necessitates a complete relock at 
sport broadcasting rights as a tool to facilitate competition thus enhancing the growth of 
the broadcasting market. And, as mentioned above, the quest to create a competitive 
environment should not negate the equally important task of ensuring accessibility of sport, 
especially to the urban and rural poor. In this undertaking, the Authority will endeavor to 
meet the needs of all stakeholders, especially consumers, subscription television services, 
free-to-air television services and, equally important, the needs of the sporting codes, 
especially commercial sport.'1882 
1882 Transformation appears to resonate strongly in ICASA's objects behind the currently-applicable list of listed 
events as well as the new proposals: 
'This list sought to create exposure to most sporting codes by all South Africans, including those from 
historically disadvantaged communities. The Authority opted for this approach to ensure that access to sport is 
not delineated along racial lines, but that all South Africans have access to variety of sporting codes, 
irrespective of their historical exposure. It is important to note that the transformation of the different sports 
codes depend on the extent to which they are accessible to most South Africans. With regard to soccer, the 
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The Discussion Paper expressly provides that it is expected that the recent licensing of. 
additional subscription television_·services (as well as the advent of digital migration) are 
expected to accentuate the contesting of sports broadcasting rights, which are also 
expected to enhance the .commercialization of sport as new and existing players in the 
market will compete for lucrative content. 1~83 The document refers to trends elsewhere in 
the world for regulators· to opt for an approach that favours competition between 
broadcasters, with little or no exclusivity, but continues to state that '[i]n a developing 
country context, the disparities between the ri.ch and the poor necessitates the 
introduction of regulatory regimes that set aside certain sporting codes to be broadcast 
on both the subscription television and free-to-air broadcasting services.'1884 
592 The 2008 ICASA Discussion Paper highlights the fact that current sports 
broadcasting regulation in South Africa, which is limited to the listed events and the 
provisions of the Electronic Communications Act which provide for a prohibition on the 
acquisition ~f exclusive rights to sport of national importance by a subscription 
broadcasting service (which service, if it aquires exclusive rights in respect of such 
events must sub-license rights to the free-to-air services1885), has limitations because 'it 
is open to abuse by broadcasting service licensees with financial leverage to conclude 
long-term contracts, in th·e long run, limiting the competitiveness of the broadcasting 
sector.'1886 It is also noted that the European model of sports broadcasting regulation 
places emphasis on all sporting events, while the current South African model only 
relates to listed events. 
Authority opted to strike a balance between the needs of people from historically disadvantaged communities 
as well as those of the sport.' [Par 3.2. 7 - 3.2.8] 
1883 In par 3.1.4 - 3.1.5 
1884 At par 3.1.6 
1885 Such sub-licensing was provided for in the 2003 Position Paper, but was not made a regulatory requirement 
in terms of the Regulations 
1886 Par 4.2. 7 of the Discussion Paper 
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According to the Discussion Paper, the 2007 rights dispute in respect of the Premier 
Soccer League has highlighted the need for watertight regulation, specifically in respect 
of issues of sub-licensing and dispute resolution mechanisms. 1887 It appears that the 
current long-term contracts between Multichoice and rights owners has specifically been 
targeted in respect.of its potential foreclosure effect on the market, and it has been 
suggested that '[a] sub-licensing system should be seen as a prerequisite in the sport 
broadcasting rights market, especially with the increase in the number of broadcasting 
service licensees in the market, without leading to the over-regulation of the market.'1888 
It has also been observed that the absence of empowering legislative provisions to 
address the conditions that determine fair and transparent sub-licensing conditions poses 
a regulatory chal-lenge to ICASA. 1889 
The reader is referred to the discussion in par 482 et seq above regarding the provisions 
of Chapter 10 of the Electronic Communications Act, 2005 (which deal with competition 
matters in respect of broadcasing). 
593 In submissions following the publication of the Discussion Paper, the national free-
to-air broadcaster, the SABC, .has requested ICASA to extend the broadcaster's access to 
a number of sporting events wh.ich it views to be in the national interest. In oral 
representations to !CASA on 22 January 2009, the SABC argued for inclusion in the list of 
events of national interest of the ICC Twenty20 Cricket World Cup (which was watched 
by 880 000 viewers on one of the SABC's channels for the inaugural tournament in 
2007), as well as certain matches in the Absa Premiership (football) and Absa Currie Cup 
and Vodacom Super 14 (rugby union) tournaments. This request has been opposed by 
the Premier Soccer League (PSL), who have argued that they need to bring in more 
revenue from the sale of broadcasting rights to develop the game of football. 1890 
According to a submission by the South African Football Association (SAFA), the existing 
listing of national football team matches and the resultant exclusivify of the SABC's rights 
1887 Par 4.3.9 
1888 At par 4.3.10 of the Discussion Paper 
1889 Par 4.3.11 
189° From a report entitled 'PSL digs in heels over SABC's demands', Business Day, 23 January 2009 (available 
online at www.businessday.co.za - last accessed 23 January 2009) 
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in respect of such matches are seriously hampering the association's generation of 
revenues from international matches: SAFA claims that it costs between ZAR 6.5 million 
and ZAR 7 million to stage a national team match, and that the SABC pays ZAR 2 million 
to SAFA per match (and charges up to ZAR 950 000 per match for production costs). The 
SABC has apparently also been criticized by SAFA and Cricket SA for not honouring its 
contractual obligations in respect of sports broadcasting. Subscription services have 
apparently also criticized the SABC for failing to broadcast certain listed events as a 
result of its capacity limits. 1891 
594 Following the high profile sports broadcasting rights dispute in 2007 between the 
SABC and the PSL involving Premier Soccer League matches., the recent submissions to 
ICASA have also included calls by the local broadcasters for the regulatory body to play 
an active role in respect of the resolution of rights disputes through the provision of 
independent mediation and/or arbitration services. It is unknown to what extent if any 
the proposed new sports broadcasting regulations will empower ICASA in respect of 
dispute resolution concerning the acquisition of broadcasting rights, beyond noting that 
section 60(2) of the Electronic Communications Act requires ICASA to develop 
regulations regarding dispute resolution. ICASA has welcomed submissions by interested 
parties in respect of the preferred mechanism for dispute resolution (with reference to 
the possible avenues of regulatory or non-regulatory (ADR) dispute resolution). ICASA 
has (in the 2008 Discussion Paper) expressed a preference for employing its Complaints 
and Compliance Committee1892 to perform such dispute resolution functions, but is· 
awaiting comments from interested parties in this regard. Developments will be watched 
closely. 
1891 This apparently relates to five matches in the 2006-7 Pro20 Cricket Series for which rights were obtained by 
the SABC, but where only highlights were shown, as well as exclusive rights which were available for what 
translated to 180 days of broadcasting in respect of soccer matches, of which only 18 hours worth was 
screened (the !CASA Discussion Paper, September 2008 - par 3.2.10). 
1892 Established in terms of section 17A of the Independent Communications Authority of South Africa Act 13 of 
2000 
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595 Finally, it should also be noted that broadcasting rights disputes elsewhere may 
also affect South African sports broadcasters as well as the commercial interests of 
sporting codes which are involved in high profile and in-demand events from the 
perspective of broadcasters. Developments in world cricket, and specifically the 
phenomenally successful new Indian Premier League, have been discussed elsewhere in 
this chapter where relevant. For present purposes it is important to note a broadcasting 
rights dispute which is related to such developments and which appears to be brewing 
currently. The relevant issues have been summarized ~s follows in a report in the Sport 
and the Law Journal in early 2009: 1893 
'Major Asian TV operator threatens to sue ICC over Twenty20 (India) 
The world of cricket has recently been revolutionised by the new types of competition, in 
particular the Twenty20 limited overs events. It is obvious that the media rights to such 
competitions will command vast sums of money, and therefore almost automatically give 
rise to legal action. Thus in early August 2008, ESPNStar, the famous broadcaster, served 
notice on the International Cricket Council (ICC) (the world governing body in cricket) that 
it intended to prepare a lawsuit worth £42 million against it if the latter authorised the 
Champions Twenty20 league, which was being launched in the Indian city of Mumbai 
around that time. The Asian television operator is the ICC's broadcasting partner, and was 
committed to paying $1.2 billion for an eight-year deal to cover all ICC events. However, in 
an email _circulated to all 10 member boards, the ICC Chief Executive, Haroon Lorgat, 
expressed the ESPN-Star's opinion that the Twenty20 League was a threat to its interests. 
Although Cricket South Africa and Cricket Australia are its founder members and 
shareholders, the Champion league's equity arrangement is believed to be weighted so 
much in favour of the Indian cricket authority BCCI as to have effectively made it a 
subsidiary of the Indian Premier League. The IPL has a separate broadcasting partner in 
Sony, leaving ESPNStar holding a contract to broadcast tournaments in which there is 
diminishing public interest. More particularly, the widely acknowledged failure of the 2007 
World Cup, the expensive logistics of broadcasting the 2011 tournament from India, 
1893 Sport and the Law Journal Issue 2 Vol. 16 (March 2009), 'Sports Law Foreign Update' at 57 
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Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh have combined with the success of the Twenty20 
League to erode the value of ESPN-Star's contract with the ICC (The Guardian of 1/8/2008, 
p. 52). 
At a certain point, it became a certainty that the Champions League would not be included 
in the ICC's portfolio. When the [Champions League] proposal was made public in 
September 2007, the ICC President, Ray Mali, was a key figure in the announcement. 
However, when the revised competition was launched, there was no mention of the ICC. 
Indeed, Gerald Majola, the Chierf (sic) Executive of Cricket South Africa, informed a leading 
·British newspaper that the ICC was unable to declare the new League unofficial because, · 
unlike the rebel Indian Cricket league, it was a club competition organised by ICC member 
boards. It is this interpretation which, at the time of writing, was set to be tested in court. 
It was precisely this threatened litigation which caused the England and Wales C.ricket 
Board (ECB) to be cautious over commiting itself to the new competition - even though the 
invitation to send the Middlesex county club was ·accepted.' 
§7 Other forms of commercialization of sport and the comme_rci.a.1 
exploitation of marketable rights to sports events 
I Stadium Naming Rights 
596 The practice of selling naming rights to event venues is often packaged separately 
from team sponsorships, as they comprise different types of marketing platforms for a 
sponsor. Stadium naming rights have also taken hold in South Africa, with iconic stadia 
(such as the Newlands cricket stadium in Cape Town - currently Sahara Park Newlands, 
and the King's Park rugby stadium in Durban - currently the ABSA Stadium) having 
carried corporate sponsors' names since the 1990s. It was reported in June 2008 that the 
most lucrative such deal to date had been concluded (apparently following two years of 
negotiation) in respect of the historic Ellis Park rugby stadium in Johannesburg, which is 
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now known as the Coca Cola Park stadium. Coca Cola International had apparently paid 
ZAR 45 million for the naming rights in a four year deal. The deal does not include the 
2010 FIFA World Cup South Africa™, as FIFA has prohibited the use of corporate names 
for stadia during the event (corporate use will be interrupted during the Exclusive Use 
Period when FIFA regulations require a 'clean' stadium free of non-FIFA sponsor 
advertisin.g an9 marketing rights in terms of the agreement between FIFA and the South 
African bid committee, and corporate sponsors will not be compensated by FIFA in this 
regard). 1894 
597 The practice of granting publicity rights in respect of stadia is of course not new. 
The Supreme Court of Appeal was in 1999 faced with a dispute regarding the Ellis Park 
stadium in the matter of Golden Lions Rugby Union & Another v First National Bankof 
.. 
Southern Africa Ltd. 1895 In this matter, the rugby union had entered into a loan 
agreement with the respondent bank for purposes of financing the lease of the facility. 
The relevant provisions of the loan agreement, which related to the granting of certain 
publicity rights to the bank, provided as follows: 
'Clause 9: Promotion of the bank's association with the stadium: 
9.1 The [rugby union] agrees ... that the name of First National Bank of Southern Africa 
Limited shall be used and will feature prominently in all publicity campaigns and on all 
programmes, tickets or other documentation of whatsoever nature and in any way relating 
to the stadium or the sporting or other activities to be carried on therein as the bank 
deems appropriate and in such a manner as to convey the bank's close association with 
and support of the stadium and [the union]. 
9.2 [The union] shall ensure and procure that this promotion of the bank's name in close 
association with the stadium shall endure in perpetuity or until terminated by the bank; 
9.3 Furthermore, the parties shall procure that the area immediately above the TV screen 
in the stadium, and the entrances to and exits from the stadium as well as all other areas 
1894 See the report by Moholoa, R 'Blow to corporate stadium names', The Sowetan, 7 March 2007 
1895 1999 (3) SA 576 (A) . 
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of the stadium and the grounds, as the bank may reasonably determine shall, if not already 
contracted out,. all carry such free advertising of the bank's name as the bank might 
reasonably require, provided thatthe cost of erecting signs or billboards or advertising 
material shall be for the bank's account.' 
At issue was whether the rights that were granted were to operate in perpetuity as per 
the express wording of the agreement, while the Golden Lions union contended that such 
rights were not intended to survive the ceasing of a 'close association' between the 
'parties (which it claimed had occurred) . The court found in favour of the bank and 
issued a declaratory order in this regard. 
598 At the time of wiriting, the City of Cape Town is undergoing a tender process in 
respect of the newly buily (currently in progress) Green Point stadium, which is a 
designated venue for the 2010 FIFA World Cup ·south Africa™ (the 68 000-seater venue 
is set to host 9 matches during the tournament - the most of any venues for the event -
including a semi-final). The city on 15 January 2008 invited tenders for the operation of 
the stadium (it was hoped that appointment of the operator would be finalized by June 
2008, depending on negotiation) as well as the naming rights to the venue (which will be 
available prior to the date of construction handover - construction is scheduled to be 
completed in December 2009 - but will be interrupted during the Exclusive Use Period in 
respect of the FIFA World Cup, which period is to be adjusted in time with a matching 
compensatory period added to the end of the scheduled agreement date. 
II Internet domain name rights 
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599 Domain name disputes (in respect of the· .za domain names) 1896 relating to 'cyber-
piracy' or 'cyber-squatting' in South Africa are adjudicated in terms of the provisions of 
the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002, and the Alternate 
Dispute Resolution Regulations published in terms of the Act. 1897 The South African 
Institute for Intellectual Property Law (or SAIIPL) and the Arbitration Foundation of South 
Africa (AFSA) are currently the only two accredited dispute resolution service providers to 
the Department of Communications. 1898 
600 The ADR procedure~ entitles any party to lodge a complaint against a .za domain if 
the domain name 'takes unfair advantage of the rights' of that party or 'is contrary to law 
or likely to give offence to any class of persons'. Complaints can be filed against domain 
names which incorporate registered trade marks or even trade marks which are not 
registered but which are well known. Complaints can also be filed against domain names 
which amount to hate speech or racism or any other such names which are contrary to 
public policy. This procedure provides a cost efficient and expeditious resolution of 
domain name disputes, and disputes filed with SAIIPL are normally concluded within two 
to three months, using on-line procedures, whereas court litigation would take 
significantly longer (and be more costly). 1899 
601 The remedies available through the ADR procedure to complainants in domain 
disputes are limited to the adjudication panel refusing the dispute or transferring the 
domain name to the complainant. In the case of offensive registration disputes, the 
remedies are limited to refusing a dispute or deleting and prohibiting the domain name 
1896 The .za Domain Names Authority (' .za DNA' or 'Zadna') is the organisation that oversees all South African 
.za top level domain (TLDs) names on the internet. It was established as a section-21 company by section 59 of 
the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act, 2002. 2nd level domains are administered by other bodies 
(i.e. the .co.za domain is administered by UniForum) 
1897 The Regulations were published in Government Notice R11666 in Government Gazette No. 29405 of 
November 20, 2006 (effective 1 April 2007). For more on the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy 
as administered by the Arbitration and Mediation Centre of the World Intellectual property Organisation (WIPO), 
see the short article by Blackshaw, I 'Settling sports domain name disputes' in Sport and the Law Journal Issue 
2 Vol. 13 (2005) 6-9 
1898 See Van der Merwe, A & Snail, S 'A Brief Excursus on the South African Online Alternative Dispute 
Resolution' (available online at http://www.domaindisputes.co.za/news.php?newsID=30 - accessed 8 April 
2009), previously published in the February 2008 edition of Without Prejudice under the title "Alternative 
Dispute Resolution", Vol. 8 No.1 
1899 Information provided by the SAIIPL on its web site http://www.domaindisputes.co.za 
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from future registration. 1900 In both cases, the adjudicator may also refuse the dispute 
where it constitutes reverse domain name hijacking (an attempt to use the Regulations 
to prevent a registrant from using a domain name). 1901 
Apart from the above remedies in the ADR process, a matter may also be referred to the 
High Court, where a complainant can claim in terms of the normal common law remedies 
(including for passing off and unlawful competition) or for trade mark infringement in 
terms of the Trade Marks Act, 1993. 
602 Detailed discussion of South African domain name disputes and the applicable 
legal framework (more generally) is beyond the scope of this chapter, and the reader is 
referred to the relevant web site1902 and othe·r available texts. 1903 
603 In respect of sports-related matters, football world governing body FIFA has 
apparently been involved in some disputes regarding South African-registered domains. 
In 2006 the organisation was forced to admonish a local businessm·an who had registered 
five 2010 World Cup-related .co.za domains for an online travel and accommodation 
reservation, booking and information service. 1904 It appeared at the time that there was a 
lack of clarity regarding the legal position, as it appeared that FIFA's name and brand 
were not used, although FIFA's legal representatives were of the opinion that the 
domains were in contravention of the ambush marketing provisions of section lSA of the 
Merchandise Marks Act, in light of the 'protected event' status of the 2010 World Cup. 1905 
The eventual outcome of this dispute is unknown to the author at the time of writing. 
FIFA was again involved in a domain name dispute which was adjudicated by means of 
ADR by a SAIIPL adjudicator in November 2007. In the matter of Federation 
1900 Van der Merwe & Snail supra par 4, with reference to the adjudication in the matter of Gateway, Inc v High 
Traffic Pro-Life Domains (D2003 - 0261) 
1901 Ibid. Van der Merwe & Snail supra refer to the matter of Telkom SA (Ltd) and TDA Directory Operations 
(Pty) Ltd v The Internet Corporation (ZA2007 - 0005), which was the first ruling on 'reverse domain name 
hijacking' 
1902 http://wwwdomaindisputes.co.za 
1903 See also Pistorius, T., '.za Alternative Dispute Resolution Regulations: The First Few SAIIPL Decisions', 
2008(2) Journal of Information, Law & Technology (JILT), <http://go.warwick.ac.uk/iilt/2008 2/pistoriusl> 
[also available on the http://wwwdomaindisputes.co.za web site] 
1904 See the article by Glazier, D 'FIFA threatens World Cup domain owner', 5 October 2006 (available on the 
web site of http://www.itweb.co.za - accessed 8 April 2009) 
1905 See the discussion on ambush marketing in par 562 et seq above 
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Internationale de Football Association (Fifa) v. X Yin 1906 the domain name fifa.co.za was 
in dispute, and had to be adjudicated against the background of Regulation 4(1) (b), 1907 
which provides as follows: 
'A registration may ... be deemed to be abusive where circumstances indicate that the 
registrant is using, or has registered, the domain name in a way that leads people or-
businesses to believe that the domain name i,s registered to, operated or authorised by, or 
otherwise connected with the complainant.' 
The registrant's domain name was previously linked to a commercial website which bore 
many of FIFA's trade marks, including FIFA, 2010 FIFA WORLD CUP SOUTH AFRICA arid 
2010 WORLD CUP SOUTH AFRICA. The web site published discussion about FIFA and the 
2010 World Cup in South Africa, which, as the adjudicator held, lent 'an air to the site of 
(also) a general information source'. Hyper links on the site showed its underlying 
commercial nature, and there were also a number of references to computer games of a 
'WORLD CUP nature', including at least one such licensed game produced by Electronic 
Arts. A legend on the site claimed that the site was 'a private, non-affiliated website ... 
we hold no affiliations to FIFA, [the South African Football Association] or the 2010 [Local 
Organising Committee], or to any other related body, company or organisation.' 
The adjudicator came to the conclusion that the fifa.co.za domain was an abusive 
registration, as the registration was likely to take advantage of, or be detrimental to 
FIFA's rights (particularly as one of the funders of the 2010 World Cup tournament in 
South Africa). It was held that the issue in this regard is not the extent to which the 
registration will prejudice such licensing and franchising efforts, but the potential for it to 
do so. On the question of whether the domain name registration has the requisite quality 
of 'unfairness', it was held that the same considerations that the Constitutional Court 
1906 (ZA2007-0007) - report available on the internet as 
http://www.do ma i ndisputes.co.za/ down loads/decisions/ZA2007-0007. pdf 
1907 Alternate Dispute Resolution Regulations, published in terms of the Electronic Communications and 
Transactions Act, 25 of 2002, Government Notice R11666 in Government Gazette No. 29405 of November 20, 
2006 
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applied in Laugh It Off Promotions CC v. SAB International (Finance) BV1908 would not 
necessarily apply to domain names. 1909 The adjudicator was of the opinion that given the 
infinite proportions of access to the web site in question, and the possibilities of its use 
(and abuse), a likelihood of substantial economic detriment cannot be the sole standard 
for assessing unfairness in the context of domain name disputes. Evidence had also been 
put forward of an intention on the part of the registrant to continue to avail himself of the 
benefit and advantage of the use of the mark 'FIFA' in a domain name; which was 
deemed to be unfair. Accordingly, while the website would only have an insubstantial 
consequence for FIFA, the domain name fifa.co.za was judged to be an abusive 
registration .1910 
1908 2006 (1) SA 144 (CC) 
1909 The court in the Laugh it Off case had held as follows regarding alleged tarnishment of a trade mark: 
'The section does not limit use that takes fair advantage of the mark or that does not threaten substantial harm 
to the repute of the mark, or indeed that may lead to harm but in a fair manner. What is fair will have to be 
assessed case by case with due regard to the factual matrix and other context of the case.' (at par. 49 of the 
judgment) 
191° From the discussion of this matter in Pistorius, T. '.za Alternative Dispute Resolution Regulations: The First 
Few SAIIPL Decisions', 2008(2) Journal of Information, Law & Technology (JILT), 
<http://qo.warwick.ac.uk/jilt/2008 2/pistoriusl> [also available on the http://wwwdomaindisputes.co.za web 
site] 
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CONCLUSION 
. . 
604 As I have tried to show in this chapter, various aspects of the South African law· 
relating to sport have developed in the recent past in line with similar developments in 
other jurisdictions. However, South African sports law has to a significant extent 
developed in an isolated manner, due to a variety of reasons (connected inter a/ia with 
the country's segregated past and politically imposed isolation from international sport in 
the'latter part of the last century). 
605 . One of the main aspects of South African sport which promises to contribute to 
the development of a uniquely nuanced system of regulation and governance as well as 
the application of sports-related laws, is the issue of race-based sports transformation 
(which, as sections of this chapter have shown, continues to run like a golden thread 
through all aspects of the private governance and state regulation of South African sport 
post 1994 and to date). As discussed, such policies and practices (and, more recently, 
prescriptive legislative provisions) affect not only the individual rights of sports 
participants (especially in the context bf the professional sports industry), but there are 
also indications of potential future challenges to the authority and powers of the state in 
regulating sport and specifically of intervening in the authority of the organizations 
involved in the private governance of sport along such lines. Such developments, 
especially in respect of recent, controversial, legislative provisions as contained in the 
National Sport and Recreation Amendment Act, 2007., and the widespread perception of 
the politicization of sport, promise to lead to future legal challenges which may constitute 
landmark jurisprudence in international sports law in light of the peculiarity of these 
issues as experienced in the South African context. 
606 While the point was made in the introductory section of this chapter that 
developments in respect of the interweaving of laws with sport have been recent in South 
Africa (specifically as a result of the international boycott of apartheid sport under the old 
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dispensation, as well as the recent emergence of professionalism and commercialization 
in some of the major South African professional sports), it is expected that South Africa 
is poised to play a more significant role in the future development of the law relating to 
sport than one might otherwise expect in light of the country's rather isolated 
geographical.position vis a vis other important jurisdictions (e.g. Europe). This is due 
mainly to the major professional sports' important role in respect of international 
competition in such codes. 
Mention was also made ofthe important role of developments in the South African 
ju_risdiction·for other·systems on the African continent; in football, specifically, 
developments ih South African law relating to e.g. the free movement of players· and 
treatmenrof issues·such ·as th~ often-critieized apparent 'slave trade' of young players to 
European clubs) promise to. serve as a basis for'future developments in protecting the 
rights of individuals elsewhere on the continent. 
While other systems, especially in respect of the private governance of sport, have been 
characterized by the continued debate over and interaction between the twin pillars of 
autonomy and specificity of sport, it is expected that future developments (and the 
increased main~streaming of legal issues in the sporting context) will also raise the 
importance of these issues on the South African l:egal landscape. 
607 Recent high profile international sports events have focused attention on the role 
of international sports governing bodies in the commercial exploitation of sporting codes, 
and the significant risks for the public and fans related to the commercialization of sport. 
The ICC Cricket World Cup (West Indies) 2007 is.a good example: The tournament was 
marked, from the outset, by poor attendance reportedly attributable to excessive ticket 
pricing. The run-up to the event was also characterized by disputes between the ICC and 
team sponsors; while it appears that disputes regarding player sponsors (which 
characterized the 1999 event) were largely avoided, teams such as Australia were forced 
to jettison existing sponsors who would potentially conflict with the Global Cricket 
Corporation's own event sponsors. 
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The 2007 IRB Rugby World Cup also generated criticism regarding restrictions on press 
freedoms imposed by the governing body. It was reported in April 2007 that the IRB had 
imposed restrictions on the international media regarding the extent of coverage of the 
event. 1911 Such restrictions incurred the criticism of the World Press Freed9m Association, 
and raised questions regarding the public's interest in events of this· nature and the rights 
of supporters and others of access to events and information relating to teams and 
matches. 
South Africa's preparations for the 2010 FIFA World Cup event have· also been touched 
by similar concerns. In 2005 it was reported that the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee 
on Sport and Recreation had taken FIFA to task about apparent excessive price-fixing of 
tickets for the event. Various parties had criticized FIFA's alleged rigid stance on ticket-
pricing, which, it was claimed, was contrary to the organisers' objective to make the 
event accessible to the masses. Similarly, proposed municipal by-laws for some of the 
2010 host cities (notably Cape Town) have also come under fire from various quarters for 
their (what is argued to be) excessive curtailment of the rights of traders and business 
entities (especially the large numbers of informal street traders from the previously 
disadvantaged groups). There have also been calls for constitutional-challenge to the 
existing ambush marketing legislation, in light of its potential impact on the rights and 
commercial interests of individuals and business undertakings. 
608 It seems that the increased commercial nature of the activities of sports 
organisations in the modern era has exposed the inherent contradictions in their 
governance. The very core function of governing bodies has traditionally been viewed to 
be the trusteeship of a public interest in the sport; ironically, the development of 
commercial exploitation of the substantial entertainment value of sports (an important 
element of the public interest in such activity) has served to spawn an ever-widening 
chasm between the governing bodies and teams as commercial enterprises and their 
1911 E.g by limiting the number of photographs that journalists would be allowed to take during a match, and by 
the imposition of rather strenuous conditions for the use of photographs in newspapers in reportage of the 
event 
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multi-millionaire players, on the one hand, and the fans and supporters, on the other 
hand. 1912 Commercialisation, which has largely been a product of the activities of these 
same governing bodies, appears to be making a mockery of this 'sacred trust'. 1913 And 
big money has also contributed significantly to the increased scrutiny of the activities of 
such organisations by the media and others; allegations of greed and corruption have 
been levelled at those at the very top in the largest and most elite of these bodies. 1914 
A prime reason for the emerging conflicts and the problems associated therewith is the 
monopolistic nature of sports governing bodies. 1915 Developments in the law relating to 
competition, coupled with developments in the actual nature and socio-economic 
characteristics of sport, have therefore also occasioned a shift in the balance between the 
traditional virtues of governing bodies (we have seen that the monopolistic nature of the 
'FIFA model' of sports governance is one of its prime components) and their continued 
legitimacy in terms of regulatory functions and powers. Interestingly, the increased 
commercial role and activities of sports governing bodies have also exposed them to 
increased scrutiny from the law. In the European Union, for example, regulatory 
functions that were traditionally viewed as outside the scope of the lawmakers have now 
started to fall within the purview of legal regulation .1916 And, as judgments such as 
Bosman have shown, such intervention may have quite far-reaching consequences. 1917 
1912 See, in general, Tom Mortimer & Ian Pearl 'The Effectiveness of the Corporate Form as a Regulatory Tool in 
European Sport: Real or Illusory?' in Caiger & Gardiner Professional Sport in the EU at 217 et seq; Adrian Budd 
'Sport and Capitalism' in Levermore and Budd (eds.) Sport and International Relations: An Emerging 
Relationship Routledge, London and New York 2004 at 36. 
1913 It is interesting to note what (it is submitted) may amount to a rather blatant recent example of the way in 
which the pursuit of profit has assumed a dominant role over the promotion of sport for the greater good: The 
South African organisers of the 2010 FIFA World Cup have apparently experienced difficulty in negotiations with 
FIFA regarding ticket prices for the event. While the organisers (and other forums across Africa) have insisted 
that tickets should be affordable to the masses, FIFA have apparently pegged the prices, insisting on the 
maximisation of profits in order to finance their own activities for the four years before the next World Cup. 
Apparently, FIFA have emphasised the fact that the event is a FIFA event and that South Africa has little 
bargaining power in this respect - even to the point of stating that the organisation could take away the World 
Cup if they chose (from a briefing to the parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Sport and Recreation, Cape 
Town, 14 June 2005). 
1914 Compare the latest in a number of critical exposes, British investigative journalist Andrew Jennings's Foul! 
The Secret World of FIFA: Bribes, Vote Rigging and Ticket Scandals, Harper Sport, London, 2006. 
1915 Gardiner et al. Sports Law 3rd edition, Cavendish Publishing Ltd 2001, at 179. 
1916 See Simon Boyes 'Globalisation, Europe and the Re-regulation of Sport', in Caiger & Gardiner Professional 
Sport in the EU at 73. In respect of EC competition law's stance towards 'sporting' vs. 'economic' competition, 
and the role for legal intervention in this regard, see Klaus Vieweg 'The Legal Autonomy of Sport Organisations 
and the Restrictions of European Law', in Caiger & Gardiner Professional Sport in the EU at 100 et seq. 
1917 ASBL Union Royale Beige des Societes de Football Association & Others v Jean-Marc Bosman [1996] CMLR 
645 ECJ. See the discussion of the judgment in Le Roux 'Under Starter's Orders: Law, Labour Law and Sport' 
(2002) 23 Industrial Law Journal 1195 at 1201 et seq. 
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This is indeed also a major challenge for international sports governing bodies in the 
modern era of world sport. 
609 It is submitted that these issues are especially relevant in the South African 
sporting context. As a developing nation and, more importantly, a key developmental 
player on the African continent, it is expected that such conflicts of interest between the 
commercial aspirations of (international) sports governing bodies and the needs of the 
masses of sports fans will continue to provide fertile soil for disputes. This is especially 
likely in light of the South African government's apparently active policy of intervention in 
private sporting matters, as evidenced most recently by the 2007 amendments to the 
National Sport and Recreation Act as discussed in this chapter. It is not fanciful to 
speculate.that the .South African government might very actively· intervene in sport in 
future, in the.event that commercial-decisions by those governing a sporting code are 
viewed to impinge.on the rights of individuals and groups of sports supporters to have 
access to affordable and accessible entertainment provided by high-profile sporting 
events. A prime example, which has been referred to, is the current process of 
restructuring of sports broadcasting rights regulation to prevent anti-competitive conduct 
and to place restrictions on the acquisition of exclusive rights by subscription 
broadcasters .. Of course, where such expected government intervention (especially in 
furtherance of the race-based transformation policies in sport, which have been 
discussed) impacts on the commercial activities of international federations or other 
external stakeholders, there is a likelihood of significant disputes that may serv_e to 
isolate South Africa on the global sporting stage. 
610 Finally, in respect of the commercial side of sport, it is expected that the current 
worldwide economic crisis which was caused by 2008's 'credit crunch' will, potentially, 
affect sport as it will most other industries. Commercialization of the globalized nature of 
modern international competitions and leagues is a double-edged sword; while the 
substantial financial injections in other jurisdictions have also fueled investment in South 
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African sport, it is expected that sponsorship investment and other sources of revenue in 
professional sport may show declining trends in the foreseeable future. 
611 In the short term, the major specific future impetus for development of sports 
law-related issues and responses by the legislature and the judiciary in this regard is 
expected to be the hosting by South Africa of the world's biggest sporting event, FIFA's 
football World Cup in 2010. It is expected that developments such as the ever-
increasingly ingenious methods of ambush marketing and the often opportunistic (and 
sometimes·underhanded) commercial practices of sponsors or others may serve to 
provide an opportunity for South African courts to consider legal issues which to date 
may not have been prioritized, including the protection of athletes' image rights. Apart 
from the 2010 tournament, the participation and stature of South African players and 
teams on the international stage in the other two major South African professional 
sports, rugby union and cricket, promise to focus international attention on the treatment 
of legal _issues regarding -such players (e.g. in respect of freedom of movement, player 
restrictions, restraint of trade and competition law issues) within the South African 
jurisdiction and elsewhere (e.g.·in the European Union). This is especially true also in 
respect of cricket, in light of South Africa's hosting of the DFL Indian Premier League 
tournament in April and May 2009. 
612 While this chapter has highlighted certain areas of South African law which display 
the potential to provide a more flexible approach fo the resolution of sports disputes than 
encountered elsewhere (e.g. the general Aquilian action in the law of delict, and its 
flexible application in a number of instances where the more limited, closed system of 
torts employed in common law systems appears less than perfect), other areas of the law 
(e.g. judicial conservatism regarding the issue of judicial review of the decisions and 
regulatory conduct of sports governing bodies, and the surprisingly slow development of 
meaningful protection of athletes' image rights) may potentially serve to keep South 
African sports law on a path of catching up to developments elsewhere. However, it is 
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hoped that the Constitution and, specifically, its progressive Bill of Rights, will promise to 
provide the platform for significant judicial innovation in the area of sports-related legal 
issues. 
613 Similarities between the legal systems of South Africa and of other countries 
which are. involved in the three major professional sports (especially the UK and Australia 
and, possibly increasingly, India) promise to underline the important potential role of the 
South African legal system in providing jurisprudence and precedent in resolving the 
potential disputes that are sure to arise along with the increased globalization and 
commercialization of such sporting codes in the 21st century context. In this regard, it is 
predicted that one very significant aspect of South African law -. namely its ever-growing 
Bill of Rights jurisprudence and (what has on occasion been referred to as) the 
'constitutional colonization' of the various disciplines of the common law - may serve to 
shape sports law in South Africa as a relative hotbed for fut_ure developments in certain 
areas and respects that might serve to lead developments elsewhere. For example, 
reference was made in the section on sport and employment to recent case law regarding 
the availability of the order for specific performance and/or a 'negative injunction' against 
professional athletes in cases of contract-jumping. Developments in this regard may 
serve to inform the treatment of the issue in other jurisdictions (such as English law, in 
which the courts have, traditionally, been more conservative in this regard). 
614 Finally, the impact of a changing world order might also be felt, on a more 
practical level, in South African sport. Issues such as threats to the security of major 
sporting events and participants in the post 9/11 era might serve to counteract the 
recent trends in the increased expansion of commercially driven professional sports 
competitions and leagues. The abhorrent attack on the Sri Lankan national cricket team 
in Lahore on 3 March 2009, which left eight people d.ead and a n·umber of cricketers 
wounded, has again focused the world's attention on international terrorism and, more 
-specifically, the apparent potential of high profile sport to provide an unfortunate target 
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J 
for unscrupulous opportunists with a political or other agenda. One can only hope that 
upcoming events such as the 2009 Confederations Cup, the 2010 FIFA World Cup and 
the 2012 London Olympics will be remembered in years to come for the sporting prowess 
of participants and the spirit in which sport is played, rather than for cowardly attacks on 
those who love sport and practice it at the highest level. 
It is expected that a significant concern for the organizers of major events will in future 
be the safety and security of participants, officials and spectators (as has already been 
evident in respect of the impact of recent events on the international cricket tour 
programme). Sports lawyers would be advised to take a more active interest in the legal 
aspects and implications in this regard. 
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